International Political Economy II

Exchange Rate Policy

• 
  Berger, Helge, Jan-Egbert Strum, Jakob de Haan. 2001. “Capital Controls and Exchange Rate Regimes: An Empirical Investigation.” CESifo Working Paper 433.
  
• 
  Bernhard, William and David Leblang. 1999. “Democratic Institutions and Exchange-rate Commitments.” International Organization 53 (1): 71-97.
  
• 
  Broz, J. Lawrence. 2002. “Political System Transparency and Monetary Commitment Regimes.” International Organization. 56 (4): 169-195.
  
• 
  Broz, J. Lawrence, Jeffry Frieden, and Stephen Weymouth. 2008. "Exchange Rate Policy Attitudes: Direct Evidence from Survey Data." Imf Staff Papers 55 (3):417-44
  
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  Broz, J. Lawrence. 2008. “Congressional voting on funding the international financial institutions.” The Review of International Organizations 3(4): 351–74.
  
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  Broz, J. Lawrence. 2011. “The United States Congress and IMF financing, 1944–2009.” The Review of International Organizations 6(3): 1–28.
  
• 
  Hausmann, Ricardo, Ugo Panizza, Ernesto Stein. 2000. “Why Do Countries Float the Way they Float?” Inter-American Development Bank Working Paper 481.
  
• 
  Eichengreen, Barry and Raul Razo-Garcia. 2006. “The Evolution of Exchange Rate Regimes.” Economic Policy (July): 393-422.
  
• 
  Fritz-Krockow, Berhnard and Emilia Magdalena Jurzyk. 2004. “Will You Buy My Peg? The Credibility of a Fixed Rate Regime as a Determinant of Bilateral Trade.” IMF Working Paper 04-065.
  
• 
  Hallerberg, Mark. 2002. “Veto Players and the Choice of Monetary Institutions.” International Organization 56 (4): 83-110.
  
• 
  Klein, Michael W. and Jay C. Shambaugh. 2004. “Fixed Exchange Rates and Trade.” NBER Working Paper 10690.
  
• 
  Shambaugh, George E. 2004.”The Power of Money: Global Capital and Policy Choices in Developing Countries.” American Journal of Political Science 48 (2): 281-95.
  

Currency Cooperation and Currency Union

• 
  Burdekin, Richard C. K., Jilleen R Westbrook and Thomas D. Willett. 1994. “Exchange Rate Pegging as a Disinflationary Strategy: Evidence from the European Monetary System,” in Pierre L. Siklos (eds.), Varieties of Monetary Reforms: Lessons and Experiences on the Road to Monetary Union (Boston: Kluwer Academic Publishers), 45-72.
  
• 
  Cooper, Scott. 2007. “Why Doesn’t Regional Monetary Cooperation Follow Trade Cooperation?” Review of International Political Economy 14 (4): 626-652.
  
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  Dyson, Kenneth, Kevin Featherstone and George Michalopoulos. 1995. “Strapped to the Mast: EC Central Bankers Between Global Financial Markets and Regional Integration.” Journal of European Public Policy 2 (3): 465-487.
  
• 
  Eichengreen, Barry and Jeffry Frieden.1994. “The Political Economy of European Monetary Unification: An Analytical Introduction,” in Barry Eichengreen and Jeffry Frieden (eds,), The Political Economy of European Monetary Integration (Boulder Co: Westview Press). (Frieden and Lake, Chapter 17)
  
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  Henning, C. Randall. 1998. “Systemic Conflict and Regional Monetary Integration: The Case of Europe.” International Organization 52 (3): 537-573.
  
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  Rose, Andrew K. 2000. “One Money, One Market: The Effect of Common Currencies on Trade.” Economic Policy 30 (1): 7-45.
  
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  Rotte, Ralph. “International Commitment and Domestic Politics: The Maastricht Case.” European Journal of International Relations 4 (1): 131-142.
  
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  Stasavage, D., and D. Guillaume. 2002. "When are monetary commitments credible? Parallel agreements and the sustainability of currency unions." British Journal of Political Science 32:119-46.
  
• 
  Walsh, James I. 1994.“International Constraints and Domestic Choices.” Political Studies 42 (2)
  

Week 9: Financial Crisis

4. 
   Oatley, Chapter 15
   

The Conserquences of Capital Liberalization

• 
  Arteta, Carlos, Barry Eichengreen & Charles Wyplosz. 2001. “When Does Capital Account Liberalization Help More Than it Hurts?” NBER Working Paper 8414
  
• 
  Bekeart,Geert, Campbell R. Harvey and Christian Lundblad. 2001. “Does Liberalization Spur Growth?” NBER Working Paper 8245
  
• 
  Desai, Milir A., C. Fritz Foley and James R. Hines Jr. 2004. “Capital Controls, Liberalizations, and Foreign Direct Investment.” NBER Working Paper 10337.
  
• 
  De Santis, Roberto A. and Paul Ehling. 2007. “Do International Portfolio Investors Follow Firm’s Foreign Investment Decisions?” ECB Working Paper Series, No. 815.
  
• 
  Edison, Hali J et al. 2002. “Capital Account Liberalization and Economic Performance: Survey and Synthesis.” NBER Working Paper 9100
  
• 
  Edwards, Sebastian. 2001. “Capital Mobility and Economic Performance: Are Emerging Economies Different?” NBER Working Paper 8076
  
• 
  Edwards, Sebastian. 2005. “Capital Controls, Sudden Stops and Current Account Reversals.” NBER Working Paper 11170
  
• 
  Fratzscher, Marcel and Matthieu Bussiere. 2004. “Financial Openness and Growth: Short-run Gain, Long-run Pain.” European Central Bank Working Paper Series 348
  
• 
  Kaminsky, Garciela Laura and Sergio L. Schmukler. 2003. “Short-run Pain, Long-run Gain: The Effects of Financial Liberalization.” IMF Working Paper 03-34
  
• 
  Moore, Will H. and Bumba Mukherjee. 2006. “Coalition Government Formation and Foreign Exchange Markets: Theory and Evidence from Europe.” International Studies Quarterly 50: 93–118.
  
• 
  Quinn, D. P., and A. M. Toyoda. 2008. "Does capital account liberalization lead to growth?" Review of Financial Studies 21 (3): 1403-49.
  

Financial Crisis

• 
  Domaç, Ilker and Maria Soledad Martinez Peria. 2000. “Banking Crises and Exchange Rate Regimes: Is There a Link?” Working Paper No. 2489 (The World Bank).
  
• 
  Eichengreen, Barry, Andrew K. Rose and Chares Wyposz. 1995. “Exchange Rate Mayhem: The Antecedents and Aftermath of Speculative Attacks.” Economic Policy (1995): 251-312.
  
• 
  Fontaine, Thomson. 2005. “Currency Crisis in Developed and Emerging Market Economies: A Comparative Empirical Treatment.” IMF Working Paper 05-03
  
• 
  Hong, Kiseok and Aaron Tornell. 2005. “Recovery from a Currency Crisis: Some Stylized Facts.” Journal of Development Economic, 76 (1): 71-86.
  
• 
  Irwin, Gregor and David Vines. 2003. “Government Guarantees, Investment, and Vulnerability to Financial Crises.” Review of International Economics 11 (5): 860-874.
  
• 
  Kaminski, Graciela L. and Carmen M. Reinhart. 1999. “The Twin Crises: The Causing of Banking and Balance-of-Payments Problems.” American Economic Review 89 (3): 473-500.
  
• 
  Kaminsky, Graciela L., Carmen M. Reinhart and Carlos A. Vegh. 2003. “The Unholy Trinity of Financial Contagion.” NBER Working Paper 10061.
  
• 
  Kaminsk, Graciela L.2006. “Currency Crises: Are They All the Same?” Journal of International Money and Finance 25:503-527.
  
• 
  Keefer, Philip. 2007. “Elections, Special Interests, and Financial Crisis.” International Organization 61: 607-641
  
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  Leblang, David and William Bernhard. 2000. “The Politics of Speculative Attacks in Industrialized Democracies.” International Organization 54 (2): 291-324.
  
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  Leblang, David and Shanker Satyanath. 2006. “Institutions, Expectations, and Currency Crises.” International Organization 60: 245-262.
  
• 
  Leaven, Luc, Daniela Klingebiel and Randy Kroszner. 2002. “Financial Crises, Financial Dependence, and Industry Growth.” World Bank Research Working Paper 2855
  
• 
  Montinola, Gabriella R. 2003. “Who Recovers First? Banking Crises Resolution in Developing Countries.” Comparative Political Studies 36 (5): 541-574.
  
• 
  Pop-Eleches, Grigore. 2008. “Crisis in the Eye of the Beholder: Economic Crisis and Partisan Politics in Latin America and East European International Monetary Fund Programs.” Comparative Political Studies 41 (9): 1179-1211.
  
• 
  Rosas, Guillermo. 2006. “Bagehot or Bailout? An Analysis of Government Responses to Banking Crises.” American Journal of Political Science 50 (1): 175-191.
  
• 
  Tornell, Aaron, Frank Westermann and Lorenza Martinez. 2004. “The Positive Link Between Financial Liberalization, Growth and Crises.” NBER Working Paper 10293.
  

Financial Crisis and IMF Loans

• 
  Barro, Robert J. and Jong-Wha Lee. 2005. “IMF Programs: Who is Chosen and What Are the Effects?” Journal of Monetary Economics 52: 1245-1269.
  
• 
  Bird, Graham, and Dane Rowlands. 2007. "The IMF and the Mobilisation of Foreign Aid." Journal of Development Studies 43 (5): 856-70.
  
• 
  Brune, Nancy, Geoffrey Garrett, and Bruce Kogut.2004. “The International Monetary Fund and the Global Spread of Privatization.” IMF Staff Papers 51 (2): 195-219.
  
• 
  Dreher, Axel and Roland Vaubel.2004. “The Causes and Consequences of IMF Conditionality.” Emerging Markets Finance and Trade 40 (3): 26-54.
  
• 
  Dreher, Axel and Roland Vaubel. 2004. “Do IMF and IBRD Cause Moral Hazard and Political Business Cycles? Evidence from Panel Data.” Open Economies Review 15: 5-22.
  
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  Dreher, Axel. 2006. “IMF and Economic Growth: The Effects of Programs, Loans, and Compliance with Conditionality.” World Development 34 (5): 769-788.
  
• 
  Dreher, Axel and Nathan M. Jensen. 2007. “Independent Actor or Agent? An Empirical Analysis of the Impact of U.S. Interests on International Monetary Fund Conditions.” Journal of Law and Economics 50:105-124.
  
• 
  Gould, Erica R. 2003. “Money Talks: Supplementary Financiers and International Monetary Fund Conditionality.” International Organization 57: 551-586.
  
• 
  Jensen, Nathan M. 2004.“Crisis, Conditions, and Capital: The Effect of Monetary Fund Agreements on Foreign Direct Investment Inflows” Journal of Conflict Resolution 48 (2): 194-210.
  
• 
  Kan, Seonjou. 2007. “Agree to Reform? The Political Economy of Conditionality Variation in International Monetary Fund Lending, 1983-1997.” European Journal of Political Research 46: 685-720.
  
• 
  Mayer, Wolfgang, and Alexandros Mourmouras. 2005. "The Political Economy of IMF Conditionality: A Common Agency Model." Review of Development Economics 9 (4): 449-66.
  
• 
  Mody, Ashoka, and Diego Saravia. 2006. "Catalysing Private Capital Flows: Do IMF Programmes Work as Commitment Devices?" Economic Journal 116: 843-67.
  
• 
  Mody, Ashoka, and Diego Saravia. 2008. “From Crisis to IMF-Supported Program: Does democracy impede the speed required by financial markets.” IMF Working Paper 08-276.
  
• 
  Moser, Christoph and Jan-Egbert Sturm. 2011. “Explaining IMF lending decisions after the Cold War.” The Review of International Organizations 6(3): 307–40.
  
• 
  Mukherjee, Bumba and David Andrew Singer. 2010. “International Institutions and Domestic Compensation: The IMF and the Politics of Capital Account Liberalization.” American Journal of Political Science 54(1): 45–60.
  
• 
  Nooruddin, Irfan and Joel W. Simmons. 2006. “The Politics of Hard Choices: IMF Programs and Government Spending.” International Organization 60 (4): 1001-1033.
  
• 
  Przeworski, Adam and Jamse Raymond Vreeland 2000. “The Effect of IMF Programs on Economic Growth.” Journal of Development Economics 62: 385-421.
  
• 
  Stone, R. W. 2008. "The Scope of IMF Conditionality." International Organization 62 (4): 589-620Thacker, Strom C. 1999.“The High Politics of IMF Lending.” World Politics 52: 38-75.
  
• 
  Vreeland, James Raymond. 2003.“Why Do Governments and the IMF Enter into Agreements? Statistically Selected Cases.” International Political Science Review 24 (3): 321-343.
  

Week 10: International Financial Regulation
International Financial Regulation

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  Barajas, Adolfo Ralph Chami, and Thomas Cosimano. 2005. “Did the Basel Accord Cause a Credit Slowdown in Latin America.” IMF Working Paper WP-05-38
  
• 
  Bernauer, Thomas, and Vally Koubi. 2006. “On the Interconnectedness of Regulatory Policy and Markets: Lessons from Banking.” British Journal of Political Science 36:509-525.
  
• 
  Decamps, Jean-Paul, Jean-Charles Rochet, and Benoit Roger. 2004. "The Three Pillars of Basel II: Optimizing the Mix." Journal of Financial Intermediation 13:132-55.
  
• 
  Demirguc-Kunt, Asli, Enrica Detragiache, and Thierry Tressel. 2006. "Banking on the Principles: Compliance with Basel Core Principles and Bank Soundness." In IMF Working Paper.
  
• 
  Grieco, Joseph M. Christopher F. Gelpi, and T. Camber Warren. 2009. “When Preferences and Commitments Collide: The Effect of Relative Partisan Shifts on International Treaty Compliance.” International Organization 63 (Spring): 341-355.
  
• 
  Holdausen, Cornelia and Thomas Rende. 2004. “Cooperation in International Banking Supervision.” European Central Bank Working Paper no. 316
  
• 
  Kapstein, Ethan B. 1989. “Resolving the Regulator’s Dilemma: International Coordination of Banking Regulations.” International Organization 43 (2): 454-478.
  
• 
  Jacques, Kevin T. 2008. "Capital Shocks, Bank Asset Allocation, and the Revised Basel Accord." Review of Financial Economics 17 (2): 79-91King, Michael R.and Thimothy J. Sinclair. 2003. "Private Actors and Public Policy: A Requiem for the New Basel Capital Accord." International Political Science Review 24 (3): 345-62.
  
• 
  Oatley, Thomas and Robert Nabors. 1998. “Redistributive Cooperation: Market Failure, Welfare Transfers, and the Basle Accord.” International Organization 52 (1): 55-86.
  
• 
  Pagno, Marco, and Paolo Volpin. 2001. “The Political Economy of Finance.” Oxford Review of Economic Policy 17 (4): 502-519.
  
• 
  Posner, Elliot. 2009. “Making Rules for Global Finance: Transatlantic Regulatory Cooperation at the Turn of the Millennium.” International Organization 63 (Fall): 665-699.
  
• 
  Quaglia, L. 2007. "The politics of financial services regulation and supervision reform in the European Union." European Journal of Political Research 46 (2): 269-90.
  
• 
  Quaglia, L. 2008. "Explaining the reform of banking supervision in Europe: An integrative approach." Governance 21 (3): 439-63.
  
• 
  Quinn, Dennis. 1997.“The Correlates of Change in International Financial Regulation.” American Political Science Review 91 (3): 531-551.
  
• 
  Simmons, Beth A. 2000. “International Law and State Behavior: Commitment and Compliance in International Monetary Affairs.” American Political Science Review 94 (4): 819-835.
  
• 
  Simmons, Beth A. 2001. “The International Politics of Harmonization: The Case of Capital Market Regulation.” International Organization 55 (3): 589-620.
  
• 
  Singer, David Andrew. 2004. “Capital Rules: The Domestic Politics of International Regulatory Harmonization.” International Organization 58: 531-565
  
• 
  von Thadden, E. L. 2004. "Bank Capital Adequacy Regulation under the New Basel Accord." Journal of Financial Intermediation 13: 90-95.
  

Week 11: Capital Mobility and Economic Reforms

3. 
   Oatley, Chapter 13
   

Capital Mobility and Economic Policy

• 
  Andrews, David M. 1994. “Capital Mobility and State Autonomy.” International Studies Quarterly 38 (2): 193-218.
  
• 
  Annett A. 2002. “Politics, Government Size, and Fiscal Adjustment in Industrial Countries.” IMF Working Papers 02-162.
  
• 
  Bearce, David. 2002. “Monetary Divergence: Domestic Political Institutions and the Monetary Autonomy-Exchange Rate Stability Trade-Off.” Comparative Political Studies 35 (2): 194-220.
  
• 
  Boix, Carles. 2000. “Partisan Governments, the International Economy, and Macroeconomic Polices in Advanced Nations, 1960-93.” World Politics 53 (1): 38-73.
  
• 
  Boltho, A., and A. Glyn. 2006. "Prudence or profligacy: Deficits, debt, and fiscal consolidation." Oxford Review of Economic Policy 22 (3): 411-25.
  
• 
  Burdekin, Richard C. K., Jilleen R Westbrook and Thomas D. Willett. 1994. “Exchange Rate Pegging as a Disinflationary Strategy: Evidence from the European Monetary System.” in Pierre L. Siklos (eds.), Varieties of Monetary Reforms: Lessons and Experiences on the Road to Monetary Union (Boston: Kluwer Academic Publishers), 45-72.
  
• 
  Clark, William Robert et.al. 1998. “International and Domestic Constraints on Political Business Cycles in OECD Economies.” International Organization 51 (1): 87-120.
  
• 
  Clark, William Robert and Mark Hallerberg. 2000. “Mobile Capital, Domestic Institutions, and Electoral Induced Monetary and Fiscal Policy.” American Political Science Review 94 (2): 323-346.
  
• 
  Corsetti, Giancarlo and Gernot J. Muller. 2006. “Twin Deficits: Squaring Theory, Evidence and Common Sense.” Economic Policy 48:597-638.
  
• 
  Crepaz, M. M. L., and A. W. Moser. 2004. "The impact of collective and competitive veto points on public expenditures in the global age." Comparative Political Studies 37 (3): 259-85.
  
• 
  Cusack, Thomas R. 1999. “Partisan Politics and Fiscal Policy.” Comparative Political Studies. 32 (4): 464-484.
  
• 
  Cusack, Thomas R. 2001. “Partisanship in the Setting and Coordination of Fiscal and Monetary Policies.” European Journal of Political Research 40: 93-115.
  
• 
  Dreher, A., J. E. Sturm, and H. W. Ursprung. 2008. "The impact of globalization on the composition of government expenditures: Evidence from panel data." Public Choice 134 (3-4): 263-92.
  
• 
  Eichengreen, Barry and Charles Wypolz. 1998. “The Stability Pact: More than a Minor Nuisance?” Economic Policy 26: 65-113.
  
• 
  Frankel, Jeffrey A. 2004. “Managing Macroeconomic Crises.” NBER Working Paper 10907.
  
• 
  Hallerberg, Mark. 2004. Domestic Budgets in a United Europe: Fiscal governance from the end of Bretton Woods to EMU (Ithaca: Cornell University Press)
  
• 
  Kumar, Manmahon S. Kumar, Daniel Leigh, and Alexander Plekhanov. 2007. “Fiscal Adjustments: Determinants and Macroeconomic Consequences.” IMF Working Paper 07-178.
  
• 
  Li, Quan. 2001. “Commitment Compliance in G-7 Summit Macroeconomic Policy Coordination.” Political Research Quarterly 54 (2): 355-378
  
• 
  Oatley, Thomas. 1999. “How Constraining is Capital Mobility? The Partisan Hypothesis in an Open Economy.” American Journal of Political Science 43 (4): 1003-1027.
  
• 
  Satyanath, Shanker and Arvind Subramanian. 2004. “What Determines Long-ran Macroeconomic Stability? Democratic Institutions.” IMF Working Paper 04-215
  
• 
  Way, Christopher. 2000. “Central Banks, Partisan Politics, and Macroeconomic Outcomes.” Comparative Political Studies 33 (2): 196-224.
  
• 
  Webb, Michael C. 1991. “International Economic Structures, Government Interests, and International Coordination of Macroeconomic Adjustment Policies.” International Organization 45 (3): 309-342.
  
• 
  Weber, Axel A.1996. “Foreign Exchange Intervention and International Policy Coordination: Comparing the G3 and EMS Expernience.” in Matthew B. Canzoneri et al. (eds,), The Transatlantic Economy (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press).
  
• 
  Zohlnhofer, Reimut, Herbert Obinger, and Frieder Wolf. 2008.“Partisan Politics, Globalization, and the Determinants of Privatization Proceeds in Advanced Democracies (1990-2000).” Governance 21 (1): 95-122.
  

Capital Mobility and Tax Reform

• 
  Bretschger, Lucas, and Frank Hettich. 2002. “Globalisation, Capital Mobility and Tax Competition: Theory and evidence for OECD countries.” European Journal of Political Economy 18: 695-716.
  
• 
  Cusack, Thomas R., and Pablo Beramendi. 2006. “Taxing Work.” European Journal of Political Research 45: 43-73.
  
• 
  Daveri, Francsco and Guido Tabellini. 2000. “Unemployment, Growth and Taxation in Industrial Countires.” Economic Policy 30: 49-104
  
• 
  Devereux, Michael P., Rachel Griffith, and Alexander Klemm. 2002. “Corporate Income Tax Reforms and International Tax Competition.” Economic Policy 35: 451-495.
  
• 
  Garrett, Geoffrey and Deborah Mitchell. 2001. “Globalization, Government Spending and Taxation in the OECD.” European Journal of Political Research 39: 145-177.
  
• 
  Griffith, Rachel, and Alexander Klemm. 2004. “What Has Been the Tax Competition Experience of the Last 20 Years.” IFS Working Paper 04-05.
  
• 
  Hallerberg, Mark and Scott Basinger. 1998. “Internationalization and Changes in Tax Policy in OECD Countries: The Importance of Domestic Veto Players.” Comparative Political Studies. 31 (3): 321-352
  
• 
  Mosley, Layna. 2000. “Room to Move: International Financial Markets and National Welfare States.” International Organization 54 (4): 737-73.
  
• 
  Swank, Duane. 1998. “Funding the Welfare State: Globalization and the Taxation of Business in Advanced Market Economies.” Political Studies 46: 671-692.
  
• 
  Swank, Duane. 2006. “Tax Policy in an Era of Internationalization: Explaining the Spread of Neoliberalism.” International Organization 60 (4): 847-882.
  

Capital Mobility and Product Market Reform

• 
  Alesina, Alberto, Silvia Ardagna, and Vincenzo Galasso. “The Euro and Structural Reforms.” NBER Working Paper Series 14479.
  
• 
  Belke, Ansgar, Bernhard Herz, and Lukas Vogel. 2007. “Reforms, Exchange Rates and Monetary Commitment: A Panel Analysis for OECD Countries.” Oxford Economic Review 18: 369-88.
  
• 
  Brooks, Sarah M., and Marcus J. Kurtz. 2007. “Capital, Trade, and the Political Economy.” American Journal of Political Science 51 (4): 703–720
  
• 
  Duval, Romain. Jørgem Elmeskov. 2005. “The Effects of EMU on Structural Reforms in Labor and Product Markets.” OECD Economics Department Working Papers 438.
  
• 
  Duval, Romain. 2008. “Is There a Role for Macroeconomic Policy in Fostering Structural Reforms? Panel evidence from OECD countries over the past two decades.” European Journal of Political Economy 24: 491-502.
  
• 
  Duval, Romain, and Lukas Vogel. 2008. “Economic Resilience to Shocks: The Role of Structural Policies.” OECD Economic Studies 44-1: 1-38.
  
• 
  Fiori, Giuseppe, Giuseppe Nicoletti, Stefano Scarpetta, and Fabio Schiantarelli. 2007. “Employment Outcomes and the Interaction between Product and Labor Market Deregulation: Are they substitutes or complements?” IZA Discussion Paper Series 2770.
  
• 
  Griffith, Rachel, Rupert Harrison, and Gareth Macartney. 2007. “Product Market Reforms, Labor Market Institutions and Unemployment.” 2007. “The Economic Journal 117 (March): C142-C166.
  
• 
  Henisz, Witold J., Bennet A. Zelner, and Mauro F. Guillén. 2005. “The Worldwide Diffusion of Market-Oriented Infrastructure Reform, 1977-1999.” American Sociological Review 70 (December): 871-97.
  
• 
  Høj, Jens, Vincenzo Galasso, Giuseppe Nicoletti, and Thai-Thanh Dang. 2006. “The Political Economy of Structural Reform.” OECD Economics Department Working Papers 501.
  
• 
  Kennedy, Mike, and Torsten Sløk. 2005. “Structural Policy Reforms and External Imbalances.” OECD Economics Department Working Papers 415.
  
• 
  Nicoletti, Giuseppe, and Stefano Scarpetta. 2003. “Product Market Reforms and Employment in OECD Countries.” OECD Economics Department Working Papers 472.
  
• 
  Pitlik, Hans, and Steffen Writh. 2003. “Do Crisis Promote the Extent of Economic Liberalization? An Empirical Test.” European Journal of Political Economy 19: 565-81.
  
• 
  Pitlik, Hans. 2007. “A Race to Liberalization? Diffusion of economic policy reform among OECD economies.” Public Choice 132: 159-178.
  
• 
  Uprelainen, Johannes. 2010. “Regulation under Economic Globalization.” International Studies Quarterly 54: 1099-1121