R. H. Coase Graduate School
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26 Selected Papers No. 50 s o o n . F u r t h e r m o r e , o n e c a n h a r d l y b e upset by people’s actions, even if in some respects disagreeable, they are incapable of acting otherwise. Any- one who knows anything about cats will not spend much time deploring their unkindness to mice.
Many economists have thought that there is an inconsistency between Adam Smith’s argument in
and in
The Wealth of Nations. 47 Jacob Viner refers to this question in the following terms : “The Germans, who, it seems, in their methodical manner commonly read both
and
The Wealth of Nations, have coined a pretty term, Das Adam Smith Problem, to denote the failure to understand either which results from the attempt to use the one in t h e i n t e r p r e t a t i o n o f t h e other."48 T h e inconsistency which Viner himself finds is that in
The Theory of Moral Sentiments, Adam Smith assumes that there exists a natural harmony while in
Adam Smith seems to have aban- doned this belief, as is shown by the references to desirable government actions. Viner’s view involves, I think, a misunderstanding of these two books. The Theory of Moral Sentiments is a study of human psychology. The Wealth of Nations is a study of the organization of economic life. A harmony in human nature does not imply that no government action is required to achieve the appropriate insti- tutional structure for economic activity. Most economists, however, who have thought that there was an inconsistency between Adam Smith’s position in these two books have come to this conclusion for another reason. In
The Theory of Moral Sentiments, man’s actions are influenced by R. H. Coase benevolence. In The Wealth of Nations, this motive is apparently absent. This view is supported by a much-quoted passage: “It is not from the benevolence of the butcher, the brewer, or the baker, that we expect our own dinner, but from their regard to their own interest. We address ourselves, not to their humanity but to their self-love, and never talk to them of our own necessities but of their advantages.” 49 What is not quoted is something which Adam Smith says earlier in the same paragraph: “In civilized society, [man] stands at all times in need of the co-operation and assistance of great multitudes, while his whole life is scarce sufficient to gain the friendship of a few persons.“50 This puts a completely different complexion on the matter. For that extensive division of labour required to maintain a civilized standard of living, we need to have the cooperation of great multitudes, scattered all over the world. There is no way in which this cooperation could be secured through the exercise of benevolence. Benevolence, or love, may be the dominant, or, at any rate, an important factor within the family or in our relations with colleagues or friends, but as Adam Smith indicates, it operates weakly or not at all when we deal with strangers. Benevolence is highly personal and most of those who benefit from the economic activities in which we engage are unknown to us. Even if they were, they would not necessarily, in our eyes, be lovable. For strangers to have to rely on our benevolence for what they received from us would mean, in most cases, that they would not be supplied: “ . . . man has almost constant occasion for the help of his brethren, and it is in vain to expect it from their benevolence only.” 51 Looked at in this way, Adam Smith’s 28 Selected Papers No. 50 argument for the use of the market for the organization of economic activity is much stronger than it is usually thought to be. The market is not simply an ingenious mechanism, fueled by self-interest, for secur- ing the cooperation of individuals in the production of goods and services. In most circumstances, it is the only way in which this could be done. Nor does government regulation or operation represent a satisfactory way out. A politician, when motivated by benevolence, will tend to favour his family, his friends, members of his party, inhabitants of his region or country (and this whether or not he is democratically elected). Such benevolence will not necessarily redound to the general good. And when politicians are motivated by self-interest unalloyed by benev- olence, it is easy to see that the results may be even less satisfactory. T h e great advantage of the market is that it is able to use the strength of self-interest to offset the weakness and partiality of benev- olence, so that those who are unknown, unattractive, or unimportant, will have their wants served. But this should not lead us to ignore the part which benevolence and moral sentiments do play in making possible a market system. Consider, for example, the care and training of the young, largely carried out within the family and sustained by parental devotion. If love were absent and the task of training the young was therefore placed on other institutions, run presumably by people following their own self-interest, it seems likely that this task, on which the successful working of human societies depends, would be worse performed. At least, that was Adam Smith’s opinion: “Domestic education is the institution of nature-public education the contrivance of
R. H. Coase 29 man. It is surely unnecessary to say which is likely to be the wisest.” 52 Again, the observance of moral codes must very greatly reduce the costs of doing business with others and must therefore facilitate market trans- actions. As Adam Smith observes, “Society. . . cannot subsist among those who are at all times ready to hurt and injure one another. . . . ” 53 Adam Smith allows for a good deal of folly in human behaviour. But this does not lead him to advocate an extensive role for government. Politicians and government officials are also men. Private individuals are constrained in their folly because they personally suffer its consequences : “Bank- ruptcy is perhaps the greatest and most humiliating calamity which can befall an innocent man. The greater part of men, therefore, are sufficiently careful to avoid it. ” 54 But, of course, men who bankrupt a city or a nation are not necessarily them- selves made bankrupt. Adam Smith, there- fore, continues : “Great nations are never impoverished by private, though they some- times are by public prodigality and mis- conduct.” 55 As he later observes: “[Kings and ministers] are themselves always, and without any exception, the greatest spend- thrifts in the society. Let them look well after their own expence, and they may safely trust private people with theirs. If their own extravagance does not ruin the state, that of their subjects never will.” 56 In the regulation of behaviour, Adam Smith put little confidence in human reason. When discussing self-preservation and the propagation of the species, Adam Smith said, in a passage to which I have already referred, that the securing of these ends is so important that “it has not been entrusted to the slow 30 Selected Papers No. 50 and uncertain determination of our reason” but to “original and immediate instincts.” Jacob Viner makes a similar point: “The important thing for the interpreter of Smith is to note how low down. . . reason enters into the picture as a factor influencing social b e h a v i o u r . T h e s e n t i m e n t s [ t h a t i s , t h e instincts] are innate in man. . . . Under normal circumstances, the sentiments make no mistake. It is reason which is fallible."57 It is wrong to believe, as is commonly done, that Adam Smith had as his view of man an abstraction, an “economic man,” rationally pursuing his self-interest in a single-minded way. Adam Smith would not have thought it sensible to treat man as a rational utility-maximiser. He thinks of man as he actually is-dominated, it is true, by self-love but not without some concern for others, able to reason but not necessarily in such a way as to reach the right conclusion, seeing the outcomes of his actions but through a veil of self-delusion. No doubt modern psychologists have added a great deal, some of it correct, to this eighteenth century view of human nature. But if one is willing to accept Adam Smith’s view of man as containing, if not the whole truth, at least a large part of it, realisation that his thought has a much broader foundation than is commonly assumed makes his argu- ment for economic freedom more powerful and his conclusions more persuasive. R. H. Coase Footnotes 1. Adam Smith, of Moral Sentiments 3 (E.G. West ed. 1969) [hereinafter cited as Theory]. 2. Theory 10. 3. Theory 11. 4. Theory 12-13. 5. Theory 192. 6. Theory 192-93. 7. Theory 193-94. 8. A. L. Macfie, The Individual in Society: Papers on Adam Smith 96 ( 1 9 6 7 ) . 9. Theory 189. 10.
Theory 222-23. 11.
Theory 223-24, 229. 12. Theory 446. 13. Theory 321. 14.
Theory 332-23. 15.
Theory 328-29. 16. Theory 338. 17.
Theory 217-19. Jacob Viner, who adopts a similar v i e w , p o i n t s o u t t h a t A d a m S m i t h ’ s s e n t i m e n t s g r o w w e a k e r w i t h “ s o c i a l d i s t a n c e . ” S e e J a c o b Viner,
The Role of Providence in the Social Order 80-81 ( 1 9 7 2 ) . 18. See Jacob Viner, “Adam Smith and Laissez-Faire,” in
Adam Smith 1776-1926: Lectures to Commem- orate the Sesquicentennial of the Publication of The Wealth of Nations, 116-55 (1928). 19.
Theory 152-153. 20. Theory 153-54. 21.
Theory 109. 22. Theory 378. 23. Theory 442-44. 24. Theory 445. 25. Theory 446-47. 26. Theory 348. 27. Theory 110, 264, 442. See Jacob Viner, supra note 18, at 121. 2 8 . A d a m S m i t h , A n
Cannan ed. 1937) [hereinafter cited as Wealth]. 29. Theory 110. 30. Theory 33. 32 Selected Papers No. 50 3 1 .
3 2 . T h e o r y 3 9 . 33. Theory 1 9 9 .
3 4 . T h e o r y 3 2 2 . 35. Michael T. Ghiselin, a biologist, has noted that Adam Smith “clearly grasped” that “our moral sentiments have an adaptive significance.” See Michael T. Ghiselin, The Economy of Nature and
(1974).
36. David Hume, “Human Uniformity and Predict- ability,” in The Scottish Moralists on Human Nature and Society 44 (Louis Schneider ed. 1967). 37. See Philip V. Tobias, “Implications of the New Age Estimates of the Early South African Homi- nids,” 246 Nature 79-83 (1973); and Charles E. O x n a r d , Uniqueness and Diversity in Human Evolution: Morphometric Studies o f Australopi- thecines ( 1 9 7 5 ) . 38. For a general survey of the problem, see Edward 0. Wilson, Sociobiology: The New Synthesis 547- 5 7 5 ( 1 9 7 5 ) . See. also Robert L. Trivers, “The Evolution of Reciprocal Altruism,” 46 Q. Rev.
(1971); and Robert L. Trivers,” “Parental Investment and Sexual Selection,” in
(Bernard Campbell ed. 1972). 39. Wealth 717. 40. Wealth 818.
41. Wealth 107.
42. Theory 2 1 0 .
43. Theory 259-60. 44. Theory 263-64. 45. Wealth 366. 46. Arthur H. Cole, Puzzles of the “Wealth of Nations,” 24 Can. J. Econ. & Pol. Sci. 1, 5 (1958). 47. See August Oncken, “The Consistency of Adam Smith,” 7 Econ. J. 443-50 (1897). 48. Jacob Viner, supra note 18, at 120. 49. Wealth 14.
50. Wealth 14.
51. Wealth 14. 5 2 . T h e o r y 3 2 6 . 54. Wealth 325. 55. Wealth 325. The reasons why Adam Smith ad- vocated limited government cannot be summarised in a single paragraph. Professor J. Ralph Lindgren R. H. Coase 33 has argued persuasively that it was Adam Smith’s view that the institutional role of men in govern- will inevitably lead them to adopt attitudes dominated by a “love of system.” See J. Ralph Lindgren, The Social Philosophy of Adam Smith, 60-83 ( 1 9 7 3 ) . 56. Wealth 329. 57. See Jacob Viner, supra note 17, at 78. Yüklə 99,99 Kb. Dostları ilə paylaş:
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