Kontemplativ erfaring, naturvidenskab og dialog

3.2Mind and Life’s ’Opening Remarks’

”Dalai Lama: I welcome you. […] For quite some time I have had a great interest in the close relationship between Eastern philosophy, particularly Buddhism, and Western science. My basic aim as a human being is to speak always for the importance of compassion and kindness in order to help build a better, happier human society, and a brighter future. […I]t’s important for Western science and material development and Eastern mental development to work together. Sometimes people have the impression that these two things are very different, even incompatible. However, in recent years this has changed. Some Western scientists have reached highly sensitive and deep issues in their research work, Such as: What is the mind, what is ‘I’, what is human being. […] Our first aim is to benefit humanity in the future. Then, the second level is the study itself.” (Hayward et al 2001)

Der er helt tydeligt buddhistiske værdier i Dalai Lamas tilgang til dialogerne, og det er ikke nødvendigvis den samme intention, som en vestlig videnskabsmand har med at gå i videnskabelig dialog. F.eks. ville de fleste vestlige videnskabsfolk nok anerkende, at de håbede, at deres virke gavner menneskeheden, men at sætte det som det primære mål, er ikke almindeligt. Neurologen Robert B. Livingston afslutter afsnittet ’Opening remarks: Brain Science as a Path to World Peace’ (Houshmand et al 1999 p.11) i den anden Mind and Life dialog med følgende sætning:

”One of the fundamental underlying these dialogues is our mutual concern for world peace. We sincerely believe that several pertinent disciplines from both traditions are of great importance for humanity to help in the development of more rational human self-knowledge, cross-cultural mutual understanding, and compassion, all urgently needed to safeguard this planetary habitat and to ensure equitable sharing of its bounty.” (Houshmand et al 1999 p.16)

Det er tydeligt, at de deltagende vestlige videnskabsmænd også har en fornemmelse af at arbejde inden for rammerne af buddhistiske idealer, når det gælder perspektivet på mødet. At fokusere så meget på at de globale problemer er presserende, konnoterer den 1. hellige sandhed om lidelse. Hvem siger, at det kan være anderledes? Hvem siger, at verdens tilstand kan blive bedre? Evolutionshistorisk er der intet argument for, at vi behøvede at bekymre os om andre så længe det ser ud som om at vi overlever. Men hvis man er buddhist, så følger de 3 sidste sandheder af den første, og dette genererer en drift mod vejen ud: Nirvāna, som (for Mahāyānabuddhister) først nås, når alle væsner ved hjælp af medfølelse har nået oplysning, som indebærer ’world peace’. Et forhold, som nok springer i øjnene hos europæisk-naturvidenskabeligt orienterede læsere, er, at man konsekvent henviser til Dalai Lama som ’Holiness’, og at han står som den øverste på Mind and Lifes hjemmeside, selvom listen i øvrigt er ordnet alfabetisk. Er dette et symmetrisk møde med balance mellem proksimalitet og distalitet i Garfield’sk forstand?

Dialogerne, som gennemgås i det følgende, er Mind and Lifes egne redigerede referater²¹, så på den ene side er de jo ikke ’objektive’, men på den anden side, fremstår de i overensstemmelse med egne idealer.

3.3Form og forholdsregler for Mind and Life møderne

Grundet emnets kompleksitet besluttede de, at de første dialogers rammer skulle være et lukket forum med kompetente videnskabsfolk, som havde interesse for Mind and Life dialogerne. De var altså opmærksomme på vigtigheden af en kollegial atmosfære (som Garfield kalder det). Det lille lukkede forum var også bedre til at rumme små afbrydelser og afklarende spørgsmål (www.mindandlife.org/history.html). Allerede i deres anden dialog (’Consciousness at the Crossroads’, Houshmand et al 1999) har de dog en skeptisk opponent med i panelet, Patricia Smith Churchland, og det giver dialogen en frisk pust.

Formen på møderne var således, at formiddagene var afsat til en præsentation af et videnskabeligt emne af hensyn til Dalai Lama, og eftermiddagene var afsat til dialog. Denne struktur gør det lettere for en vestligt orienteret læser at følge den røde tråd, da naturvidenskaben sætter, hvor en tibetansk buddhist måske ikke ser den røde tråd så tydeligt. De første 2 møder var meget generelle i deres tilgang til dialogen, da man var bevidst om, at disse dialoger gik de første spæde skridt i en kollegial dialog. Fra 3. møde begyndte man at blive mere specifik i emnerne, som typisk var opstået i de første dialoger. Det 11. Mind and Life møde – nu kaldt ‘Investigating the mind’²² – er det første, der er åbent for andre end forskerne selv – dvs. publikum (Goleman, 2003a p.359). Alle dialoger introduceres af en vestlig filosof. (Varela 1997 p.11)

Mind and Life dialogerne handler i høj grad om konkret videnskab, men i denne læsning er der søgt efter videnskabsteoretiske og filosofiske pointer og figur 1’s 3-deling (Gross, subtle, very subtle) viser sig som et centralt tema i dialogerne.

3.4Det første møde

’Gentle Bridges’ er titlen på den første bog fra Mind and Life Institute (Hayward et al 2001), som er et redigeret referat fra det første møde. Hele værket er i høj grad en opsummering af, hvad den vestlige videnskab har at sige om bevidsthed, og således gennemgås minutiøst videnskabsfilosofi og videnskabsteori; neurologis forhold til perception; kognitiv psykologi; kunstig intelligens; hjernens udvikling; og Evolution.

Jeremy W. Hayward havde rollen som dialogens indledende filosof og lægger ud med at problematisere, hvad videnskab er, og han mener, at der blandt lægmand er en udbredt forestilling om, at der kun findes én type videnskab, som alle videnskabsgrene holder sig til, og dette mener han er en fejlagtig myte om videnskabens enhed. Det frembrydende naturvidenskabelige verdensbillede startede ifølge Hayward med Galileo Galilei (1564-1642) og Isaac Newton (1666-1703), hvis fundamentale bidrag til naturvidenskaben og verdensbilledet er, at man foretrækker egne erfaringer som grundlag for viden, snarere end Bibelens skrift, og at matematikken er det sprog, som kan udtrykke bevægelige legemers dynamik. Fokus er imidlertid i høj grad på fysiske legemer, så sjæl/Gud får suspekt ontologisk status, og ’det objektive’ bliver ofte anstillet som det, der er hævet over subjektive tilbøjeligheder. (Hayward et al 2001 p.7)

Hayward redegør for, hvorledes fundamentet for denne klassiske videnskab bliver draget i tvivl i det 20.århundrede med kvantefysikken og relativitetsteorien, og med dette tab af realisme slår dette tilbage i solipsisme. Fra absolut objektivitet til absolut subjektivitet. Men den logiske empirisme kommer snart videnskabsfilosoffer til undsætning og etablerer videnskabens enhed i metoden. Med den mister man retten til at finde ’endelige sandheder’, men man må resignere til at underbygge hypoteser. Man anerkendte, at man ligger under for induktionsproblemet: Man kan aldrig vide, om der mon findes en enkelt sort svane, selvom alle de svaner man har set, er hvide. Man kan kun falsificere og ikke verificere - i hvert fald ikke endegyldigt verificere (Hayward et al 2001 p.17). Hayward nævner, at kognitiv psykologi udfordrer idéen om passiv erkendelse, og argumenterer på denne baggrund for, at virkeligheden ikke er ’på forhånd givet’, men i høj grad er en aktiv fortolkning, som det perceptuelle apparat er medskaber af (Hayward et al 2001 p.18). At den ydre virkelighed ikke bare er et selveksisterende ting, som perceptionen kan ’tage billeder af’, og det kan man jo genkende fra både fænomenologien og Nagarjunas tomhedsanalyse.

3.4.1Logisk empirisme vs. Sunyata (’tomhed’)

Dalai Lamas første kommentar til indledningen angår Thomas Kuhns begreb om ’Disciplinær matrix’, og han har hæftet sig ved ”[…] a conditioning of the mind that eventually leads you to have a certain view due to a particular opinion or theory[…].”. At ens hermeneutiske situation konstituerer erkendelsen, siger åbenbart Dalai Lama noget, men hvor forskellige verdensbillederne er på andre punkter, får man en fornemmelse af lige bagefter, når Dalai Lama begynder at diskutere det buddhistiske tomhedsbegreb i forlængelse af Logisk empirisme.

”In Buddhist training, for example, when studying Madhyamika, first you hear that things have no inherent existence or intrinsic existence. You hear it and it doesn’t mean much, but then you hear it again – there is no true existence, no inherent existence, no intrinsic existence – and after a while an understanding of this comes vividly to mind. Then you say, ‘Ah! Now I know what this means.’ So the mind has been conditioned, and a kind of new vision or understanding arises.” (Hayward 2001, p.26)

For en logisk empirist er tomhedsfilosofien næppe interessant på ontologisk niveau – det er i hvert fald en type sandhed, som ikke har noget med tænkningen i logisk empirisme at gøre. Dalai Lama fortsætter med at redegøre for, at der er to måder man kan forstå dette:

”[…]you know what it means; it is actually more convincing, it comes closer to reality. In the other case, the phrase becomes something very alive, something very meaningful, but not in a way that corresponds to reality. Due to your own too-close feeling for that phrase, you see it in a way that does not correspond to reality. So the conditioning can go both ways. It can lead you deeper into reality or it can lead you right away from reality and actually distort your mode of experience. With the “disciplinary matrix”, which of these two cases are you referring to generally?” (Hayward 2001, p.26f)

Den forkerte forståelse, er måske den, hvor man ikke efterlader tømmerflåden, efter at have nået den anden bred? Denne første udveksling mellem de to traditioner er uhyre interessant, og retrospektivt var det måske også forventeligt, men for den uforberedte læser kan denne indledende snak være dybt forvirrende. Svaret fra de tilstedeværende videnskabsmænd viser også, at idéen om noget absolut sandt er videnskaben fremmed – i det mindste den mere moderne videnskabsteori:

”[Varela:] But in general the belief is that there is some kind of a progress toward a reality, so in the disciplinary matrix it is neither of the two cases that His Holiness was talking about. There is not an immediate apprehension of what seems to be totally true as in the Madhyamika, for example. Nor is it a case of pure opinion, as when people have an ideology that they have picked up in society. This middle Kuhnian or loosely Kuhnian scientist would say that in this disciplinary matrix you learn a worldview that is not completely true, but it’s better than anything else because it leads you little by little, closer and closer to the truth. There is a sense of getting better and better, which is why a scientist would prefer to be a scientist than something else.” (Hayward 2001, p.27f)

“[Hayward:] But I think that the ordinary scientist would have to ask His Holiness, How do you know the Madhyamika view of emptiness is reality any more than I know that the matter view is reality or the biologist know that the brain really is equivalent to the mind? From the point of view that I’m presenting now, very sadly, when we lost logical empiricism, we lost forever the possibility of actually knowing a complete objective reality. Now, this is the scientist speaking – we have to go with some level of Kuhnian view.” (Hayward 2001, p.28)

Dalai Lama svarer ikke på spørgsmålet. Man har ellers på fornemmelsen, at noget meget centralt er på spil her. Det er plausibelt, at han ikke svarer på spørgsmålet, fordi han ikke forstår det. Han forstår det givet vis ikke, fordi han ikke kender vores videnskabs idéhistorie, og i øvrigt er trænet i et læringssystem, som arbejder med andre begreber og fænomener end naturvidenskaben. Hans umiddelbare reaktion er at spørge: ”[…] Within one field, whether physics or another discipline, do you find different views arising in different countries[…]. So, is there any sort of nationalistic factor from one country to another, or not?” (Hayward 2001, p.28)

Man fornemmer Nagarjunas dekonstruktion bag Dalai Lamas argument (hvis videnskaben afhænger af kulturel kontekst, er den kun konventionelt sand; ikke absolut selveksisterende), hvortil de tilstedeværende kognitionsvidenskabsfolk nævner eksempler fra deres forskningsfelt, hvor der har været magtsociologiske årsager til, at ellers korrekte data ikke er blevet accepteret. Diskussionen er slået ud af kurs. En eventuel vesterlandsk læser sidder efterladt med det brændende spørgsmål, som ikke blev besvaret: Hvordan kan man indenfor buddhismen hævde, at man har overvundet kløften mellem viden og virkelighed og med absolut sikkerhed hævde, at f.eks. idéen om ’there is no true existence, no inherent existence, no intrinsic existence’ kan etableres med sikkerhed?

3.4.2Buddhisme og falsifikation.

Dalai Lama svarer ikke præcist på ovenstående spørgsmål, men han forsøger på mange måder at indkredse problematikken ved at påpege, hvad han har oplevet som konvergens mellem videnskab og buddhisme. Han hævder: “It is my view that generally Buddhism, and particularly Mahayana Buddhism, is very close to a scientific approach.” (Hayward et al 2001 p.31). Hans redegørelse er af idéhistorisk karakter, og synsvinklen er – som det også fremgår af citatet – mahāyānabuddhisme: De oprindelige buddhistiske tekster (Sutra) indeholder selvmodsigelser, men alle ordene er jo Buddhas ord, så hvordan skal man forholde sig til dette? ”[E]ventually the final validation has to be done on the authority of reasoning, logic.” (Hayward et al 2001, p.31f). Dalai Lama opfatter altså mahāyāna-reformbevægelsen, som en bevægelse, der stolede på egen ræson og dømmekraft, og således er den i overensstemmelse med videnskabens vilje til verifikation og falsifikation. ’Denne udvikling ville ikke være sket, hvis buddhismen var dogmatisk’ – må være Dalai Lamas ræsonnement. Det er typisk for den senere buddhisme – i hvert fald tibetansk (vajrayāna) buddhisme - at omtale de tidligere former for buddhisme som mere primitive end dem selv²³, men Dalai Lama tilføjer dog:

”From either of these two perspectives, the Hinayana or the Mahayana, we find that analysis and examination through reasoning, the basic Buddhist attitude, is very important. Once you find a fact through investigation, then you accept it. Even if that fact appears contradictory to Buddha’s own words, it doesn’t matter. Because of this, I feel the basic Buddhist attitude is quite similar to the scientists’ attitude. Be open and investigate, find something, confirm it, then accept it. Whichever way you go, whether you think that all the teachings of Mahayana and Hinayana were taught by the Buddha, or whether you think that they were progressively created by later people, either way there is a strong emphasis upon your own analysis and investigation and not simply a dogmatic adherence out of faith on the Buddha. (Hayward et al 2001 p.32f)

Dalai Lama giver et eksempel på hvordan buddhistiske skrifter kan blive afvist på baggrund af bedre viden: ”I feel that it is totally compatible with the basic attitude of Buddhism to refute the lateral interpretation of Abhidharma²⁴ that says the earth is flat, because it is incompatible with the direct experience of the world as being round” (Hayward et al 2001 p.37).

3.4.3Valid cognition

“I think the basic Buddhist attitude is [that] we have to discriminate between things that are existent and things that are not. We determine that something exists by whether or not it is established by a valid cognition or not. If something is established by a valid cognition, it is existent; if it is not, then it is nonexistent. What is meant by valid cognition is consciousness. I am defining consciousness here as a perception that perceives the object and is not mistaken with respect to the object; that is, the object can indeed perform its function in accordance with the way consciousness perceives it. By discriminating between existence and non-existence in such a manner, we escape the danger of accepting something that might just be conjured up by a conception. Therefore, as a Buddhist I find that discoveries made by scientists through the scientific method, that have been proven as facts by scientists, really help the Buddhist way of thinking rather than harming it.” (Hayward 2001, p.35f)

Men der er stadig ikke svaret på spørgsmålet! Uanset om man gør sig nok så umage i konteksten af logisk empirisme, så kan man ikke berolige en skeptiker med, at ’man har skam kigget ordentligt efter’. De klassiske fysikere mente også, at de havde kigget ordentlig efter, men det ændrede ikke ved, at man med kvantefysikken og relativitetsteorien på ganske få år komplet havde ændret på det fundamentale begreb om den fysiske virkelighed. Det er virkelig svært at se for en videnskabsmand, hvordan man skal acceptere et vagt begreb om ’valid kognition’. Det står da også dialogparterne klart, så Dalai Lama må forklare, hvad han overhovedet forstår ved et fænomen:

“Buddhists divide phenomena into three categories, depending on how ordinary beings relate to objects and perceive them. It’s very important to recognize that the Buddhist usage of the term phenomenon includes everything that exists. In the first category of phenomenon are those that are obvious, that can be directly perceived through the sense faculties that are immediately apparent to the senses. In the second category are hidden types of phenomena that cannot be perceived directly by ordinary living beings but depend on some kind of logical process in order to be perceived. You can perceive them only through inference. Relying on certain logical processes, you can infer their existence. The first type requires no reasoning and the second one necessarily does. Now with respect to the second category of phenomena, the slightly concealed phenomena, although at that moment you can only understand them through inference, that experience of inference also has to trace back to a certain direct experience you had. The initial access may be only through reasoning, but eventually it must lead to a direct experience, and also the inference itself must depend upon a certain direct experience. In the case of understanding something that is not obvious, you require examples so your perception of the examples can be direct. (Hayward 2001 p.33)

Den sidste kommentar vedrørende det nødvendige i eksempler er interessant i forhold til Thomas Kuhns paradigmeteori, da eksempler/forbilleder er det 4. element i den ’faglige matrix’ (Schmith 2001 p.158). Ovenstående citat lyder jo meget som logisk empirisme. Man kan enten percipere fænomener direkte, f.eks. en fodbold, eller man kan erkende dem gennem ræsonnementer, som f.eks. en elektron, som man jo ikke ser direkte, men som man resonerer sig til på baggrund af målinger og logik, hvilket svarer meget godt til Husserls intuition. Ikke mere sikkert end den hypotetisk deduktive metode foreskriver, men ikke desto mindre sikkert indenfor disse rammer. Men vi er stadig ikke kommet svaret nærmere. Hvordan kan man erkende fænomenernes tomhed? Hvordan valideres det?

3.4.4Consciousness

Måske kan buddhismens bevidsthedsbegreb kaste lys over ovenstående spørgsmål. Lidt om bevidsthed, erkendelse og objekter fra den første dialog:

“Thubten Jinpa [tolk]: I think we have to make clear what we mean by consciousness, because in English it seems that when you say ‘conscious,’ there is some kind of mental conceptual ascertainment. When we use consciousness in the Buddhist context, the term is wider. Anything that is the subject of experience is consciousness, including nonascertaining awareness.” (Hayward et al 2001 p.193)

Jeremy Hayward (fysiker og biolog) kommer med det eksempel, at man under en samtale uopmærksomt kan tømme et glas og glemme, at man har gjort det, således at man, når man rækker ud efter det anden gang, bliver overrasket over, at det er tomt, og i øvrigt ikke kan huske, at man selv har tømt det. Er der bevidsthed involveret her? Hvortil Dalai Lama svarer: ”It is conscious.” (Hayward et al 2001 p.193). Tolkene konfererer med Dalai Lama og Wallace siger: “Thubten Jinpa and I have tried to understand what you [in English] mean by conscious, and what we’ve come up with is conceptual mental ascertainment. Now this is very, very important.” (Hayward et al 2001 p.193)

“Dalai Lama: […] The Buddhist definition of consciousness, from one point of view, is a subjective agent that has the potential to arise correspondent to an object that appears to it. Through the force of the stimulus of the object, consciousness has the ability to arise in an aspect corresponding to the object.

Rosch: But I thought the object and the consciousness were codependent? How can the object of cognition come before the cognition?

Dalai Lama: The object’s being dependent on the subject doesn’t mean that the object is dependent on a subject that precedes it. It is important to make discriminations between two types of analysis – relative and ultimate analysis. The fact is that the object cannot withstand ultimate analysis and is ultimately unfindable. The only mode of existence that object has left is that it exists by the force of designation, by the force of imputation, of consciousness. For example, when you see this as a cup and you use it for drinking tea, you do this by relying on the conventional experience; you don’t question the validity of that convention. But this cup doesn’t exist when you analyze it with the ultimate analysis. The only mode of existence it has is the existence it has by the force of conceptual designation. (Hayward et al 2001 p.194)

Her ses Nagarjunas tomhedsanalyse i brug! Nagarjuna bliver flittigt brugt af den tibetanske buddhisme, og det er ikke kun når kuriøse metafysiske spørgsmål skal diskuteres. Dalai Lamas første beskrivelse af bevidsthed lyder som subjekt-objektorienteret bevidsthed, som på niveau ’a’ i figur 1, hvilket da også Rosch undrer sig over, men Dalai Lamas svar bruger Nagarjuna til at slå bunden ud af ’a’, og således bevæger man sig nedad i figur 1.

3.4.5Gross (‘a’-‘c’), Subtle (‘d’-‘e’) and very subtle (‘f’) consciousness

Men spørgsmålet vedrørende hvordan en buddhist validerer tings iboende ’tomhed’, og dette spørgsmål viser sig ikke kun i den første Mind and Life dialog. Diskussioner fra de to første dialoger om forholdet mellem det materielle og mentale fører også ud i spørgsmål om validitet af udsagn, nemlig fordi buddhismen påstår, at den meget subtile bevidsthed er uafhængig af det materielle. Sådanne et udsagn kræver validitet, og Dalai Lama befinder sig ofte i dialogerne i en redegørelse for sådanne udsagn. Her i en diskussionen om forholdet mellem 3 niveauer af bevidstheden, som i figur 1.

“Dalai Lama: [W]e divide consciousness into three levels: gross, subtle, and very subtle. As we discussed earlier, the grosser the levels of mind, the more they are dependent on the body. The subtler they are, the less dependent they are, and the very subtle consciousness is independent of the body. We have this very subtle consciousness that is called velar light, clear-light mind. The grosser levels of mind that arise through the interaction with brains, neurons, sense organs, do so because we have this source that is the very subtle consciousness. So there is a great distinction in that in Buddhism the gross levels of consciousness are emergent properties of the subtle clear light, whereas for you people, for science, it normally emerges out of the brain. Just as all the grosser levels of mind arose from the very subtle consciousness, they would also eventually dissolve into the very subtle consciousness [at death]. So it’s like the source of all the grosser levels of mind. (Hayward et al 2001 157f)

“Hayward: Well, the scientist take the view that consciousness arises from a material cause.

Dalai Lama: Buddhists cannot accept this. You have to divide the cause into two: the main or substantial cause and the cooperative cause. Matter can only be a cooperative cause, never the main or substantial cause for consciousness. “ (Hayward 2001 p.153f)

Den samme diskussion dukkede op i den anden dialog (Consciousness at the Crossroads; Houshmand 1999 p.37f):

Patricia Churchland: ”[Consciousness] must have a cause in the brain, or at least that’s our expectation […]”(Houshmand 1999 p.37f)

Hvortil Dalai Lama spørger:

“Must all mental events, even those that seem to come out of the blue, have physical causes? Is your assertion here based upon a great number of observations – that a great number of mental events certainly do arise as a result of cerebral events? Are you making this generalization because it may be uncomfortable to admit that there could be exceptions? Or, have you established with one hundred percent certainty that exceptions do not occur and you know explicitly why?

Antonio Damasio: As Pat said, there is very little that we have established at one hundred percent for anything.

Dalai Lama: Isn’t it the case that you have simply not found any mental events independent of physical events, rather than finding that there are no mental events independent of physical events? That is a subtle but important distinction.

Allan Hobson: […] At present, I think it is very clear that all aspects of spontaneous thoughts that arise in dreams are related to specific activation of the brain and come from no other source.” (Houshmand 1999 p.39)

“Allan Hobson: What is the evidence, from your perspective, that subtle aspects of consciousness are independent of brain? That’s one question. A second question is: Are you really sure about this?”

Dalai Lama: […] But there needs to be a cause for [consciousness]. If you posit there is no cause for consciousness, then this leads to all sorts of inconsistencies and logical problems. So the cause is posited, established. It is considered certain. (Houshmand 1999, p.46)

“Patricia Churchland: But then I want to know why you think that. What is the evidence for that?

[…]

[Dalai Lama:] The first fundamental philosophical question is How do we determine whether something exists or not? That is the initial question. The factor that determines the existence or non-existence of something is verifying cognition, or awareness: the awareness that verifies. You have some experience; you saw something, so it exists. That’s the final criteria. (Houshmand 1999, p.49f)

Efter en længere redegørelse for ’sentient beings’ rolle i struktureringen af universet spørger:

”Allan Hobson: What is the evidence?

Dalai Lama: Yes, very difficult, very difficult.” (Houshmand 1999, p.51f)

Ovenstående er et udpluk af forskellige passager fra de to først dialoger, så det er et tilbagevendende problem. I første dialog forklarer Dalai Lama dog noget, som kaster lys over, hvad der forstås ved validitet, men for en naturvidenskabsmand er det en påstand, som ikke i sig selv bringer evidens. Redegørelsen er som følger:

3.4.6Yogic direct perception

Dalai Lama starter i nedenstående redegørelse med at bruge erkendelsen af en elektron som eksempel, og således er vi på niveau ’a’ i figur 1. Men pludselig snakker han om ’nonconceptual valid awarenes’, og så er vi pludselig på niveau ’e’ i figur 1, og det ser ud som om, at Dalai Lama ikke ved, at det er en ’ontologisk kategorifejl’. Hvis man er i dialog med naturvidenskabsfolk gør man klogt i at holde sig på niveau ’a’ i sin terminologi og omtalte fænomener, eller i det mindste det videnskabsteoretiske niveau, som er ’b’ og ’c’ i figur 1. Citatet bringes her, for at give læseren en fornemmelse af dialogens retorik.

”A very major issue, which is discussed at great length in Buddhist epistemology, concerns the progression of one continuum of cognition focusing on a particular entity. Let us say that you are focusing on a state of affairs that is not evident but is concealed. You must resort to logic. The one continuum may start out with a false view. You are miscognizing the object in question. You have misconstrued it. From that, in the same continuum of awareness, you may then shift over to non-realistic doubt. “Non-realistic” means, to take the electron as an example, you are cognizing this thing and saying it may be an electron, but it is probably not. (We are assuming for the sake of argument that in fact what you are concerned with is an electron). So you then have a non-realistic doubt. You are wavering, but away from reality rather than toward it. Then, as you investigate further, you may come to a state of doubt that is in equilibrium. This thing may be an electron and it may not; you are not quite sure[…]. As investigation continues, the same continuum of one person’s awareness may eventually arrive at a realistic doubt: “I’m not really sure, but it seems likely that it is an electron.” You investigate yet further and then you may reach a conviction that this is an electron. But still you don’t have what is called valid cognition [!] or a verifying cognition, because you don’t have sufficient evidence. With the same continuum of awareness, you investigate further and you find conclusive evidence on the subject in question. You still have the conviction, but now you also have had what we would call a valid or verifying cognition of an inferential nature. You have found evidence that leads conclusively to the presence of an electron. You have a completed inference, which is better than just a conviction, although it may feel the same. Having arrived at this inferential conclusion, you now investigate further, and finally you arrive at perception. By “perception” we mean here a non-conceptual valid awareness. This whole process takes time. It is a gradual process.

In the context of this kind of process, which proceeds from a wrong view and winds up with a valid perception, we speak of the various sources of deception, discriminating those that are of adventitious nature from those that are of an essential nature. In probing toward the inferential conclusion, we use different logical tools, such as inferring a consequence, then syllogism, and finally, conclusive reasoning. These are the three major tools in a logical investigation or analysis. So that is a kind of standard modus operandi of starting from a false view and winding up with a valid perception.” (Hayward et al 2001 p.39f)

Proceduren med at udrense bevidstheden for at nå til en ren erkendelse kan minde en smule om Husserls fænomenologi på den måde, at der skal en udrensning af visse kognitive elementer til, før man ser ’tingene som de præsenterer sig uformidlet for bevidstheden’. Husserls metoder til dette kaldte han: ’suspension af den naturalistiske attitude’ (Moran 2000 p.136); ’den fænomenologiske epoché’ (Moran 2000 p.146)og ’transcendental reduktion’ (Moran 2000 p.147). Dog har den før-refleksive livsverden for Husserl og for buddhismen næppe mange andre ligheder end deres før-refleksive status. Husserl var fokuseret på logik og matematik som forbillede for intuitiv erkendelse, og bedrev ikke ’bredspektret’ introspektion eller meditation (Moran 2000 p.136)

Videnskabsmændene bliver dog ved med at problematisere evidensspørgsmålet, og i Dalai Lamas svar, ser det ud som om, de er ved at opdage en vigtig pointe:

”[Dalai Lama: W]hen you speak of direct experience, you seem invariably to mean sensory direct experience; whereas in Buddhism the sensory aspect of experience is really quite peripheral. When you go through this whole progression from false view to perception, the whole idea is not to wind up with some sensory perception. That’s not the point at all. Rather, the aim is to wind up with a mental perception, or better yet, a contemplative perception which is the yogic perception. So it is really a different order of perception than simply what you were talking about, namely, ordinary visual perception. According to the Prasangika presentation, there are three types of direct perception[…]: sensory, mental and yogic. Yogic direct perception is not easy to describe; suffice it to say that it is a separate category. ” (Hayward et al 2001 p.47)

“Hayward: How is yogic direct perception validated?

Dalai Lama: [laughing] That is quite complicated! […] There are […] types of direct […] perception, that are not there initially, that you achieve as a result of your meditation (Hayward et al 2001 p. 47f)

3.4.7Delkonklusion – de første Mind and Life dialoger

Som de selv nævner under Mind and Life møderne, er den største ontologiske forskel mellem videnskaben og buddhismen, at det naturvidenskabelige verdensbillede opfatter bevidstheden som et sekundært (emergent) fænomen afledt af materien, hvor buddhismen opfatter den materielle verden som et emergent (sekundært) fænomen af ’very subtle consciousness’ (citat side 35 (Hayward et al 2001 157f) og Houshmand 1999 p.42f). På figur 1 vil det svare til, at naturvidenskabens ontologi tager udgangspunkt i (’c’) og ikke mener, at det giver mening at ’gå længere ned’ i figur 1; kausalitet udgår fra materien. Buddhismens ontologi ser ingen grund til, at ’c’ skulle være et privilegeret sted for bevidstheden at bygge en model af virkeligheden ud fra. Tværtimod er både den meditative praksis (Samatha, Vipasyana, Dzogchen) og Nagarjunas tomhedsfilosofi eksplicitte teknikker til at hive tæppet væk under ’c’ ; kausalitet udgår fra subtle consciousness.

Hvad validitet og evidens er, var tydeligvis kontroversielt, da Dalai Lama begyndte at snakke om ’non-conceptual valid awareness’, og dette problem forfølger de i de følgende dialoger og resulterer i et videnskabsteoretisk begreb om 1.personserfaring som ’forsøgsopstilling’. Dette behandles udførligt i afsnit 3.6 ’Varelas Neurofænomenologi’.