25
tion of the gains from technical change, in a three layer rent-seeking where both capitalists,
workers and the government in the producing nation ‘collude’ and keep a large share of the
technological gains in their own nation. This contrasts with the classical distribution of gains
from technical change as it is assumed in economic theory: to the consumer as lowered
prices. The smaller scale of operations in the network society of post-Fordism seems to make
collusive distribution of gains from technical change much more difficult than before: we
now get richer more from lower prices than from higher nominal wages. This tendency is re-
inforced by the sheer size of global markets, creating a new situation of ‘the winner takes it
all’ markets. In our opinion it is therefore likely that societies going directly from semi-
feudalism to post-Fordism will maintain the feudal structure of income distribution, albeit
based on other criteria. We are much in agreement with Carlota Perez’ view that all stages
and techno-economic paradigms open for a whole range of possible types of societies. How-
ever, we fear that the establishment of a nation-wide distributive justice will be very difficult
without passing through the nation-state based Fordist mass production society as an obliga-
tory passage point. The scale of operations under the mass production paradigm may have
had as its most important effect that labour was needed on such a large scale that their bar-
gaining power for the first time in history made a more equitable income distribution politi-
cally feasible.
2)
One important aspect of Fordism was – as Carlota Perez points out – that, influenced by the
technologies of mass production,
[216] large categories of objects became standardised and
‘alike’. The typical example of this age is Henry Ford’s statement that ‘You can have your
car any colour you want as long as it is black’. In Northern European social democracies it
was stressed that human beings are equal. Under Maoism all individuals were even supposed
to dress equally. Even under Hitler all Aryans were seen as being alike, as well as all Jews
and Gypsies in their categories. All human beings, or groups of human beings, came to be
seen as ‘equal’ and ‘alike’. Most societies now face a transition from seeing all human beings
as being alike, to a stage where – if all goes well – all human beings are seen as being differ-
ent – unique – but of equal value. Is it likely that cultures which have not passed through this
stage of ‘all human beings are equal’ are able to build a consensus that all Men are different,
but of equal value? Can such a consensus be built in places where native Indians are still con-
sidered not much higher than animals – like in parts of the Amazon? Is, in some cumulative
sense, a notion that ‘all Men are equal’ an obligatory passage point in order that the idea that
all Men are different – but of equal value – may be created?
8. Conclusions and Brief Policy Implications
Common to all stage theories during their ‘golden age’ from the 1840’s to the 1930’s is a view
that, at any point in time, different geographical areas live in different stages. This may not be so
obvious today, when most consumers consume in the global supermarket. However, if we, in the
tradition of Bücher, focus on production rather than consumption, it will be clear that although
consumers in Somalia or Haiti – if they can afford it – have access to state-of-the art goods, their
own system of production is, to a large extent, locked into a specialisation in activities operating
under previous technological paradigms. Haiti is the world’s largest exporter and most efficient
producer of baseballs, a product that all the capital of the United States so far has not managed to
26
mechanise. All baseballs are hand-sown, steeped in a techno-economic paradigm which other-
wise died out centuries ago. Because they are specialised in leftover activities
[217] from former
paradigms, the Haitians are increasingly reinforcing their comparative advantage in international
trade: they are specialised in being poor and ignorant.
We would claim that the study of economic stages – keeping the caveats of such generalisa-
tion in mind – is indeed useful for understanding today’s world. Today agricultural labour per-
formed by women is a main characteristic of African economies. Keeping in mind today’s agri-
cultural production in Africa and the horrid description of the slaughtering of Tutsies in Rwanda,
US economist Richard Ely’s 1903 description of one stage of the development of Mankind is
striking. ‘The slaughter of enemies and woman’s labour are characteristic features of the early
stage in the development of labour.’
61
Africa’s problems are clearly not within the range of the
(admittedly now slightly changing) policies of the World Bank. These are problems which are
too fundamental to be solved in the sphere of ‘fiscal restraint’ and monetary economics, of
‘openness’ of the economy and of ‘free trade’ and of ‘getting the prices right’.
We would suggest that what the disintegrating and desperately poor African nations produce,
and how they produce it – as the stage theories suggest – are important elements which today
have been unlearned in the policies of the World Bank and the IMF. Perhaps, by insisting that
these nations specialise according to their comparative advantage in raw materials, we are pre-
venting them from entering into the creative processes that brought wealth elsewhere. Perhaps,
by attacking symptoms rather than causes of poverty, and by putting Africa ‘on the dole’ in line
with our own unemployed, we have played an important role in the process of retrogression?
Perhaps, by focusing on their needs as consumers we have prevented them from developing as
producer? Perhaps a Renaissance-type gestalt-switch -fundamentally changing a society’s view
on the importance of new knowledge – is the mandatory passage point which Asia has been
through, but Africa not?
If these are factors of any importance, they are clearly not included in the policies of the
‘Washington Consensus’ on development policies. Present policies are, as is neo-classical eco-
nomics,
[218] essentially based on a view of Man as an animal which has learned to barter,
rather than an animal which has learned to produce.
62
Our policies towards the South today are
heavily biased towards monetary aspects, we forget that money is only ‘the veil behind which
the action of real economic forces is concealed’.
63
The focus on monetary and consumption as-
pects, rather than on the real economy of goods and services and on production, is an invitation
to treat symptoms rather than causes of poverty. Perhaps we may regain lost insights by attempt-
ing to internalise the intuitions and the factual knowledge behind long lost stage theories, theo-
ries which allow us to strip off the monetary veil which prevents qualitative understanding.
Stage theories are generalisations, and as any kind of generalisation they are subject both to
misuse and to easy criticism. Without generalisation or abstractions, however, there is no sci-
ence. Neo-classical economics, as well as today’s standard economics, is a case of such an ab-
straction carried to the extreme. This theory is based on a seed on a very special case where the
forces causing ‘progress’ are assumed away, creating what Schmoller called ‘dead equilibrium’.
The present world economic order is based on a type of economic theory which has not man-
61
Ely, op. cit., p. 72.
62
See Reinert, Erik S. (1997) The Role of the State in Economic Growth, SUM Working Paper No. 5, 1997.
63
Pigou, A. C, The Veil of Money, London, Macmillan, 1949, p. 18.
27
aged to formalise the activity-specific aspects of human knowledge – and its relationship both to
human welfare and to ecological sustainability – and which is therefore of solving the problems
of nations which are stuck in past evolutionary stages and techno-economic paradigms, like
Haiti. Because their theories are based on the assumption that all economic activities – regard-
less of evolutionary stage or paradigm – have the same potential for creating welfare, these insti-
tutions do not see that their fundamental demand on immediate ‘openness’ to international trade
under all circumstances may cause whole nations to disintegrate and retrogress in the stages of
evolution. The core assumptions of economic theory are irrelevant and harmless to the nations
carrying the next techno-economic paradigm, but they are irrelevant and very harmful to the
welfare of societies that are lagging in the evolution.
[219]
In the 1960’s many people wished to see ‘one, two, many Vietnams’. Now we risk a break-
down of civilised society in an increasing number of states which are absolutely uncompetitive
and unemployable – at any wage level – in the globalised economy. Liberia, Rwanda, and Soma-
lia are recent examples of total collapse of the nation-state, and of a step back into tribal econo-
mies, back into Karl Bücher’s clan economies. By re-introducing what Bücher saw as the ‘indis-
pensable tool’ of stage theories – of production-based (as opposed to barter-based) economic
theories – will we be able to better understand why globalisation on the one hand is producing
unprecedented wealth in some nations, but also has the power to create ‘one, two, many Soma-
lias’.
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