How do disparate people



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How do disparate people

  • How do disparate people

  • come together and agree

  • on rules and decisions

  • in order to manage and

  • sustain resources.?



European commons and the Enclosure Movements (1200-1900)

  • European commons and the Enclosure Movements (1200-1900)

  • Shared (British) university dining halls

  • New England town commons (US)

  • Indigenous shared natural resources (forest, grazing and agricultural lands fisheries, etc.)

  • Global Commons (outer space, atmosphere, high seas, Antarctica)

  • New Commons (Internet and knowledge commons, genetic resources, urban commons, etc.)



  • Group boundaries clearly defined

  • Rules governing the use of collective goods are well matched to local needs and conditions

  • Most individuals affected by these rules can participate in modifying the rules

  • The right of community members to devise their own rules is respected by external authorities

  • Monitoring mechanisms by community

  • Graduated sanctions



1950s – Work of Gordon, Scott, and Vincent Ostrom

  • 1950s – Work of Gordon, Scott, and Vincent Ostrom

  • 1968 – Hardin’s “Tragedy of the Commons”

  • 1977— Ostrom and Ostrom

  • 1985— Conference on Common Property Resource Management

  • 1989 – formation of International Association for the Study of Common Property (IASCP) (E. Ostrom first president)

  • 1990—Publication of Ostrom’s seminal work: Governing the Commons

  • 1995 – IASCP conference “Reinventing the Commons” in Norway

  • 2006—Association name change to International Association for the Study of the Commons (IASC) (See Hess and Meinzen-Dick 2006)

  • 2009—Elinor Ostrom wins Nobel Prize in Economics “for her work on economic governance, especially the commons”



Resources shared by a

  • Resources shared by a

  • group of people

  • Vulnerable to enclosure,

  • degradation, and social

  • dilemmas

  • They can be:

  • small (the family refrigerator)

  • community-level (sidewalks, playgrounds, libraries)

  • large, at the international and global levels (deep-sea oceans, the atmosphere, the Internet, and scientific knowledge)



Self-governing

  • Self-governing

  • Participatory

  • Social dilemmas

  • Social capital—trust—reciprocity

  • Communication & dialogue

  • Locally-designed rules

  • Governance of shared resources is hard work

  • Community members are “artisans” who “craft” appropriate institutions



Focus on evolution or building new types of commons

  • Focus on evolution or building new types of commons

  • No pre-existing rules and norms

  • Increasingly complex

  • Size, communities, incentives often unknown

  • Extremely dynamic



Reactions to threats of enclosure

  • Reactions to threats of enclosure

  • In the process of evolving

  • No clear rules

  • Heterogeneous community

  • New forms of collaboration and collective action

  • We don’t know much about them

  • We know less about global commons



“Complexity refers to attributes of natural resources, ecological systems, and socioeconomic and political systems that affect the ability of resource users to recognize how their actions affect the condition of the resource. Complexity limits the ability of individuals to identify the full set of possible outcomes or assign probabilities to particular outcomes of specific actions. Difficult to discern cause-effect relationships. Studies that grapple with complexity often generate new hypotheses about appropriate collective action. (Poteete, Janssen, Ostrom. 2010)

  • “Complexity refers to attributes of natural resources, ecological systems, and socioeconomic and political systems that affect the ability of resource users to recognize how their actions affect the condition of the resource. Complexity limits the ability of individuals to identify the full set of possible outcomes or assign probabilities to particular outcomes of specific actions. Difficult to discern cause-effect relationships. Studies that grapple with complexity often generate new hypotheses about appropriate collective action. (Poteete, Janssen, Ostrom. 2010)



  • New Technologies

  • New Laws

  • New Communities

  • Sudden change

  • (disasters)



Dramatic rise of

  • Dramatic rise of

  • Intellectual property rights (i.e. patenting of everything, including life)

    • New enclosure movement—Boyle
    • New colonization -- Shiva
  • Privately owned “public” resources (such as water systems & groundwater basins, highways)

  • Globalization and Corporate domination (Of the 100 largest economies in the world, 51 are global corporations; only 49 are countries); also the corporatization of Higher Education



Forests and Fisheries

  • Forests and Fisheries

  • Rivalrous

  • Depletable

  • Open Access -- Bad

  • Rapid change

  • Threat of Overuse

  • (tragedy of the commons)









Lack of preservation

  • Lack of preservation

  • New IPR Legislation

  • New technologies

  • Resource scarcity through growing competition

  • Overpatenting

  • Withdrawal

  • Censure

  • Destruction

  • Loss

  • Neglect



Tendency to privatize

  • Tendency to privatize

  • Critical need to better understand complex adaptive systems

  • Need to devise effective governance systems : Alternative ways of governing often not recognized. Global and national environmental policy frequently ignores community-based governance and traditional tools, such as informal communication and sanctioning

  • Many only know about the commons from the tragic perspective.

  • Concerted collective action is powerful

  • *



Collective action

  • Collective action

  • Communication and dialogue

  • Information

  • Social capital, trust and reciprocity

  • Effective rules

  • Participation

  • Monitoring and sanctioning



Local matters

  • Local matters

  • Rules matter

  • No one rules applies to all

  • Participation counts

  • Communication is essential

  • Ostrom’s design principles



Trust and Reciprocity are very key to explaining levels of cooperation

  • Trust and Reciprocity are very key to explaining levels of cooperation

  • Social Dilemmas such as overharvesting—communication and common understandings are essential for people to cooperate

  • Incentives for authors and scientists

  • Need robust and flexible institutional infrastructures



Argyres, Nicholas S., and Julia Porter Liebeskind 1998. “Privatizing the Intellectual Commons: Universities and the Commercialization of Biotechnology.” Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization 35

  • Argyres, Nicholas S., and Julia Porter Liebeskind 1998. “Privatizing the Intellectual Commons: Universities and the Commercialization of Biotechnology.” Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization 35

  • Benkler, Y. 2010. “Law, Policy, and Cooperation.” pp. 299-334, in Balleisen, E.J. and D. A. Moss, eds. Government and Markets: Toward a New Theory of Regulation. Cambridge University Press.

  • Benkler, Yochai. 2006. The Wealth of Networks: How Social Production Transforms Markets and Freedom. New Haven: Yale University Press.

  • Berkes, F. J. Colding, C. Folke, Eds., 2003. Navigating Social-Ecological Systems: Building Resilience for Complexity and Change .Cambridge UP.

  • Blue Ribbon Task Force. 2010. Sustainable Digital Preservation and Access. http://brtf.sdsc.edu/

  • Designing the Microbial Research Commons: An International Symposium (website). 8-9 Oct. 2009. National Academy of Sciences. http://sites.nationalacademies.org/PGA/brdi/PGA_050859

  • Dietz, Thomas, Elinor Ostrom, and Paul C. Stern 2003. “The Struggle to Govern the Commons.” Science 302(5652):1907-1912.

  • Digital Library of the Commons (website) http://dlc.dlib.indiana.edu/dlc

  • Gordon, H. Scott. 1954. “The Economic Theory of a Common-Property Resource: The Fishery.” Journal of Political Economy 62:124-142

  • Gray, Eve. 2010. Access to Africa’s Knowledge: Publishing Development Research and Measuring Value. African Journal of Information and Communication vol. 10 http://link.wits.ac.za/journal/AJIC10-Gray.pdf

  • Gunderson, Lance H., and C. S. Holling, eds. 2001. Panarchy: Understanding Transformations in Human and Natural Systems. Washington, DC: Island.

  • Hardin, Garrett. 1968. “The Tragedy of the Commons.” Science 162:1243-1248. http://www.garretthardinsociety.org/articles/art_tragedy_of_the_commons.html



Heller, Michael A. 1998. “The Tragedy of the Anticommons: Property in the Transition from Marx to Markets.” Harvard Law Review 111(3):622-688. http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=57627

  • Heller, Michael A. 1998. “The Tragedy of the Anticommons: Property in the Transition from Marx to Markets.” Harvard Law Review 111(3):622-688. http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=57627

  • Hess, Charlotte. 2008. The Comprehensive Bibliography of the Commons. http://dlc.dlib.indiana.edu/cpr/index.php

  • Hess, Charlotte, and Elinor Ostrom, eds. 2007. Understanding Knowledge as a Commons: From Theory to Practice. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.

  • Hess, Charlotte, and Ruth Meinzen-Dick 2006. “The Name Change; or, What Happened to the ‘P’?” The Commons Digest 2:1-4. http://www.iascp.org/E-CPR/cd02.pdf

  • International Association for the Study of the Commons (new website---Mexico) http://www.iascp.org/

  • International Association for the Study of the Commons (old website– Indiana U.) www.indiana.edu/~iascp/

  • Kristof, Nicholas. 2010.Death by Gadget. New York Times (June 26) http://www.nytimes.com/2010/06/27/opinion/27kristof.html

  • Lynch, Clifford A. 1994. “Rethinking the Integrity of the Scholarly Record in the Networked Information Age.” Educom Review 29(2). http://www.educause.edu/Resources/RethinkingtheIntegrityoftheSch/158190

  • Linebaugh, Peter . 2008. The Magna Carta Manifesto: Liberties and Commons for All. Berkeley: University of California Press.

  • Madison, M., B. Frischmann, and K. Strandburg. 2010. “Constructing Commons in the Cultural Environment.” Cornell Law Review, Vol. 95(4). http://www.lawschool.cornell.edu/research/cornell-law-review/Volume-95-Number-4.cfm

  • Maskus, Keith, and Jerome H. Reichman, eds. 2005. International Public Goods and Transfer of Technology Under a Globalized Intellectual Property Regime. Cambridge University Press.



  • National Research Council, ed. 1986. Proceedings of the Conference on Common Property Resource Management, April 21-26, 1985. Washington, DC: National Academy Press.

  • Ostrom, Elinor. 1965. “Public Entrepreneurship: A Case Study in Ground Water Basin Management.” (Ph.D. Dissertation, University of California-Los Angeles, 1965). http://dlc.dlib.indiana.edu/dlc/handle/10535/3581

  • Ostrom, Elinor. 1990. Governing the Commons: The Evolution of Institutions for Collective Action. New York: Cambridge University Press. (The Political Economy of Institutions and Decisions).

  • Ostrom, Elinor. 2010. “The Institutional Analysis and Development Framework and the Commons.” Cornell Law Review. 95:807-816. http://dlc.dlib.indiana.edu/dlc/handle/10535/5770

  • Ostrom, Vincent. 1950. “Government and Water: A Study of the Influence of Water Upon Governmental Institutions and Practices in the Development of Los Angeles.” (Ph.D. Dissertation, University of California-Los Angeles, 1950). http://dlc.dlib.indiana.edu/dlc/handle/10535/3608

  • Ostrom, Vincent, and Elinor Ostrom 1977. “Public Goods and Public Choices.” In Alternatives for Delivering Public Services; Toward Improved Performance. E. S. Savas, ed. Boulder, CO: Westview.

  • Poteete, A. Janssen, M. Ostrom, E. 2010. Working Together: Collective Action, The Commons, and Multiple Methods in Practice. Princeton University Press.

  • Resilience Alliance (website) http://www.resalliance.org/1.php

  • Scott, Anthony D. 1955. “The Fishery: The Objectives of Sole Ownership.” Journal of Political Economy 65:116-124.

  • Shiva, Vandana. 1997. Biopiracy: The Plunder of Nature and Knowledge. Boston: South End Press.

  • Waters, Donald J. 2007. “Preserving the Knowledge Commons.” In Understanding Knowledge as a Commons: From Theory to Practice. C. Hess and E. Ostrom, eds. Cambridge, Massachusetts: MIT Press.





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