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How do disparate people
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tarix | 12.08.2018 | ölçüsü | 1,78 Mb. | | #62447 |
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How do disparate people come together and agree on rules and decisions in order to manage and sustain resources.?
European commons and the Enclosure Movements (1200-1900) European commons and the Enclosure Movements (1200-1900) Shared (British) university dining halls New England town commons (US) Indigenous shared natural resources (forest, grazing and agricultural lands fisheries, etc.) Global Commons (outer space, atmosphere, high seas, Antarctica) New Commons (Internet and knowledge commons, genetic resources, urban commons, etc.)
Group boundaries clearly defined Rules governing the use of collective goods are well matched to local needs and conditions Most individuals affected by these rules can participate in modifying the rules The right of community members to devise their own rules is respected by external authorities Monitoring mechanisms by community Graduated sanctions
1950s – Work of Gordon, Scott, and Vincent Ostrom 1950s – Work of Gordon, Scott, and Vincent Ostrom 1968 – Hardin’s “Tragedy of the Commons” 1977— Ostrom and Ostrom 1985— Conference on Common Property Resource Management 1989 – formation of International Association for the Study of Common Property (IASCP) (E. Ostrom first president) 1990—Publication of Ostrom’s seminal work: Governing the Commons 1995 – IASCP conference “Reinventing the Commons” in Norway 2006—Association name change to International Association for the Study of the Commons (IASC) (See Hess and Meinzen-Dick 2006) 2009—Elinor Ostrom wins Nobel Prize in Economics “for her work on economic governance, especially the commons”
Resources shared by a Resources shared by a group of people Vulnerable to enclosure, degradation, and social dilemmas They can be: small (the family refrigerator) community-level (sidewalks, playgrounds, libraries) large, at the international and global levels (deep-sea oceans, the atmosphere, the Internet, and scientific knowledge)
Self-governing Self-governing Participatory Social dilemmas Social capital—trust—reciprocity Communication & dialogue Locally-designed rules Community members are “artisans” who “craft” appropriate institutions
Focus on evolution or building new types of commons Focus on evolution or building new types of commons No pre-existing rules and norms Increasingly complex Size, communities, incentives often unknown Extremely dynamic
Reactions to threats of enclosure Reactions to threats of enclosure In the process of evolving No clear rules Heterogeneous community New forms of collaboration and collective action We don’t know much about them
“Complexity refers to attributes of natural resources, ecological systems, and socioeconomic and political systems that affect the ability of resource users to recognize how their actions affect the condition of the resource. Complexity limits the ability of individuals to identify the full set of possible outcomes or assign probabilities to particular outcomes of specific actions. Difficult to discern cause-effect relationships. Studies that grapple with complexity often generate new hypotheses about appropriate collective action. (Poteete, Janssen, Ostrom. 2010) “Complexity refers to attributes of natural resources, ecological systems, and socioeconomic and political systems that affect the ability of resource users to recognize how their actions affect the condition of the resource. Complexity limits the ability of individuals to identify the full set of possible outcomes or assign probabilities to particular outcomes of specific actions. Difficult to discern cause-effect relationships. Studies that grapple with complexity often generate new hypotheses about appropriate collective action. (Poteete, Janssen, Ostrom. 2010)
New Technologies New Laws New Communities Sudden change (disasters)
Dramatic rise of Dramatic rise of Intellectual property rights (i.e. patenting of everything, including life) - New enclosure movement—Boyle
- New colonization -- Shiva
Privately owned “public” resources (such as water systems & groundwater basins, highways) Globalization and Corporate domination (Of the 100 largest economies in the world, 51 are global corporations; only 49 are countries); also the corporatization of Higher Education
Forests and Fisheries Forests and Fisheries Rivalrous Depletable Open Access -- Bad Rapid change Threat of Overuse (tragedy of the commons)
Lack of preservation Lack of preservation New IPR Legislation New technologies Resource scarcity through growing competition Overpatenting Withdrawal Censure Destruction Loss Neglect
Tendency to privatize Tendency to privatize Need to devise effective governance systems : Alternative ways of governing often not recognized. Global and national environmental policy frequently ignores community-based governance and traditional tools, such as informal communication and sanctioning Many only know about the commons from the tragic perspective. Concerted collective action is powerful *
Collective action Collective action Communication and dialogue Information Social capital, trust and reciprocity Effective rules Participation Monitoring and sanctioning
Local matters Local matters Rules matter No one rules applies to all Participation counts Communication is essential Ostrom’s design principles
Trust and Reciprocity are very key to explaining levels of cooperation Trust and Reciprocity are very key to explaining levels of cooperation Social Dilemmas such as overharvesting—communication and common understandings are essential for people to cooperate Need robust and flexible institutional infrastructures
Argyres, Nicholas S., and Julia Porter Liebeskind 1998. “Privatizing the Intellectual Commons: Universities and the Commercialization of Biotechnology.” Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization 35 Argyres, Nicholas S., and Julia Porter Liebeskind 1998. “Privatizing the Intellectual Commons: Universities and the Commercialization of Biotechnology.” Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization 35 Benkler, Y. 2010. “Law, Policy, and Cooperation.” pp. 299-334, in Balleisen, E.J. and D. A. Moss, eds. Government and Markets: Toward a New Theory of Regulation. Cambridge University Press. Benkler, Yochai. 2006. The Wealth of Networks: How Social Production Transforms Markets and Freedom. New Haven: Yale University Press. Berkes, F. J. Colding, C. Folke, Eds., 2003. Navigating Social-Ecological Systems: Building Resilience for Complexity and Change .Cambridge UP. Blue Ribbon Task Force. 2010. Sustainable Digital Preservation and Access. http://brtf.sdsc.edu/ Designing the Microbial Research Commons: An International Symposium (website). 8-9 Oct. 2009. National Academy of Sciences. http://sites.nationalacademies.org/PGA/brdi/PGA_050859 Dietz, Thomas, Elinor Ostrom, and Paul C. Stern 2003. “The Struggle to Govern the Commons.” Science 302(5652):1907-1912.
Digital Library of the Commons (website) http://dlc.dlib.indiana.edu/dlc Gordon, H. Scott. 1954. “The Economic Theory of a Common-Property Resource: The Fishery.” Journal of Political Economy 62:124-142 Gray, Eve. 2010. Access to Africa’s Knowledge: Publishing Development Research and Measuring Value. African Journal of Information and Communication vol. 10 http://link.wits.ac.za/journal/AJIC10-Gray.pdf Gunderson, Lance H., and C. S. Holling, eds. 2001. Panarchy: Understanding Transformations in Human and Natural Systems. Washington, DC: Island. Hardin, Garrett. 1968. “The Tragedy of the Commons.” Science 162:1243-1248. http://www.garretthardinsociety.org/articles/art_tragedy_of_the_commons.html
Heller, Michael A. 1998. “The Tragedy of the Anticommons: Property in the Transition from Marx to Markets.” Harvard Law Review 111(3):622-688. http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=57627 Heller, Michael A. 1998. “The Tragedy of the Anticommons: Property in the Transition from Marx to Markets.” Harvard Law Review 111(3):622-688. http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=57627
Hess, Charlotte. 2008. The Comprehensive Bibliography of the Commons. http://dlc.dlib.indiana.edu/cpr/index.php Hess, Charlotte, and Elinor Ostrom, eds. 2007. Understanding Knowledge as a Commons: From Theory to Practice. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
Hess, Charlotte, and Ruth Meinzen-Dick 2006. “The Name Change; or, What Happened to the ‘P’?” The Commons Digest 2:1-4. http://www.iascp.org/E-CPR/cd02.pdf International Association for the Study of the Commons (new website---Mexico) http://www.iascp.org/ International Association for the Study of the Commons (old website– Indiana U.) www.indiana.edu/~iascp/ Kristof, Nicholas. 2010.Death by Gadget. New York Times (June 26) http://www.nytimes.com/2010/06/27/opinion/27kristof.html
Lynch, Clifford A. 1994. “Rethinking the Integrity of the Scholarly Record in the Networked Information Age.” Educom Review 29(2). http://www.educause.edu/Resources/RethinkingtheIntegrityoftheSch/158190
Linebaugh, Peter . 2008. The Magna Carta Manifesto: Liberties and Commons for All. Berkeley: University of California Press. Madison, M., B. Frischmann, and K. Strandburg. 2010. “Constructing Commons in the Cultural Environment.” Cornell Law Review, Vol. 95(4). http://www.lawschool.cornell.edu/research/cornell-law-review/Volume-95-Number-4.cfm Maskus, Keith, and Jerome H. Reichman, eds. 2005. International Public Goods and Transfer of Technology Under a Globalized Intellectual Property Regime. Cambridge University Press.
National Research Council, ed. 1986. Proceedings of the Conference on Common Property Resource Management, April 21-26, 1985. Washington, DC: National Academy Press. Ostrom, Elinor. 1965. “Public Entrepreneurship: A Case Study in Ground Water Basin Management.” (Ph.D. Dissertation, University of California-Los Angeles, 1965). http://dlc.dlib.indiana.edu/dlc/handle/10535/3581 Ostrom, Elinor. 1990. Governing the Commons: The Evolution of Institutions for Collective Action. New York: Cambridge University Press. (The Political Economy of Institutions and Decisions). Ostrom, Elinor. 2010. “The Institutional Analysis and Development Framework and the Commons.” Cornell Law Review. 95:807-816. http://dlc.dlib.indiana.edu/dlc/handle/10535/5770 Ostrom, Vincent. 1950. “Government and Water: A Study of the Influence of Water Upon Governmental Institutions and Practices in the Development of Los Angeles.” (Ph.D. Dissertation, University of California-Los Angeles, 1950). http://dlc.dlib.indiana.edu/dlc/handle/10535/3608 Ostrom, Vincent, and Elinor Ostrom 1977. “Public Goods and Public Choices.” In Alternatives for Delivering Public Services; Toward Improved Performance. E. S. Savas, ed. Boulder, CO: Westview.
Poteete, A. Janssen, M. Ostrom, E. 2010. Working Together: Collective Action, The Commons, and Multiple Methods in Practice. Princeton University Press. Resilience Alliance (website) http://www.resalliance.org/1.php Scott, Anthony D. 1955. “The Fishery: The Objectives of Sole Ownership.” Journal of Political Economy 65:116-124. Shiva, Vandana. 1997. Biopiracy: The Plunder of Nature and Knowledge. Boston: South End Press.
Waters, Donald J. 2007. “Preserving the Knowledge Commons.” In Understanding Knowledge as a Commons: From Theory to Practice. C. Hess and E. Ostrom, eds. Cambridge, Massachusetts: MIT Press.
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