234
Suffered
Forced Resettlement, and on Safeguarding their Rights” in November
1989, the Ingush had already revealed their demands by several occasions.
566
Later
on, in late March 1990, as a response to those Ingush claims, the Soviet of
Nationalities of the USSR Supreme Soviet set up a commission, called Belyakov
Commission, in order to investigate the claims of the Ingush for the land. Nine
months later, it concluded that the Ingush claim was well founded, and that the
Prigorodnyi ought to be restored to the Chechen-Ingush
ASSR from the North
Osetian ASSR. It also requested the Supreme Soviet of the RSFSR to take the
matter on its agenda.
567
During 1990 and 1991, however, the situation became more complex. In the
first place a split emerged between the Chechens and the Ingush. While Chechens
were moving towards independence, the Ingush were still looking at Moscow for
support in the conflict with the Osetians. Nevertheless, the growing weakness of
the central government in Moscow and its apparent inability
to stop the riot only
complicated this dangerous situation.
566
In the course of 1988 and 1989, Ingush population via a powerful socio-political movement
called
Niiskho (Justice) that was based on national traditions and supported by the clergy and the
Council of Elders –the heads of the clans (
teips)- activated social mobilization among the Ingush.
“…
Niiskho called the first Congress of the Ingush people and made an appeal to the Central
Committee of the CPSU and the Soviet government to partition the Chechen-Ingushetian Republic
and restore the Ingushetian Republic to its 1924-34 boundaries, which would include the Malgobek,
Nazran, Sunzha, and Prigorodnyi districts.
In addition to that, the Ingush collected some 60.000
signatures on petitions in support of Ingush autonomy, and on 29 May 1989 an Ingush deputy to the
Congress of People’s Deputies in Moscow similarly declared out essential to their culture and
economic development.” In September 1989, a second Ingush congress in Grozny, also took up this
appeal once more and reaffirmed that the Prigorodnyi was an unalienable part of Ingushetia, while
advocating the re-establishment of a separate Ingush territorial entity, apart from the Chechen-
Ingush ASSR.
567
See Cornell
Small Nations, 412 and Zverev, “Ethnic
Conflicts,” 63.
235
Further clashes occurred in March and April 1991, when the armed Ingush
tried to take over Osetians’ houses in Prigorodnyi. In response, the North Osetian
Supreme Soviet declared a state of emergency in the district and instituted a
curfew, document checks, confiscation of illegal weapons and the demolition of
dwellings built illegally by the Ingush who did not have residence permits
(
propiska) in mid-April.
Nevertheless, the Russian Supreme Soviet’s “Law
on the Rehabilitation of
Peoples Subjected to Repression” dated 26 April 1991 gave a new departure point
for the Ingush for insisting their claims on a legal basis. The Ingush deputies to the
Supreme Soviet were among those who lobbied heavily for the law, the Osetian
deputies seldom attended the sittings and failed to take part in the debate. From
then on, the Ingush justified their claims to Prigorodnyi by articles 3 and 6. Article
6 indicated that former territories of the peoples involved would be restored.
During a visit to the area in September 1991, Yeltsin also hinted Russian support to
the Ingush territorial claims. Moreover, the Ingush
in order to secure Russian
support, complied with the Russian desire and did not take part in the Chechen-
Ingush Republic’s elections. In contrast to the Chechen declaration of
independence, they held their own referendum in November 1991 and
overwhelmingly supported the establishment of a separate Ingush Republic within
the Russian Federation including the Prigorodnyi.
While the Ingush received some encouragement from these developments,
the North Osetians acted to protect their own interests by imposing state of
emergency in December 1991, following an Ingush attack on a special police unit.
This situation was to remain unaltered right up to the events of October 1992. In
236
October, they also took advantage of the Ingush weakness and created a National
Guard of around 5,000 men, equipped with 20 armoured vehicles.
3- The Conflict and the Confederation:
The Ingush were among the founding members of the Assembly, but they
did not take part in the establishment of the Confederation.
In contrast, the Osetians
were the founding members of the Confederation. The Confederation’s role has
been minor in this conflict, however it is important to note that, it could actually
have been used as an institutional framework to find a solution to the Prigorodnyi
conflict, as Russian mediation was unlikely to be objective and disinterested. As it
is pointed out by Cornell, the Confederation set up a committee
to find a solution to
the conflict and also proposed replacing the Russian peacekeeping forces with a
joint North Caucasian force, an idea that has been favourably viewed by most
North Caucasians, and indeed by the Ingush. Although the North Osetian side may
prefer Russian mediation or rather no mediation at all, given the fact that it was the
only Christian member of the organization
and the closest to Russia, the
Confederation was an option that was understood in the quest for a resolution.
568
The Assembly and later the Confederation, closely interested in the events
in Ingushetia and the clashes between its member peoples. Following the Ingush
referendum and the increasing tensions with possibility of armed clashes, the
Confederation in its parliamentary meeting called for a moratorium on 15
December 1991. With this moratorium the Confederation proposed a peaceful