13
(2)
where Y is real income, p
*
is the average price level in the economy, and M is the money supply.
The usual constant of such quantity theory equations has been normalized to one by choice of
units.
The microeconomics of this economy begins with the boiler plate for models with
monopolistically competitive firms. There are n firms in this economy. They divide up the total
aggregate demand, M/p
*
, according to the relative prices for their respective goods, so that the
demand for the output of an individual firm is of the form:
where p is the price charged by a firm for its own product.
This takes us to the first innovation of the model, which occurs in the formulation of
productivity and its effect on wages. All of these firms will pay an efficiency wage, which
minimizes the unit labor cost of production. Productivity (and also turnover costs) in each firm
depends upon the morale of its workers. That morale, in turn, depends upon workers’ conception
of their outside opportunities, which has two major determinants. The first of these is the rate of
unemployment, which determines how easy it would be for an individual worker to obtain
another job. The higher the unemployment rate the lower will be the opportunity cost of workers
and therefore the higher the morale inside the firm. The second determinant of morale is the
workers’ perception of the gap between their wage at their own firm and of the wage outside the
firm. That perception depends upon the wage being paid by the worker’s current firm and her
reference wage, which gives her perception of the wages of other workers. Thus the productivity
14
(3)
(4)
(5)
of the firm will depend also upon both the wage it pays as well as the level of unemployment.
For convenience we shall give productivity the following functional form:
where P denotes labor productivity, w is the wage paid by the firm, w
R
is the reference wage of
its workers and u is the aggregate unemployment rate.
is chosen in the range 0 <
< 1.
Firms set both prices and wages one period ahead. In so doing they project the effects of
inflation on the reference wages of their workers. These reference wages, of course determine the
level of wages that a firm should be paying. Totally rational firms will incorporate all of their
expected inflation into the reference wage w
R
. In contrast, near-rational firms—and, similarly,
fully rational firms whose workers under-weight inflation in w
R
—will incorporate only a fraction
of inflation, a, into their projections of inflation. When a is zero inflation is totally ignored. In
the intermediate range, 0< a < 1, it is merely underestimated. Thus the reference wage for fully
rational workers for the joint wage and price decisions of fully rational firms is
where w
*
-1
is the average wage paid to all workers in the previous period, and
%
e
is the expected
rate of price inflation. The reference wage for the wage and price setting decision by near-rational
firms, which are engaging in cognitive error, will analogously be:
15
(6)
(7)
(5) also describes the reference wage for the near-rational employees.
The profit-maximizing choice of the price for both the rational and for the near-rational
firm will take the following form. In both cases the prices will be a mark-up over wages,
where j refers both to rational and near-rational firms,. The mark-up factor m will be
/(
-1).
These maximizing firms will, in turn, establish their wages as a multiple of their respective
reference wages, which will differ for rational and for near-rational firms. The efficiency wage
paid by each firm-type will minimize its respective unit labor costs, w
j
/P
j
. Accordingly, each type
of firm will choose, respectively,
Near-rational firms set wages that are different from those of fully rational firms, but the
difference does not cumulate. The wages of near rational firms are reset relative to their
respective reference wage in each and every period. The reference wages for rational and near-
rational firms, which are both rising with inflation, differ only by the fraction (1+(1 - a)
%
e
)/(1 +
%
e
). As a result, the difference between wages at the two types of firms will not grow large;
indeed, they will be fairly small at low and moderate levels of inflation.
The profits of each type of firm will be revenues net of labor costs. Given the demand
function for firms’ product (2) and their labor productivity (3), the profits for the two types of
firms will be, respectively,
6
A slightly more complicated formula will give the relative profits when
is different from
e
.
16
(8)
(9)
So far the model has described the case where the firm ignores or under-weights inflation,
and also the case where the firm is rational, but workers’ reference wages are under-indexed.
Both situations will give us similar Phillips Curves. In one case near-rational firms will be
switching to true rationality as their costs from near rationality mount with high inflation, in the
other case the workers will eventually curb their mis-perceptions as inflation rises. But the two
hypotheses are slightly different, and at this point we shall take the junction that analyzes the
model where the near-rational firms fail to fully take account of inflation in forming w
R
. This
route permits an evaluation of the losses by near-rational firms from their failure to correctly
perceive the effects of inflation.
Each of the terms p
j
, w
j
, and P
j
is known relative to the value of the average wage w
*
-1
, from
(3), (4), (5), (6) and (7) so it is possible to evaluate the relative profits of rational and near-rational
firms. Using the profit function (8) along with the assumption that both rational and near-rational
firms have correct expectations about inflation, yields a formula for the relative profits of the two
types of firm.
6
The relative increase in profits that a near-rational firm could make by becoming a
rational firm is given by the loss function (9),
where z is the ratio (1+ a
%
)/(1 +
%
). Equation (9) has three implications for this paper, which we
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