Principles of Morals and

Principles of Morals and Legislation/169
various occasions, to drop or change the names which bring them under
this division: this is chiefly the ease with regard to simple falsehoods.
Others retain their names unchanged; and even thereby supersede the
names which would otherwise belong to the offences which they de-
nominate: this is chiefly the case with regard to personation, forgery,
and perjury. When this circumstance then, the circumstance of false-
hood, intervenes, in some cases the name which takes the lead is that
which indicates the offence by its effect; in other cases, it is that which
indicates the expedient or instrument as it were by the help of which the
offence is committed. Falsehood, take it by itself, consider it as not
being accompanied by any other material circumstances, nor therefore
productive of any material effects, can never, upon the principle of util-
ity, constitute any offence at all. Combined with other circumstances,
there is scarce any sort of pernicious effect which it may not be instru-
mental in producing. It is therefore rather in compliance with the laws
of language, than in consideration of the nature of the things themselves,
that falsehoods are made separate mention of under the name and in the
character of distinct offences. All this would appear plain enough, if it
were now a time for entering into particulars: but that is what cannot be
done, consistently with any principle of order or convenience, until the
inferior divisions of those other classes shall have been previously ex-
hibited.
XXV. We come now to offences against trust. A trust is, where
there is any particular act which one party, in the exercise of some power,
or some right, which is conferred on him, is bound to perform for the
benefit of another. Or, more fully, thus: A party is said to be invested
with a trust, when, being invested with a power, or with a right, there is
a certain behaviour which, in the exercise of that power, or of that right,
he is bound to maintain for the benefit of some other party. In such case,
the party first mentioned is styled a trustee: for the other party, no name
has ever yet been found: for want of a name, there seems to be no other
resource than to give a new and more extensive sense to the word ben-
eficiary, or to say at length the party to be benefited.
The trustee is also said to have a trust conferred or imposed upon
him, to be invested with a trust, to have had a trust given him to execute,
to perform, to discharge, or to fulfil. The party to be benefited, is said to
have a trust established or created in his favour: and so on through a
variety of other phrases.
XXVI. Now it may occur, that a trust is oftentimes spoken of as a

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170/Jeremy Bentham
species of condition: that a trust is also spoken of as a species of prop-
erty: and that a condition itself is also spoken of same light. It may be
thought, therefore, that in the first class, the division of offences against
condition should have been included under that of the offences against
property: and that at any rate, so much of the fifth class now before us
as contains offences against trust, should have been included under one
or other of those two divisions of the first class. But upon examination
it will appear, that no one of these divisions could with convenience, nor
even perhaps with propriety, have been included under either of the other
two. It will appear at the same time, that there is an intimate connection
subsisting amongst them all: insomuch that of the lists of the offences to
which they are respectively exposed, any one may serve in great mea-
sure as a model for any other. There are certain offences to which all
trusts as such are exposed: to all these offences every sort of condition
will be found exposed: at the same time that particular species of the
offences against trust will, upon their application to particular condi-
tions, receive different particular denominations. It will appear also,
that of the two groups of offences into which the list of those against
trust will be found naturally to divide itself, there is one, and but one, to
which property, taken in its proper and more confined sense, stands
exposed: and that these, in their application to the subject of property,
will be found susceptible of distinct modifications, to which the usage
of language, and the occasion there is for distinguishing them in point of
treatment, make it necessary to find names.
XXVI. In the first place, as there are, or at least may be (as we shall
see) conditions which are not trusts, so there are trusts of which the idea
would not be readily and naturally understood to be included under the
word condition: add to which, that of those conditions which do include
a trust, the greater number include other ingredients along with it: so
that the idea of a condition, if on the one hand it stretches beyond the
idea of a trust, does on the other hand fall short of it. Of the several sorts
of trusts, by far the most important are those in which it is the public
that stands in the relation of beneficiary. Now these trusts, it should
seem, would hardly present themselves at first view upon the mention of
the word condition. At any rate, what is more material, the most impor-
tant of the offences against these kinds of trust would not seem to be
included under the denomination of offences against condition. The of-
fences which by this latter appellation would be brought to view, would
be such only as seemed to affect the interests of an individual: of him,

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