3
dimension.
6
It is true that, in his classical work, Popkin considers Bacon as a proponent
of a kind of “temporary or partial skepticism”, nonetheless assuming that, in this case,
he is not dealing with a skeptic, but instead, as he sees it, with the leading figure of an
“Aristotelian” strategy to respond to skepticism. Once again, however, these are just
passing allusions and, as such, are not developed into a more detailed examination of
how he understood and solved the skeptical problem within his personal reflection.
7
However, even if it is hard to determine the sources on which Bacon relied, it seems to
us that there are enough elements to argue that skepticism played a much more relevant
role in his philosophical reflection than has usually been acknowledged.
Here, we shall neither deal with a close investigation into the question of whether
those aspects of Baconian philosophy which seem to bear some relation with skeptical
themes are closely connected or not with the skeptical way of advancing doubtful pieces
of reasoning, nor shall we offer an examination of the way he expected to respond to
skeptical problems. Before doing this, it seems to us important to examine how far we
can evaluate the philosophical significance of the affinities acknowledged by Bacon
between his ideas and that sort of philosophy, bearing in mind the very passages in
which he expresses his opinion about it. As we shall see, they seem to indicate that it is
possible to go beyond the general remarks on the “influences” of this philosophy upon
his own reflection and to make precise the meaning that he conveyed to that
relationship, even though we cannot argue that Bacon considers his own “Doctrine of
6
SCHMITT (1972); POPKIN (2001)
7
Cf. POPKIN (2001), pp. 85, 156, 174, 202. Popkin does not provide a clear justification for this assimilation of
Bacon’s case into the Aristotelian type of responses to skepticism. On p. 208, he nevertheless says that all these
Aristotelian responses bear the common feature that there would be normal conditions of our faculties functioning
according to which we could attain knowledge, but it is doubtful whether we should include the case of Bacon
here, as we shall see. Even though we may recognize several points of contact between his philosophy and
Aristotelianism— see MALHERBE, 1986, p. 36 — Popkin’s hypothesis has to be contrasted with the many
criticisms Bacon directs towards that philosopher, whom he sees as a paradigm of “rationalist” corruption of
Philosophy (cf. N.O., I, §§54, 63, 67, 77). The new edition of Popkin’s History (2003) contains nothing new about
Bacon. In his turn, OLIVEIRA (2002) devotes to the theme a chapter of his book, which we will consider next.
4
Idols” as a skeptical doctrine. The affinity that he accepts between the diagnosis of
knowledge offered by this doctrine and the skeptical position seems to be so that his
revocation would not only depend, according to Bacon, upon the possession of the new
method to investigate nature which he aims at announcing, but also upon the complete
fulfillment of the project on the foundation of a science of the Forms of the things
themselves — something that Bacon himself takes as an impossible task and delegates
to the work of future generations. Furthermore, most of the discussions about
philosophical skepticism are frequently compromised by the vagueness of this concept
— and Bacon’s case is far from being an exception. Therefore, we will also try to keep
in mind the way his reflections take into account the different aspects with which the
skeptical way of thinking presents itself in the midst of the intellectual atmosphere of
the Renaissance (including the association between skepticism and literary paradox), as
well as the differences between the skeptical schools. Nevertheless, with regard to this
last point, we can notice that Bacon’s thought — apparently through lack of a more
direct contact with the works of Sextus Empiricus — conforms to its own theoretical
reflections on the theme, thus converging into a type of distinction between “extreme
skepticism” and “moderate skepticism” quite similar to the one which would turn out to
be usual in the philosophy to come.
We should note from the start that Bacon’s references to philosophical skepticism
constantly bear a critical element, continually taking up the same points: according to
him, the skeptics are those who profaned the oracle of the senses and human faculties
instead of providing them with the support needed to obtain the truth, and outlined their
diagnosis of our cognitive situation so as to substitute the straight path of research for a
simple “ride about things” through pleasant dissertations.
8
But these observations offer
8
See, for instance, N.O. I, §67 (Sp I, 179).
5
just a partial image, which can lead us to a false evaluation if we do not bear in mind the
fact that, on more than one occasion, his critiques are brought to light in the form of a
counterpoint between his own world-view and the skeptical way of thinking. In
aphorism I § 37 of Novum organum, for instance, Bacon writes — concerning the
philosophers who argued for a suspension of assent:
The doctrine [ratio] of those who denied that certainty could be attained at all [eorum qui
acatalepsia tenuerunt], has some agreement with my way of proceeding at the first setting
out [initiis]; but they end in being infinitely separated and opposed. For the holders of that
doctrine assert simply that nothing can be known; I also assert that not much can be
known in nature by the way which is now in use. But then they go on to destroy the
authority of the senses; whereas I proceed to devise and supply helps [auxilia] for the
same.
9
In this text, Bacon exposes the “final” distance that he considers to exist between
his reflection and that of the supporters of acatalepsia (in an oblique reference to the
skeptics of the New Academy, as we shall see better), but only after the
acknowledgement of an affinity. In our view, a first important point consists in trying to
comprehend better the meaning of this opposition between the beginning (initium) and
the end (exitus) of these paths compared by him. Should it just exhibit the unreliable
character of the resemblance between these philosophies and conclude that “initial”
would stand here for “at first sight” (as Spedding´s translation proposes)? Or, despite
the disagreements mentioned, might this counterpoint have, philosophically speaking, a
more essential meaning regarding the possible similarities identified by Bacon between
9
N.O. I, §37, Sp. I, p. 162-163; IV, p. 52. I follow the Spedding translation here and go to the original Latin text
when necessary.