21
democratization. The majority of alternative movements, in part also the League of Socialist
Youth, placed democratic civil rights before the national issue. The Slovene Democratic Al-
liance and some other parties conceded the same importance to both issues.
7
Differences were
existent even after Demos (democratic opposition) came to power in the spring of 1990, since
it was evident that a part of the political forces primarily wished to consolidate its position in
power, take control of the social capital, while independence would follow later on.
Nonetheless, it can be assessed that the political gravitation in Slovenia at the time leaned
towards the simultaneousness of both processes. In Yugoslavia, generally speaking, a strong
opposition to both processes is discernible; and as regards international circumstances, the
western forces, especially the USA, supported democratization but were against secession.
8
Choosing between both processes, they were prepared to sacrifice democracy for geostrategic
interests and allowed the Yugoslav Premier Ante Markovič the so-called limited intervention
with army in Slovenia (which changed to real war).
7
Koga voliti? Programi političnih strank in list na pomladnih volitvah v Sloveniji
[Who to Vote for? Programs of Political Parties Taking Part in the Spring Elections in Slovenia], ed.
Jugoslovanski center za teorijo in prakso samoupravljanja Edvard Kardelj [Yugoslav Centre for Theory and
Practice of Self-Management Edvard Kardelj] (Ljubljana, March 1990). See also: Nastajanje slovenske
državnosti [Formation of Slovene Statesmanship], ed. Slovensko politološko društvo (Ljubljana 1992).
8
The USA held this position until the final collapse of Yugoslavia, most decisively in the spring of 1991.
American Secretary of State James Baker had, only a few days before the proclamation of Slovene independence
in Belgrade on June 21, 1991, told Slovene representatives that the USA wished to preserve the unity of
Yugoslavia and that they would not recognize the independence of Slovenia, nor would any other country do so,
but that they wished to help with the democratization of Yugoslavia (Note of the discussion between the
President of the Presidency of the Republic of Slovenia Milan Kučan and James Baker Ill, Secretary of State of
the USA, Belgrade, June 21st, 1991, Arhiv Predsedstva Republike Slovenije [Archives of the Presidency of the
Republic Slovenia], see also Warren Zimmermann: Origins of a Catastrophe, New York 1996, 71).
22
Fig. 15: Yugoslavia an orphan girl, poor child, is waiting before a drawbridge of the Eu-
ropean fortress (Milan Maver, Delo, February 20, 1989). The general opinion at the end of
the eighties in Slovenia was that it would not be able to enter the European Community as a
part of Yugoslavia. That was a matter of dispute with the federal centre and especially with
Serbia. The conflict with Serbia was not a conflict of two nationalisms, as is usually
interpreted, but a split between two evolutional concepts: the Slovene, oriented towards Europe
and modernization, and the Serbian one, patriarchal, introverted and oriented towards the past.
"To Brussels over Ljubljana and not over Belgrade" was a popular phrase at the end of the
eighties and the beginning of the nineties.
The independent Slovene state was a result of political and social changes in the 1980s.
These took place in the context of a global crisis of communism, the disintegration of the
bipolar division of the world, the disintegration of the Soviet Union and a deep political
and economic crisis in Yugoslavia, as well as a crisis in the relationships among the
different nations within the state. Independence would not have been possible without these
external changes and likewise, the internal process of democratization would also have
been very different. Incorporated among the basic internal characteristics, which the
Slovenes themselves could influence, was a relatively open political scene which enabled
a circulation of ideas and meetings between those in power and those in opposition, a strong
23
civil society, supremacy of a reformist movement within the Communist Party and a high
level of consent concerning basic national issues. The processes of social democratization
and of national emancipation were tightly intertwined. This situation enabled a smooth
transition from the one-party to a multi-party system and successful preparations for attaining
independence. Consensus between the socialist government and the opposition was settled
upon through a confederation status, a fact that is nowadays all too frequently forgotten.
Even when Demos came to power the evaluation of a confederation as the maximum
achievement possible under such circumstances did not alter. It was only after the
Yugoslav People’s Army attacked Slovenia that the standpoint and the situation shifted.
Following the proclamation of independence, there has been an ongoing shift in the
Slovene political sphere, polarization was re-established and parties continued to fall apart and
merge. This process has been going on for already more than a decade.
The 10-year economic balance demonstrates that, on the whole, Slovenia underwent a
successful transition and it continues to make progress. Nowadays GNP, for example,
exceeds 10 000 US$, purchasing or buying power is even stronger, about 14 000 US$.
Towards its end, the GNP of Yugoslavia was less than 3000 US$ for the whole country,
whereas Slovene GNP was about 5000 US$; two thirds of the former Yugoslav market
were replaced with western markets, etc. But a high price had to be paid: social
differences and unemployment increased (the present rate is about 12%), with the
consequence that an increasing number of young people, educated people are being turned
into second-rate citizens. There are many other side effects, all influencing the
augmenting of an unbalanced social structure. One of the basic characteristics of Slovene
society is its tendency towards 'particracy', a growing ideological intolerance, and due to the
small size of the country, the formation of clienteles and clans. The once powerful civil
movements have been sucked into the various parties and no longer play an important
role.
The new political ideology, which developed following the proclamation of independence
and is shared by the majority of the political parties, could be labeled as a "rush towards
Europe". But the course is directed by the European Union and proceeds more in
accordance with the Latin proverb "festina lente" [Eile mit Weile] "more haste, less
speed". Characteristically, it presents the so-called Europe as an internally non-
differentiated notion, which can generally adapt to particular political interests (following
a self-serving principle, for example, educational systems that correspond to a particular
line of argumentation would be used, and the same holds true for the relationship
between Church and State — adherents of confessional religious subject in schools
claim that a European (i.e. Austrian, Italian) model should be followed, whereas the
opponents are in favor of the European (read: French) model, etc.
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