174
İqtisadi və Siyasi Elmlər Jurnalı.
№ 4 (9) 2017
the Arab revolutions and, in particular, to the Syrian crisis. Although
Turkey has tried to assert itself as a champion of democracy in the Arab
world, Turkey's own democratic shortcomings and its excessive
participation in Syrian affairs create serious restrictions on its foreign
policy towards the Middle East. In this context, and in opposition to
Turkey, Russia,
like China, took the side of the Assad regime in Syria.
Important in the current context is that the main differences in the
political orientations of the two states have not undermined their economic
partnership, created on the basis of trade and investment ties built over two
decades. At the same time, in the absence of common norms, it is
extremely difficult to establish a genuine "political community" among
such states. This conclusion concerns not only the bilateral relations
established between such states, but also the regional blocs, where these
states constitute the main driving force. BSEC is a vivid example of such a
vague regionalism. This does not correspond to a genuine political order
based on a common identity, bearing in mind that member states, in
particular leading states such as Russia and Turkey, can not agree on
common norms that are necessary to create a genuine political community.
Another key question concerns the often paradoxical coexistence of
interdependence and dependence, especially when one of the states has an
economic advantage over the other. In the case of BRICS, this model
seems to apply to China in relation to the rest of the group. In Russian-
Turkish relations, Russia is certainly a stronger partner as a result of
Turkey's dependence on Moscow because of its energy resources. This
pattern of asymmetric interdependence is important in terms of limiting
negotiation options for a more vulnerable partner, which can also cast
doubt on the logic of the "strategic partnership" created between the two
states, which raises some concerns about its longevity.
Transformation of bilateral relations: elements of continuity and
discontinuity
Russians and Ottomans have been rivals for centuries. The turbulent
history of the Ottoman-Russian relations was marked by 13 bloody wars,
the last of which was the First World War. However, by the end of the war,
when both monarchies were overthrown or defeated, the unprecedented
transformation of both internal and external dynamics of these forces
marked the beginning of a new and much more positive chapter in bilateral
relations. After the First World War at a time when both sides were
isolated from the international system, the Bolshevik government under
175
İqtisadi və Siyasi Elmlər Jurnalı.
№ 4 (9) 2017
Vladimir Lenin, and the Turkish nationalists led by Mustafa Kemal
Ataturk developed close relations. The USSR was the first European state
to officially recognize the nationalist government of Turkey with the
Moscow Treaty signed on March 16, 1921, ironically, while the Ottoman
Sultanate nominally still existed.
The interwar era was marked by economically close, but politically
cautious bilateral relations. During this period, the propaganda of statism
was inspired by the socialist experiment of the USSR. The obvious success
of the centralized Soviet economy at a time when the Western world was
struck by the Great Depression made it an attractive model. However, the
human costs and shortcomings of the socialist system in the Stalin era were
not disclosed to the outside world. Turkey's emphasis on developing the
industrial base and implementing the five-year plans was based on the
Soviet model. However, despite close cooperation with the USSR, Turkish
leaders stressed that their statist policy is different from socialism. There
was no class conflict, and state control was still limited. Most of the
economy, especially agriculture and light industry, remained in private
hands.
The first serious tension in bilateral relations arose in 1936 during the
negotiations in Montreux, which allowed Turkey to regain control of the
Turkish Straits through remilitarization. Tension reached its climax after
World War II, when on March 19, 1945, Molotov, Foreign Minister of the
USSR, informed Turkey that the USSR refused to resume the non-
aggression pact of 1925. When the Turkish government learned about the
terms of the new agreement, Molotov said that in addition to the bases in
the straits, the USSR required some territory in Eastern Anatolia.
Moreover, at the Potsdam Conference (July 1945),
the Soviet leader Joseph
Stalin tried to revise the Montreux Convention. In March 1947, the
contours of the Cold War began to appear with the proclamation of the
Truman Doctrine, while the USSR and Turkey were in different camps
during the Korean War. Finally, when Turkey joined NATO in 1952, the
Turkish-American alliance, as well as the Turkish-Soviet split, became
institutionalized.
The geostrategic rivalry of the bipolar era determined the controversial
relations of the Cold War period. During this time, relations between the
two countries were practically frozen, and the rise of the USSR and the
spread of communism were regarded as serious security threats from the
Turkish point of view. Turkey was firmly in the Western camp, as a
member of NATO and as an associate member and potential full member