Itinerarium mentis in deum the journey of the mind into god

P. 315

 

fieri potest arguendo et resolvendo ab intellectu rationabiliter investigante; perfectius autem fit ab eodem illuminato et intellectualiter contemplante.  —  Ordo hic idealis, vulgari intellectui obscurus et fere ignotus, a S. Bonaventura, duce S. Augustino, praecipuo studio in capp. 2. 3. 5. 6.  propositur, ut oculus contemplativus transeat ad divina contemplanda.  Supposito triplici illo esse eiusdem rei, talis transitus non difficulter intelligitur;  attamen bene attendendum est, quod alia est ratio et via, qua intellectus transit ab ordine reali ad idealem, et alia, qua ab hoc ascendit ad ordinem divinum (cfr. de hoc Dissertatio cit. pag. 22-25).	can be accomplished in arguing and resolving by an intellect rationally investigating; but more perfectly it is accomplished by the same illuminated and intellectually contemplating.  —  This ideal order, obscure and nearly unknown to the common intellect, is proposed by St. Bonaventure, following the lead of St. Augustine, chiefly for study in chapters 2, 3, 5 and 6, so that the contemplative eye may pass-over to contemplate divine things.  Having considered the threefold ‘being’ of real things, it is not difficult to understand such a passing-over; and yet it must be attended to well, that one is the reason and way, by which the intellect passes-over from the real to the ideal order, and another is that, by which it ascends to the divine order (cf. the Dissertation cited above on this matter, pp. 22-25).
5.  Communiter antiqui Scholastici cum S. Thoma (de Verit. q. 22. a. 2. ad 1.) docuerunt, « quod omnia cognoscentia cognoscunt implicite Deum in quolibet cognito » (cfr. cit. dissert. pag. 17. 18); et secundum hanc implicitam et confusam qualemcumque cognitionem dici posse asserunt, naturaliter notam esse existentiam Dei (S. Thom., S. I. q. 2. a. 1, ad 1.).  « Motus ergo nostri intellectus, dum intelligit, dum ratiocinatur, a cognitione implicita Dei incipit et in cognitionem explicitam Dei terminatur »; ita cl. P. Lepidi O. Praed. (Perod. Divus Thomas 1881, n. 11. seqq.).	5.  Commonly the ancient Scholastics together with St. Thomas (De Veritate, q. 22, a. 2, ad 1) taught, « that all cognizers cognize God implicitly in every cognized » (cf. the cited Dissertation, p. 17 & 18); and according to this implicit and confused, any kind of cognition they assert that it can be said, that naturally the existence of God has been known (St. Thomas, Summa, I, q. 2, a.1, ad 1).  « Therefore the movement of our intellect, while it understands, while it reasons, begins from the implicit cognition of God and is terminated in the explicit cognition of God »; thus cl. P. Lepidi, O. P., (Periodical Divus Thomas, 1881, n. 11 ff.).
6. Inter mentem humanam et Deum, quatenus est suprema « causa essendi, ratio intelligendi et ordo vivendi », nulla creatura est intermedia; hoc tamen non impedit, quominus creaturae sint medium disponens et quasi manuducens ad cognitionem Dei, ut bene explicat S. Bonav. I. Sent. d. 3. p. I. q. 3. ad 1. et II. Sent. d. 3. p. II. a. 2. q. 2. ad 6.  —  Licet igitur intellectus humanus in statu viae minime Deum cognoscat immediate, sed tantum in speculo creaturarum; recte tamen dicitur in se ipso coniunctus Deo, Deo proximus, vel pertingens ad Deum, ut passim occurrit hic c. 2. et 3. et apud Augustinum docentem, naturam intelligibilem connecti non solum intelligibilibus, verum etiam immutabibilus rebus (I. Retract. c. 8. n. 2.).  Monet tamen Seraphicus (Quaest. disp. de scientia Christi, q. 4. ad 19.):  «  Pauci sunt, qui isto modo illas rationes sciant se attingere; immo, quod plus est, pauci sunt, qui velint hoc credere, quia difficile videtur intellectui ad aeterna contemplanda nondum elevato, quod ita habeat Deum praesentem et propinquum, cum tamen dicat Paulus (Act. 17, 27), quod non longe est ab unoqueque nostrum ».	6.  Between the human mind and God, insofar as He is the supreme « Cause of being, Reason of understanding, and Order of living », no creature is an intermediary; this, however, does not impede, that creatures be a means disposing and quasi leading-by-the-hand to the cognition of God, as St. Bonaventure better explains in Sent, Bk. I, d. 3, p. I, q. 3, ad 1, and Bk. II, d. 3, p. II, a. 2, q. 2, ad 6.  —  Therefore, though the human intellect in the state of the way  least of all cognizes God immediately, but only in the mirror of creatures; nevertheless rightly is it said to in itself conjoined to God, near to God, and/or stretching out to God, as occurs here in passing in chs. 2 and 3, and in (St.) Augustine, teaching that we have been connected to intelligible nature not only by intelligibles, but also by immutable things. (Retract., Bk. I, ch. 8, n. 2).  However the Seraphic Doctor warns (Quaest. disp. de scientia Christi, q. 4, ad 19.): « There are few, who know how to attain by themselves those reasons in this manner; nay, what is more, there are few, who want to believe this, because it seems difficult for an intellect not yet elevated to contemplate eternal things, that it has a God so present and near, though even (St.) Paul says (Acts 17:27), that He is not far from each one of us ».
7.  Communis item sententia ut certum docet concursum Dei generalem, activum et immediatum ad quaslibet actiones creaturarum; unde « lumen creatum non potest perficere operationem suam absque aliqua cooperatione luminis increati, per quod illuminatur omnis homo, qui venit in hunc mundum ». (S. Bonav., II.Sent. d. 28. a. 2. q. 3. in corp.).  Nam « in hoc continuo Deus operatur in mente, quod in ipsa lumen naturale causat et ipsum dirigit ad videndum; et sic mens non sine operatione causae primae in suam operationem procedit » (S. Thom., Opusc. 63, sive in librum Boethii de Trin. q. 1. a. 1. ad 6.).  Haec immediata cooperatio primae lucis vocatur ab Augustino et Scholasticis quaedam mentium irradiatio sive illuminatio, quae praeter intellectum creatum suo modo est quoddam supremum principium, quo cognoscitur; sive, ut S. Bonav. dicit, ipsa est ratio motiva, in aliud ductiva, sive regulans; et hoc sensu « ad modum candelabri relucet lux veritatis in facie nostrae mentis » (c. 3. n. 1.); tamen prima lux non est pincipium, quod (directe) cognoscitur, sive obiectum terminans, quietans et in se ducens.  De hoc agit tota q. 4 inter Qq. disput. de scientia Christi, quae magis explicatur a Matth. ab Aquasparta (de Hum. Cognitionis ratione, pag. 87-108; cfr. ibid. Dissert. cit. pag. 26-44).  Summi momenti est tum haec distinctio inter cognitionis principium quo et principium quod, sive inter medium (ratio) et obiectum cognoscendi, tum doctrina omnium Scholasticorum, quod aliquid potest esse medium quo sive ratio cognoscendi, quin ipsum sit obiectum cognitionis, ita ut « lateat ut obiectum cognitionis, set pateat ut ratio cognoscendi » (sic Matth. ab Aquasparta, q. disp. 3. ad 4.; cfr. ibid. ad 5. et S. Thom., I. Sent., d. 3, q. 4. ad 5.).  Praecipue propter neglectam hanc distinctionem et doctrinam exortae sunt falsae Itinerarii interpretationes, de quibus continuo agimus.	7.  Likewise the sentence commonly held to be certain teaches that there is a general concourse of God, both active and immediate, to every action posited by creatures; whence « their created light cannot perfect their activity without some cooperation from the increated Light, through which every man, who comes into this world, is illuminated ».  (St. Bonaventure, Sent, Bk. II, d. 28, a. 2, q. 3 in corp.).  For « in this God continuously acts in the mind, because He causes in it a natural light and He directs it to see; and in this manner the mind proceeds not without the activity of the First Cause in its activity » (St. Thomas Aquinas, Opusculum 63, or In librum Boethii de Trin., q. 1, a. 1, ad 6).  This immediate cooperation of the First Light is called by (St.) Augustine and the Scholastics a certain irradiation or illumination of minds, which is, besides the created intellect in its own manner, a certain supreme principle by which one knows; or, as St. Bonaventure says, it is a motive reason, ductive or regulating unto the other; and in this sense « after the manner of a candlestick the Light of Truth glitters upon the face of our mind » (ch. 3, n. 1); however the First Light is not a principle which is (directly) known, nor a terminating object, quieting and leading into Itself.  He deals with this throughout q. 4 in Qq. disput. de scientia Christi, which is explained at greater length by Matthew of Aquasparta (de Humanae Cognitionis ratione, pp. 87-108; cf. ibid. Dissert. cit. pp. 26-44).  Of the greatest importance is both this distinction between cognition’s principle by which and principle which, or between the means (reason) and the object of cognizing, and the doctrine of all Scholastics, that something can be the medium by which or the reason for cognizing, and not be the object itself of cognition, so that « It lies hidden as an object of cognition, but lies out in the open as the reason of cognizing » (thus Matthew of Aquasparta, q. disp. 3, ad 4.; cf. ibid. ad 5, and St. Thomas Aquinas, Sent., Bk. I, d. 3, q. 4, ad 5).  Chiefly on account of this distinction and doctrine there have arisen the false interpretions of the Itinerarium, of which we will now treat.
8.  His suppositis, genuinus sensus aliqorum loquendi modorum, qui ex Augustino sumti sunt, patere potest, simulque falsitas quarundam interpretationum, quae duplicem errorem seraphico Doctori imposuerunt.	8.  With this supposed, the genuine sense of the other manners of speaking, which have been taken from (St.) Augustine, can be laid out, and at the same time the falsehood of certain interpretations, which have imposed upon the Seraphic Doctor a twofold error.
Primo enim dictum est, eum consentire ontologismo Malebranchii, quasi docuerit, veritates intellectuales cognosci formaliter in rationibus aeternis.  Attamen eiusdem testimoniis irrefragabilibus iam toties demonstratum est, ab ipso admittti pro hac vita ne « exilem » quidem gradum immediatae Dei cognitionis, nec in alitissima contemplatione (saltem ordinarie), nec ullum transitum ad rationes aeternas, nisi eum quo intellectus « transfert se ab effectu ad causas ».  « Unde si quae auctoritates id dicere inveniantur, quod Deus in praesenti ab homine videtur et cernitur, non sunt intelligendae, quod videtur in sua essentia, sed quod in aliquo effectu inferiori cognoscitur » (II. Sent. d. 23. a. 2. q. 3.  in corp.).  Ipsi Angeli naturali cognitione non poterant Deum cognoscere nisi « per effectus.  Cognoscitur autem Deus per effectus visibiles et per substantias spirituales et per influentiam luminis connaturalis potentiae cognoscenti, quod est similitudo quaedam Dei, non abstracta, sed infusa, inferior Deo, quia in inferiori natura, sicut dicit Augustinus » (IX. de Trin. c. 11. n. 16).  Ita II. Sent. d. 3. p. II. a. 2. q. 2. ad 4.  Plura vide I. Sent. d. 3. p. I. q. 1, scholion et cit. Disert. pag. 7-12.  —  Mirum videtur, quod de genuina doctrina S. Bonaventurae propter quasdam male intellectas formulas huius Itinerarii potuerit dubitari, cum in eodem clarissime (c. 1. 2. 3.) non nisi ascensionem a creaturis ad Deum doceat; et quando adhibet verba videre Deum, se explicet additis aliis verbis, ut:  « conari debemus per speculum videre Deum » (c. 3. n. 1.) et « videre poteris Deum per te tanquam per imaginem; quod est videre per speculum in aenigmate » (ibid.).	For first is has been said, that he consented to the Ontologism of Malebranche, as if he had taught, that intellectual truths are cognized formally in eternal reasons.  And yet how often has it  already been demonstrated by irrefragable testimonies of the same, that in this life he admits indeed neither a « thin » step of the immediate cognition of God, nor in the highest contemplation (at least ordinarily), nor any passing-over to eternal reasons, except that by which the intellect « transfers itself from effect to causes ».  « Whence if the things which the authorities on that account say be found, that God in the present (life) is seen and discerned by man, they are not to be understood, (as saying) that He is seen in His Essence, but that He is cognized in some inferior effect » (Sent., Bk. II, d. 23, a. 2, q. 3, in corp.).  The Angels themselves by a natural cognition could not cognize God except « through His effects.  But God is cognized through visible effects and through spiritual substances and through an influence of a light connatural to the cognizing power, which is a certain similitude of God, not abstracted, but infused, inferior to God, because it is in an inferior nature, just as (St.) Augustine says » in De Trinitate, Bk. IX, ch. 11, n. 16 (thus Sent., Bk. II, d. 3, p. II, a. 2, q. 2, ad 4).  See further Sent., Bk. I, d. 3, p. I, q. 1, Scholium, and the Dissertation cited above, pp. 7-12.  —  It seems a wonder, that on account of certain badly understood formulae in his Itinerarium, one could have any doubts concerning the genuine doctrine of St. Bonaventure, when in the same work he teaches in the clearest manner (in chs. 1, 2, and 3) that there is not but an ascension from creatures to God; and when he employs the words to see God, he will explain himself with other additional words, that : « we ought to strive to see God through the mirror » (ch. 3, n. 1) and « you will already be able to see God through yourself as through an image, which is to see Him through a mirror in mystery » (ibid.).
9.  Alius error impositus est auctori nostro per falsam capituli 5. interpretationem, quasi docuerit, tum quod primum cognitum intellectus apprehendentis sit esse divinum, tum quod esse commune confuderit cum esse divino.  Perversa haec interpretatio prorsus aliena est a mente S. Doctoris et manifeste excluditur irrefragabilibus doctrinae capitibus, quae constanter et passim asserit.  Nam docet verbis peremptoris, quod divinum esse in se nec ante nec post primum peccatum immediate cognosci possit; quod non percipiatur nisi in speculo creaturarum et per ordine, quem effectus habent ad causam (I. Sent. d. 3. p. I. q. 1. 2; II. Sent. d. 23. a. 2. q. 3. et passim); item, quod actualis intellectio incipiat a sensu, ita ut ab intellectione imperfecta et confusa progrediatur ad perfectiorem et explicitam (cfr. II. Sent. d. 39. a. 1. q. 2. et scholion, n. II, d. 25. p. II. q. 6; I. Sent. d. 8. p. II. dub. 1.).  Denique toties affirmat, esse divinum non esse in genere, sed supra omne genus, nec univocum, sed tantum analogum cum omnibus mentis conceptibus, etiam transcendentalibus.	9.  Another error has been imposed upon our author through a false interpretation of Chapter 5, as if he taught, both that the first thing cognized of the intellect apprehending is the divine ‘Being’ [esse divinum], and that he confounded common ‘being’ with the divine ‘Being’.  This perverse interpretation is in a word foreign to the mind of the Seraphic Doctor and manifestly is excluded by the irrefutable chapters of the doctrine, which he constantly and in passing asserts.  For he teaches with peremptory words, that the divine ‘Being’ in itself could not be cognized immediately, neither before nor after the first sin; that It is percieved not but in the mirror of creatures and through the order, which effects have to their Cause (Sent., Bk. I, d. 3, p. I, q. 1, 2; Sent., Bk. II, d. 23, a. 2, q. 3, and passim); likewise, that actual intellection begins from a sense, thus that it progresses from an imperfect and confused intellection to a more perfect and explicit one (cf. Sent., Bk. II,  d. 39, a. 1, q. 2,  and the Scholium, n. II, d. 25, p. II, q. 6; Sent., Bk. I,  d. 8, p. II, dubium 1).  Then how often does he affirm, that the divine ‘being’ is not in a genus, but is above every genus, nor is it univocal, but only analogous with all mental concepts, even those transcendental.
Insuper ex hoc Itinerario et ex ipso cap. 5. genuinus sensus auctoris satis apparet.  —  Nam primo clarissime docet ordinem et gradus cognitionis et contemplationis, per quos a creaturis ascendimus ad perfectam, quantum fas est, Dei cognitionem (c. 1. n. 2.).  Primum enim gradum ponit in imo incipiendo a mundo sensibili, ut supra (n. 1.) notavimus; scilicet « ut perveniamus ad Deum, oportet nos transire per vestigium » (c. 1. n. 2. et 5.).  —  Superiores autem gradus ab ipso deinde explicati supponunt praecedentes.	Moreover, from this Itinerarium and from chapter 5 itself the genuine sense of the author is sufficiently apparent.  —  For first he most clearly teaches that there is an order and steps of cognition and of contemplation, through which we ascend from creatures to a perfect, as much as this can be said, cognition of God (ch. 1, n. 2).  For he puts the first stem at the bottom by beginning from the sensible world, as we have noted above (Scholium, n. 1); that is « so that we arrive at God, it is opportune that we pass-over through the vestige » (ch. 1, nn. 2 and 5).  —  But the superior steps explained afterwards from that suppose those preceeding.
Secundo, de conceptu  esse iam in tertio gradu (c. 3. n. 3.) auctor locutus est secundum intellectum apprehendentem et resloventem (vide supra n. 3.); ubi dicitur, quod « non venit intellectus noster ut plene resolvens intellectum alicuius entium creatorum, nisi iuvetur ab intellectu entis purissimi » etc.  Non igitur nisi ascendendo a causatis rebus et resolvendo, immo resolvendo non semiplene, sed plene, intellectus concipit ens purissimum et absolutissimum.	Second, concerning the concept of ‘being’ itself [ esse], already on the third step (ch. 3, n. 3) the author spoke according to intellect apprehending and resolving (see above n. 3); where there is said, that « our intellect does not come to resolve fully the understanding of any of the created beings [entium], unless it be aided by the understanding of the most pure Being [entis] » etc..  Therefore not but by ascending from things caused and by resolving, nay by resolving not semi-fully, but fully, does the intellect conceive the most pure and absolute Being [ens].
Hoc supposito, etiam in c. 5. n. 3. triplex distinguit esse, scil. in rebus (extra nos) « esse particulare, quod est esse arctatum, quia permixtum est cum potentia »; in intellectu (intra nos) « esse analogum, quod minime habet de actu, eo quod minime . . .	With this supposed, even in ch. 5, n. 3, he distinguishes the threefold ‘being’ (of things), namely in things (outside of us) « particular ‘being’, which is constrained ‘being’, because it is commingled with potency »; in the intellect (within us) « analogous ‘being’, because it has the least actuality [minime de actu], for the reason that exists in the least manner [minime est] »; . . .