4
the extent to which inflation is increasing the pay available to them in alternative jobs. Even
fully rational employers, who must solve the typical efficiency wage problem, can exploit
workers' misperceptions by giving nominal wage increases that are less than what would be
required if workers fully incorporated inflation into their mental frames.
If any of these three departures from the fully rational use of information on inflation are
important, then at low rates of inflation prices and wages will be set consistently lower relative to
nominal aggregate demand than they would be at zero inflation. As a result, operating the macro
economy with a low but positive rate of inflation will permit a higher level of output and
employment to be sustained. We will show that at low rates of inflation the behaviors that we
posit, which depart from the fully rational decisions of typical economic models, impose very
small costs on those who practice them. Since there may be subjective or objective costs
associated with fully rational behavior, or because implementing fully rational behavior may
require overcoming some perception threshold or behavioral inertia, it is plausible that these
small costs may not be enough to induce rational behavior on the part of all economic agents.
However, if inflation increases, the costs of being less than perfectly rational about it will also
rise, and people will switch their behavior to take inflation into full account. Thus while
increasing inflation modestly above zero will permit lower unemployment, there is a rate of
inflation above which the sustainable unemployment rate rises as more and more people adopt
fully rational behavior. This rate of inflation thus minimizes the sustainable rate of
unemployment and yields maximum employment and output. With monopolistically competitive
firms and with efficiency wages, workers and firms will be better off at these higher levels of
employment and output. The owners of the firms will have higher profits; the workers will have
5
jobs they were willing to accept. In our model this minimum sustainable rate is also the optimal
unemployment rate.
The remainder of the paper proceeds in three steps. First, we describe departures from
perfect rationality at low rates of inflation and present some evidence that supports our view.
Second, we formally derive our model of near-rational wage and price setting, show that the
costs of near rationality are small, derive a short and long-run Phillips Curve from the model, and
present a calibration exercise that shows that, even when only a fraction of wages and prices are
influenced by near-rational behavior, there can still be substantial long-run gains in employment
from moderate, rather than very low or zero, inflation. Finally, we estimate the theoretical
model using post-war quarterly US data. The results support the theoretical model and are
surprisingly robust.
Near-Rational Behavior Towards Inflation
As noted above, psychologists and economists who study decision-making approach it
differently. Psychologists have identified many ways in which real world decision making
departs from economic rationality. Here we describe three ways in which we suspect behavior
towards inflation departs from the economist's rational model.
First, psychologists suggest that decision makers—far from making the best use of
available information—readily ignore potentially relevant considerations and discard potentially
relevant information in order to simplify their decision problems. Kahneman and Tversky [1979]
3
Kunreuther (1978) has used the phenomena of editing to explain why many people do not buy disaster insurance—
very low probability events are ignored in decision making. His book presents the results of experiments that
demonstrate the phenomena of editing (pp 165-186).
4
Direct attempts to assess the effects of forecast inflation on wage setting have ignored the indirect effects of
inflation through other information that will be correlated with inflation. Such information includes the wages and
prices of competitive and complementary goods and factors. Thus the findings that wage and price setters seem to
put little weight on inflation (Blinder et al. (1998), Levine (1993)) are inconclusive. For this reason we made our
own attempt to solicit such information. We sent an e-mail questionnaire to randomly selected members of the
American Compensation Association asking them to recommend wage and salary increases in hypothetical situations
varying by respondent in a number of different dimensions. The respondents were given the type of information that
personnel executives typically use to make recommendations for wage and salary changes. This information
included the wage and salary increases of other firms in their labor market over the past year, the desired relative
wage and salary position of their firm, expected wage and salary increases of other firms in their labor market for the
next year, the increase in the CPI, the difficulty of hiring and retention, their firm’s expected net revenue growth
relative to that of their industry and relative to that of the economy as a whole. The mean of expected wage increases
by other firms in the sample was increased one-for-one with the rate of inflation. The total effect of changes in
inflation on wage and salary increases by individual firms can be seen by regressing the recommended wage and
salary increases on the expected wage and salary increases of others and the CPI. The point estimate of the change
caused by a one-point change in the CPI in the wages of an individual firm, given that that firm’s changes are
representative of other firms facing the same increase in the CPI, is .738. This estimate is obtained by dividing the
coefficient on the CPI by one minus the coefficient on the expected wage increases of other firms. Unfortunetly, this
estimate has a very high standard error so we cannot rule out the possibility that the impact of in increase in expected
CPI inflation on wage inflation would be one for one, but the point estimates is suggest of our view.
6
have dubbed this behavior editing.
3
When people “edit” decision problems they rule out less
important considerations in order to concentrate on the few factors that matter most. In this
regard, real world decision makers are no different from academic economists when they
construct models: unimportant factors are ignored in order to concentrate on important factors.
In addition to the study of the cognitive process of editing, there is a related literature in the
psychology of perception that suggests that items must reach a threshold of salience before they
are even perceived (See Gleitman (1996)). Thus, when inflation is low it may be at most a
marginal factor in wage and price decisions, and decision makers may ignore it entirely.
We know of no strong evidence either for or against the view that some wage and price
setters ignore inflation
4
, but several before us have suggested the occurrence of such behavior.
For example, Eckstein and Brinner (1972) based their model of a shifting Phillips Curve on the
assumption that inflationary expectations mattered more in determining inflation in the 1970s