Microeconomics of Banking

Microeconomics of Banking

Karel Janda

Syllabus for Spring 2013

Email: [e-mail]

Office Hours:

Monday 9:30-10:50, 12:30-13:10 room 408, Opletalova 26;

Tuesday 9:00-10:50 room 182NB, W. Churchilla Square 4.

Explanations:

W.Churchilla Square 4 is the main building of University of Economics, Prague.

Opletalova 26 is the building of Institute of Economic Studies of Charles University.

I have no office hours during the following periods:

March 4: no office hours (I have a Czech Science Foundation meeting)

May 20 – September 23 I am at Toulouse School of Economics

Brief Overview of the Course

This course uses asymmetric information approach of a modern microeconomics theory to explain the role of banks in the economy. Therefore a good knowledge of microeconomic theory on intermediate level with calculus is necessary. The familiarity with simple calculus techniques of optimization as used in microeconomic models is essential too. The understanding of basic probability theory and comfort with using expected values is very useful. A preliminary knowledge of the institutional aspects of banking is helpful but it is not necessary. These institutional aspects will be reviewed in class when needed.

Goals

The aim of this course is to show the ways to overcome limitations to the microeconomic foundations of banking imposed by general equilibrium theory. The students will learn modern asymmetric information theory of financial intermediation. Besides learning the techniques of applied game theory, contract theory and principal-agent theory, the students will understand the information aspects of financial intermediation.

Intended Audience

Master (magistr in Czech terminology) level students interested in banking or optimal contracting.

The course is also useful for the Ph.D. students in finance or economics.
The Topics Covered (FR chapter numbers here are based on 1^st edition – you do not need to read 2^nd edition, the 1^st edition is perfectly O.K. for our class.)

Lecture 1: Introduction to microeconomics of banking - functions of bank, banking in general equilibrium theory (Freixas, Rochet (FR) ch. 1)

Lecture 2: Review of basic game theory concepts – backwards induction, strict dominance, Nash equilibrium, mixed strategies (lecture notes)

Lecture 3: Game theory continued – subgame perfect Nash equilibrium, Bayesian equilibrium (lecture notes)

Lecture 4: Why do financial intermediaries exist? Liquidity insurance (FR ch.2.2)

Lecture 5: Information sharing coalitions. (FR ch. 2.3)

Lecture 6: Financial intermediation as delegated monitoring (FR ch. 2.4)

Lecture 7: Coexistence of direct and intermediated lending – A simple model of the credit market with moral hazard, Monitoring and Reputation (FR ch. 2.5)

Lecture 8: Coexistence of direct and intermediated lending – Monitoring and capital. Optimal contracts when cash flows are observable (FR. ch. 2.5. , ch. 4.1)

Lecture 9: Costly state verification. Incentives to repay – Threat of termination. (FR ch. 4.2, ch. 4.3)

Lecture 10: Moral hazard (FR ch. 4.4)
Additional material, to be covered time permitting:

Strategic debt repayment (FR ch. 4.3.2),

Collateral and loan size as devices for screening heterogenous borrowers (FR ch. 4.6)
Grading

The students are evaluated according to written exam and activity in the class. Cheating or other academic dishonesty during exam implies failing the class without any possibility to make up the exam. Any communication among the students during the exam is considered as cheating. Therefore during the exam communicate only with the exam supervisor. You may take watch and simple calculator for exams. Do not take any mobile phones or any other electronic devices for exams.

The exam will be on Tuesday May 7, 2013 in the usual place and time of our class.
Sample exam is available at http://nb.vse.cz/~janda/
Libraries, teaching texts availability:

I will try to provide you with relevant handouts. There are libraries with books relevant to our class both at University of Economies and Institute of Economic Studies. I asked the librarians at University of Economies and Institute of Economic Studies to put one copy of the main textbook for our class on reserve. I also arranged for a few copies of Microeconomics of Banking and An Introduction to the Economics of Information: Incentives and Contracts to be available for take-home loans at Institute of Economic Studies library. In addition, the best economic library in Prague is at CERGE-EI on Politickych veznu 7 street. The CERGE-EI library has all the books relevant for our class, some of them available for take-home loans.

You may also buy the textbooks over the Internet or ordering them through some local bookshop like

http://www.starman.net

The textbooks for this class are also available for free download on Internet. I am not going to distribute the addresses of the Internet places for free downloads.

References:

X. Freixas and J. Rochet: Microeconomics of Banking, Cambridge, MIT Press, 1997 (1^st edition) or 2008 (2^nd edition) - main textbook.

R. Gibbons: Game Theory for Applied Economists, Princeton University Press, 1992 - good treatment of signalling and other game theoretic issues.

(If you do not like Gibbons, you may want to look at any of a number of other game theory textbooks or to many microeconomics textbooks which usually contain a section(s) on game theory).

A few additional references for those who want more books to study:

Jean Tirole: The Theory of Corporate Finance, Princeton University Press, 2006

Patrick Bolton, Mathias Dewatripont: Contract Theory, 2005

Bernard Salanie: The Economics of Contracts: A Primer, 2005

Martin J. Osborne: An Introduction to Game Theory, 2003

Oliver Hart: Firms, Contracts, and Financial Structure, 1995

Mathias Dewatripont, Jean Tirole: The Prudential Regulation of Banks, 1994

J. Laffont and D. Martimort: The Theory of Incentives: The Principal-Agent Model. Princeton University Press, 2002