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who are able to resist a present pleasure for a greater one hereafter; another, in whom it is
weak, and who can seldom resist the charm of immediate enjoyment” (James Mill 1826, p.
52). This relationship with time, risky or not, also appears in John Stuart Mill, when he remarks
that “the willingness of a ‘dealer’ to use his credit, depends on his expectations of gain, that
is, on his opinion of the probable future price of his commodity” (John Stuart Mill 1848, Vol.
2, p. 554). The two men seem furthermore share the idea that the possession of great wealth
does not contribute to individual excellence: “(T)he possession of a large fortune generally
whets the appetite for immediate enjoyment” (James Mill 1826, p. 52), and“(T)he greatest
part of the utility of wealth, beyond a very moderate quantity, is not the indulgences it
procures, but the reserved Power which its possessor holds in his hands of attaining purposes
generally” (John Stuart Mill 1848, vol. 1, p. 6). In other words, up to a certain point, wealth is
power.
These cases show that simple expedient courses of action are not necessarily moral. But
“there are different orders of expediency”, and “all expediencies are not exactly on the same
level” (John Stuart Mill 20 May 1867, p. 152). General expedient courses of action have other-
regarding aspects, and are therefore directly in relation to the domain of morality.
2.3.
General expediency
A lot could be said about general expediency. Nevertheless, I focus here on the famous,
though delicate, case of justice. My point is only to show that justice is subordinated to
morality and is therefore closely related to calculation. I will be quick.
At first sight, John Stuart Mill seems to differ from the Benthamite tradition in viewing
justice as an idea based on intense and absolute feelings not necessarily associated with utility
(John Stuart Mill 1861, p. 251). The complex sentiment of justice, indeed, based on a “natural
feeling of retaliation or vengeance” extended, through intelligence and sympathy, to society
as a whole, “has nothing moral in it” (John Stuart Mill 1861, p. 249). But he made clear
afterward that justice is at the service of general utility by recalling the standard tilitarian
views in the field. Justice allows to secure our rights, such as liberty and property, to give the
possibility to change improper laws, and more generally to secure our expectations. John
Stuart Mill provided a clear synthesis of his confidence in security. “(S)ecurity”, he wrote, “no
human being can possibly do without; on it we depend for all our immunity from evil, and for
the whole value of all and every good, beyond the passing moment; since nothing but the
gratification of the instant could be of any worth to us, if we could be deprived of everything
the next instant by whoever was momentarily stronger than ourselves” (John Stuart Mill 1861,
pp. 250–1).
15
We find here the idea that justice, and therefore security, is the necessary
condition for having a “harmonious” life in society. Usurprisingly, James Mill, shared this view
without reserve (see, for instance, James Mill 1820, p. 5). In Bentham’s words, “Without law
there is no security; consequently no abundance, nor even certain subsistence (Bentham
1785-6, p. 307). In short, justice is calculated to secure our interest and that of others, and
from there, the quest for excellence can become.
Surely the Mills believed that cases of general expediency are closely related to the
“permanent interests of man as a progressive being” (John Stuart Mill 1869c, p. 224). In the
15
I will not deal with the possible conflict between justice and liberty in John Stuart Mill’s thought. What matters
here, is that justice is far from being incompatible with the felicific calculus.
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next and last part, we consider the domain of aesthetism, a domain that John Stuart Mill
conceived important for the quest of excellence, but independently from considerations of
interest. A closer and different look into the relation may nevertheless suggest a slight
different story.
3.
Calculation and aesthetics
What is noble, or beautiful, or aesthetic seems to contrast every courses rational courses
of actions that we have seen above. According to the principle of aesthetism, actions are in
themselves our only ends. We do not perfom actions due to moral obligations, by expecting
pleasure, but rather spontaneously, for their own sake. From an Associationist point of view,
however, it is possible to explain this kind of actions in relation to calculation. To do so, I begin
by remarking that Utilitarians were aware that the felicific calculus had boundaries and was
not every time suitable (§3.1.). Though not perfect, they nevertheless thought that the
calculation was perfectible via their faith in the teachings of experience. On this basis, John
Stuart Mill talked about the general experience of mankind (§3.2.). At last, I claim that
aesthetic actions may be explained through what I call a “perfect calculation” or “aesthetic”
one : the object of calculation has so many times be strongly experienced and associated with,
that what was desired for an end becomes desired for his own sake. In other words, we
“perfectly” calculate things when we are not aware of calculating anymore (§3.3.).
3.1.
The limits of calculation
It is not too much to say that the felicific calculus is not always adequate to every cases.
There are indeed opportunity costs to calculating expected utility, limited information at the
time of decision, knowing that calculations are often subject to familiar temporal and personal
biases: these are well-known limits. What is less well-know is that Bentham himself
acknowledged that – of course, not by using the same vocabulary. Better: he noticed that on
certain occasions, the fact of always consulting the principle of utility could be dangerous
(Bentham 1823, p. 5), though he was not clear about what these occasions are. And besides
the fact that our ability to calculate is limited, the circumstances in which we take our decision
can be complex and exogenous. Bentham devoted a lot of pages to these circumstances, and
surely, a man whose a such developed love of details like Bentham was aware of a possible
disconnection between the calculation – even enlighted – and its actual consequences. James
Mill seems to follow the same path. “The consequences of an act”, he wrote, “may be such,
that the person had no reason to anticipate them, or could not possibly anticipate them; or
they may be such, that, though actually not foreseen, they might, with more of less of care,
have been foreseen”. Unfortunately, like Bentham, his discussion comes to a sudden end, by
remarking that “any further consideration of them is not within the province of this inquiry”
(James Mill 1829, vol. II, pp. 400-401). Drawing on his father, John Stuart Mill will explicitly try
to respond to the criticisms on the limits of the calculation.