Principles of Morals and

Principles of Morals and Legislation/59
which the legislator has to do. These may, by some accident or other, be
any whatsoever: but those which he has principally to do, are those of
the painful or afflictive kind. With pleasurable ones he has little to do,
except now and then by accident: the reasons of which may be easily
enough perceived, at the same time that it would take up too much room
to unfold them here. The exciting causes with which he has principally
to do, are, on the one hand, the mischievous acts, which it is his business
to prevent; on the other hand, the punishments, by the terror of which it
is his endeavour to prevent them. Now of these two sets of exciting
causes, the latter only is of his production: being produced partly by his
own special appointment, partly in conformity to his general appoint-
ment, by the special appointment of the judge. For the legislator, there-
fore, as well as for the judge, it is necessary (if they would know what it
is they are doing when they are appointing punishment) to have an eye
to all these circumstances. For the legislator, lest, meaning to apply a
certain quantity of punishment to all persons who shall put themselves
in a given predicament, he should unawares apply to some of those
persons much more or much less than he himself intended; for the judge,
lest, in applying to a particular person a particular measure of punish-
ment, he should apply much more or much less than was intended, per-
haps by himself, and at any rate by the legislator. They ought each of
them, therefore, to have before him, on the one hand, a list of the several
circumstances by which sensibility may be influenced; on the other hand,
a list of the several species and degrees of punishment which they pur-
pose to make use of: and then, by making a comparison between the
two, to form a detailed estimate of the influence of each of the circum-
stances in question, upon the effect of each species and degree of pun-
ishment.
There are two plans or orders of distribution, either of which might
be pursued in the drawing up this estimate. The one is to make the name
of the circumstance take the lead, and under it to represent the different
influences it exerts over the effects of the several modes of punishment:
the other is to make the name of the punishment take the lead, and under
it to represent the different influences which are exerted over the effects
of it by the several circumstances above mentioned. Now of these two
sorts of objects, the punishment is that to which the intention of the
legislator is directed in the first instance. This is of his own creation,
and will be whatsoever he thinks fit to make it: the influencing circum-
stance exists independently of him, and is what it is whether he will or

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60/Jeremy Bentham
no. What he has occasion to do is to establish a certain species and
degree of punishment: and it is only with reference to that punishment
that he has occasion to make any inquiry concerning any of the circum-
stances here in question. The latter of the two plans therefore is that
which appears by far the most useful and commodious. But neither upon
the one nor the other plan can any such estimate be delivered here.
XLVI. Of the several circumstances contained in this catalogue, it
may be of use to give some sort of analytic view; in order that it may be
the more easily discovered if any which ought to have been inserted are
omitted; and that, with regard to those which are inserted, it may be seen
how they differ and agree.
In the first place, they may be distinguished into primary and sec-
ondary: those may be termed primary, which operate immediately of
themselves: those secondary, which operate not but by the medium of
the former. To this latter head belong the circumstances of sex, age,
station in life, education, climate, lineage, government, and religious
profession: the rest are primary. These again are either connate or ad-
ventitious: those which are connate, are radical frame of body and radi-
cal frame of mind. Those which are adventitious, are either personal, or
exterior. The personal, again, concern either a man’s dispositions, or
his actions. Those which concern his dispositions, concern either his
body or his mind. Those which concern his body are health, strength,
hardiness, and bodily imperfection. Those which concern his mind, again,
concern either his understanding or his affections. To the former head
belong the circumstances of quantity and quality of knowledge, strength
of understanding, and insanity. To the latter belong the circumstances of
firmness of mind, steadiness, bent of inclination, moral sensibility, moral
biases, religious sensibility, religious biases, sympathetic sensibility,
sympathetic biases, antipathetic sensibility, and antipathetic biases. Those
which regard his actions, are his habitual occupations. Those which are
exterior to him, regard either the things or the persons which he is con-
cerned with; under the former head come his pecuniary circumstances;
under the latter, his connexions in the way of sympathy and antipathy.

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Chapter VII: Of Human Actions in General
I. The business of government is to promote the happiness of the soci-
ety, by punishing and rewarding. That part of its business which con-
sists in punishing, is more particularly the subject of penal law. In pro-
portion as an act tends to disturb that happiness, in proportion as the
tendency of it is pernicious, will be the demand it creates for punish-
ment. What happiness consists of we have already seen: enjoyment of
pleasures, security from pains.
II. The general tendency of an act is more or less pernicious, ac-
cording to the sum total of its consequences: that is, according to the
difference between the sum of such as are good, and the sum of such as
are evil.
III. It is to be observed, that here, as well as henceforward, wher-
ever consequences are spoken of, such only are meant as are material.
Of the consequences of any act, the multitude and variety must needs be
infinite: but such of them only as are material are worth regarding. Now
among the consequences of an act, be they what they may, such only, by
one who views them in the capacity of a legislator, can be said to be
material (or of importance) as either consist of pain or pleasure, or have
an influence in the production of pain or pleasure.
IV. It is also to be observed, that into the account of the conse-
quences of the act, are to be taken not such only as might have ensued,
were intention out of the question, but such also as depend upon the
connexion there may be between these first-mentioned consequences
and the intention. The connexion there is between the intention and cer-
tain consequences is, as we shall see hereafter, a means of producing
other consequences. In this lies the difference between rational agency

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