Panos eliopoulos the relation between truth and democracy: principles for an effective interaction

Panos Eliopoulos, “The Relation between Truth and Democracy: Principles for an Effective Interaction”. In Olympic and Elian Dialogues (Proceedings of the Ninth World Congress of ISUD), edit. L. Bargeliotes- K. Wang, XXII/iii-2012, pp. 399-410.

PANOS ELIOPOULOS

THE RELATION BETWEEN TRUTH AND DEMOCRACY:

PRINCIPLES FOR AN EFFECTIVE INTERACTION
“Truth is the most valuable thing we have - so let us economize it”.

Mark Twain
Starting from Aristotle’s definition of truth in the Metaphysics (III. 7. 27: “to say of what is that it is, or of what is not that it is not, is true”), this paper aims to explore the relation between Truth and Democracy, also according to modern theorizations of the former, such as deflationism or the coherence theory. None the less, it should be noted from the beginning that the relation between Truth and Democracy is not solely a gnoseological problem. Apart from its inevitable epistemic and metaphysical references, already known in the Platonic dialogues and in the Aristotelian corpus, there are evident moral and political repercussions that also apply to contemporary societies. In this paper, I argue that, while a singular concept of truth¹ can neither be epistemically safe, thus becoming flexible enough for partial or subjective demonstrations of its authentic or ideal value, nor applicable for every society, in terms of a political constitution it can take the form of a critically continuous consensus, an agreement among equal citizens much like the one described in Aristotle’s Politics². This kind of consensus can sustain the Polis by its capacity to employ knowledge and logic in an atmosphere of moral integrity. By so doing it can largely avoid the deleterious effects of demagogy and can provide the conditions for a meaningful public life that teleologically leads to eudemonia. Apart from this, I aim to raise issues which seem problematic in the examined co-relation between Truth and Democracy, also conclusively to propose two principles that I consider elementary for their effective interaction.

Despite the deontological quest for objectivity³, despite our inability to verify or assert true facts, truth, even in its potentially fractional forms, should not be abandoned in a number of semantic constructions, but, instead, its relation with democracy ought to become conscious and consistent. If truth is responsible for corresponding, local or regional, values, and if truth regarding past events is more secure than present or future ones (see Diodorus Cronus and Epictetus), then it is closely connected with the historical character and, simultaneously, with the quotidian works of Democracy. Ancient Greek Philosophy, much more than any other, recent or not, philosophical current of thought, seems to follow quite more profoundly the realization that democracy is not only an ideological schema but, on the contrary, a powerful claim of values for the Polis and its citizens. It is exactly in this context that the role of truth needs to be discussed: as the ethical and political basis for the definition of principles for its effective interaction with democracy. Therefore this paper will not be thorough in scrutinizing various theories of truth but will employ a number of insights taken from them to examine potential relations of truth with democracy.

In Plato’s dialogue Theaetetus⁴, Socrates⁵ refutes the position of those who claim that whatever the city considers as good or useful is indeed such. Therefore the polis is not meant to have one particular canon that should differ from any other. Socrates goes on to remark that the judgment of an expert⁶ is the one that can clarify and define the true parameters of an issue; otherwise we, the rest of us, the non experts, are subjected to mere opinion, not knowledge. In Crito he fortifies the same position by repeating that we must consider only what is said by him who knows about right and wrong and by truth herself⁷. In Theaetetus again it is upheld that knowledge is impossible without a known reality or essence⁸. True convictions are formed through time, effort and education⁹. As Socrates proves near the end of the same dialogue, if we do not have a clear understanding of the elements of the things, we do not know the things themselves either. In Gorgias, he affirms that there are two forms of persuasion, one providing belief without knowledge and the other sure knowledge¹⁰. Rhetoric is a producer of persuasion for belief, not for instruction in the matter of right and wrong. As a consequence, the rhetorician’s work is not to instruct in matters of right and wrong but only to make the public believe. After all, Socrates observes, it is impossible that someone could instruct masses of people in such short time about matters that important¹¹. However, his absolute trust in the value of truth allows him to declare that the truth is never refuted¹².

William James sets before us an interesting view about the nature of truth: the truth of a proposition depends on its usefulness, on its serving a particular need. Truth with no practical effect is of no use. If I ask one “what is the time?” and he answers: “I am Mr Smith”, then his response is of no importance to me even if what he utters is true. If truth is disconnected from practical interest and from human activity, then its existence is not substantiated or necessary. This conception of non-abstract truth generates a range of truths that are selected in accordance with the temporary environment in which they are found. E.g. water is not only the chemical molecule H2O but also a liquid that will quench my thirst, or a substance that helps me keep clean¹³. Its many definitions provide diverse aspects of the truth, all equal among them, all functional or useful at the time of inquiry¹⁴.

On the contrary, for the coherence theory, a belief is true if and only if it is part of a coherent system of beliefs¹⁵. That entails that truth is actually a matter of how beliefs are related to each other. The coherence theory points out that truth is not a content-to-world relation at all; rather, it is a content-to-content, or belief-to-belief, relation. Joachim clarifies that what is true is the “whole complete truth”¹⁶. Individual judgments or beliefs are certainly not the whole complete truth. Such judgments are, according to Joachim, only true to a degree. One aspect of this doctrine is a kind of holism about content, which holds that any individual belief or judgment gets its content only in virtue of being part of a system of judgments. But even these larger systems are only true to a degree, measuring the extent to which they express the content of the single ‘whole complete truth’. Any real judgment we might make will only be partially true.

In the critique attempted by the deflationist theory¹⁷ it is claimed that the above ideas are fallacious, sharing a common mistake. It is erroneous to assume that truth has a nature of the kind that philosophers might find out about and develop theories of. For the deflationists, truth has no nature beyond what is captured in ordinary claims such as that ‘snow is white’, which is true, if snow is white in fact. Philosophers looking for the nature of truth are bound to be frustrated because truth has no nature. In relevance with the above, Frege remarks that: “It is worthy of notice that the sentence ‘I smell the scent of violets’ has the same content as the sentence ‘it is true that I smell the scent of violets’. So it seems, then, that nothing is added to the thought by my ascribing to it the property of truth”¹⁸. None the less, the ontological question about the nature of truth returns even more noticeably if we are to inquire about the actual terms of the correspondence between truth and the object or situation. If we hypothesize that the deflationists are wrong and Aristotle is right, it is deduced that each time we need to know truth we need to be certain about the relation or connection between the thought or phrase and the thing or situation per se. Such a connection is more than semantic since it comprises a comparison of either two different or tautological things. Locating the differentia or the idem per idem relation between our terms we could potentially be confident about our knowledge, our “ἐπιστήμη”, since it would prove beyond doubt the truth or falsity of a given discourse. However, this remains an external relation.

The Stoics seem to have predicted and resolved this discrepancy, quite interestingly, in the inner space of a person. The locus of unerring wisdom is the human soul, a place immune to external influences that would subordinate the sage’s free will. Despite the causal and teleological determinism of their Physics and Ethics, the Stoic teachers maintain that human freedom is sine qua non in decision making and in giving assent. Knowledge is the prerequisite for giving assent in accordance with cognitive impressions and one’s right reason. However, the Stoics do not maintain that merely having a cognitive impression constitutes knowledge (ἐπιστήμη). Indeed, not even assent to such an impression amounts to knowledge: this is only cognition or grasp (κατάληψις) of some individual fact. Real knowledge (ἐπιστήμη) requires cognition which is secure, firm and unchangeable by reason and, furthermore, worked into a systematic whole with other such cognitions¹⁹. Due to the absolute distinction between the wise and the ignorant it is interpreted that the Stoic sage's confirmation of cognitive impressions counts as knowledge, because only a sage has the proper discipline and ability always to use his assent properly. The Stoics call this epistemic virtue ‘non-precipitancy’ (ἀπροπτωσία) and it underlies their claim that the Stoic sage never makes mistakes; he is always securely bound to the truth²⁰. The Stoics are committed to the view that it is within our power to avoid falling into error and that there is a kind of impression which reveals to us the world as it really is and which is different from those impressions which might not so reveal the world.

The criticism of the skeptics regarding the concept of truth is quite acute but mostly is focused on empirical grounds. According to Arcesilaus, “no impression arising from something true is such that an impression arising from something false could not also be just like it”²¹. For Democritus, who presages the sophist Protagoras, truth and falsity are tautological concepts and truth does not differ from illusion, since perception through the senses is subjective. Each man sees a different truth²². Thus it is only the intellect that can interpret the sense data since truth is at the bottom²³.

Aristotle poses some challenging remarks on the question of truth and the expert. In the Politics, Aristotle upholds that if we compare the ruler to the flute player and the subject to the flute maker, the only excellence the subject needs is true opinion, whereas “φρόνησις” is the excellence that distinguishes rulers²⁴. He goes on to comment that it is the user of a thing and not its maker who judges it best²⁵. Actually he finds it difficult, if not impossible, for those who do not perform to be good judges of the performance of others²⁶. In making and using, the former should be subordinated to the latter, in Aristotle’s view. From this perspective, it is a natural consequence that rulers and those ruled should interchange positions in power. Practitioners of government are the makers and users of their own justice and their own laws²⁷. This relation between political practice and good judgment is imbued by the idea of reciprocity. Access to power means a direct relation with the data and the resources that are used for ruling. Hence the critical significance of responsible political participation by ordinary citizens.

Although so many conflicting views of what Truth is or is not exist, it remains as an issue of paramount importance how it can be employed in political matters. The use and dispersion of Truth is itself an issue of political repercussions. For Aristotle, the person who uses the thing knows more of its truth. The management of truth, in the particular field, is associated with specific influences towards the electors as well as to the citizens, who do not use power directly in modern democracies. If gaps of knowledge or information are presented during the political interaction of the citizen and the polis, if truth is “economized” through parliamentary representation, then it is a natural aftermath that the political outcome or action will be altered or disrupted. Just as in the case of science which has to stand free of political and religious influences, democracy needs to evaluate carefully the kind of influences, if any, that it should carry. The absence of whole “blocks” of truth, regarding political, military, economic and social facts, raises obstacles to the proper handling of the political matters and enhances the authority and efficacy of demagogues or interest groups, as a result it is disruptive to democracy itself, if not totally subversive. Economizing truth, we must be aware that eventually we economize democracy.

In this sense, it is imperative to decide on the overall orientation of a state, whether a democratic state will head for prosperity in a purely materialistic mode, i.e. providing citizens with all imaginable goods available, or will labor towards the direction of eudemonia in the ancient Greek philosophical sense. After one of these options prevails, it is left to decide whether it is knowledge or information that will be in the limelight of the citizen’s interest. In either case it is questionable whether politics, like science, takes the form of a secular priesthood or is accessible to every citizen. For the “good” of democracy, decisions are being made with the aid of demagogical speech, without the public actually knowing the whole truth or at least the most important aspects of the truth, what Kitcher calls “significant truth” even though the search for significance can conflict with other important values²⁸. In a series of events that are supposed to have moral repercussions, apart from the apparent practical ones on people’s lives,, as in most, if not every, of the cases when political decisions are made, it is problematic how democracy can safeguard its moral superiority over other forms of regimes if it does not account to truthful events. To be a democratically responsible citizen implies that he is responsible for keeping the truth resonant with his moral and political awareness. In the form that democracy is practiced today, much of the citizen’s responsibility is ceded to the professional politicians and their institutions, which intentionally or not mask the nature of their decisions, providing citizens with shallow and often misleading rhetoric, if not outright falsehoods. Almost any viable conception of democracy is thereby undermined. In these circumstances majorities become meaningless, little more than plebiscitary notations, as ephemeral as the vote. Without sustained attention to the substantive activities of the politicians and the interest groups they serve, there is no possibility of understanding, much less directing, the political process which determines the lives of ordinary citizens. They might as well be subjects in an authoritarian regime. One might argue that few citizens have either the desire or the capacity to be politically responsible. Of course this is true to some extent, but one must consider that their alienation from the political process may reflect a rational judgment regarding its possibilities. Why should citizens who are busy providing for their families spend the time, talent and effort to be informed and to participate as much as they can when their efficacy is thoroughly undermined? When the decisions have already been made or will be made in accordance with rich and powerful interest groups? In any case in a power state inevitably driven by mass politics, citizens informed or misinformed by a commercial or government controlled media have very little opportunity to participate in the political process.

This analysis suggests that the difficult and complex relations of truth, responsibility and political participation are exacerbated by the power state. Even if citizens had access to reliable information, unless they could evaluate it in the context of the social and political values of the community, their knowledge will not enable them to participate responsibly in politics. As Paul Kitcher maintains: “the significant truths for a person are just those the knowledge of which would increase the chance she would attain her practical goals”²⁹. The quest in this case would be that truth- based political action should remain consistent according to a taxonomy that is the product of social consensus, as the citizen recognizes similarities and differences according to a certain pattern, it should also remain morally orientated and practically effective.

This analysis further suggests that small, coherent communities, or their functional equivalents, may be essential to effective political participation and to the realization of democratic values. However laudable diversity may be on humanitarian grounds or from a global perspective, widespread and differing public experiences and divergent cultural practices tend to engender negative stereotypes among political groups, which often evolve into concrete walls of dogmatism. In such an “environment”, effective and meaningful political communication is complicated and compromised, if not made impossible. Reaching decisions based on the public interest is all but impossible because there is no sufficiently coherent public, sharing values to a degree which enables them to accommodate the significant conflicts of interests which are endemic even in relatively unified communities.

At the extreme, different societies disagree because they apprehend reality through radically different conceptual frameworks. Hence, it is almost impossible that truth can have the same meaning for the western world or for the eastern world, for a Christian or for a Muslim, for a European or for an Indian person. Conceptions of reality can be more easily shared within one’s own community, which bears more or less similar empirical representations, that is how having access to the truth that is vital for political decision making and action has to be accessed within one’s community. It must be said in extenuation of this point that consensus of values, attitudes and practices among divergent peoples can exist. Unfortunately, this consensus seems to be limited to educated elites who are the products of similar class, economic and cultural backgrounds and who almost necessarily treat the narrow traditions of their respective places of origin nominally, if they acknowledge them at all. Therefore, it is difficult to conceive of them as members of a ‘diverse’ community who have learned to get along sufficiently to live under the same political order. Moreover, the consensus of elites complicates the political attitudes of ordinary citizens, who tend to resent their ‘betters’ who seem more comfortable with elites from other cultures than with them. There is a natural tendency among ordinary citizens and the demagogues that exploit them to double down on their ‘parochialism,’ becoming more encased in a siege mentality and less willing to hear rational discussion much less act upon it. Rationality, truth, logic, even information seem tools of their oppressors, who employ them for their own interests and against the people. When these tools are employed by identifiable foreigners, the resentment of ordinary citizens may reach irrational and paranoid heights. So far from being essential to the democratic process, as this analysis has argued, truth and logic are perceived as its enemies, insofar as no effective community exists. Mass politics makes political participation seem absurd to citizens who inevitably believe that they have been bypassed by their political, economic and social elites, that they are no more than servants of the state, that democracy is a fraud, especially insofar as it connotes equality among citizens.

The contrast with the kind of political community this analysis supports and the one just described should be manifest, as they constitute qualitative differences in kind. This radical difference is captured by the difference between the ancient Greek focus on knowledge and contemporary emphasis on the management of ‘information.’ This difference in turn rests perhaps interactively on a radically different approach to the political. The contemporary emphasis on material prosperity makes information seem preferable to knowledge. When citizens are political consumers rather than actors, information, inevitably distorted by marketing devices is all they need to make a ‘purchase’. Of course this poverty of real knowledge makes effective democracy impossible. Robert Dahl affirms that the availability of alternative and relatively independent sources of information is required by several of the basic democratic criteria. He expresses concerns such as: how can citizens acquire the information they need in order to understand the issues if the government controls all the important sources of information? What happens in the case that some group enjoys a monopoly in providing information? In that aspect, how could citizens participate effectively in political life if all the information they could acquire was provided by a single source, e.g. the government, or a single party, faction or interest³⁰? Dahl believes that while the twentieth century turned out to be the century of democratic triumph, this triumph yet should be seen with some caution. One reason is that a significant number of the countries which are considered democratic are only marginally so, while it is doubtful whether democratic countries will be successful in meeting challenges such as the contradictory consequences of market-capitalism³¹.

In this context, I think there is theoretical space to introduce two philosophical- political prerequisites for democracy: a) commitment to the truth, b) access to the truth. Along with keeping democratic societies not gigantic in size, as Aristotle advises, these two principles recognize the conclusions from the historical precedents of democracy³². Democracy is not only the concession of legal rights and personal property; above all, it is the confirmation of the citizen as a value per se, demonstrated in the allotment of all, even the ordinary citizens, to the government offices and the assembly of all the citizens. These political powers have been substituted by the parliament and by the Press. The nucleus of the problem, apart from the above, lies in the additional recognition that information given from sources such as the Press is often based on psychological techniques, as Noam Chomsky has demonstrated, rendering truthfulness problematic. To use one example: who could check the validity of streaming information in the days of Bin Laden’s killing? Journalists? Certainly not, as mostly, if not exclusively, they used sources from the military. Journalists quite often also depend on governmental payrolls, public relations etc. As a result, their interference complicates further the public’s access to unbiased information. Since the citizen has no reliable mediator between him and the truth, the democratic procedure acquires the characteristics of an oligarchic procedure, where those who have more access to their version of truth can direct, in either a pedagogical or a demagogical way, the “informed” citizen. Aside from the huge power that the Press gathers in this indirect but forceful manner, it becomes apparent that access to the sources of information can equal access to whole phases where political truth related with decision making is absolutely essential. The solution would orientate somewhere between enhancing the citizen’s access to the truth while strengthening the moral responsibility of those who communicate the truth, not only in terms of information but in terms of what is politically good (in the sense of the ἀγαθόν). In the case of Bin Laden’s death, or in the case of the current severe financial crisis within Greece and the Eurozone, if there were a larger variety of independent sources of information, another truth would probably become known. As long as there are many sources of information, which have sufficient reasons to retain their independence, access to the truth is safer. It needs to be seen what these sources can be like and why in their present form they do not seem to be effective.

So why does this model not work today despite the plethora of blogs, the internet, the immense variety of radio stations? One answer seems to be that all these media remain endosystemic, very close to the original sources of influence. Thus we are presented with pseudo-dilemmas: to preserve the freedom of the press signifies to preserve the freedom of expression for everyone. But is the Press expressing politically significant truths? Is the citizen allowed his own political voice or is he confined to echo the unlimited vocality of the Press? That is why smaller communities, only interacting but not interdependent for reasons of commerce or consumerism, can be responsible for their own application of the two principles mentioned above. Democracy can work today if there are many small autonomous groups in critical interaction, not isolation, but preserving their right to regional or communal forms of truth, whether taken as knowledge or information. Autonomy, dispersion, creative conflict, and the different interests of the citizens in Aristotle’s polis can guarantee the existence of democracy, also free expression of the citizens’ ideas. Even in the case that some communities will not succeed in preserving the relationship between truth and democracy, they will be like hot spots in a big forest, separated by the rest of the forest with fire-resistant zones. All in all, these communities will be autocentric on the first level but allocentric on a second level as nucleuses of civilization and knowledge. If one nucleus is corrupted, truth and democracy do not need to be corrupted for everyone everywhere. The global village bears this great risk: that when a decisive moment comes in history, there may be no resistance left. To continue our metaphor, conflagration will engulf the forest. To enjoy the benefits of democracy we either have to be assured that the political group of authority has absolute commitment to the truth or that we, the citizens, have absolute access to the truth, not through the Press but through our own means. If one of the two parameters is not present, democracy is abolished by the ones who have absolute or partial power to manipulate the sources of knowledge.

Edward Wilson rightly remarks that: “Knowledge humanely acquired and widely shared, related to human needs but kept free of political censorship, is the real science for the people”³³. This real science, as Wilson calls it, is the starting point of free expression. Access to the truth, access to knowledge, is a compass for synthesis and organization inside any democratic society. The danger shall always remain that the pursuit and acquisition of knowledge can be assymetrical to the situation of those who are underprivileged inside the community or of those politically indifferent as mentioned before. That, in continuation, even if it is considered legitimate, could be the source of uncontrolled bias. If this political attitude is to resonate with the pursuits of modern democracy it remains to be seen in some other examination of the matter if some instantiations of its arguments are cogent. But here let us consider the case when circumstances do not allow the responsible politician or citizen to express truth or side with it³⁴. Certainly there will be cases like that, but again it should be a matter of consensus on what values and what priorities each society has. Which will be the determining factors? Who will make decisions? Will this consensus lead to a repulsive form of homogeneity? What is the collective good that inquiry should promote? The answer that Paul Kitcher has given starts from a subjectivist view of individual value (using personal preferences as the basis for an account of a person’s welfare) and relates the individual good to the collective good within a framework in which democratic ideals are taken for granted³⁵. From my perspective, democratic ideals should not be taken for granted; they ought to be re-invented, re-established, re-confirmed anew in any form of social unity, as their immobility in accordance with old ideals, uncritically inherited from previous centuries, would lead to an unacceptable stagnation of values, especially in western society.

Of course to establish truth based on reliable information as an ideal and sine qua non of substantive democracy is easier to postulate than to actualize. It remains exceedingly difficult to establish truth objectively. How can one objectively prove that a particular society’s dependence on certain values is erroneous beyond contradiction? Which are the methodological loci on which differences of tradition and modern theorizations can be met and reconciled? Perhaps notions of scientific or philosophical objectivity will need to be relaxed, if the concept of truth is to operate in a political environment. As Aristotle suggested, political and social truths are true for the most part and are far from absolute. Therefore, a kind of structured subjectivism may prove workable, so long as it does not degrade into a vulgar relativism.

The democratic ideal and therefore the quest for the significant truth that is indispensable for political action is supposed to contribute to people’s welfare. That unavoidably will always take us back to the previous discussion about what are the constituents of this welfare: a rapid increase in our convenience of purchasing material goods or eudemonia in the ancient Greek philosophical perspective? Is democracy allowed to change our values if the truth that is revealed points out to that direction as a necessity and not as mere choice?

Professional politics, like professional science, should not take the form of theology, should not become fundamentalist in its pursuits and aspirations, nor should it enjoy the solitary privilege to possess truth. If not conducive to the public good, whichever that good is concluded to be within the limits of a moral consensus shared by members of a community, the search for truth would remain futile in the practical level of making people’s lives better and enhancing their bond with their polis. Truth and democracy intertwine at the point where the right service to the former means right service to the latter, both for the collective good of the society. If democracy is not a product of rhetoric but comprises a valuable political event, how truth safeguards it and what type of truth we need to employ in order to defend democracy has to be cross-examined with the question whether democracy is or is part of a certain episteme. Whatever the answer is, we had better forbear from economizing either democracy or our commitment to truth.
Panos Eliopoulos, PhD

Universities of Athens & Peloponnese, Greece

BIBLIOGRAPHY
Aristotle, The Politics of Aristotle, transl. by W. L. Newman, 4 vols., University Press, Oxford 1887-1902.

Cicero, De Natura Deorum & Academica, translated by H. Rackham, Harvard University Press, (Loeb) 1933.

Dahl Robert, On Democracy, Yale University Press, New Haven-London 1998.

Diels H. and Kranz W., Die Fragmente der Vorsokratiker, 6^th edition, Weidmann, Berlin 1951.

Field H., “The Deflationary Conception of Truth”. In G. MacDonald and C. Wright (eds.), Fact, Science and Morality, Blackwell, Oxford 1986.

Horwich P. (ed.), Theories of Truth, Dartmouth, New York 1994.

James William, Pragmatism, A New Name for Some Old Ways of Thinking, Popular Lectures on Philosophy, Longmans, Green, and Company, New York 1907.

James William, The Meaning of Truth, A Sequel to 'Pragmatism', Longmans, Green, and Company, New York 1909.

Jill Frank, A Democracy of Distinction, The University of Chicago Press, Chicago and London 2005.

Joachim, H. H., The Nature of Truth, Clarendon Press, Oxford 1906.

Katsimanis Kyriakos, Praktiki filosofia kai politico ithos tou Sokrati, France, Université de Paris - Sorbonne - Paris IV, 1979.

Kitcher Paul, Science, Truth, and Democracy, Oxford University Press, New York 2001.

Künne W., Conceptions of Truth, Clarendon, Oxford 2003.

Lansford Tom, Democracy, Benchmark Books, NY 2007.

Pelegrinis Theodosios, Lexiko tis Filosofias, Ellinika Grammata, Athens 2004.

Platon, Oeuvres Complètes, Tome I-XIII, Les Belles Lettres, Paris 1962-1982.

Pomeroy A., Arius Didymus: Epitome of Stoic Ethics, Society of Biblical Literature, Atlanta 1999.

Wright C., Truth and Objectivity, Harvard University Press, Cambridge, MA 1992.

Wilson Edward, “Academic Vigilantism and the Political Significance of Sociobiology”. In Bioscience, 26, 1976, pp. 187-190.

1 Cf. W. Künne, Conceptions of Truth, Clarendon, Oxford 2003.

2 Aristotle, Politics, 1328 a 36-37.

3 Cf. C. Wright, Truth and Objectivity, Harvard University Press, Cambridge, MA 1992.

4 Plato, Theaetetus, 176c-179b.

5 Cf. Kyriakos Katsimanis, Praktiki filosofia kai politico ithos tou Sokrati, France, Université de Paris - Sorbonne - Paris IV, 1979.

6 Kitcher makes the following inquiries: how do we recognize an ideal expert? How do we become sure that the ideal expert’s personal interests do not interfere with his line of decision? See Paul Kitcher, Science, Truth and Democracy, Oxford University Press, New York 2001, pp. 119-120.

7 Plato, Crito, 48a.

8 Plato, Theaetetus, 186c.

9 Plato, Theaetetus, 186a-c.

10 Plato, Gorgias, 454 e.

11 Plato, Gorgias, 455a.

12 Plato, Gorgias, 473b: «τὸ γὰρ ἀληθὲς οὐδέποτε ἐλέγχεται».

13 Theodosios Pelegrinis, Lexiko tis Filosofias, Ellinika Grammata, Athens 2004, pp. 42-43.

14 See William James, Pragmatism, A New Name for Some Old Ways of Thinking, Popular Lectures on Philosophy, Longmans, Green, and Company, New York 1907. Also, William James, The Meaning of Truth, A Sequel to 'Pragmatism', Longmans, Green, and Company, New York 1909.

15 See H. H. Joachim, The Nature of Truth, Clarendon Press, Oxford 1906.

16 H. H. Joachim, The Nature of Truth, Clarendon Press, Oxford 1906, p. 90.

17 See H. Field, “The Deflationary Conception of Truth”. In G. MacDonald and C. Wright (eds.), Fact, Science and Morality, Blackwell, Oxford 1986. Cf. P. Horwich (ed.), Theories of Truth, Dartmouth, New York 1994.

18 G. Frege, ‘Thoughts’, in his Logical Investigations, Blackwell, Oxford 1977.

19 Arius Didymus, 41 H.

20 S.V.F. II. 39.

21 Cicero, Academica, 40 D.

22 68 A 113.

23 68 B 117.

24 Aristotle, Politics, 1277 b 26-30.

25 Aristotle, Politics, 1282 a 17-23.

26 Aristotle, Politics, 1340 b 24-26.

27 Frank Jill, A Democracy of Distinction, The University of Chicago Press, Chicago and London 2005, p. 99.

28 Paul Kitcher, Science, Truth and Democracy, Oxford University Press, New York 2001, p. 111.

29 Paul Kitcher, Science, Truth and Democracy, Oxford University Press, New York 2001, p. 65.

30 Robert Dahl, On Democracy, Yale University Press, New Haven-London 1998, pp. 97-98.

31 Robert Dahl, On Democracy, Yale University Press, New Haven-London 1998, pp. 164-165.

32 Cf. Tom Lansford, Democracy, Benchmark Books, NY 2007.

33 Edward Wilson, “Academic Vigilantism and the Political Significance of Sociobiology”. In Bioscience, 26, 1976, pp. 187-190.

34 Cf. Paul Kitcher, Science, Truth and Democracy, Oxford University Press, New York 2001, pp. 93-108.

35 Paul Kitcher, Science, Truth and Democracy, Oxford University Press, New York 2001, p. 116.

[]