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Intelligence - Led Policing:
How the Use Of Crime Intelligence Analysis Translates in to the Decision-Making
worthwhile to adapt and apply; a new application may attract the federal government funds
and support that may result in a waste of money. The association of crime analysis functions
(through the decision-making process) with the criminal environment is not covered in this
study, although it is part of the 3-i model. Therefore, the 3-i model was tested partially.
1. Intelligence-Led Policing
1.1. A Brief History of Intelligence-Led Policing
Intelligence-led policing existed first in Kent, United Kingdom. Anderson (1997) summarizes
the history of intelligence-led policing and its first British version in the Kent Constabulary
policing area. He mentions several factors that influenced the development of intelligence-led
policing in the early 1990s. He states that “crime levels had risen sharply in the preceding
years, particularly the property-related offences of burglary and automobile theft…. At
the same time, the economic recession had increased the pressure for restraint in public
spending” (p. 4). Therefore, he adds, “the police were expected to produce more with
budgets that either remained constant or were reduced in real terms” (p. 4). Anderson
further notes that a 1993 audit commission report recommended the use of intelligence
from informants as well as other sources in order to prevent and detect crime in ways that
would be more effective and efficient in terms of using police resources. And yet, one of
the starting points of intelligence-led policing is the research claiming that “a relatively small
number of individuals were responsible for a disproportionate amount of the total crime
committed” (p. 4). Ratcliffe (2002, 2003, 2008; see also Maguire, 2000) also discusses
similar points and says that there were two influential reports behind the existence of
intelligence-led policing in the United Kingdom: The Report of Audit Commission (1993)
and Her Majesty’s Inspectorate of Constabulary (1997). As he wrote, “Both of these reports
focused on the information gathering and analysis facets of modern policing” (2002: 54).
Both facets needed to be both cost-efficient and effective.
In the United States, however, the main triggering event for intelligence-led policing
was the 9/11 terrorist attacks (Baker, 2009; Carter, 2005; IACP, 2002; Peterson, 2005;
Ratcliffe, 2008). As stated previously, change in U.S. institutions occurs incrementally
(Lindblom, 1959) and retains an equilibrium until punctuated by a radical event (Baumgartner
& Jones, 1993)—namely, the 9/11 attacks. The following year, the International Association
of Chiefs of Police hosted a Criminal Intelligence Sharing Summit where the importance of
intelligence sharing and intelligence-led policing was emphasized. As stated in the report
from that meeting:
It is difficult to enhance intelligence sharing without also having a shared
understanding of what “criminal intelligence” is. Summit participants’
definitions placed emphasis on the various ways that intelligence supports the
policing mission. In particular, they noted that “information” is not the same
thing as “intelligence.” Rather, intelligence is the combination of credible
information with quality analysis—information that has been evaluated and
from which conclusions have been drawn. Criminal intelligence is data that
can be used proactively for strategic and tactical purposes. (IACP, 2002: v)
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International Journal of Security and Terrorism • Volume: 4 (1)
More important, “law enforcement and other collaborating agencies must be able to plan,
gather, collate, analyze, manage, disseminate and then use intelligence data” (IACP, 2002: 13).
In summary, the reasons and events, as well as the purposes behind the existence
of intelligence-led policing is different in the United Kingdom and in the United States. In
the United Kingdom, financial issues provided the impetus for a policing model that would
be more efficient and effective in agencies with limited resources; in the United States,
the impetus was a tragic terrorist event that called for a better, proactive, and cooperative
policing model. However, the fundamental element seems to be the same: data analysis.
1.2. What Is Intelligence-Led Policing?
There is no standard definition of and no one approach to intelligence-led policing in the
literature (Baker, 2009; Carter, 2004; Cope, 2004; Maguire, 2000; McGarrell et al., 2007;
Peterson, 1994, 2005; Ratcliffe, 2003, 2008). As Ratcliffe also notes, “there is still a lack of
clarity among many in law enforcement as to what intelligence-led policing is, what it aims
to achieve, and how it is supposed to operate” (2003: 1). Some scholars have referred to
the same concept but used different terminology. For instance Taylor, Kowalyk, and Boba
(2007) used the term information-led policing instead of intelligence-led policing.
Although scholars use the same conceptualization for the most part, they may see
the framework differently. Some scholars see intelligence-led policing as a way to fight
against terrorist events, while others see it as a new way of policing that is information- and
data-based and applicable to all types of crime. Still others see intelligence-led policing as
an operational and tactical use of intelligence. A fourth group of scholars see intelligence-led
policing as part of or descendant of problem-oriented policing, community-oriented policing,
and/or compstat. Ratcliffe’s (2008) approach and framing of intelligence-led policing is
taken as the basis for this study and further arguments.
According to Ratcliffe (2008), intelligence-led policing is defined as follows:
…a business model and managerial philosophy where data analysis and
crime intelligence are pivotal to an objective, decision-making framework that
facilitates crime and problem reduction, disruption and prevention through
both strategic management and effective enforcement strategies that target
prolific and serious offenders. (p. 89)
The following section focuses the discussion on the main focus of this study: 3-i
model of intelligence-led policing.
1.3. The 3-i Model
The 3-i model has three components (crime intelligence analysis, decision-making, and
criminal environment) and three processes (interpret, influence, and impact) (Ratcliffe,
2008). It is assumed in this model that analysts will interpret and analyze the data collected
from the criminal environment and then (using those useable outcomes) try to influence
the decision-makers to make decisions that might impact the criminal environment. It is a
business model that seeks meld efficiency with a rational approach. Ratcliffe states that “the
end state of ILP is an attempt to reduce the effects of criminality, either through prevention
and disruption or by effectively deploying the criminal justice system” (p. 112). The “3-i