Neg China Reaction da 1NC

Generic/All Regions

Links

Military presence acts as a deterrent—symbolic commitment sends signals to hostile nations

Davis et. al. 09

(Jacquelyn K., Ph.D. in international relations from the University of Pennsylvania executive vice president of the Institute for Foreign Policy Analysis, Dr. Robert L. Pfaltzgraff, Jr., Dr. Charles M. Perry, James L. Schoff, 2/2009 “Updating U.S. Deterrence Concepts and Operational Planning” Accessed 7/29/15 from http://www.ifpa.org/pdf/Updating_US_Deterrence_Concepts.pdf LC)

Symbols have always been important to the Alliance and to the concept of deterrence, and for¶ many years the American emphasis on forward-deployed forces in Europe and Asia was seen¶ as emblematic (and proof) of the U.S. extended deterrence commitment. In Europe, the deployment¶ of V and VII Corps Headquarters was perceived as the substance of that commitment,¶ while in Asia the deployment of 100,000 forces was explicitly identified as the key to operational¶ planning and to the credibility of American commitments to Japan and South Korea. The¶ 100,000 level of forward-deployed U.S. forces was considered to be necessary to implement¶ operational plans, but it also had a profound political and psychological importance in relation¶ to counter-proliferation and deterrence planning. Hence, when the Bush administration began¶ to de-emphasize the 100,000-troop threshold in Asia and discount the two major theaters of war¶ (MTW)-construct in 2001, and as U.S. military personnel were moved out of Korea along with planned re-deployments from Japan and Europe as part of the Pentagon’s Global Posture Review¶ (GPR), suspicions of a global U.S. retreat grew in alliance capitals in Europe and Asia. Despite U.S.¶ efforts to characterize global troop re-deployments in the context of military transformation and¶ modernization, these tangible symbols of the extended deterrence construct have been devalued,¶ leaving us with the dilemma of how to convey and signal our deterrence commitments and the¶ credibility of extended deterrence at a time when more and more U.S. forward deployed assets¶ are being drawn back to the continental United States (CONUS). One answer to this dilemma lies¶ in the development of a well considered strategic communications/information operations (IO)¶ roadmap designed to reassure allies and to convey the seriousness of our intentions to prospective¶ adversaries. Specifically, this IO roadmap should highlight the capabilities of U.S. forces in the¶ region and demonstrate their potential through realistic training exercises with allies.

Impacts

US-Sino competition goes nuclear—more tension than the Cold War

Keck 14

(Zachary, Assistant Editor of The Diplomat and a graduate student in the Department of Public and International Affairs at George Mason University. 1/28/14 “US-China Rivalry More Dangerous Than Cold War?” in The Diplomat, accessed 7/31/15 from http://thediplomat.com/2014/01/us-china-rivalry-more-dangerous-than-cold-war/ LC)

The prominent realist international relations scholar John Mearsheimer says there is a greater possibility of the U.S. and China going to war in the future than there was of a Soviet-NATO general war during the Cold War.¶ Mearsheimer made the comments at a lunch hosted by the Center for the National Interest in Washington, DC on Monday. The lunch was held to discuss Mearsheimer’s recent article in The National Interest on U.S. foreign policy towards the Middle East. However, much of the conversation during the Q&A session focused on U.S. policy towards Asia amid China’s rise, a topic that Mearsheimer addresses in greater length in the updated edition of his classic treatise, The Tragedy of Great Power Politics, which is due out this April.¶ In contrast to the Middle East, which he characterizes as posing little threat to the United States, Mearsheimer said that the U.S. will face a tremendous challenge in Asia should China continue to rise economically. The University of Chicago professor said that in such a scenario it is inevitable that the U.S. and China will engage in an intense strategic competition, much like the Soviet-American rivalry during the Cold War.¶ While stressing that he didn’t believe a shooting war between the U.S. and China is inevitable, Mearsheimer said that he believes a U.S.-China Cold War will be much less stable than the previous American-Soviet one. His reasoning was based on geography and its interaction with nuclear weapons.¶ Specifically, the center of gravity of the U.S.-Soviet competition was the central European landmass. This created a rather stable situation as, according to Mearsheimer, anyone that war gamed a NATO-Warsaw conflict over Central Europe understood that it would quickly turn nuclear. This gave both sides a powerful incentive to avoid a general conflict in Central Europe as a nuclear war would make it very likely that both the U.S. and Soviet Union would be “vaporized.”¶ The U.S.-China strategic rivalry lacks this singular center of gravity. Instead, Mearsheimer identified four potential hotspots over which he believes the U.S. and China might find themselves at war: the Korean Peninsula, the Taiwan Strait and the South and East China Seas. Besides featuring more hotspots than the U.S.-Soviet conflict, Mearsheimer implied that he felt that decision-makers in Beijing and Washington might be more confident that they could engage in a shooting war over one of these areas without it escalating to the nuclear threshold.¶

Chinese-US Conflict causes massive war and global reordering

Wyne 6/5/15

(Ali Wyne contributing analyst at Wikistrat 6/5/15 “The balance of power between the U.S. and China” in The Washington Post, accessed 7/31/15 https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/the-us-china-rivalry/2015/06/05/6bc7ffb0-e456-11e4-81ea-0649268f729e_story.html LC)

Thomas J. Christensen opens his new book by observing that post-1978 China has achieved economic progress that is “unprecedented in world history” and has registered “equally dramatic” advances in its economic and diplomatic ties abroad. Since the mid-1990s, moreover, its official military budget has grown even faster than its economy.¶ It was perhaps inevitable that such a dramatic rise — or resurgence, from China’s perspective — would elicit exaggerated analysis. Especially in the United States, to whose preeminence that phenomenon poses a singular challenge, one tends to encounter depictions of China as either a fearsome juggernaut or a paper dragon. Christensen, a former U.S. deputy assistant secretary of state for East Asian and Pacific affairs, avoids both fallacies, offering instead a model of judicious analysis: Carefully deconstructing the economic, military and diplomatic balances between the United States and China, he reveals the magnitude of the latter’s challenge without inflating it.¶ First, the bad news: While China’s conventional and nuclear capabilities are a long way from approximating America’s, they pose growing threats to U.S. interests, particularly in the ­Asia-Pacific region. Christensen notes that an increasingly confident China “enjoys military superiority over most, if not all” of America’s regional allies, three of which (Japan, the Philippines and Taiwan) have intractable territorial disputes with China.¶ Of greater long-term concern, in his estimation, is enlisting its support in upholding the liberal world order that has been so instrumental to its ascent: “No government has experience . . . persuading a uniquely large developing country with enormous domestic challenges and a historical chip on its national shoulder to cooperate actively with the international community.” Christensen focuses on the obstacles to U.S.-China cooperation in the arenas of nonproliferation, global economic management, peacekeeping and, most vexing of all, climate change.¶ Still, “The China Challenge” strikes a tone of cautious optimism, and Christensen makes a persuasive case that conflict between the United States and China is far from inevitable. The scale of economic interdependence worldwide is unprecedented, and transnational production, a marginal feature of economic activity in the run-up to World War I, has exploded over the past quarter-century. In 2012, China’s trade with the United States, formal U.S. allies in East Asia and U.S. security partners in Asia accounted for roughly two-fifths of its overall trade (about a fifth of its gross domestic product) and one-third of official foreign direct investment flowing into the mainland. Conflict would risk those benefits and compound China’s diplomatic isolation: Christensen observes that it “lacks any strategically important allies.”¶ Finally, while China regards today’s world order as more of a Western imposition than a just consensus — alternatively reacting with confusion and irritation to America’s exhortation to become a “responsible stakeholder” — it has neither a coherent alternative to offer nor a compelling rationale for posing a systemic revisionist challenge: Japan, Germany and the Soviet Union suffered greatly for undertaking that course in the 20th century.¶ Yet one wonders if America and China’s sensible rhetoric — about forging a new type of great-power relations and avoiding what Graham Allison calls the “Thucydides trap” (in his words, “the natural, inevitable inescapable discombobulation that accompanies a tectonic shift in the relative power of a rising and [a] ruling state”) — belies increasing pessimism about the trajectory of their relationship. Christensen notes that “John Mearsheimer is seen by many Chinese as the one honest American strategist, willing to admit that the United States has deep-seated national interests in delaying and halting China’s rise.” In the new, concluding chapter of “The Tragedy of Great Power Politics,” orginally published in 2001, Mearsheimer, a distinguished political scientist at the University of Chicago, warns that “if China continues to grow economically, it will attempt to dominate Asia the way the United States dominates the Western Hemisphere. The United States, however, will go to enormous lengths to prevent China from achieving regional hegemony.”¶ The path of least resistance, but also of greatest danger, would be for the two countries to conclude that they are prisoners of history. While implementing their shared desire for a constructive partnership will be among the most daunting projects of the new century, they must spare no effort in pursuit of that goal.