International Political Economy II


Week 5: Domestic Politics and International Trade and Investment



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Week 5: Domestic Politics and International Trade and Investment


  1. Oatley, Chapter 4 (pp. 82-93)


Trade and Democratic Institutions

  • Ehrlich, Sean D. 2007. “Access to Protection: Domestic Institutions and Trade Policy in Democracies.” International Organization 61: 571-605.

  • Ehrlich, Sean D. 2010. “The Fair Trade Challenge to Embedded Liberalism.” International Studies Quarterly 54:1013-1033.

  • Goldstein, Judith. 1988. “Ideas, Institutions, and American Trade Policy.” International Organization 42 (1): 179-217 (Frieden and Lake, Chapter 24)

  • Goldstein, Judith. 1986. “The Political Economy of Trade: Institutions of Protection.” American Political Science Review 80: 161-184.

  • Goldstein, Judith and Stefanie Ann Lenway. 1989. “Interests or Institutions: An Inquiry into Congressional-ITC Relations.” International Studies Quarterly 33 (3): 303-327.

  • Guisinger, Alexandra. 2009. “Determining Trade Policy: Do Voters Hold Politicians Accountable?.” International Organization 63 (Summer): 533-557.

  • Hansen, Wendy L.1990. “The International Trade Commission and the Politics of Protectionism.” American Political Science Review 84 (1): 21-46.

  • Henisz, Witold J. and Edward D. Mansfield. 2000. “Votes and Vetos: The Political Determinants of Commercial Openness.” International Studies Quarterly 50: 189-211.

  • Mansfield, Edward D. and Mark L. Busch. 1995. “The Political Economy of Nontariff Barriers: a Cross-National Analysis.” International Organization 49 (4): 723-749. (Frieden and Lake, Chapter 23)

  • Mansfield, Edward D,. Helen V. Milner and B. Peter Rosendorff. 2000. “Free to Trade: Democracies, Autocracies, and International Trade.” American Political Science Review 94 (2): 305-321.

  • Mansfield, Edward D., and Diana C. Mutz. 2009. Support for Free Trade: Self-Interest, Sociotropic Politics, and Out-Group Anxiety.” International Organization 63 (Summer): 425-457.

  • Milner, Helen, and Keiko Kubota. 2005. “Why the Move to Free Trade? Democracy and Trade Policy in the Developing Countries.” International Organization 59 (1): 107-143.

  • Milner, Helen, and Dustin H. Tingley. 2011. “Who Supports Global Economic Engagement? The Sources of Preferences in American Foreign Economic Policy.” International Organization 65 (Winter): 37-68.

  • Ray, Edward John. 1988. “Changing Patterns of Protectionism: The Rise and Fall in Non-Tariff Barriers.” Northwestern Journal of International Law and Business 285 (Frieden and Lake, Chapter 22)

  • Rogowski, Ronald. 1987. “Trade and the Variety of Domestic Institutions” International Organization 41 (2): 205-223.

  • Scheve, Kenneth and Matthew J. Slaughter. 2004. “Economic Insecurity and the Globalization of Production.” American Journal of Political Science 48 (4): 662-74.

  • Souva, Mark, Dale L. Smith and Shawn Rowan .2008. “Promoting Trade: The Importance of Market Protecting Institutions.” The Journal of Politics 70 (2): 383-392.


Trade and Partisan Conflict

  • Nollen, Stanly and Dennis P. Quinn.1994. “Free Trade, Fair Trade, Strategic Trade and Protectionism in the US Congress 1987-88” International Organization 48 (3): 491-525.

  • Baldwin, Robert and Christopher Magee. 2000. “Is Trade Policy for Sale? Congressional Voting on Recent Trade Bills.” Public Choice 105 (1-2): 79-101.

  • Karol, David.2001. “Divided Government and U.S. Trade Policy: Much Ado About Nothing?” International Organization 54 (4): 825-845.

  • Milner, Helen V. and Benjamin Judkins. 2004. “Partisanship, Trade Policy, and Globalization: Is There a Left-Right Divide on Trade Policy.” International Studies Quarterly 48 (1): 95-119.

  • Gawande, Kishore and Bernard Hoekman. 2006. “Lobbying and Agricultural Trade Policy in the United States.” International Organization 60: 527-561.

  • Hankla, Charles R. 2006. “Party Strength and International Trade: A Cross-National Analysis,” Comparative Political Studies 39 (9): 1133-1156.

  • Thies, Cameron G. and Schuyler Porche. 2007. “The Political Economy of Agricultural Protection.” The Journal of Politics 69 (1): 116-127.

  • Weller, Nicholas. 2009. “Trading Policy: Constituents and Party in U.S. Trade Policy.” Public Choice 141: 87-101.



Week 6: Trade and Investment Agreements


  1. Oatley, Chapter 7 & 9


Political Regimes and Trade Agreements

  • Albertin, Giorgia. 2008. "Regionalism or Multilateralism? A Political Economy Choice." IMF Working Paper.

  • Baier, Scott L. and Jeffrey H. Bergstrand. 2007. “Do free trade agreements actually increase members’ international trade?” Journal of International Economics 71(1): 72–95.

  • Baier, Scott L. and Jeffrey H. Bergstrand. 2009. “Estimating the effects of free trade agreements on international trade flows using matching econometrics.” Journal of International Economics 77(1): 63–76.

  • Baier, Scott L., Jeffrey H. Bergstrand, Peter Egger, and Patrick A. McLaughlin. 2008. “Do Economic Integration Agreements Actually Work? Issues in Understanding the Causes and Consequences of the Growth of Regionalism.” The World Economy 31(4): 461–97.

  • Chase, Kerry A. 2003. “Economic Interests and Regional Trading Arrangements: The Case of NAFTA.” International Organization 57: 137-174.

  • Dee, Philippa, and Jyothi Gali. 2003. "The Trade and Investment Effects of Preferential Trading Arrangements." In NBER Working Paper 10160.

  • Duina, Francesco, and Jason Buxbaum. 2008. "Regional Trade Agreements and the Pursuit of State Interests: Institutional Perspectives from NAFTA and Mercosur." Economy and Society 37 (2):193-223.

  • Fernández, Raquel, and Jonathan Portes. 1998. "Returns to Regionalism: An Analysis of Nontraditional Gains from Regional Trade Agreements." World Bank Economic Review 12 (2): 197-220.

  • Genna, Gaspare M., and Taeko Hiroi. 2004. "Power and Preponderance and Domestic Politics: Explaining Regional Economic Integration in Latin America and the Caribbean, 1960-1997." International Interactions 30 (2): 143-64

  • Henisz, Witold J. and Edward D. Mansfield. 2000. “Votes and Vetos: The Political Determinants of Commercial Openness.” International Studies Quarterly 50: 189-211.

  • Mansfield, Edward D. 1998. “The Proliferation of Preferential Trading Agreement.” Journal of Conflict Resolution 42 (5): 523-543.

  • Mansfield, Edward D. and Helen V. Milner. 1999. “The New Wave of Regionalism.” International Organization 53 (3): 589-627.

  • Mansfield, Edward D., Helen V. Milner and Jon C. Pevehouse. 2007. “Vetoing Co-opertion, The Impact of Veto Players on Preferential Trading Arrangements.” British Journal of Political Science 37 (3): 403-432

  • Mansfield, Edward D., Helen V. Milner and Jon C. Pevehouse. 2008. “Democracy, Veto Players, and the Depth of Regional Integration.” The World Economy 31 (1): 67-96.

  • Medvedev, Denis. 2006. "Beyond Trade: The Impact of Preferential Trade Agreements on Foreign Direct Investment Inflows." In World Bank Policy Research Working Paper 4065.

  • O'Reilly, Robert F. 2005. "Veto Points Veto Players, and International Trade Policy." Comparative Political Studies 38 (6): 652-73.

  • Remmer, Karen L. 1998. “Does Democracy Promote Interstate Cooperation? Lessons from the Mercosur Region.” International Studies Quarterly 42: 25-52.


Trade Agreements and Dispute Settlement

  • Busch, Marc L. 2007. “Overlapping Institutions, Forum Shopping, and Dispute Settlement in International Trade.” International Organization 61: 735-761.

  • Chase, Kerry A. 2004. “Foreign Direct Investment and Commitment Problems in Regional Trade Arrangements.” Paper delivered to the American Political Science Association Meeting

  • Goldstein, Judith. 1996. “International Law and Domestic Institutions: Reconciling North American ‘Unfair’ Trade Laws.” International Organization 50 (4): 541-564.

  • Haftel, Yoram Z. 2004. “From the Outside Looking In: The Effect of Trading Blocs on Trade Disputes in the GATT/WTO.” International Studies Quarterly 48: 121-142.

  • Mansfield, Edward D,. Helen V. Milner and B. Peter Rosendorff. 2002. “Why Democracies Cooperate More: Electoral Control and International Trade Agreements.” International Organization 56 (3): 411-513.

  • Mansfield, Edward D and Eric Reinhardt. 2003. “Multilateral Determinants of Regionalism: The Effects of GATT/WTO on the Formation of Preferential Trading Arrangements.” International Organization 57: 829-862.

  • Ryan, Michael P. 1995. “USTR's Implementation of 301 Policy in the Pacific.” International Studies Quarterly 39 (3): 333-350.

  • Smith, James McCall. 2000. “The Politics of Dispute Settlement Design: Explaining Legalism in Regional Trade Pacts.” International Organization 54 (1): 137-180.


Political Regimes and FDI

  • Alee, Todd, and Cling Peinhardt. 2011. “Contingent Credibility: The Impact of Investment Treaty Violations on Foreign Direct Investment.” International Organization 65 (Summer) 401-432.

  • Blanton, Shannon Lindsey and Robert G. Blanton. 2007. “What Attracts Foreign Investors? An examination of human rights and foreign direct investment.” American Journal of Political Science 69 (1): 143-155.

  • Büthe, Tim and Helen Milner. 2008. “The Politics of Foreign Direct Investment into Developing Countries: Increasing FDI through Investment Trade Agreements?” American Journal of Political Science 52 (4): 741-762.

  • Campos, Nauro F., and Yuko Kinoshita. 2010. “Structural Reforms, Financial Liberalization, and Foreign Direct Investment.” IMF Staff Papers 57 (2): 2010: 326-365.

  • Choi, Seung-Whan, and Yiagadeesen Samy. 2008. "Reexamining the Effect of Democratic Institutions on Inflows of Foreign Direct Investment in Developing Countries." Foreign Policy Analysis 4 (1): 451-78.

  • Feng, Yi. 2001. "Political Freedom, Political Instability, and Policy Uncertainty." International Studies Quarterly 45 (2): 271-94.

  • Gelos, R. Gaston and Shang-Jin Wei. 2002. “Transparency and International Investment Behavior.” NBER Working Paper 9260.

  • Garland, Marshall, and Glen Biglaiser. 2009. “Do Electoral Rules Matter: Political Institutions and Foreign Direct Investment in Latin America.” Comparative Political Studies 42 (2): 224-231.

  • Harms, Philipp, and Heinrich W. Ursprung. 2002. "Do Civil and Political Repression Really Boost Foreign Direct Investment?" Economic Inquiry 40 (4): 651-63.

  • Levy Yeyati, Eduardo, Ernesto Stein, and Christian Daude. 2003. "Regional Integration and the Location of FDI." In Inter-American Development Bank Working Paper 462.

  • Li, Quan and Adam Resnick. 2003. “Reversal of Fortunes: Democratic Institutions and Foreign Direct Investment Inflows to Developing Countries.” International Organization 57 (1): 175-211.

  • Neumayer, Eric, and Laura Spess. 2005. "Do Bilateral Investment Treaties Increase Foreign Direct Investment to Developing Countries?" World Development 33 (10): 1567-85.

  • Jakobsen, Jo, and Indra de Soysa. 2006. "Do Foreign Investors Punish Democracy? Theory and Empirics." Kyklos: Internationale Zeitschrift fur Sozialwissenschaften 59 (3): 383-410.

  • Jensen, Nathan M. 2003. “Democratic Governance and Multinational Corporations: Political Regimes and Inflows of Foreign Direct Investment.” International Organization 57 (3): 587-616.

  • Pauly, Louis W. and Simon Reich. 1997.“National Structures and Multinational Corporate Behavior: Enduring Differences in the Age of Globalization.” International Organization 51 (1)


Investment Treaties

  • Elkins, Zachary, Andrew T. Guzman and Beth A. Simmons. 2006. “Competing for Capital: The Diffusion of Bilateral Investment Treaties, 1960-2000.” International Organization 60 (4): 811-846.

  • Feng, Yi. 2001. "Political Freedom, Political Instability, and Policy Uncertainty." International Studies Quarterly 45 (2): 271-94.

  • Guzman, Andrew T. 2000. “Why LDCs Sign Treaties That Hurt Them: Explaining the Popularity of Bilateral Investment Treaties.” Virginia Journal of International Law 38: 639-688.

  • Jandhyala, Srivdya, Witold, J Henisz, and Edward D. Mansfield. 2011. “Three Waves of BITs: The Global Diffusion of Foreign Investment Policy.” Journal of Conflict Resolution 55(6): 1047-1073.

  • Kerner, Andrew 2009. “Why Should I Believe You? The Costs and Consequences of Bilateral Investment Treaties.” International Studies Quarterly 53: 73–102.

  • Li, Quan and Adam Resnick. 2003. “Reversal of Fortunes: Democratic Institutions and Foreign Direct Investment Inflows to Developing Countries.” International Organization 57 (1): 175-211.

  • Neumayer, Eric, and Laura Spess. 2005. "Do Bilateral Investment Treaties Increase Foreign Direct Investment to Developing Countries?" World Development 33 (10): 1567-85.

  • Tobin, Jennifer, and Susan Rose-Ackerman. 2005. "Foreign Direct Investment and the Business Environment in Developing Countries: The Impact of Bilateral Investment Treaties." In Yale Law & Economics Research Paper 293.

  • Tobin, Jennifer L. and Marc L. Busch. 2010. “A bit is better than a lot: Bilateral investment treaties and preferential trade agreements.” World Politics 62(1): 1–42.

  • Tobin, Jennifer L. and Susan Rose-Ackerman. 2006. “When BITs have some bite: The political economic environment for bilateral investment treaties.” The Review of International Orgainzations 6(1): 1–32.



Week 7: International and Regional Trade Regimes


  1. Oatley, Chapter 2 & Chapter 3 (pp. 59-70)


GATT/WTO and Trade

  • Aaronson, Susan Ariel, andM. Rodwan Abouharb. 2011. “Unexpected Bedfellows: The GATT, the WTO and Some Democratic Rights.” International Studies Quarterly 55: 1-30.

  • Engelbrecht, Hans-Jurgen, and Christopher Pearce. 2007. "The GATT/WTO Has Promoted Trade, But Only in Capital-intensive Commodities!" Applied Economics 39:1573-1581.

  • Francois, Joseph, Hans van Meijl and Frank van Tongeren. 2005. “Trade Liberalization in the Doha Development Round.” Economic Policy, 20 (42): 349-391.

  • Goldstein, Judith L., Douglas Rivers and Michael Tomz. 2007. “Institutions in International Relations: Understanding the Effects of the GATT and the WTO on World Trade.” International Organization 61 (1): 37-67.

  • Gowa, Joanne and Soo Yeon Kim. 2005. “An Exclusive Country Club: The Effects of the GATT on Trade, 1950-94.” World Politics 57: 453-478.

  • Hertel, Thomas W., Roman Keeney, Maros Ivanic and L. Alan Winters. 2007. “Distributional Effects of WTO Agricultural Reforms in Rich and Poor Countries.” Economic Policy 50: 289-337.

  • Ozden, Caglar and Eric Reinhardt. 2005. “The Perversity of Preferences: GSP and Developing Country Trade Policies, 1976-2000.” Journal of Development Economics 78 (1): 1-21.

  • Rose, Andrew K. 2004. “Do We Really Know that the WTO Increases Trade?” American Economic Review 94 (1): 98-114.

  • Rose, Andrew K. 2004. “Do WTO Members Have More Liberal Trade Policy?” Journal of International Economics 63: 209-235.

  • Rose, Andrew K. 2005. “Does the WTO Make Trade More Stable?” Open Economies Review 16: 7-22.

  • Subramanian, Arvind and Shang-Jin Wei. 2007. “The WTO Promotes Trade, Strongly but Unevenly,” Journal of International Economics 73: 151-175.

  • Tang, Man-Keung and Shang-Jin Wei. 2008. “The Value of Making Commitments Externally: Evidence from WTO Accessions.” NBER Working Paper No. 14582.


GATT/WTO and Dispute Resolution

  • Busch, Marc L. 2000. “Democracy, Consultation, and the Paneling of Disputes under GATT.” Journal of Conflict Resolution 44 (4): 425-446.

  • Busch, Mark L. and Eric Reinhardt. 2002. “Testing International Trade Law: Empirical studies of GATT/WTO dispute settlement.” in Daniel L. M. Kennedy and James D. Southwick eds. The Political Economy of International Trade Law: Essays in honor of Robert E. Hudec (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press)

  • Busch, Marc L. and Eric Reinhardt. 2006. “Three’s a Crowd: Third Parties and WTO Dispute Settlement.” World Politics 58: 446-477.

  • Busch, Marc L. 2007. “Overlapping Institutions, Forum Shopping, and Dispute Settlement in International Trade.” International Organization 61: 735-761.

  • Goldstein, Judith. 1998. “International Institutions and Domestic Politics: GATT, WTO, and the Liberalization of International Trade.” in Anne O. Krueger, The WTO as an International Organization (Chicago: Chicago University Press), 133-152.

  • Goldstein, Judith. 1996. “International Law and Domestic Institutions: Reconciling North American ‘Unfair’ Trade Laws.” International Organization 50 (4): 541-564.

  • Guzman, Andrew and Beth A, Simmons 2002. “To Settle or Empanel? An Empirical Analysis of Litigation and Settlement at the World Trade Organization.” Journal of Legal Studies 29: S205-S235.

  • Haftel, Yoram Z. 2004. “From the Outside Looking In: The Effect of Trading Blocs on Trade Disputes in the GATT/WTO.” International Studies Quarterly 48: 121-142.

  • Kim, Moonhawk. 2008. “Costly Procedures: Divergent Effects of Legalization in the GATT/WTO Dispute Settlement Procedures.” International Studies Quarterly 52: 657–686.

  • Moon, Don. 2006. “Equality and Inequality in the WTO Dispute Settlement (DS) System: Analysis of the GATT/WTO Dispute Data.” International Interactions 32: 201-228.

  • Reinhardt, Eric. 2001. “Adjudication without Enforcement in GATT Disputes.” Journal of Conflict Resolution, 45 (2): 174-195.

  • Rickard, Stephanie J. 2010. “Democratic differences: Electoral institutions and compliance with GATT/WTO agreements.” European journal of international relations 16(4): 711–29.

  • Rosendorff, B. Peter. 2005. "Stability and Rigidity: Politics and Design of the WTO's Dispute Settlement Procedure." American Political Science Review 99 (3): 389-400.

  • Smith, James McCall. 2000. “The Politics of Dispute Settlement Design: Explaining Legalism in Regional Trade Pacts.” International Organization 54 (1): 137-180.

  • Staiger Robert W. and Guido Tabellini. 1999. “Do GATT Rules Help Governments Make Domestic Commitments?” Economics and Politics 11 (2): 109-144.

  • Steinberg, Richard H. 2002. “In the Shadow of Law or Power? Consensus-Based Bargaining and Outcomes in the GATT/WTO.” International Organization 56 (2): 339-374.



III. The Political Economy of International Finance
Week 8: Capital Liberalization, Financial Market Reforms, and Exchange Rate Policy


  1. Oatley, Chapter 11 & 12


Capital Liberalization

  • Alesina, Alberto, Vittorio Grilli and Gian Maria Milesi-Ferretti. 1994. “The Political Economy of Capital Controls.” In Leonardo Leideran and Assaf Razin eds. Capital Mobility: The Impact on Consumption, Investment and Growth. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press: 289-328.

  • Eichengreen, Barry. 2001. “Capital Account Liberalization: What Do Cross-Country Studies Tell Us?” The World Bank Economic Review. 15 (3): 341-365.

  • Frieden, Jeffry A. 1991. “Invested Interests: The Politics of National Economic Policies in a World of Global Finance.” International Organization. 45 (4): 425-454

  • Goodman, John B. and Louis W. Pauly. 1993. “Obsolescence of Capital Controls.” World Politics 46 (1): 50-82. (Frieden and Lake, Chapter 19)

  • Kastner, S. L., and C. Rector. 2003. "International Regimes, Domestic Veto-Players, and Capital Controls Policy Stability." International Studies Quarterly 47 (1): 1-22.

  • Kastner, S. L., and C. Rector. 2005. "Partisanship and the path to financial openness." Comparative Political Studies 38 (5): 484-506.

  • Leblang David A. 1997. “Domestic and Systemic Determinants of Capital Controls in the Developed and Developing World.” International Studies Quarterly 41(3): 435-454.

  • Li, Quan and Dale L. Smith. 2003. “The Dilemma of Financial Liberalization: State Autonomy and Societal Demands.” Journal of Politics 64 (3).

  • Quadrini, V. 2005. "Policy commitment and the welfare gains from capital market liberalization." European Economic Review 49 (8): 1927-51.

  • Quinn, Dennis P. and Carla Inclán. 1997. “The Origins of Financial Openness: A Study of Current and Capital Account Liberalization.” American Journal of Political Science 41 (3): 771-813.

  • Quinn, Dennis P. 2000. “Democracy and International Financial Liberalization.” ms.

  • Quinn, Dennis P. and A. Maria Toyoda. 2007. “Ideology and Voter Preferences as Determinants of Financial Globalization.” American Journal of Political Science 51 (2): 344-363.

  • Simmons, Beth A., and Zachary Elkins. 2004. "The Globalization of Liberalization: Policy Diffusion in the International Political Economy." American Political Science Review 98 (1): 171-89.

  • Von Hagen, Jürgen and Jizhong Zhou. 2005. “The Determination of Capital Controls: Which Role Do Exchange Rate Regimes Play?” Journal of Banking and Finance 29 (1): 227-248.


Capital Liberalization and Financial Market Reform

  • Abiad, Abdul and Ashoka Mody. 2005. “Financial Reform: What Shakes It? What Shapes It?” The American Economic Review 95 (1): 66-88.

  • Chinn, Menzie and Hiro Ito. 2006. “What Matters for Financial Development? Capital Controls, Institutions, and Interactions.” Journal of Development Economics 81: 163-92.

  • Culpepper, Pepper D. 2005. “Institutional Change in Contemporary Capitalism: Coordinated Financial Systems Since 1990.” World Politics 57: 173-99.

  • Deeg, Richard and Sophia Perez. 2000. “International Capital Mobility and Domestic Institutions: Corporate Finance and Governance in Four European Cases.” Governance 13 (2): 119-154.

  • Edey, Malcom, and Ketil Hviding. 1995. “An Assessment of Financial Reform in OECD Countries.” OECD Economics Department Working Papers 154.

  • Vives, X. 2006. "Banking and regulation in emerging markets: The role of external discipline." World Bank Research Observer 21 (2): 179-206.

  • Way, Christopher R. 2005. “Political Insecurity and the Diffusion of Financial Market Regulation.” The ANNALS of the American Academy of Political and Social Science. 598: 125-44.


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