Islamist radicalisation the challenge for euro-mediterranean relations

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individual statements of powerful sheikhs. One faction justifies democratic 
practices for purely strategic purposes while another attempts to 
accommodate democratic practices within their ideology. Recently, the 
tensions among the various trends within Islah have threatened to split the 
party, particularly as those running the party bureaucracy have pushed to 
invigorate the party’s role as an oppositional actor.  
Extreme pressure from the regime has at times led to splits within 
Islamist movements. In the 1990s, as the government was cracking down 
on Islamists, differences over whether to register as a political party led to a 
split within the MB, with one group leaving to form the more liberal Hizb 
al-Wasat (Centre Party). In a similar fashion, Haq split from Wefaq in 2006 
in a dispute over participation in the elections. Some predict that splinter 
groups and radical elements could rebel against mainstream movements 
that play according to the rules of the political game.  
When regimes go too far in their efforts to interfere with the system 
or in elections, their actions can result in boycotts. Still, while from time to 
time Islamist parties will decide to boycott elections owing to 
dissatisfaction with the process, there do not seem to be any signs of a 
permanent disengagement by any party. For example, the IAF’s boycott in 
1997 was argued on the grounds of a series of extra-parliamentary 
procedures considered unconstitutional (press and publication 
amendments), but they have participated since then. In the same way, 
despite deciding to boycott the 2002 parliamentary elections, Wefaq is now 
considered to be on the moderate side of the spectrum. The Muslim 
Brotherhood decided to boycott local elections two days before they were 
scheduled to take place in April 2008 and it stepped up its confrontational 
rhetoric and called on all Egyptians to join the boycott. While Mehdi Akef, 
the general guide of the Brotherhood, warned that the government’s 
actions could trigger violence he was careful to emphasise his group’s 
commitment to peaceful activism. Indeed, many observers fear that 
Islamist boycotts of elections could eventually incite popular revolts that 
could end in violence. 
Failure to achieve results through political participation has reopened 
an internal Islamist debate on how best to effect change, yet at least among 
the established parties there has been no move to disengage from political 
participation or threats to abandon a policy of peaceful change. 
The clearest consequence of the lack of progress on the political 
participation front seems to be growing disenchantment with 

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R
ADICALISATION OF MODERATE 
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SLAMIST PARTIES
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R
EALITY OR CHIMERA
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parliamentary politics, as reflected for example in the low percentage of 
participation in the 2007 elections in Morocco. Elections are seen as 
fraudulent or merely cosmetic. The general disinterest, disappointment and 
sense of uselessness regarding the voting process can also be attributed to 
the lack of positive results. Given that for the most part parliaments are 
powerless and dominated by a majority loyal to the regime, efforts by the 
Islamist parties to shape the legislative process have been in vain. This 
powerlessness and inability to affect policy provides damning evidence for 
those opposed to accommodating the regime.
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 Public disinterest and 
disappointment extends not only to the process, but also to the Islamists 
themselves as reflected in their poor electoral results. As  parliamentary 
systems in which Islamists participate are seen as cosmetic attempts to 
cover up autocracy rather than real opportunities to influence governance, 
participants stand accused of legitimising an undemocratic regime.
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 This 
could lead to increased support for groups operating outside the system. If 
Islamist parties are denied the opportunity of meaningful participation, 
their supporters could turn to actors who are more radical or they could 
choose to disengage completely from the political process – neither of 
which is an option in the interests of the EU.  
In sum, despite the perception that regime intransigence will lead to 
the radicalisation of Islamist parties, the empirical evidence does not seem 
to support this. If anything, it is the voters who are disengaging and 
withdrawing their support from the Islamist parties. Furthermore, it seems 
that one cannot even speak of a splintering of the parties as differences 
between the more hawkish or liberal elements are often reconciled 
internally. Indeed, the main result of the latest setback in the polls for the 
Islamist parties has been a round of internal discussions that have 
culminated in renewed commitment to the system. 
When Hammam Sa’id, known as a hardliner, was elected general 
guide of the Muslim Brotherhood in Jordan in May 2008, many predicted 
heightened confrontation between the regime and opposition. Since being 
elected, however, he has toned down his rhetoric and made an effort to 
reach understandings with the government on key issues. As ties between 
Islamists and the regime have improved, so too have relations between the 
                                                      
43
 Piscatori (2006), op. cit., p. 49. 
44
 Wittes (2008), op. cit. 

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