Itinerarium mentis in deum the journey of the mind into god



Yüklə 453,02 Kb.
səhifə10/10
tarix05.12.2017
ölçüsü453,02 Kb.
#14068
1   2   3   4   5   6   7   8   9   10

 

 

P. 316



 

est »; denique esse supra nos.  Sed breviter commemoratis duobus prioribus, totus versatur in contemplatione illius esse, quod est « supra nos » nec attingitur nisi ab oculo contemplativo.  Ne igitur lector a genuino huius capituli sensu aberret, ea quae in cap. 3. dicta sunt et nexus gradus quinti cum tertio mente retinenda sunt.

finally the ‘being’ above us.  But having briefly recalled those two prior ones, he turns entirely to the contemplation of that ‘being’, which is « above us » and is not attained except by the contemplative eye.  Therefore lest the reader wander away from the genuine sense of this chapter, those things which are said in Chapter 3 and the connexion of the fifth step with the third must be kept in mind.

Tertio, contemplatio huius 5. gradus fundatur in axiomate Avicennae communiter a Scholasticis recepto, quod « ens (esse) est quod primo cadit in intellectu ».  Haec sententia intelligitur proprie de illo ente communi, primo actu intellectus concepto, quod nullo modo manifestari nobis potest per aliquid notius illo.  Hoc tamen ens, quatenus conciptitur ab intellectu apprehendente, « non est aliquid determinatum, nec actu nec potentia, nec praesens nec futurum, nec homo vel equus et huiusmodi, sed ens, quod est superius ad omnia ista, et ego dico, quod quidditas illa est ens in intellectu . . . licet non sit ens in actu, quia nec hoc est de intellectuo suo » (Matth. ab Aquasparta, in cit. Opusc. de Hum. Cognitionis ratione, pag. 120; sive in quaest. disp.:  Utrum ad cognitionem rei requiratur ipsius rei existentia etc., ad 4; cfr. ad 5.6. 7. et corp., ubi etiam alia sunt ad rem spectantia).  S. Thom. (S. I. II. q. 94. a. 2. corp.) dicit:  « Illud quod primo cadit in apprehensione, est ens, cuius intellectus includitur in omnibus, quaecumque quis apprehendit; et ideo primum principium indemonstrabile est, quod non est simul affirmare et negare, quod fundatur super rationem entis et non entis, et super hoc principio omnia alia fundatur » (cfr. idem de Potentia q. 9. a. 7. ad 15. et in fine; S. I. q. 11. a. 2. ad 4.).

Third, the contemplation of this 5th step is founded on the axiom of Avicenna commonly received by Scholastics, that « being [ens]* is what first falls in the intellect ».  This sentence is understood properly of that common being, conceived by the first act of the intellect, which in no manner can be made manifest to us through something more known than it.  However this being, insofar as it is conceived by the intellect apprehending, « is not something determinate, neither according to act nor potency, neither present nor future, neither man nor horse and things of this kind, but being, which is superior to all these, and I say, that this quiddity is being in the intellect . . . though it be not being in act, because neither does this concern its own understanding » (Matthew of Aquasparta, in the cited Opusculum de Humanae Cognitionis ratione, p. 120; or in the disputed question:  “Whether for cognition of a thing there is required the existence of the thing itself” etc., ad 4; cf. ad 5, 6, and 7, and in the body of the question, where there are also some other things regarding the matter at hand).  St. Thomas (Summa, I, II, q. 94, a. 2 in the body) says:  « That which first falls upon the apprehension, is a being, the understanding of which is included in all things, whatsoever anyone apprehends; and for that reason the first principle is indemonstrable, because there is no simultaneous affirmation and negation, which is founded upon the reckoning of being and non-being, and upon this principle all other things are founded » (cf. the same author’s De Potentia, q. 9, a. 7, ad 15 and at the end; Summa, I, q. 11, a. 2, ad 4).

Hoc esse analogum, ab intellectu apprehendente primo cognitum, non est nisi tenuissima umbra divini esse, a quo ratione realitatis toto caelo distat eique quasi est oppositum; nihilominus ratione suae maximae universalitatis, primitatis et simplicitatis aptum est contemplativo oculo fieri speculum ad divina contemplanda.  Observat etiam Richardus a Med. (I. Sent., d. III. p. I. a. 3. q. 3.):  « cum intelligimus ens in communi, non descendendo ad ens creatum vel increatum, intelligimus Deum intellectione generalissima, in quantum intelligimus aliquid commune sibi et cuilibet creaturae, non communitate univoca, sed analoga.  Et haec naturalis cognitio de Deo prior est quam Dei cognitio [propria] per vestigium; quia ista praesupponit in intellectu alicuius alterius cognitionem, sed illa non.  Unde secundum Avicennam . . . ens commune omnibus rebus nullo modo potest manifestari nobis per aliquid notius illo.  Alio modo cognoscitur Deus a nobis in generali, in quantum cognoscimus, esse aliquod ens increatum, cuiuslibet entis creati causam efficientem et finalem; et hanc cognitionem habemus de Deo per naturam primo per vestigium ».  —  Omnia haec confirmari possunt testimoniis nostri auctoris, quorum unum insigne iuvat transcribere, in quo loquitur de genere generalissimo et specie specialissima et sic concludit:  « Et hinc est, quod genus in aliquo assimiliatur Deo magis quam species, in aliquo e converso. Deus enim, quia nobilissimus est in fine totius nobilitatis, simul habet in se omnem perfectionem, ita quod ipse est simplicissimus et omnino incorruptibilis, est etiam perfectus et in omnimoda actualitate constitutus.  Creatura vero, secundum quod potest, semiplene assimilatur Deo; et quantum ad rationem simplicitatis et incorruptibilitatis magis assimilatur magis universale, quantum ad rationem actualitatis magis assimilatur minus universale » (II. Sent. d. 18. a. 1. q. 3. in corp. cira finem).  Eo fortius hoc valet de universalibus transcendentalibus, quorum primum et generalissimum est esse.

This analogous ‘being’, first cognized by the apprehending intellect, is not but the most tenuous shadow of the divine ‘being’, from which it is by a reckoning of reality an entire heaven in distance and quasi Its opposite; nevertheless by reason of its greatest universality, primacy and simplicity it is apt to be become for the contemplative eye a mirror for contemplating divine things.  Richard of Milan also observes ( Sent., Bk. I, d. III, p. I, a. 3, q. 3):  « when we understand being in common (terms), not by descending to being created and/or uncreated, we understand God by the most general intellection, inasmuch as we understand something common to Him and to any creature, not by a univocal commonness, but by an analogical one.  And this natural cognition of God is more first than the (proper) cognition of God through the vestige; because that presupposes the cognition of something other in the intellect, but this one does not.  Whence according to Avicenna . . . the being common to all things can in no manner be made manifest to us through something more known that it.  In another manner God is cognized by us in general (terms), inasmuch as we cognize, that some uncreated being is, the efficient and final cause of any created being; and this cognition we have of God through nature first through the vestige ».  — All this can be confirmed by the testimonies of our author, one of which it markedly helps to quote here, in which he speaks of a most general genus and a most special species and concludes in this manner:  « And hence it is, that genus in something is assimilated to God more than species, in something and vice-versa. For God, because He is most noble is at the end of all nobility, has together in Himself every perfection, thus that He Himself is most simple and entirely incorruptible, is also perfect and constituted in an omnimodal actuality.  A creature, on the other hand, according to which it is able, is assimilated to God semi-fully; and as much as regards its reckoning of simplicity and of incorruptibility the more it is assimilated the more it is universal, as much as regards its reckoning of actuality the more it is assimilated the less universal » (Sent., Bk. II, d. 18, a. 1, q. 3, in corp. near the end).  For this reason this is all the more valid concerning transcendental universals, of which the first and most general is ‘being’.

Quarto, ipsa verba auctoris in cap. 5. satis manifestant, quod bene distinguat ab esse divino, quod est actus purus, illa duo alia.  Dicit enim:  « Sed hoc non est esse particulare [extra nos realiter existens], quod est esse arctatum, quia permixtum est cum potentia; nec esse analogum [in intellectu intra nos], quia minime habet de actu, eo quod minime est ».  De esse analogo sive communissimo, quod est quasi infimum inter omnia, quibus competit esse, auctor hic non loquitur, nisi quatenus occasionem dat contemplandi ipsum esse (supra nos).  Unde monet:  « Volens contemplari Dei invisiblia quoad essentiae unitatem defigat aspectum in ipsum esse et videat » etc. (n. 3).  Item:  « Vide igitur ipsum purissimum esse, si potes, et occurrit tibi » etc. (n. 5).  Haec verba de  « ipso esse » manifeste non intelliguntur de primo illo actu intellectus apprehendentis, qui naturaliter et necessario exercetur, et cuius obiectum est tenuissimum illud esse, quod non est primum et purum esse, sed potius eiusdam longinqua umbra.  Intellectus autem reflectens et resolvens, et praecipue oculus contemplativus facile advertere potest, ipsum esse per se, quod est primum a parte rei essendi et cognoscendi principium, esse aliquid supra nos et ante nos, in quod omne esse creatum et etiam illud communissimum primi universalis esse radicatur, et in quod omnia ducunt intellectum resolventem.  Hoc sensu etiam S. Thomas (S. I. q. 3. a. 5, sed contra)  proclamat:  « Nihil prius est Deo, nec secundum rem nec secundum intellectum ».  Quod manifeste dictum est non ex parte intellectus humani, qui in caecitate sua prius umbram veritatis quam ipsam veritatem in se apprehendit, sed ex parte rei vel intellectus superioris, qui bene videt, ipsum esse praecedere umbram ipsius.  —  Hoc sensu accipienda sunt illa verba, quae multis fuerunt lapis offensionis:  «  Esse igitur est, quod primo cadit in intellectu; et illud esse est, quod est pururs actus » (n. 3.).  Sensus igitur genuinus hic est:  ipsum esse non est in rebus particularibus nisi per participationem et modo arctato et imperfecto, nec ab intellectu humano primo suo actu apprehenditur in sua puritate et distinctione, sed tantum imperfectissime in illa communissimi esse umbra; idem tamen ab oculo contemplativo cognoscitur distincte ut illud esse, quo revera « nihil prius est, nec secundum rem nec secundum intellectum ».  Quia autem intellectus apprehendens propter suam caecitatem illud esse purissimum « non videt », « nec advertit », immo « videtur sibi nihil videre » (ut inculcatur, ibid. n. 4.); S. Doctor miro acumine secundum intellectum reflectentem et resolventem ex ipso conceptu  esse per se evolvit praecipua attributa divina.

Fourth, the very works of our author in Chapter 5 sufficiently manifest, that he distinguished well these two others from the divine ‘being’, which is a pure act.  For he says:  « But this is not particular ‘being’ (really existing outside of us), which is constrained ‘being’, because it is commingled with potency; nor is it analogous ‘being’, because it has the least actuality, for the reason that it scarcely is ».  Of analogous or most common ‘being’, which is quasi lowest among all beings, to which (the term) ‘being´ pertains, our author does not speak here, except insofar as it gives him occasion to contemplate ‘being’ itself (above us).  Whence he warns:  « Wanting therefore to contemplate the invisible things of God in regard to His unity of essence, let (the mind) first fix its power of sight upon ‘being’ itself and see » etc. (n. 3).  Likewise:  « See, therefore, that most pure ‘being’, if you can, and it occurs to you » etc. (n. 5).  These words concerning « ‘being’ itself » [ipso esse] manifestly are not understood of that first act of the intellect apprehending, which naturally and necessarily is exercised, and whose object is that most tenuous ‘being’, which is not the first and pure ‘being’, but rather a distant shadow of it.  On the other hand, the intellect reflecting and resolving, and chiefly the contemplative eye can easily advert, that ‘being’ itself per se, which is first in respect to the existing thing [a parte rei essendi] and the principle of cognizing, is something above us and before us, in which every created ‘being’ and even that most common ‘being´ of the prime universal is rooted, and into which all things lead the resolving intellect.  In this sense St. Thomas (Summa., I, q. 3, a. 5, sed contra) also proclaims: « Nothing is prior to God, neither according to thing [rem] nor according to understanding [intellectum] ».  Which is manifestly said not on the part of the human intellect, which in its blindness first apprehends a shadow of the truth than the very truth in itself, but on the part of the thing and/or superior intellect, which sees well, that ‘being’ itself precedes its shadow.  —  In this sense are to be accepted those words, which have become a stumbling block to many:  «Therefore ‘being’ is what first falls in the intellect, and ‘being’ is that which is a pure act » (n. 3).  Therefore the genuine sense is this:  ‘being´ itself is not in particular things except through (their) participation (in it) and (this) in a constrained and imperfect manner, nor by the human intellect in its own first act, is it apprehended in its purity and distinction, but only most imperfectly in that shadow of most common ‘being’; nevertheless the same is cognized distinctly by the contemplative eye as that ‘being’, to which in truth « nothing is prior, neither according to thing nor according to understanding ».  Moreover because the intellect apprehending on account of its own blindness « does not see », « nor advert  » to that most pure ‘being’, nay rather « it seems to it that it sees nothing » (as is taught, ibid., n. 4); the Seraphic Doctor with wonderful acumen expounds the chief attributes of God according to the intellect reflecting and resolving, from the concept itself of per se ‘being’ itself [ esse per se].

In toto autem Itinerario suo Seraphicus innitiur doctrinae S. Augustini; ad cuius profunditatem intelligendam simul optimam quasi clavem praebet.  Qui igitur sublime hoc opusculum bene vult intelligere legat vel potius meditetur S.Augustini libros de Vera Religione, VI. de Musica et II. et III. de Libero Arbitrio, vel saltem confera locos a nobis in notis allegatos.

Moreover, in his entire Itinerarium the Seraphic Doctor leans upon the doctrine of St. Augustine and at the same time offers in a sense the best key for understanding his profundity.  Therefore who would understand this sublime work well, let him read and/or rather meditate on the books of St. Augustine, De Vera Religione, De Musica, Bk. VI, and De Libero Arbitrio, Bks. II and III, and/or at least refer himself to those passages cited by us in the notes here above.

 

 

* [Translator’s Note:  Here the critical text juxtaposes the term esse to term ens.  Scholasticism for all its erudition and exactitude has no consensus for the proper term for being.  With the Greek, following such authors in Latin translations, as Avicenna, St. Thomas and others (for example Richard of Milan, here in the Scholium, n. 9, p.  313, and Bl. John Duns Scotus, cited here below) employ ens, while St. Bonaventure, whenever he writes on his own, apart from quoting others, employs esse.  Each in its own manner has its advantages and draw backs.  Properly, since every being is constituted by an act of being, it does not seem fitting that the present active participle, used as a substantive, in the form of ens or being should be employed for the most common and general ontological characteristic of all things, especially when the use of a gerund of the verb ‘to be’ would capture more closely this fundamental truth of metaphysics.  On the other hand to employ the gerund in Latin, when this is identical to the infinitive of the verb ‘to be’, confounds the distinction between essence and existence, between being in its most general sense and the act of existing. St. Bonaventure for his part appears to follow the linguistic custom of the Latin and Italic tongues, which employ the infinitive of the verb for the gerund; while St. Thomas appears to have accepted the linguistic custom of the Greek, and of French, (which is also that of modern English) which even today uses the present active participle as the gerund of the verb.  For a modern English translation, I have always followed the principle here at The Franciscan Archive that a translation should be as transparent as possible, allowing the English reader to understand the Latin author, as it seems best that that author would have so expressed himself in modern English, had he had the talent and opportunity.  For this reason, in the translation above, and throughout the translations at the Franciscan Archive, whenever esse is employed in its metaphysical and proper sense, the translation ‘being’ is employed and when ens is similarly employed, not for the individual being, but for the general reality, being without quotes or necessarily italics, is employed. I leave it to scholars to sort out why apparently such erudite men as St. Thomas and St. Bonaventure, who quoted differing uses of the term for being, continued to use ambiguous terminology, sometimes even in the same tract, as is done here.

Contemporary scholastics also follow this same ambiguous terminology.  For example, here in the Itinerarium, p. 308, in footnote 8, the Quaracchi editors seemingly contradict the usage of identifying ens and esse which they employ here in the Scholium; saying on p. 308 in the said footnote, « It must be noted, that Avicenna says being [ens], not ‘being’ [esse], which is what is being discussed here. »  Which comment would be superfluous if the editors had in mind the identity of ens and esse in all usages regarding being.  —  Similarly Bl. John Duns Scotus, Sent., Prolog., p. I. q. unic. n. 1, p. 2 in the critical edition, quotes the same passage of Avicenna referred to above thus: Avicenna in his First Book on the Metaphysics, chapter 5 [chapter 6 (72rb)] (says):  « Being [ens] and thing by a first impression are impressed upon the soul, nor can they be made manifest from others »;  if, however, anything other than these would be the first object, those could be manifested through a reckoning of it; but this is impossible. — And yet the critical edition of Scotus’ works in the footnote to the passage just prior has this citation: Avicenna, Metaphysics. I c. 6 (73ra):  « ‘being’ [esse] on the other hand is more known than ‘non-being’ »; even though Scotus has just written: « But the first natural object of our intellect is being inasmuch as it is being [ens in quantum ens];  therefore our intellect can naturally have an act about whatever being, and thus about whatever intelligible non-being, because negation is cognized through affirmation ».  What Scotus says here is certainly true, however, the cognition of the reader is rather negated by a twofold usage and affirmation.]



 

The English translation here has been released to the public domain by its author. The / symbol is used to indicate that the text which follows appeared on the subsequent page of the Quarrachi Edition. The translation of the notes in English corresponds to the context of the English text, not that of the Latin text; likewise they are a freer translation that that which is necessitated by the body of the text. Items in square [ ] brackets are Latin terms corresponding to the previous English word(s) and/or notes added by the translator.






Yüklə 453,02 Kb.

Dostları ilə paylaş:
1   2   3   4   5   6   7   8   9   10




Verilənlər bazası müəlliflik hüququ ilə müdafiə olunur ©genderi.org 2024
rəhbərliyinə müraciət

    Ana səhifə