15 / Croce /
The Essence of Aesthetic
artistic kinds (lyric, drama, romance,
epic and romantic
poem, idyll, comedy, tragedy; sacred, civil-life, family-
life, animal-life, still-life, landscape, flower and fruit
painting; heroic, funereal, characteristic, sculpture;
church, operatic, chamber music; civil, military,
ecclesiastic architecture, etc., etc.), and the other as theory
of the arts (poetry, painting,
sculpture, architecture,
music, art of the actor, gardening, etc., etc.). One of these
sometimes figures as a sub-division of another. This
prejudice, of which it is easy to trace the origin, has its
first notable monuments in Hellenic culture, and persists
in our days. Many aestheticians still write treatises on the
aesthetic of the tragic, the comic, the lyric, the humorous,
and aesthetics of painting, of music, or of poetry (these
last are still called by the old name of “poetics”); and,
what is worse (though but little attention is paid to those
aestheticians who are impelled to write for their own
amusement or by academic profession), critics, in judging
works of art, have not altogether abandoned the habit of
judging them according to the genus or particular form of
art to which, according to them, they should belong; and,
instead of clearly stating whether a work be beautiful or
ugly, they proceed to reason their impressions, saying that
it well observes, or wrongly violates, the laws of the
drama, or of romance, or of painting, or of bas-relief. It is
also very common in all countries to treat artistic and
literary history as history of kinds, and to present the
artists as cultivating this or that kind; and to divide the
work of an artist, which always has unity of development,
whatever form it take, whether lyric, romance or drama,
into as many compartments as there are kinds; so that
Ludovico Ariosto, for example, appears now among the
cultivators of the Latin poetry of the Renaissance, now
among the authors of the first Latin satires, now among
those of the first comedies, now among those who
brought the poem of chivalry to perfection: as though
Latin poetry, satire, comedy, and poem were not always
the same poet, Ariosto, in his experiments and forms, and
in the logic of his spiritual development.
It cannot be said that the theory of kinds and of the arts
has not had, and does not now possess, its own internal
dialectic and its auto-criticism, or irony, according as we
may please to call it; and no one is ignorant that literary
history is full of these cases of an established style,
against which an artist of genius offends in his work and
calls forth the reprobation of the critics: a reprobation
which does not, however, succeed in suffocating the
admiration for, and the popularity of, his work, so that
finally, when it is not possible to blame the artist and it is
not wished to blame the critic of kinds, the matter ends
with a compromise, and the kind is enlarged or accepts
beside it a new kind, like a legitimized bastard, and the
compromise lasts, by force of inertia, until a new work of
genius comes to upset again the fixed rule. An irony of
the doctrine is also the impossibility, in which its theorists
find themselves, of logically fixing the boundaries
between the kinds and the arts: all the definitions that they
have produced, when examined rather more closely,
either evaporate in the general definition of art, or show
themselves to be an arbitrary raising of particular works
of art irreducible to rigorous logical terms to the rank of
kinds and rules. Absurdities resulting from the effort to
determine rigorously what is indeterminable, owing to the
contradictory nature of the attempt, are to be found even
among great writers such as Lessing, who arrives at this
extravagant conclusion, that painting represents “bodies”:
bodies, not actions and souls, not the action and the soul
of the painter! Absurdities are also to be found among the
questions that logically arise from that illogic: thus, a
definite field having been assigned to every kind and to
every art, what kind and what art is superior? Is painting
superior to sculpture, drama to lyric? And again, the
forces of art having been thus divided, would it not be
advisable to reunite them in a type of work of art which
shall drive away other forces, as a coalition of armies
drives away a single army: will not the work, for instance,
in which poetry, music, scenic art, decoration, are united,
develop greater aesthetic power than a Lied of Goethe or a
drawing of Leonardo? These are questions, distinctions,
judgments, and definitions which arouse the revolt of the
poetic and artistic sense, which loves each work for itself,
for what it is, as a living creature, individual and
incomparable, and knows that each work has its
individual law. Hence has arisen the disagreement
between the affirmative judgment of artistic souls and the
negative judgment of professional critics, and between the
negation of the former and the affirmation of the latter;
and the professional critics sometimes pass for pedants,
not without good reason, although artistic souls are in
their turn “disarmed prophets” — that is, incapable of
reasoning and of deducing the correct theory immanent in
their judgments, and of opposing it to the pedantic theory
of their adversaries.
The correct theory in question is precisely an aspect of the
conception of art as intuition, or lyrical intuition; and,
since every work of art expresses a state of the soul, and
the state of the soul is individual and always new, the
intuition implies infinite intuitions, which it is impossible
to place in pigeon-holes as kinds, unless there be infinite
pigeon-holes, and therefore not pigeon-holes of kinds, but
of intuitions. And since, on the other hand, individuality
of intuition implies individuality of expression, and a
picture is distinct from another picture, not less than from
a poem, and picture and poem are not of value because of
the sounds that beat the air and the colours refracted in the
light, but because of what they can tell to the spirit, in so
far as they enter into it, it is useless to have recourse to
abstract means of expression, to construct the other series
of kinds and classes: which amounts to saying that any
theory of division of the arts is without foundation. The
kind or class is in this case one only, art itself or the
intuition, whereas particular works of art are infinite: all
are original, each one incapable of being translated into
the other (since to translate, to translate with artistic skill,