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PIIGS at the Slaughter (PIIGS në kasaphanë)

The situation in the EU would be largely contained if Greece were the only country affected right now by staggering debts and deficits, but it's not. Portugal, Italy, Ireland and Spain are also at risk of serious economic consequences right now, and investors are rightfully concerned. The five countries are sometimes referred to as the PIIGS.

Situata në BE do të jenë në masë të madhe e përmbajtur në qoftë se Greqia do të ishte i vetmi vend i prekur, tani për tani, nga borxhet dhe deficitet tronditëse, por nuk është kështu. Portugalia, Italia, Irlanda dhe Spanja janë tashti, gjithashtu, në rrezik me pasoja të rënda ekonomike, ndërsa investitorët janë të shqetësuar me të drejtë. Të pesë vendet nganjëherë i referohen si PIIGS (Portugalia, Italia, Irlanda, Greqia dhe Spanja).

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In early February, Portugal attempted to raise 500 million euros from a T-bill auction, but ended up reducing the amount and selling only 300 million euros of T-bills – a sign that investors were betting on a significantly increased likelihood that the Mediterranean nation would default on its sovereign debt. Despite the drama unfolding elsewhere, however, Greece continues to be the most pressing priority – at least for the moment.

Në fillim të shkurtit, Portugalia u përpoq për të marrë 500 milionë € nga një ankand i Bonove të Thesarit (T-bill), por përfundoi duke ulur sasinë e shitur në vetëm 300 milionë euro të bonove të thesarit - një shenjë që investitorët kishin vërë bast mbi gjasat e rritura ndjeshëm se shtetet e Mesdheut do të mos i plotësojnë detyrimet e tyre të borxhit shtetëror (publik). Pavarësisht nga drama e shpalosur diku tjetër, megjithatë, Greqia vazhdon të jetë prioriteti më i ngutshëm - të paktën për momentin.

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The EU's Subtle Safety Net (Rrjeti Delikat i Sigurisë i BE-së)
But many of the concerns going on right now may be overdone. After all, while the financial collapse of an EU country would take a serious toll on U.S. markets, that's nothing compared to the toll it would take on other EU countries – like France or Germany. As a result, it's more than likely that we'll see financially stable European states step in before it's too late. (For related reading, check out Can The IMF Solve Global Economic Problems?
Por, shumë nga shqetësimet që po ndodhin tani mund të jenë të zmadhuara. Pas të gjithave, ndërsa kolapsi financiar i një vendi të BE do të marrë një çmim (taksë) të rëndë në tregjet e SHBA, kjo nuk është asgjë në krahasim me çmimin (taksën) që do të marrë në vendet tjera të Bashkimit Evropian – siç është Franca apo Gjermania. Si rezultat, kjo është më se e mundshme që ne do të shohim hapa (konsolidues) të shteteve europiane për të qenë financiarisht të qëndrueshme, para se nuk është shumë vonë.
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Trilema politike e ekonomisë botërore“ (The political trilemma of the world economy)

Greek Lessons for the World Economy (Mësimet greke për ekonominë botërore)

Dani Rodrik

May 11, 2010

Dani Rodrik, Professor of Political Economy at Harvard University’s John F. Kennedy School of Government, is the first recipient of the Social Science Research Council’s Albert O. Hirschman Prize. His latest book is One Economics, Many Recipes: Globalization, Institutions, and Economic Growth.
CAMBRIDGE – The $140 billion support package that the Greek government has finally received from its European Union partners and the International Monetary Fund gives it the breathing space needed to undertake the difficult job of putting its finances in order. The package may or may not prevent Spain and Portugal from becoming undone in a similar fashion, or indeed even head off an eventual Greek default. Whatever the outcome, it is clear that the Greek debacle has given the EU a black eye.

Deep down, the crisis is yet another manifestation of what I call “the political trilemma of the world economy”: economic globalization, political democracy, and the nation-state are mutually irreconcilable. We can have at most two at one time. Democracy is compatible with national sovereignty only if we restrict globalization. If we push for globalization while retaining the nation-state, we must jettison democracy. And if we want democracy along with globalization, we must shove the nation-state aside and strive for greater international governance.

The history of the world economy shows the trilemma at work. The first era of globalization, which lasted until 1914, was a success as long as economic and monetary policies remained insulated from domestic political pressures. These policies could then be entirely subjugated to the demands of the gold standard and free capital mobility. But once the political franchise was enlarged, the working class got organized, and mass politics became the norm, domestic economic objectives began to compete with (and overwhelm) external rules and constraints.

The classic case is Britain’s short-lived return to gold in the interwar period. The attempt to reconstitute the pre-World War I model of globalization collapsed in 1931, when domestic politics forced the British government to choose domestic reflation over the gold standard.

The architects of the Bretton Woods regime kept this lesson in mind when they redesigned the world’s monetary system in 1944. They understood that democratic countries would need the space to conduct independent monetary and fiscal policies. So they contemplated only a “thin” globalization, with capital flows restricted largely to long-term lending and borrowing. John Maynard Keynes, who wrote the rules along with Harry Dexter White, viewed capital controls not as a temporary expedient but as a permanent feature of the global economy.

The Bretton Woods regime collapsed in the 1970’s as a result of the inability or unwillingness – it is not entirely clear which – of leading governments to manage the growing tide of capital flows.

The third path identified by the trilemma is to do away with national sovereignty altogether. In this case, economic integration can be married with democracy through political union among states. The loss in national sovereignty is then compensated by the “internationalization” of democratic politics. Think of this as a global version of federalism.

The United States, for example, created a unified national market once its federal government wrested sufficient political control from individual states. This was far from a smooth process, as the American Civil War amply demonstrates.

The EU’s difficulties stem from the fact that the global financial crisis caught Europe midway through a similar process. European leaders always understood that economic union needs to have a political leg to stand on. Even though some, such as the British, wished to give the Union as little power as possible, the force of the argument was with those who pressed for political integration alongside economic integration. Still, the European political project fell far short of the economic one.

Greece benefited from a common currency, unified capital markets, and free trade with other EU member states. But it does not have automatic access to a European lender of last resort. Its citizens do not receive unemployment checks from Brussels the way that, say, Californians do from Washington, DC, when California experiences a recession. Nor, given linguistic and cultural barriers, can unemployed Greeks move just as easily across the border to a more prosperous European state. And Greek banks and firms lose their creditworthiness alongside their government if markets perceive the latter to be insolvent.

The German and French governments, for their part, have had little say over Greece’s budget policies. They could not stop the Greek government from borrowing (indirectly) from the European Central Bank (ECB) as long as credit rating agencies deemed Greek debt creditworthy. If Greece chooses default, they cannot enforce their banks’ claims on Greek borrowers or seize Greek assets. Nor can they prevent Greece from leaving the eurozone.

What all this means is that the financial crisis has turned out to be a lot deeper and its resolution considerably messier than necessary. The French and German governments have grudgingly come up with a major loan package, but only after considerable delay and with the IMF standing at their side. The ECB has lowered the threshold of creditworthiness that Greek government securities must meet in order to allow continued Greek borrowing.

The success of the rescue is far from assured, in view of the magnitude of belt-tightening that it calls for and the hostility that it has aroused on the part of Greek workers. When push comes to shove, domestic politics trumps foreign creditors.

The crisis has revealed how demanding globalization’s political prerequisites are. It shows how much European institutions must still evolve to underpin a healthy single market. The choice that the EU faces is the same in other parts of the world: either integrate politically, or ease up on economic unification.

Before the crisis, Europe looked like the most likely candidate to make a successful transition to the first equilibrium – greater political unification. Now its economic project lies in tatters while the leadership needed to rekindle political integration is nowhere to be seen.  

The best that can be said is that Europe will no longer be able to delay making the choice that the Greek affair has laid bare.  If you are an optimist, you might even conclude that Europe will therefore ultimately emerge stronger.

Paketa mbështetëse $ 140 miliardëshe që qeveria greke ka marrë më në fund nga partnerët e saj të Bashkimit Evropian dhe Fondit Monetar Ndërkombëtar i jep hapësirë të marrë frymë, e nevojshme për të ndërmarrë punën e vështirë të sjelljes në rregull të financave të saj. Paketa mund ose jo të parandalojë Spanjën dhe Portugalinë të bëhet e ‘fikur’ në mënyrë të ngjashme, apo me të vërtetë të kthehet për së mbari. Pavarësisht nga përfundimi, është e qartë se përmbysja greke i ka dhënë BE-së një turp .

E shikuar më thellë, kriza është edhe një manifestim i asaj që unë e quaj "trilemma politike e ekonomisë botërore“ (the political trilemma of the world economy ): globalizmi ekonomik, demokracia politike dhe komb-e-shteti janë reciprokisht të papajtueshme.

Ne mund t’i kemi më së shumti dy (nga këto) në një kohë. Demokracia është në përputhje me sovranitetin kombëtar vetëm në qoftë se ne kufizojnë globalizimin. Nëse do ta shtyjmë përpara globalizimin, duke e mbajtur shtetin-komb, ne duhet hedhur demokracinë. Dhe, në qoftë se ne duam demokraci, së bashku me globalizimin, ne duhet të lëmë mënjanë shtetin-komb dhe të përpiqemi për një qeverisje më të madhe ndërkombëtare.

Historia e ekonomisë botërore tregon trilemn në vepër. Epoka e parë e globalizimit, e cila zgjati deri në vitin 1914, ishte një sukses për sa kohë që politikat ekonomike dhe monetare mbetën të izoluara nga presionet e brendshme politike. Këto politika mund të jenë vënë tërësisht nën kontroll të kërkesave të standardit të arit dhe lëvizjes se lirë të kapitalit. Por, sapo është zgjeruar ekskluziviteti politik, klasa punëtore u organizua, ndërsa politika e masës u bë normë, objektivat ekonomike vendore filluan të konkurrojnë me (dhe t’I trullosin) rregullat dhe kufizimet e jashtme.

Rasti klasik është kthimi jetëshkurtër i Britanisë në standardin e arit në periudhën e luftërave. Përpjekjet për të rikonstruktuar (ripërtërirë) modelin e globalizimit para Luftës së Parë Botërore u shembën në vitin 1931, kur politikat e brendshme e detyruan qeverinë britanike për të zgjedhur reflacionin (rritje e sasisë së parasë në qarkullim në një ekonomi) vendor kundrejt standardit të arit.

Arkitektët e regjimit të Bretton Woods-it e mbajtën këtë mësim në mendje kur ridizajnuan sistemin monetar në botë në vitin 1944. Ata e kuptuan se vendet demokratike do të kenë nevojë për hapësirë për të zhvilluar politika të pavarura monetare dhe fiskale. Pra, ata parashikuan vetëm një globalizim të “hollë”, me flukse të kufizuara të kapitalit, kryesisht në huadhënie dhe huamarrje afatgjatë. John Maynard Keynes, i cili shkroi rregullat, së bashku me Harry Dexter White, kontrollet e kapitalit i shihte jo si një dobi të përkohshme, por si një tipar i përhershëm i ekonomisë globale.


Regjimi i Bretton Woods-it u shemb në vitin 1970 si rezultat i paaftësisë ose mosdashjes - kjo nuk është plotësisht e qartë - për të udhëhequr qeveritë për të menaxhuar valën në rritje të fluksit të kapitalit.

Rruga e tretë e identifikuar nga trilema është të largojë krejt nga sovraniteti kombëtar. Në këtë rast, integrimi ekonomik mund të jetë në bashkëshortësi me demokracinë nëpërmjet bashkimit politik ndërmjet shteteve. Humbja në sovranitetin kombëtar është kompensuar pastaj me "internacionalizimin" e politikës demokratike. Mendimi i tillë është një version global i federalizmit.



The Financial Crisis of 2007-2009: Causes and Remedies
Viral Acharya, Thomas Philippon, Matthew Richardson, and Nouriel Roubini, pg 110-113

IV. Efficient Regulation: Principles and Proposals 

In order to provide a framework for efficient regulation of the financial sector based on sound economic principles, we reiterate the four important themes that have been intertwined (ndërthurur) in producing this trenchant (fuqishme) crisis.

While the discussion below overlaps to an extent with the preceding one, its goal is to establish the core set of issues and the linkages between them and reinforce how they combined into a lethal (vdekjeprurës) mixture risking the financial stability and real-sector output of our economies.

These four themes are:

1. Risk-taking incentives at banks and financial institutions;

2. Mispriced guarantees awarded to the financial sector;

3. Increasing opaqueness of the financial sector and resulting counterparty risk externality;

4. Focus of regulation on institution-level risk rather than on aggregate or systemic risk.

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http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2008/11/27/


A Win-Win Bankruptcy Reform

By Rich Leonard


November 28, 2008

I watched a middle-aged widow lose her home recently.

Her story was familiar. She owned her simple brick residence outright until four years ago, when a mortgage broker stopped by and offered her a loan too good to be true. In exchange for taking on a modest monthly payment, she could make some needed repairs and consolidate other debts.

More sophisticated than many borrowers, she realized she was getting an adjustable-rate mortgage. What she didn't realize was that, in the biggest "bait-and-switch" ever pulled by an entire industry, her ARM was not tied to the prime rate or any other index, as adjustable-rate mortgages have traditionally been. Her rate simply adjusted periodically, ever upward. When it hit 14 percent, her social worker's salary could no longer cover the payments.

I watched this story unfold in court, from my seat in a bankruptcy judge's chair. While a Chapter 13 filing temporarily stopped the foreclosure on this woman's home, it did little more than buy a few months' time.

Under existing law, bankruptcy courts cannot modify the terms of home mortgages. To keep her home, this debtor needed to demonstrate sufficient income not only to make her ongoing payments at 14 percent but also to cover, during her five-year repayment plan, the payments she had defaulted on. Her proposed plan was clearly not feasible based on her salary, so I had no choice but to lift the stay and allow the foreclosure to continue.

Homeowners are the only ones who cannot modify the terms of their secured debts in bankruptcy. Corporate America flocks to bankruptcy courts to do precisely this -- to restructure and reamortize loans whose conditions they find onerous or can no longer meet. Airlines are still flying and auto parts makers still operating because they have used this powerful tool of the bankruptcy process. Lehman Brothers will surely invoke it. But when the bankruptcy code was adopted in 1979, the mortgage industry persuaded Congress that its market was so tightly regulated and conservatively run that it should be exempted from the general bankruptcy rules permitting modification.

How far we have come.

For more than a year, a number of legislators, academics and judges have advocated removing this ban on home mortgage modification to help stem the increasing number of foreclosures. I have twice participated in briefing sessions organized by the House Judiciary Committee, where I was lectured by lobbyists for the mortgage industry about the sanctity of contracts. I have listened to their high-priced lawyers make fallacious constitutional arguments based on discredited cases from the 1930s. (This is, incidentally, an industry that is not particularly concerned about its own contractual obligations as it tries, through various Treasury-aided programs, to stay afloat.)

Allowing modifications is a solid solution, as evidenced by my example. This homeowner could have restructured her loan to terms resembling those of a conventional mortgage. If the court found that the market value of her home had fallen below what she owed, the secured portion that must be repaid in full would be reduced to the house's actual value; otherwise, the amount to be repaid would stay the same. The interest rate would be adjusted to reflect the prevailing market. However, because this homeowner is a riskier borrower than most, I would have raised her rate to account for that increased risk, as Supreme Court precedent requires. Instead of 14 percent, the rate would probably have been in the high single digits. This homeowner -- with her steady income -- could have made the reduced payments.

Such a solution would have been better for everyone. Obviously, it would have been good for the homeowner and the community in which she lives. Instead of another abandoned house tied up in foreclosure, her residence would be owned by a taxpaying citizen. More important, it would have been good for the lender. Whatever unknown mortgage syndicates hold pieces of this loan, they are never going to get their 14 percent return. Instead, the total recovery will be limited to the proceeds from a foreclosure sale in a depressed market. Any deficiency owed by the homeowner will be discharged as part of her bankruptcy. No one has been able to explain to me why it is not better for mortgage holders to get a fair return of principal back, albeit at a lower interest rate, than to take a lump sum through foreclosure that is probably much less than the value of the note.

There is a simple answer to the frequent, hyperbolic assertion that such a process would be abused: Chapter 13 is no walk in the park. It requires public disclosure of every aspect of your life, examinations under oath by a trustee and creditors, allowing creditors to haul you into court on any objection, and relinquishment of control of your financial life for up to five years. If you falter, your case will be dismissed and you will lose the entire benefit of the bankruptcy law, including having your original contract terms reinstated. That is precisely why allowing mortgage modifications is such a good approach. It would elegantly separate those homeowners who desperately need to stay in their homes and have sufficient incomes to make reasonable payments from those investors who bet on lax regulation, easy credit and an appreciating market in buying residential properties. Those in the latter category will have no use for this process, but for the first category, it could be a powerful step back to financial stability.



The writer is a judge with the U.S. Bankruptcy Court in the Eastern District of North Carolina.

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U.S. Economic Outlook for 2009

A Market Mandela
By Money Morning, November 22, 2008

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If there’s a proverb that captures the outlook for the U.S. economy in the New Year, it’s the one that says: "It’s always darkest before the dawn."

Regardless of any formal announcement of whether or not the United Stateshttp://images.intellitxt.com/ast/adtypes/mag-glass_10x10.gif drops into an actual recession, the ongoing credit crisis guarantees a contraction of the American economy by virtually every measure we know. That period of darkness will be marked by a dramatic slowdown in economic activity, as well as by rising unemployment, additional declines in U.S. stock prices, and constant volatility. And it could last as long as 12-18 months.

But when the dawn does come, it will be one to remember. If U.S. President-elect Barack Obama gets it right - and I have every reason to believe that he will - then investors will be presented with the greatest investment opportunity of our generation. At that point, shares of American companies will be at such low levels that wholesale buying by individuals, mutual funds, pension funds, institutional money managers, and foreign-controlled sovereign wealth funds, will generate gains that will not only make us whole, they will make us rich once again.

A Market Mandela

Creating an analysis of the U.S. economy’s outlook for the New Year is akin to creating a mandala, a geometric work of art whose pattern, symbolically or metaphysically, represents a microcosm of the universe from the human perspective. In some Buddhist temples, mandalas are made of tiny colored beads, painstakingly created by several monks as a form of meditation. In celebration of the ever-changing nature of the universe, the mandala is then joyously shaken by its creators, until it is once again nothing more than chaos embodied in a box of colored beads.

Regardless of the big picture, analysis of a mandala - or the economy - always starts at the center and emanates outward. With the U.S. economy, that centerpiece is credit. The credit crisis has shaken the complex mandala that is our economy and transformed the United States economy into chaos. It’s complex because this economic-forecast mandala derived its form from thousands of individual pieces - in the case of the economy, from scores of data points, many of which are currently dark and foreboding.

The credit crisis we are experiencing results from the contraction - or worse, the cessation - of lending. Under normal circumstances, institutions and markets freely facilitate capital movement between lenders and borrowers. But that’s not happening, now.

Because of a lack of transparency into the balance sheets of borrowers holding such complex and illiquid securities as collateralized debt obligations, credit-default swaps, and non-performing loans, and because of increasing recessionary fears affecting businesses and households, lenders don’t want to increase their loan exposure. Banks are holding onto the cash and liquid securities they control, using them as a cushion against their own potential losses. The U.S. Treasury Department’s direct-to-bank capital injections do not alter these banking realities. In fact, as a Money Morning investigative story recently demonstrated, instead of using these taxpayer-provided infusions to increase their lending, these banks are using the money to finance takeover deals.

The Recipe for a Recession

The National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER) will ultimately determine whether or not the United States is technically in a recession. The business-cycle dating committee of this privately run, nonprofit economic research group is right now studying five factors in an attempt to determine if the United States has entered a recession and, if so, when that downturn started, MarketWatch.com reported. Those five factors are:



  • Gross Domestic Product (GDP).

  • Industrial production.

  • Employment

  • Income.

  • Retail sales

Regardless of any formal announcement by the NBER of whether we’re in a recession, the credit crisis guarantees a general contraction of economic activity, by every measure.

"Any doubt that we’re officially in a recession can be put aside," Anthony Karydakis, former chief U.S. economist for JPMorgan Asset Management - and now a professor at New York University’s Stern School of Business - recently wrote in Fortune magazine. "The rapid deterioration of labor markets points to a sharp decline in hours worked and output in the fourth quarter. This is likely to lead to a decline in personal consumption to the tune of 5.0% or so for that period. Since [consumer spending] makes up about 70% of the economy, the stage has already been set for real GDP to shrink at a more than 4.0% rate in the fourth quarter."



Confirmation of that belief is evident by looking at each of the NBER’s five key indicators.
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