UNREPORTED
IN THE COURT OF SPECIAL APPEALS
OF MARYLAND
No. 0757
September Term, 2014
LIRI FUSHA
v.
THEODORE E. LEONARD, III
Kehoe,
Friedman,
Eyler, James R.
(Retired, Specially Assigned),
JJ.
Opinion by Kehoe, J.
Filed: September 24, 2015
*
This is an unreported opinion, and it may not be cited in any paper, brief, motion, or other
document filed in this Court or any other Maryland Court as either precedent within the rule of stare
decisis or as persuasive authority. Md. Rule 1-104.
— Unreported Opinion —
Liri Fusha was a passenger in an automobile that was “rear ended” by a vehicle
operated by Theodore Leonard, III. Her tort action against him was tried before a jury of
the Circuit Court for Baltimore County, the Honorable Susan Souder presiding. The jury
returned a verdict in favor of Mr. Leonard. Ms. Fusha presents one issue, which we have
reworded:
Did the trial court abuse its discretion in permitting Mr. Leonard’s medical expert
to testify regarding a photograph of the damage to the vehicle in which Ms. Fusha
was riding?
We will affirm the judgment of the circuit court.
Background
At trial, the parties agreed that Mr. Leonard was at fault for the accident; the only
issue for the jury was the amount, if any, of Ms. Fusha’s damages. Mr. Leonard offered
the expert testimony of an orthopedic surgeon, Lewis Halikman, M.D., who provided his
opinion as to whether Ms. Fusha’s injuries were caused by the collision. He based part of
his testimony on a photograph, already admitted in evidence, that depicted Ms. Fusha’s
vehicle after the collision. We set out the relevant portion of Dr. Halikman’s testimony
(emphasis added):
[COUNSEL TO MR. LEONARD]: Do you have an understanding Doctor,
about the nature of the collision that brought Ms. Fusha to the emergency
room?
[DR. HALIKMAN]: I do.
[COUNSEL TO MR. LEONARD]: What is that?
— Unreported Opinion —
[DR. HALIKMAN]: She was a passenger in a car which was struck from
the rear. I had seen a photograph of the vehicles and it was interesting to
note that the damage was to the trunk lid—
[COUNSEL TO MS. FUSHA]: Objection, Your Honor. Shall we
approach?
THE COURT: Objection overruled.
[COUNSEL TO MS. FUSHA]: He's getting ready to testify—
THE COURT: He is describing a picture he saw. It's in evidence No. 1, right?
[COUNSEL TO MS. FUSHA]: Correct, Your Honor.
THE COURT: Plaintiffs No. 1.
[COUNSEL TO MS. FUSHA]: I think he's getting ready to testify about
the other vehicle, and he might be a physician, but I'm not sure he's
actually a accident reconstructionist and has the ability to testify about
crush.
THE COURT: The objection has been overruled.
[COUNSEL TO MS. FUSHA]: Yes.
[DR. HALIKMAN]: I started to say the photograph showed damage to the
rear trunk lid of the vehicle, the bumper was not damaged. So we know
from looking at that, that the vehicle that struck it had a higher bumper, and
that the impact was sustained to the upper part of the trunk.
[COUNSEL TO MR. LEONARD]: Doctor, does the relative severity of this
motor vehicle collision have a bearing on the opinions you are offering in
this case?
[DR. HALIKMAN]: Yes, it does.
[COUNSEL TO MR. LEONARD]: How so?
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— Unreported Opinion —
[DR. HALIKMAN]: It is an important concept in orthopedics. It’s called
mechanism of injury. And it applies to patients who have been injured,
whether on the ball field, whether they’re in accidents, whether they fall,
however they’re hurt. The concept basically involves the direction of forces
and the magnitude of forces and how that is intercepted by the body in
terms of injury.
As a very general rule, force equals injury. When patients are involved with
relatively minor injury, you might expect some minor complaints but you
would expect the patients to recover promptly.
[COUNSEL TO MR. LEONARD]: Doctor, based on your knowledge of the
nature of this collision, do you have an opinion that you can express, to a
reasonable degree of medical probability, as to whether or not it was
appropriate for Ms. Fusha to go to the Emergency Room to be checked out?
[DR. HALIKMAN]: I have an opinion.
[COUNSEL TO MR. LEONARD]: What is that opinion?
[DR. HALIKMAN]: I think it is appropriate to go to an Emergency Room
to be examined after an accident.
[1]
This testimony elicited three relevant pieces of information. First, the witness
testified that the severity of a collision impact is significant from an orthopedist’s
perspective because an understanding of the mechanism of injury can assist in the
diagnostic process. Ms. Fusha does not suggest that this testimony was inadmissible. Dr.
Halikman opined that it is appropriate for a person involved in a vehicle collision like the
one depicted in the photograph to go to an emergency room for examination. Ms. Fusha
The remainder of Dr. Halikman’s testimony was based on his review of Ms.
1
Fusha’s medical records, and thus not relevant to the issue on appeal.
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— Unreported Opinion —
does not suggest that this opinion fell outside of the witness’s expertise. She takes issue
with Dr. Halikman’s conclusion that “the vehicle that struck [Ms. Fusha’s automobile]
had a higher bumper, and that the impact was sustained to the upper part of the trunk.”
Analysis
Ms. Fusha argues that Dr. Halikman’s testimony based on his observations from
the photograph were inadmissible because Dr. Halikman was entered as an expert witness
in the field of orthopedic surgery and not as an expert in accident reconstruction. She
argues that Dr. Halikman was not qualified to give expert testimony as to the nature or
severity of the collision. In response, Mr. Leonard suggests that Ms. Fusha’s appellate
contention is not preserved for review and, in any event, the trial court did not abuse its
discretion in permitting Dr. Halikman to testify about the photograph. We think that Mr.
Leonard is correct on both scores.
I. Preservation
Md. Rule 2-517(a) states, in part, that “[a]n objection to the admission of evidence
shall be made at the time the evidence is offered or as soon thereafter as the grounds for
objection become apparent. Otherwise, the objection is waived.” In other words, this
principle, known as the contemporaneous objection rule, see e.g., Southern Mgmt. Corp.
v. Taha, 378 Md. 461, 499 (2003), requires that an objection be made to the question
which will elicit the allegedly objectionable answer. Rule 2-517(b) states: “At the request
of a party or on its own initiative, the court may grant a continuing objection to a line of
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— Unreported Opinion —
questions by an opposing party.” If the focus of the questioning changes to another topic,
but then returns to what is objectionable, a new objection must be made. Joseph F.
Murphy, Jr.
M
ARYLAND
E
VIDENCE
H
ANDBOOK
(4th ed. 2010) § 106[A] at 32. Continuing
objections “obviate[] the need to object persistently to similar lines of questions that fall
within the scope of the granted objection.” Kang v. State, 393 Md. 97, 119 (2006),
superseded on other grounds in Valonis v. State, 431 Md. 551 (2013).
Taken together, Rule 2-517(a) and (b) establish that an objection will preserve an
issue for our review if either a) the objection is made immediately following the question
that will elicit the objectionable evidence, or b) a continuing objection is granted for a
line of questions. Ms. Fusha’s trial counsel did not ask for or obtain a continuing
objection; thus the objection he made only preserved the information that was elicited
from the question he objected to. In the present case, that information was Dr. Halikman’s
description of the damage to Ms. Fusha’s vehicle that he observed from the photograph.
Ms. Fusha’s arguments on appeal do not pertain to Dr. Halikman’s description of
the vehicular damage or his suggestion that the bumper on Mr. Leonard’s vehicle must
have been higher than the bumper on her car. Instead, she contends that Dr. Halikman’s
medical opinions were inadmissible because they were based upon his observations
drawn from the photograph. But Ms. Fusha’s counsel never objected to any of these
2
During oral argument, Ms. Fusha’s counsel argued that the remainder of Dr.
2
(continued...)
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— Unreported Opinion —
statements and the trial court was deprived of any opportunity “to attempt to cure any
error[.]” Ware, 170 Md. App. at 19. Her appellate contentions are not preserved for our
review.
II. Dr. Halikman’s Testimony
Looking past the issue of preservation, we see no error by the trial court.
“A trial court has broad discretion over the admissibility of expert testimony.”
Morton v. State, 200 Md. App. 529, 545 (2011). Once a judge has exercised that
discretion, its decision “will not be disturbed on appeal unless clearly erroneous.”
Blackwell v. Wyeth, 408 Md. 575, 618 (2009). “Put another way, ‘it is well settled . . .
that the trial court's determination [regarding the qualification of experts] . . . may be
reversed if it is founded on an error of law or some serious mistake, or if the trial court
clearly abused its discretion’ and ‘will seldom constitute a ground for reversal.’” Id.
(quoting Radman v. Harold, 279 Md. 167, 173 (1977)).
Ms. Fusha contends that his testimony regarding the photograph was inadmissible
because it was not medical in nature. We disagree.
(...continued)
2
Halikman’s testimony was “permeated” with references to the nature or mechanism of
injury, but he did not direct us to, nor were we able to find, any reference to the
mechanism of injury in Dr. Halikman’s testimony outside of that portion of the transcript
detailed supra.
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— Unreported Opinion —
First, the Maryland Rules do not prohibit an expert witness from basing his or her
opinion in part upon evidence in the record. See Md. Rule 5-703(a). That the impact to
Ms. Fusha’s vehicle was sustained to its trunk is obvious from the photograph itself. Dr.
Halikman did testify that the location of the damage indicated that “the vehicle that struck
[Ms. Fusha’s automobile] had a higher bumper” but this is a matter of common sense.
3
The trial court did not abuse its discretion in allowing this testimony.
Dr. Halikman also opined that “[a]s a very general rule . . . . [w]hen patients are
involved with relatively minor injury, you might expect some minor complaints but would
expect the patients to recover promptly.” To the extent that this observation constituted an
expert opinion, it was a medical opinion that Dr. Halikman was unquestionably qualified
to provide. The Court of Appeals addressed a very similar question, albeit in the context
of closing argument, as opposed to expert testimony, in Mason v. Lynch, 388 Md. 37, 58
(2005):
Courts, almost uniformly, have taken the position that there is in motor
vehicle accident cases, as a matter of probability, a correlation between the
nature of the vehicular impact and the severity of the personal injuries. . . .
Courts have generally taken the position that this belief is rooted in
common sense—a position with which we agree.
On cross-examination, Ms. Fusha’s counsel questioned Dr. Halikman on his
3
qualifications to opine on accident reconstruction. Dr. Halikman responded that his
testimony regarding the vehicular damage was based on common sense rather than
expertise.
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— Unreported Opinion —
With these considerations in mind, we conclude that the circuit court did not abuse
its discretion in admitting Dr. Halikman’s testimony pertaining to his observations of the
photograph.
THE JUDGMENT OF THE CIRCUIT COURT
FOR BALTIMORE COUNTY IS AFFIRMED.
APPELLANT TO PAY COSTS.
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