86 I am not sure whether the Aufbau constructions can be understood as performed on the ground of the natural science or monosubjective experience, for Carnap says about the Welt (even the WeltderWissenschaft, (Aufbau-1, p. 200), and not only about the Wirklichkeit (ibid, p. 92) (as he did in the Chaos). However he says also about the Wirklichkeit in sense of the Aussenwelt (ibid, p. 131) The terms Aufbau or logischeAufbau are not technical one in the constitution theory, they become technical in the ‘structuralisticly’ translated Aufbau-2.
87Aufbau § 62.
89 Cf. Seibt, (2000, pp.163-165).
90 Carnap says about die räumlische Ordnung der physichen Wirklichkeit (Aufbau-1, p. 129).
91Aufbau §11-12. However Carnap takes the concept of structure from Russell (ibid p. 23) he refers also to Husserlian and Meinogian theories (ibid §3).
92 The ‘sensations’ are the objects domain of psychology whereas the ‘qualities’ – of phenomenology and Meinogian theory of object, Aufbau § 93-94. Moreover ‘sensations’ are constructed from the ‘qualities’.
93 We can point to the third ontological reduction i.e. identifying an object with a concept, Seibt, (2000, p. 163).
94Aufbau § 33, 45.
95 This assumption we could name ‘apriori-realistic’. Under some conditions I believe there is possible to interpret the ‘construction system’ realisticly.
96ibid § 66.
97 For the sake of simplicity let us assume the physical only (ibid §57), despite Carnap includes to the domain of scientific objects also ‘psychic’, ‘cultural’, ‘mathematic’ or ‘sensuous-phenomenological’ (sic!) (ibid § 31).
98Aufbau § 47.
99 This concept is also in Husserl works.
100 Carnap, Aufbau §49.
101 We do not know if Carnap refers here to Husserl’s eidetics or if it is his own conception. Perhaps he attempts to construct ‘at once’ either ‘the world of science’ or ‘the world of our experience’, Cf. Jeffrey in: (Erkenntnis (1991): 257).
102Aufbau § 80.
103 It seems that under such conditions we can understand the procedures either that of visual-reductional or visual-constructional. When interpreting anti-realisticly we gain either Weylian model of the ‘ideal observer’ or as Moulines says the AI model, namely that where we program a robot to start seeing Cf. Moulines in: (Erkenntnis (1991) 75).
104 Perhaps it would be enough to say: ‘topological’.
105Aufbau § 93. As we know the idea of reducing of a certain object domain was not Husserl’s discovery but he elaborated a new form of reduction. Other reductions were performed e.g. by Helmholtz, Mach, neokantians and Russell. I would like to say that the proper ‘ontological reduction’ can be well-founded if it is conducted (can be conduced) within one and the same object order. Whereas within two (or more) object orders it is subject to the ‘ontological mistake’. We are allowed to reduce e.g. geometric objects to sets of points, physical objects to macro- or micro-objects and (under certain conditions) visual perceptions to visual sensations. Instead we are not allowed to reduce e.g. the mental states to physical ones, for we do not have good reasons to prove the existence of objective interconnection between those two spheres.
106 About that Carnap deals with the essential relations in the course of his descriptions of the structure and contents of our experience we can infer from that 1) he explicitly emphasizes that ‘sensations’ are subject to psychology and ‘qualities’ (here in the objectivistic and essential meaning) are subject to the phenomenology and theory of object (in Meinong’s sense) (Aufbau §93-94) and 2) the special two-fold notation introduced by Carnap to distinguish the objects in the sense of psychology and in the sense of the ‘constitution theory’.
107Aufbau-1, p. 88, Aufbau-2, p. 104.
109Aufbau-1, p. 87 ff., Aufbau-2, p. 103 ff.
110 Certainly, if we thought deeply enough in the formulation we would not agree with Carnap (and other similar positions), for if we really wanted to speak only of the ‘conditions of possibility of any seeing’ it would make no sense to describe them without any assumption to a seeing subject.
111 As it was in Husserl’s ‘visual isolation’.
112 Perhaps he refers to Helmholtz conception here.
113 They are behind us ‘now’, ‘eventually’.
114 Husserl says about the ‘visual points’ (1973, pp. 164-166, 260).
115 Carnap, Aufbau § 68-69.
116Aufbau-1, p. 104, Aufbau-2, p. 121. The Quasi-analysis formulated for the first time in the Quasi-Zerlegung…, was modified: 1) simplified in the Aufbau and 2) over-formulated by Goodman in his Structure of Appearance. Cf. Seibt (1997, p. 312 ff.).
117 The conception of the ‘color points’ is in Hume’s and Berkeley’s thoughts. Cf. Wittgenstein (1961, 6.3751).
118 Carnap, Aufbau § 125.
119 Carnap, Aufbau § 126.
120 Carnap, Aufbau § 126.
121 Carnap refers to the phenomenology of perception as one of primary sciences for his ‘science system’ (Cf. Aufbau-1, p. 148, Aufbau-2, p.176).
122ibid § 127. Analogically as in Husserl’s conception of the ‘visual isolation’.
123ibid § 127, point 12.
125ibid § 130-133. Cf. note 16 in this paper.
126ibid § 129.
127 Analogically as in Husserl’s.
128ibid § 132.
129ibid § 106 .
130ibid § 135.
131 This conception occurs already in the Raum.
132 In the first meaning: the (movable) world-point e.g. ‘blue’ (having such and such space-time location: here, now) would be a formal image of the blue color seen by me on my shirt at a given moment. I do not have to add that if it were not to be an epistemological construct as a ‘sense-data’ we should locate it inside of the mental sphere of a subject and then it would be something like a Husserlian ‘intentional object’. In the second meaning, i.e. if the ‘blue-world-point’ represented all ‘perceptual cases of the color blue’ in our sensual experience, we would have to treat it as if in the model theory (e.g. as a mere construct of a color theory), ontologically (as the essence of blue) or again intentionally in a stronger than in the first time (as ‘my private essence’ of blue). Perhaps we should interpret the ‘world-points’ ontologically in a different way than above. We could take a ‘red-world-point’ as being assigned to the roof of the house of my neighbors and as picturing a certain still physical qualification that occurs every time when perceiving the house. We do not see it continually but whenever we look at it its roof is red. Assigning every time the ‘red-world-point’ to a given physical object we synthesize processes of many analogical perceptions and the synthesis occurs in the so-called ‘recollection of similarity’. The recollection is meant by Carnap as a fundamental logical relation in the reconstructed structure of our sensual experience. However, from the topological point of view the above mentioned description is not an accurate one. Carnap should have rather used a concept of the area (i.e. open set) as a primary to the concept of the point. Using that would be easier to him to describe the spatial relations within the visual perception. And then the formalization of such comprehended contents of perception would hale to be different than that of the Aufbau, assuming of course, that the intra-perceptive dependencies are to be so easily logisticly interpreted.
133Aufbau § 136.
134 Richardson claims that here lies the weakest point of Carnap’s program from the Aufbau; the postulate of physico-qualitate correlation was also strongly criticized by Quine (private email). Cf. Seibt (1997, pp. 315, 317).
135 The space for Carnap is definitely the multidimensional continuum constructible on the ground of reciprocal assignments between (the respectively distributed) objects of the physical sphere and objects of the sphere of experiences of different subjects of cognition.
136 Cf. Creath, in: (Erkenntnis (1991): 373-374).
137ibid § 133.
138The author of the Cartesian Meditations usesa complicated and rich phenomenological lexicon whereas Carnap uses logistical-physicalistic (or logistical-phenomenalistic) one.
139 Here he follows perhaps Riemann, Russell and Whitehead.
140 This introduced by Helmholtz notion is the first endeavor that ‘geometrizes’ our perception. It seems that assuming the perspective of the ‘two-dimensional field’ at once puts as before the problem of ‘reconstructing’ our seeing of space. The notion of field taken by Helmholtz from the XIX century physics (and „proved” with the experimental researches) had been probably introduced by Descartes (the ‘field of forces’), but it is highly non-demonstrative in order to describe our visual perception and first of all it is unjustified from the epistemological point of view. Even if we extremely reduced the kinetics of our perception we could not say that there spreads the ‘two-dimensional field’ before our eyes. We could agree about that notion if we assumed that it refers to that what is seen by us and not to our manner of seeing. I can assume that the wall in front of me (if it fills the range of my sight) forms the ‘two-dimensional field’ but anyway I can see it spatially for between the surface of the wall and me there spreads a certain ‘vision space’. The latter can ‘shorten’ itself, can be ‘flatter’ or ‘deeper’, but it is irreducible and is a fundamental phenomenon in a description of our outer perceiving.
141 Cf. Carnap (1966, p. 168). It would be more accurately to say that the geometric model is suitable to the construction of the physical one.
142 There are many more weak points in both theories, e.g. 1) a problem of the constitution of the other subjects (methodological solipsism), 2) omitting the audible aspect of spatiality (sounds around inform us about locations and movements of things), 3) constitution of corporality (omitting such issues as a resistance, pain, gravity etc.), 4) concerning only few kinds of movements in perception.
143 The conceptions of the cognizability of space could be divided into four ones: space is cognizable 1) sensually, 2) intellectually (mentally, intuitively, imaginatively, noeticly etc.), 3) either sensually or intellectually; 4) space is uncognizable. Husserl’s position can be assigned to 3) while Carnap’s to 2), I guess because of his radical visual reduction i.e. the ‘blind-case’ and ‘subject-less’ anti-realistic pre-assumptions in the theory of space.
144 It is not a natural cognition, for we usually do not attempt to perceive space. Our moving is always grounded upon our appraisal of locations and shapes of the objects surrounding us. This type of sight that I mean needs the intentional decentralization of that what is seen by us, hence it needs a new perceptual activity and certain training.
145 I mean decades after the Vienna Circle period.
146 J. Seibt says about four Carnap’s followers: Goodman, Quine, G. Bergmann and W. Sellars (1997, p.305).
147 Mayer, in: (Erkenntnis (1991): 287-303) and Seibt (2000, p. 169).
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