10 / Croce /
The Essence of Aesthetic
celebrated sentence uttered by an English critic, and
become one of the commonplaces of journalism, states
that “all the arts tend to the condition of music”; but it
would have been more accurate to say that all the arts are
music, if it be thus intended to emphasise the genesis of
aesthetic images in feeling, excluding from their number
those mechanically constructed or realistically ponderous.
And another not less celebrated utterance of a Swiss
semiphilosopher, which has had the like good or bad
fortune of becoming trivial, discovers that “every
landscape is a state of the soul”: which is indisputable, not
because the landscape is landscape, but because the
landscape is art.
Artistic intuition, then, is always lyrical intuition: this
latter being a word that is not present as an adjective or
definition of the first, but as a synonym, another of the
synonyms which can be added to those that I have
mentioned already, and which, all of them, designate the
intuition. And if it be sometimes convenient that it should
assume the grammatical form of the adjective, instead of
appearing as a synonym, that is only to make clear the
difference between the intuition-image, or nexus of
images (for what is called image is always a nexus of
images, since image-atoms do not exist any more than
thought-atoms), which constitutes an organism, and, as
organism, has its vital principle, which is the organism
itself, — between this, which is true and proper intuition,
and that false intuition which is a heap of images put
together in play or in calculation or for some other
practical purpose, the connection of which, being
practical, when considered from the aesthetic point of
view, shows itself to be not organic, but mechanic. But
the word lyric is redundant save in this explanatory or
polemical sense; and art is perfectly defined when simply
defined as intuition.
2. Prejudices Relating to Art
There can be no doubt that the process of distinction of
art, which I have summarily traced from the facts and the
acts with which it has been and is confused, necessitates
no small mental effort; but this effort is rewarded with the
freedom which it affords in respect to the many fallacious
distinctions that disfigure the field of Æsthetic. Although
these do not present any difficulty, indeed, at first they
seduce by their very facility and deceitful self-evidence,
yet they prevent all profound understanding of what art
truly is. Many people, desirous of repeating vulgar
traditional distinctions, voluntarily resign themselves to to
knowing nothing. We, on the contrary, reject them all as a
useless hindrance in the new task to which the new
theoretic position that we have attained invites and leads
us, and thus enjoy the greater comfort which comes from
feeling rich. Wealth is not only to be obtained by
acquiring many objects, but also by getting rid of all those
that represent economic indebtedness.
Let us begin with the most famous of these economic
debts in the circle of aesthetic: the distinction between
content and form, which has caused a celebrated division
of schools in the nineteenth century: the schools of the
Æsthetic of the content (Gehaltsaesthetik) and that of the
Æsthetic of form (Formaesthetik). The problems from
which these opposed schools arose were, in general, the
following: Does art consist solely of the content, or solely
of the form, or of content and form together? What is the
character of the content and what that of the aesthetic
form? Some replied that art, the essence of art, is all in the
content, defined in turn as that which pleases, or as what
is moral, or as what raises man to the heaven of religion
or of metaphysic, or as what is historically correct, or,
finally, as what is naturally and physically beautiful.
Others maintained that the content is indifferent, that it is
simply a peg or hook from which beautiful forms are
suspended, which alone satisfy the aesthetic spirit: unity,
harmony, symmetry, and so on. And both sides attempted
to attract the element that each had previously excluded
from the essence of art as subordinate and secondary:
those for the content admitted that it was an advantage to
the content (which, according to them, was really the
constitutive element of the beautiful) to adorn itself also
with beautiful forms, and to present itself as unity,
symmetry, harmony, etc.; and the formalists, in their turn,
admitted that if art did not gain by the value of its content,
its effect did, not a single value, but the sum of two values
being thus set before us. These doctrines, which attained
their greatest scholastic importance in Germany with the
Hegelians and the Herbartians, are also to be found more
or less everywhere in the history of Æsthetic, ancient,
mediaeval, modern, and most modern, and what matters
most, in common opinion, for nothing is more common
than to hear that a play is beautiful in “form,” but a failure
in “content”; that a poem is “most nobly” conceived, but
“executed in ugly verse”; that a painter would have been
greater had he not wasted his power as a designer and as a
colourist upon “small unworthy themes,” instead of
selecting rather those of a historical, patriotic, or
sociological character. It may be said that fine taste and
true critical sense of art have to defend themselves at
every step against the perversions of judgment arising
from these doctrines, in which philosophers become the
crowd, and the crowd feels itself philosophical, because in
agreement with those crowd-philosophers. The origin of
these theories is no secret for us, because, even from the
brief explanation that we have given, it is quite clear that
they have sprung from the trunk of hedonistic, moralistic,
conceptualistic, or physical conceptions of art: they are all
doctrines which, having failed to grasp that which makes
art art, were obliged somehow to regain art, which they
had allowed to escape them, and to reintroduce it in the
form of an accessory or accidental element; the upholders
of the theory of the content conceived it as an abstract
formal element, the formalists as the abstract element of
the content. What interests us in those aesthetics is just