Labor economics 250C
Yüklə 104 Kb.
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- Bu səhifədəki naviqasiya:
- I. Economics of the Family, Fertility and Demographics II. The Economics of Religion III. Religion, Terrorism and Political Violence
- Requirements for the Course/Schedule
- Evaluation 5%
- I. Economics of the Family, Fertility and Demographics
- II. The Economics of Religion
- III. Religion, Terrorism and Political Violence
- Does Poverty cause Terrorism
- Benmelech, Effraim, and Claude Berrebi, “ Attack Assignments in Terror Organizations and The Productivity of Suicide Bombers ”, NBER WP 12910, Februa
- IV. Economics of Human Capital (Continued from 250B)
- III. Unemployment: Theory and Evidence 1) An Overview Of Different Theoretical Explanations and Evidence
- 2) Empirical Evidence on the Incidence and Duration of Unemployment
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LABOR ECONOMICS 250C UCSD PROFESSORS ELI BERMAN AND JULIAN BETTS Spring 2008 COURSE OUTLINE The course will provide a blend of theoretical labor economics and applied research. We will cover five broad themes: I. Economics of the Family, Fertility and Demographics II. The Economics of Religion III. Religion, Terrorism and Political Violence IV. The Economics of Education and Training (Continued from 250B) V. Unemployment: Theory and Evidence Professor Berman will teach topics I-III during weeks 1-5 and Professor Betts will teach topics IV-V during weeks 6-10. Requirements for the Course/Schedule To do well in this course you should have completed microeconomics and econometrics (A-C) courses. It would be helpful if you have already taken Labor Economics 250A/B, because there we covered many of the empirical methods that we will use in this course. Of these 250A is the most important. If you are unsure please consult one of the past 250A course syllabi, at http://weber.ucsd.edu/~jbetts/ and discuss with either of us if there are holes in your knowledge of the relevant empirical methods. You are required to: write your own original term paper, on a subject in labor economics of your choosing; present and critique two recent papers in an informal setting; and complete two midterms. You are also expected to attend and participate actively in all classes. Here is some advice on finding a topic for your term paper. Perusing recent issues of the Journal of Labor Economics, the Journal of Human Resources, or general interest journals such as the AER, JPE, Econometrica, R.E.Stat etc. may give you some ideas on topics. NBER working papers provide another source. The reading list for this course might also help you. Second, if you already have a general area in mind (immigration, labor supply, economics of education etc.) but not a specific topic one of the more difficult challenges is to whittle your interest down to something more specific. The Handbook of Labor Economics provides literature reviews that may help you see what areas are overly well trodden and which areas are relatively sparsely researched. A third approach is to flip through the Statistical Abstract of the United States or related government publications such as the Digest of Education Statistics – sometimes seeing what sorts of data the government collects and patterns in data can get your creative juices flowing. Fourth, talk to both of us about your ideas. This is why we are here! Evaluation 5% A paper proposal. Please email both of us a one to three page proposal with a few references by Wednesday of Week 2 (4/9). (Feel free to consult either of us informally before that time.) We offer you three options for this paper. Consider in weeks 1 and 2 which of these options will be most helpful to you as you seek to complete your Ph.D.. Note: You may wish to continue with your paper from 250B, which is certainly an option as long as you detail for us exactly what you will add to the paper this quarter. 1) Come up with a proposal for an original empirical paper. In week 2 please submit to us one or two ideas for original papers. We will work with you to decide which to pursue. The final paper should be a proposal for an original empirical paper, which states how this paper would contribute to the literature, devises an empirical strategy that is (ideally) based in theory, and discusses data sources that you could use. Ideally, your proposal would be of sufficient quality that you could submit it as a grant proposal to an outside organization. (We do not require submitting a grant application, but encourage you to think along these lines. We and will work with you if you decide to follow this route.) 2) Alternatively you could initiate or continue an applied (or a theoretical) project. Some of you may have initiated more empirically (or theoretically) oriented projects in 250A, 220F, or other graduate courses. You are welcome to continue that work in this course, but you must clear this with us and provide us with the final version you prepared for those classes, along with a clear statement of how you will extend that analysis. Note that if the empirical project is limited in scope it may be conceivable for you to start from scratch, develop a plan, acquire and clean data, and perform the empirical analysis. (This goes beyond option 1 above.) We certainly would welcome this but do talk to us first so that we can help judge whether this sounds feasible over the 10 weeks of quarter. 3) Alternatively write a 10-15 page literature review of a topic in labor economics. This literature review MUST also include thoughtful suggestions for future research. This latter statement is particularly true if you would like to extend a lit review from an earlier course. You would want to come up with a more detailed and focused lit review that builds upon the original paper and which discusses new paper ideas in detail. 45% A final draft of your paper. Due: In class on Wednesday of week 10 (June 4). Please bring two copies. (We would also appreciate receiving a copy by email.) There will be no extensions beyond the end of quarter, and papers submitted after June 4 will lose 5 percentage points (out of 45) per day late. 10% Two informal 20 minute presentations, each on ONE recent NBER working paper of your choice (but in the area of the economics of education). Please send Julian email by Friday May 9 with the titles and WP numbers of a few papers you would like to present in class. (The first meeting with Julian will be Wednesday, May 7 of that week. I may have a slightly revised reading list by then.) Feel free to consult with either or both of us in advance. Rank order the papers if you select more than two, and we can jointly decide which might be the most appropriate. One week before the scheduled presentations, please email the paper to all classmates and to us, or give all of us a paper copy. In your presentation, you should plan to present the paper as if it were “yours”, to offer constructive criticism and ideas for how you might extend the work. A few pages of handouts would be useful. A rough guideline for the talk might be 15 minutes for presentation of the paper, and a 5-minute discussion of your “referee comments”, and 5 minutes for questions from classmates and Julian. This is meant to be less formal than the presentations last quarter, and there may be tea and coffee and/or lunch involved. We will schedule two days for these presentations, probably late in the quarter. 20% A midterm on sections I-III in class on a date to be determined. 20% A second midterm on sections IV-V during finals week. Books: There is no required text. Students looking for a starting point or background material may wish to use Cahuc P. and Zylberberg A. Labor Economics (MIT press, 2004) [C&Z]. For a clear, accessible summary of much of the empirical literature try Ehrenberg, Ronald G. and Robert S. Smith (2006) Modern Labor Economics, Theory and Public Policy, (9th edition), HarperCollins, New York. Gud writing iz important. For an entertaining style manual, see Becker, Howard S. (1986) Writing For Social Scientists, U. of Chicago. Office Hours: Julian will have office hours Monday 1-2:30 throughout spring quarter. Any other time is fine as well, although it is probably best to set up something by email to make sure he is around and not in a meeting. Eli’s hours will be Wed 3:30-4:30, immediately after class. (Eli is also generally available for a chat in the afternoons if his door is open.) Reading List: The list is subject to negotiation. The (*) means priority reading. We will also try to give you some guidance as to which papers are the most important. I. Economics of the Family, Fertility and Demographics Background: Ray, Debraj Development Economics ch 9, or Weil, David Economic Growth (2nd edition) ch 4 & 5. * Becker, Gary S. “The Demand for Children,” and Becker, Gary S. and Barro, Robert “A Reformulation of the Economic Theory of Fertility,” in Becker, Gary S. A Treatise on the Family, (Harvard, Cambridge MA, 1991). * Becker, Gary S. "A Theory of the Allocation of Time", Economic Journal 75 (Sept. 1965): 493-517. * Gronau, Reuben. "Leisure, Home Production, and Work -- The Theory of the Allocation of Time Revisited," Journal of Political Economy, 85 (1977): 1099-1123. Lundberg, S.J., R.A. Pollak and T.J. Wales "Do Husbands and Wives Pool their Resources? Evidence from the U.K. Child Benefit," Journal of Human Resources 32(3) 1997: 463-480. Ashraf, Nava, “Spousal Control and Intra-Household Decision Making: An Experimental Study in the Philippines” Harvard, 2006, mimeo http://people.hbs.edu/nashraf/Spousal.pdf J. Mincer, "Labor Force Participation of Married Women," Aspects of Labor Economics, Princeton University Press, 1962. Goldin, Claudia, Understanding the Gender Gap, Oxford, 1990, chapters 2 and 5. Goldin, Claudia and Lawrence F. Katz, “Power of the Pill: Oral Contraceptives and Women's Career and Marriage Decisions," Journal of Political Economy, (August 2002). II. The Economics of Religion * Iannaccone, Laurence R (1998) “Introduction to the Economics of Religion,” Journal of Economic Literature, 36, pp. 1465-1496. * 1Smith, Adam, An Inquiry into the Nature and Causes of the Wealth of Nations (Reprint of 1776 version) Modern Library: New York; 1965. Book V, Chapter I, Part III, Article III “Religious Institutions.” * Iannaccone, Laurence R. (1992) “Sacrifice and Stigma: Reducing Free-riding in Cults, Communes, and other Collectives” Journal of Political Economy, 100(21), pp. 271-291. * Berman, Eli, ASect, Subsidy and Sacrifice: An Economist=s View of Ultra-Orthodox Jews,@ Quarterly Journal of Economics, August 2000. Chen, Daniel, “Economic Distress and Religious Intensity: Evidence from Islamic Resurgence During the Indonesian Financial Crisis,” University of Chicago mimeo, 2004. http://cas.uchicago.edu/workshops/cpolit/papers/chen.pdf Berman, Eli and Ara Stepanyan “How Many Radical Islamists? Indirect Evidence from Five Countries,” UCSD mimeo 2003. econ.ucsd.edu/~elib/ III. Religion, Terrorism and Political Violence Berman, Eli and Larry Iannaccone, “Religious Extremists: The Good the Bad and the Deadly,” (with Laurence Iannaccone), NBER WP 11663 (Public Choice, 2006). Berman, Eli, “Hamas, Taliban and the Jewish Underground: An Economists’ View of Radical Religious Militias.” NBER WP 10004, 2003. * Berman, Eli and Laitin, David, “Religion, Terrorism and Public Goods: Testing the Club Model” NBER 1WP #13725, January 2008, (forthcoming, Journal of Public Economics). Does Poverty cause Terrorism? Collier, Paul and Anke Hoeffler (2001) “Greed and Grievance in Civil War” http://econ.worldbank.org/progarms/library. * Fearon, James D. and David D. Laitin (2003) “Ethnicity, Insurgency and Civil War” American Political Science Review 97(1): 75-90 (February 2003). Krueger, Alan B. and Jitka Maleckova, “Education, Poverty, Political Violence and Terrorism: Is there a Causal Connection? NBER WP #9074, July 2002. Benmelech, Effraim, and Claude Berrebi, “Attack Assignments in Terror Organizations and The Productivity of Suicide Bombers”, NBER WP 12910, February 2007 * 1Akerlof, George A., and Janet L. Yellen, “Gang Behavior, Law Enforcement and Community Values,” in Values and Public Policy, Henry J. Aaron, Thomas E. Mann and Timothy Taylor, eds. (Washington D.C.: Brookings Press, 1994). IV. Economics of Human Capital (Continued from 250B) a) The Economics of Education (Continued from 250B. See 250B syllabus for sections i to iv) v) The Determinants Of School Quality a) Literature Review on School Inputs and Student Outcomes Basic Literature Review Coleman, James et al. (1966), "Equality of Educational Opportunity", Washington: Government Printing Office. * Hanushek, Eric A. (1986), "Production and Efficiency in Public Schools", Journal of Economic Literature, 24, #3, pp. 1141-1177. See also the articles in Burtless, Gary (Ed.) (1996), "Does Money Matter? The Effect of School Resources on Student Achievement and Adult Success." (Washington, DC: Brookings Institution). More Recent Evidence * Angrist, Joshua D., and Victor Lavy, (1999) , “Using Maimonides’ Rule to Estimate the Effect of Class Size on Scholastic Achievement,” Quarterly-Journal-of-Economics. May, 114(2): 533-75 * Betts, Julian R., (1995), "Does School Quality Matter? Evidence from the National Longitudinal Survey of Youth", Review of Economics and Statistics. * Betts, Julian R., (1996), "Is There a Link Between School Inputs and Earnings? Fresh Scrutiny of an Old Literature", in Gary Burtless (Ed.), "Does Money Matter? The Effect of School Resources on Student Achievement and Adult Success." (Washington, DC: The Brookings Institution). Betts, Julian R. (1996), “Do School Resources Matter Only for Older Workers?”, Review of Economics and Statistics (78:4), pp. 638-652. Betts, Julian R. (2001), “The Impact of School Resources on Women’s Earnings and Educational Attainment: Findings from the National Longitudinal Survey of Young Women”, Journal of Labor Economics, (19:3), pp. 635-657. Betts, Julian R. and Jamie L. Shkolnik (2000), “The Behavioral Effects of Variations in Class Size: The Case of Math Teachers”, Educational Evaluation and Policy Analysis, Summer, (20:2), pp. 193-213.
Boyd, D.; Lankford, H.; Loeb, S. and Wyckoff, J. "The Draw of Home: How Teachers" Preferences for Proximity Disadvantage Urban Schools." Journal of Policy Analysis And Management, 2005a, 24(1), pp. 113-32. ____. "Explaining the Short Careers of High-Achieving Teachers in Schools with Low-Performing Students." American Economic Review, 2005b, 95(2), pp. 166-71. Lankford, H.; Loeb, S. and Wyckoff, J. "Teacher Sorting and the Plight of Urban Schools: A Descriptive Analysis." Educational Evaluation And Policy Analysis, 2002, 24(1), pp. 37-62. Hanushek, Eric A., John F. Kain, and Steven G. Rivkin (2005), “Teachers, Schools, and Academic Achievement” Econometrica, March, 73(2): 417-58. An earlier version is available as National Bureau of Economic Research Working Paper 6691. Hoxby, Caroline M. (1996), “How Teachers' Unions Affect Education Production,” Quarterly Journal of Economics, 111:3. Loeb, Susanna and Marianne E. Page (2000), “Examining the Link between Teacher Wages and Student Outcomes: The Importance of Alternative Labor Market Opportunities and Non-pecuniary Variation,”, Review of Economics and Statistics, August, 82(3): 393-408. Koedel, Cory and Julian Betts (2007), “Re-Examining the Role of Teacher Quality In the Educational Production Function,” UCSD manuscript. Jacob, Brian A. and Lars Lefgren (2008), “Can Principals Identify Effective Teachers? Evidence on Subjective Performance Evaluation in Education,” Journal of Labor Economics, 26(1) January, 101-136. c) Peer Groups and Ability Grouping Angrist, Joshua D. and Kevin Lang (2004), “How Important are Classroom Peer Effects? Evidence from Boston’s Metco Program,” American Economic Review. December, 94(5): 1613-34. An earlier version is available as National Bureau of Economic Research Working Paper 9263. Argys, L. M., Rees, D. I., Brewer, D. J., 1996. Detracking America’s Schools: Equity at Zero Cost? Journal of Policy Analysis and Management 15, (4), 623-645. Betts, Julian R. and Jamie L. Shkolnik (2000), “The Effects of Ability Grouping on Student Math Achievement and Resource Allocation in Secondary Schools”, Economics of Education Review, (19:1), pp. 1-15. Betts, Julian R. and Andrew Zau (2003), “Peer Groups and Academic Achievement: Panel Evidence from Administrative Data,” manuscript, Department of Economics, UCSD. Hanushek, Eric A., John F. Kain, Jacob M. Markman and Steven G. Rivkin (2001), “Does Peer Ability Affect Student Achievement?” (An earlier version is available as National Bureau of Economic Research Working Paper 8502.) Hoxby, Caroline M., “Peer Effects in the Classroom: Learning from Gender and Race Variation,” NBER Working Paper No. 7867, 2001. Lazear, Edward (2001), “Educational Production”, Quarterly Journal of Economics, August (116:3). This paper is also available as NBER Working Paper 7349. (This paper has as much to say about peers as it does about class size.) Vigdor, Jacob L. and Thomas S. Nechyba (2004), “Peer Effects in North Carolina Public Schools.” Kennedy School of Government Program on Education Policy and Governance Research Paper #04-20, July 2004. d) School Choice and School Competition * Betts, Julian R., Lorien A. Rice, Andrew C. Zau, Y. Emily Tang, and Cory R. Koedel, Does School Choice Work? Effects on Student Integration and Achievement, San Francisco: Public Policy Institute of California. Available at www.ppic.org. Cullen, J. B.; Jacob, B. A. and Levitt, S. D. "The Impact of School Choice on Student Outcomes: An Analysis of the Chicago Public Schools." Journal Of Public Economics, 2005, 89(5-6), pp. 729-60. (See also NBER Working Paper 7888.) * Cullen, Julie Berry; Jacob, Brian A; Levitt, Steven, (2006) “The Effect of School Choice on Participants: Evidence from Randomized Lotteries,” Econometrica,. September, 74(5): 1191-1230. Epple, Dennis and Romano, Richard (1998), “Competition Between Private and Public Schools, Vouchers, And Peer-Group Effects,” American Economic Review 88, 33-62. Hoxby, Caroline M. (1998), “What Do America’s ‘Traditional’ Forms of School Choice Teach Us about School Choice Reforms?”, (March) Economic Policy Review, downloadable from www.ny.frb.org. * Hoxby, Caroline M. (2000), “Does Competition among Public Schools Benefit Students and Taxpayers?”, American Economic Review, December. Hoxby, Caroline M. "School Choice and School Productivity (Or, Could School Choice be a Rising Tide that Lifts All Boats," in C. Hoxby, ed. The Economics of School Choice, Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2003. Hsieh, C. T. and Urquiola, M. "When Schools Compete, How Do They Compete? An Assessment of Chile's Nationwide School Voucher Program." Journal Of Economic History, 2003, 63(2), pp. 558-58. (See also NBER Working Paper 10008.) Krueger, A. and Zhu, P. (2003), “Another look at the New York City school voucher experiment, NBER Working Paper 9418, National Bureau of Economic Research. Myers, D., Peterson, P., Mayer, D., Chou, J. and Howell, W. (2000), “School Choice In New York City After Two Years: An Evaluation Of The School Choice Scholarships Program,” Research Paper 8404-045, Mathematica Policy Research Inc. Rothstein, Jesse (forthcoming). “Does Competition Among Public Schools Benefit Students and Taxpayers? A Comment on Hoxby (2000).” American Economic Review. A version is available as NBER Working Paper 11215. Rouse, Cecilia E. (1998), “Schools and Student Achievement: More Evidence from the Milwaukee Parental Choice Program”, (March) Economic Policy Review, downloadable from www.ny.frb.org. Urquiola, M. "Does School Choice Lead to Sorting? Evidence from Tiebout Variation." American Economic Review, 2005, 95(4), pp. 1310-26. e) School Standards and Accountability Theoretical Work on Standards * Costrell, Robert M. (1994), "A Simple Model of Educational Standards", American Economic Review, September, 84(4), pp. 956-71. * Betts, Julian R., (1998), “The Impact of Educational Standards on the Level and Distribution of Earnings”, American Economic Review, (88:1), pp. 266-275. Empirical Evidence Betts, Julian (1998), “The Two-Legged Stool: The Neglected Role of Educational Standards in Improving America’s Schools”, (March) Economic Policy Review, downloadable from www.ny.frb.org. Betts, Julian R. Betts and Jeff Grogger (2003), “The Impact of Grading Standards on Student Achievement, Educational Attainment, and Entry-Level Earnings”, Economics of Education Review, (22:4), August, pp. 343-352. Zau, Andrew C. and Julian R. Betts (forthcoming 2008), Predicting Success, Preventing Failure: An Investigation of the California High School Exit Exam, San Francisco: Public Policy Institute of California. Chay, K. Y.; McEwan, P. J. and Urquiola, M. "The Central Role of Noise in Evaluating Interventions That Use Test Scores to Rank Schools." American Economic Review, 2005, 95(4), pp. 1237-58. Clotfelter, C. T.; Ladd, H. F.; Vigdor, J. L. and Diaz, R. A. "Do School Accountability Systems Make It More Difficult for Low-Performing Schools to Attract and Retain High-Quality Teachers?" Journal Of Policy Analysis And Management, 2004, 23(2), pp. 251-71. Jacob, B. A. "Accountability, Incentives and Behavior: The Impact of High-Stakes Testing in the Chicago Public Schools." Journal Of Public Economics, 2005, 89(5-6), pp. 761-96. Jacob, B. A. and Levitt, S. D. "Rotten Apples: An Investigation of the Prevalence and Predictors of Teacher Cheating." Quarterly Journal Of Economics, 2003, 118(3), pp. 843-77. Roderick, M.; Jacob, B. A. and Bryk, A. S. "The Impact of High-Stakes Testing in Chicago on Student Achievement in Promotional Gate Grades." Educational Evaluation and Policy Analysis, 2002, 24(4), pp. 333-57.
James, E., N. Alsalam, J.C. Conaty and D.-L. To, (1989), "College Quality and Future Earnings: Where Should You Send Your Child to College?", American Economic Review, 79, #2, pp. 247-252. Dale, Stacy Berg and Alan B Krueger (2002), “Estimating the Payoff to Attending a More Selective College: An Application of Selection on Observables and Unobservables”, Quarterly Journal of Economics, Nov. b) On-the-Job Training Lynch, Lisa (1992) "Private-Sector Training and the Earnings of Young Workers," American Economic Review (March). Barron; John M., Mark Berger and Dan Black (1999), “Do workers pay for on-the-job training?” Journal of Human Resources, Spring (34:2) 235-252. III. Unemployment: Theory and Evidence 1) An Overview Of Different Theoretical Explanations and Evidence Katz, Lawrence F. (1988), "Some Recent Developments in Labor Economics and Their Implications for Macroeconomics", Journal of Money, Credit and Banking, 20, #3, August, pp. 507-522. Stiglitz, Joseph E. (1986), "Theories of Wage Rigidity", in James L. Butkiewicz, Kenneth J. Koford and Jeffrey B. Miller (Eds.), Keynes' Economic Legacy: Contemporary Economic Theories, New York: Praeger, pp. 153-206. den Haan, Wouter J., Gary Ramey and Joel Watson (2000), “Job destruction and propagation of shocks”, American Economic Review, June. a) Efficiency Wages a) Survey Articles Carmichael, H. Lorne (1990), "Efficiency Wage Models of Unemployment - One View", Economic Inquiry, 28, April pp. 269-295. Lang, Kevin and Shulamit Kahn (1990), "Efficiency Wage Models of Unemployment - A Second View", Economic Inquiry, 28, April pp. 296-306. b) The Shirking Model * Shapiro, Carl and Joseph Stiglitz (1984), "Equilibrium Unemployment as a Worker Discipline Device", American Economic Review, 74, June, pp. 433-444. c) Other Models i) Adverse Selection * Weiss, A. (1980), "Job Queues and Layoffs in Labor Markets with Flexible Wages", Journal of Political Economy, 88, June, pp. 526-538. ii) Turnover Costs * Salop, Steven C. (1979), "A Model of the Natural Rate of Unemployment", American Economic Review, 69, March, pp. 117-125. iii) Sociological Explanations Akerlof, George A. (1982), "Labor Contracts as Partial Gift Exchange", Quarterly Journal of Economics, 47, November, pp. 543-569. Akerlof, George A. (1984), "Gift-Exchange and Efficiency Wage Theory: Four Views", American Economic Review, 74, May, pp. 79-83. d) Theoretical Objections i) Two Theoretical Objections to the Shirking Model * Carmichael, H. Lorne (1985), "Can Efficiency Wage Unemployment be Involuntary?", American Economic Review, 75, pp. 1213-1214. * Macleod, Bentley and James Malcolmsom (1989), "Implicit Contracts, Incentive Compatibility and Involuntary Unemployment", Econometrica, 57, pp. 312-322. Shapiro, Carl and Joseph Stiglitz (1985), "Can Efficiency Wage Unemployment be Involuntary: Reply", American Economic Review, 75, pp. 1215-1217. ii) A Further Qualification of Both the Shirking and Adverse Selection Models * MacLeod, Bentley and James M. Malcolmson (1988), "Reputation and Hierarchy in Dynamic Models of Employment", Journal of Political Economy, 96, #4. e) A Review of Empirical Evidence Blackburn, McKinley and David Neumark (1992), "Unobserved Ability, Efficiency Wages, and Interindustry Wage Differentials", Quarterly Journal of Economics, 107, #4, pp. 1421-1436. Cappelli, Peter and Keith Chauvin (1991), "An Interplant Test of the Efficiency Wage Hypothesis", Quarterly Journal of Economics, 106, #3, pp. 769-787. * Gibbons, Robert and Lawrence Katz (1992), "Does Unmeasured Ability Explain Inter-Industry Wage Differentials?", Review of Economic Studies, 59, #3, July, pp. 515-535. Groshen, Erica L. and Alan B. Krueger (1990), "The Structure and Supervision of Pay in Hospitals", Industrial and Labor Relations Review, 43, #3, Special Issue, pp. S134-S146. Krueger, Alan B. and Lawrence H. Summers (1988), "Efficiency Wages and the Inter-Industry Wage Structure", Econometrica, 56, #2, pp. 259-293. b) Minimum Wages And Unemployment Brown, Charles, Curtis Gilroy, and Andrew Kohen (1982), “The Effect of the Minimum Wage on Employment and Unemployment”, Journal of Economic Literature, (June). Card, David (1992), “Do Minimum Wages Reduce Employment? A Case Study of California, 1987-89”, Industrial and Labor Relations Review, (October). * Card, David and Alan B. Krueger (1994), “Minimum Wages and Employment - A Case Study of the Fast Food Industry in New Jersey and Pennsylvania”, American Economic Review, (84:4), September. Card, David and Alan B. Krueger (1995), Myth and Measurement : The New Economics of the Minimum Wage, (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press). Card, David, Lawrence Katz and Alan Krueger (1994), “Comment on David Neumark and William Wascher, ‘Employment Effects of Minimum and Subminimum Wages: Panel Data on State Minimum Wage Laws’”, Industrial and Labor Relations Review, (47:3), April. Castillo, Alida and Richard B. Freeman (1992), “When the Minimum Wage Really Bites: The Effect of the U.S.-Level Minimum on Puerto Rico”, in George J. Borjas and Richard B. Freeman (Eds.), The Economic Effects of Immigration in Source and Receiving Countries, (Chicago: University of Chicago Press). * Katz, Lawrence and Alan B. Krueger (1992), “The Effect of the Minimum Wage on the Fast Food Industry”, Industrial and Labor Relations Review, (October). * Kennan, John (1995), “The Elusive Effects of Minimum Wages”, Journal of Economic Literature, (33:4) (December). * Kim, Taeil and Lowell Taylor (1995), “The Employment Effect In Retail Trade Of California's 1988 Minimum Wage Increase”, Journal of Business & Economic Statistics (13:2), (April). Neumark, David and William Wascher (1994), “Employment Effects of Minimum and Subminimum Wages: Reply to Card, Katz, and Krueger”,.Industrial and Labor Relations Review, (47:3), April. Neumark, David and William Wascher (1992), “Employment Effects of Minimum and Subminimum Wages: Panel Data on State Minimum Wage Laws”, Industrial and Labor Relations Review, (46:1), October. Neumark, David and William Wascher (1995), “Minimum-Wage Effects On School And Work Transitions Of Teenagers”, American Economic Review, (85:2), (May). Neumark, David and William Wascher (1995), “Minimum Wage Effects On Employment And School Enrollment”, Journal Of Business and Economic Statistics, (13:2), (May). Neumark, David and William Wascher (1995), “The Effect Of New Jersey's Minimum Wage Increase On Fast-Food Employment: A Re-Evaluation Using Payroll Records”, NBER Working Paper #5224. See also their article in American Economic Review December 2000 and reply by Card and Krueger in same article. Rebitzer, James B and Lowell Taylor (1995), “The Consequences Of Minimum Wage Laws: Some New Theoretical Ideas”, Journal of Public Economics, (56:2) (February). Watson, Nadine (1996), Ph.D. Thesis, University of California, San Diego. Baker, Michael, Dwayne Benjamin and Shuchita Stanger (1999), “The Highs and Lows of the Minimum Wage Effect: A Time Series Cross-Section Study of the Canadian Law”, Journal of Labor Economics (April). ** Brown, Charles (1999), “Minimum Wages, Employment, and the Distribution of Income”, in Handbook of Labor Economics, Volume 3B, eds O. Ashenfelter and D. Card, Amsterdam: Elsevier Science. c) Insider-Outsider/Hysteresis Theories Blanchard, Olivier J. and Lawrence H. Summers (1986), "Hysteresis and the European Unemployment Problem", in Stanley Fischer (Ed.), NBER Macroeconomics Annual 1986, Cambridge: MIT Press, pp. 15-77. * Lindbeck, Assar and Dennis J. Snower (1988), "Cooperation, Harassment, and Involuntary Unemployment: An Insider-Outsider Approach", American Economic Review 78, #1, pp. 167-188. d) Sectoral Shifts Abraham, Katherine G. and Lawrence F. Katz (1986), "Cyclical Unemployment: Sectoral Shifts or Aggregate Disturbances?", Journal of Political Economy, 94, June, pp. 507-522. Brainard, S. Lael and David M. Cutler (1993), "Sectoral Shifts and Cyclical Unemployment Reconsidered", Quarterly Journal of Economics, 58, #1, Feb., pp. 219-243. * Lilien, David M. (1982), "Sectoral Shifts and Cyclical Unemployment", Journal of Political Economy, 90, August, pp. 777-793. Murphy, Kevin M. and Robert H. Topel (1987), "The Evolution of Unemployment in the United States", in NBER Macroeconomics Annual 2, pp. 11-58. 2) Empirical Evidence on the Incidence and Duration of Unemployment a) Gross Job Flows Davis, Steven and John Haltiwanger (1992), "Gross Job Creation, Gross Job Destruction, and Employment”, Quarterly Journal of Economics, Aug. 107:3, 819-863. b) Unemployment Insurance and the Duration of Unemployment Katz, Lawrence and Bruce Meyer. “Unemployment Insurance, Recall Expectations, and Unemployment Outcomes”, Quarterly Journal of Economics, Nov. 1990. Katz, Lawrence and Bruce Meyer. “The Impact of the Potential Duration of Unemployment Benefits on the Duration of Unemployment”, Journal of Public Economics, 1990. McCall, Brian (1996), “Unemployment Insurance Rules, Joblessness and Part-Time Work”, Econometrica, May. Meyer, Bruce (1990),. “Unemployment Insurance and Unemployment Spells”, Econometrica, July. Woodbury, Stephen and Robert Spiegelman (1987), “Bonuses to Workers and Employers to Reduce Unemployment: Randomized Trials in Illinois”, American Economic Review, Sept. Yüklə 104 Kb. Dostları ilə paylaş:
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