Russia Adv – 1ac

a2 Hedging

The Hedging strategy is Illogical - Allows countries to get the lead in tech development which would kill American primacy

Doleman 10 – Professor of Comparative Military Studies at the US Air Forces School of Advanced Air and Space Studies (US Military Transformation and Weapons in Space, http://www.e-parl.net/pages/space_hearing_images/Backgrounder%20Dolman%20US%20Weapons%20in%20Space.pdf)
The last argument has prompted members of the pro-military space and anti-weaponization parties to unite under the so-called hedging strategy. Hedging has even been linked to the ‘fastfollower’ strategy now popular with high-tech business gurus. In this, the US continues to spend money on research and development, but not testing or deployment of any kind. Thus, the argument goes, should another state attempt to deploy weapons in space, the US could quickly mobilize to compete. Everyone is happy. The pro-military space advocates of the hedging strategy do so because they calculate it is the best means to maintain funding in the near-term, and anyhow, space war is inevitable so why not stay in the mix. The anti-weaponization advocates see it as a means to by time. It is difficult to fund a weapon system that is not showing results, and after years of noticing an absence of space war between superpowers, funding will be cut from all budgets. The strategy is thus the greatest hope for advantage of two sides with diametrically opposed aims, but it is not true compromise, the situation where both sides forego some of their aims so that others can be met. It is instead the forwarding of a competition that appears unwinnable to a later time, when the odds will have changed to favor one side or the other. It is a postponement of competition, not a resolution of it. It is therefore fatally flawed in its employ as either anchor for or bulwark against the possibility of an arms race. As has been argued, should the US attempt to weaponize space today, no other state could counter it. No space arms race would unfold. To wait until another state is capable of deploying space weapons—and one would have to assume such a state would postpone its attempt until it could launch a considerable force into orbit—a space race is all but guaranteed! And not only is the hedging strategy particularly susceptible to the technology X argument above, it argues for a reactive posture from the United States. Hoping that either weapons will or will not come is a poor substitute for strategy. In a previous work, I outlined an argument for seizure of low-earth orbit as the geopolitically determined dominant ground in the near future of warfare. The advantage of occupying the top of the gravity well is such that once ensconced, a state willing to defend its position cannot be outflanked. Attempts to dislodge it would be extremely expensive and would require enormous will on the part of an opponent. The US would have the will in such a situation, but perhaps not the funds or the capability.

a2 Kinetic Weapons

BMD can stop and track kinetic weapons – layered radar capabilities and terrestrial interceptors solve

Frederick 2K8 – MA Thesis at THE SCHOOL OF ADVANCED AIR AND SPACE STUDIES, (Deterence and Space Based Missile Defense, Pg 14) AS

In 2002, the George W. Bush administration directed the DOD to “begin fielding an initial BMDS [Ballistic Missile Defense System] capable of defending the US homeland, deployed troops, friends, and allies against ballistic missiles of all ranges in all phases of flight.”⁴ Of the nine BMD system elements in development at the Missile Defense Agency, none includes a space-based interception capability.⁵ Today, the continued fielding of national missile defense interceptors in Alaska and California provides limited defense from ballistic missile attack against the United States. However, this protective layer may not guard vital interests abroad and this capability shortfall weakens BMD's contribution to deterrence. The nation’s current BMD architecture relies on space components to sense and cue terrestrial interceptors. Space-based sensors can detect the heat of the burning booster during its boost phase, and transmit trajectory information to ground stations. Once the booster extinguishes and infrared sensing satellites lose track of the missile, radars can track it throughout the remaining flight time. These radars cue terrestrial-based BMD elements so they can attempt to intercept the missile. Commanders on the ground, in turn, can launch direct interceptors to destroy the missile. Currently, the United States possesses land- and sea-based kinetic kill intercept capabilities.

Nano Satellites in a debris field would act as a deterrent to ASAT capabilities – countermeasures independently deter them

Frederick 2K8 – Approved MA Thesis at THE SCHOOL OF ADVANCED AIR AND SPACE STUDIES, (Deterence and Space Based Missile Defense, Pg 20) AS

Opponents develop countermeasures because their own capabilities are no longer as effective as originally intended. Costs and/or penalties imposed on the adversary for pursuing countermeasures may be great enough to deter them from making the attempt in the first place. Countermeasures may harden missiles, deploy faster-burning missiles, field anti-satellites (ASATs), deploy more missiles, and shift warheads to cruise missiles. These countermeasures are costly in terms of time, talent, and resources and, in the final analysis, may be futile. One countermeasure would be hardening missiles against non-kinetic SBMD capabilities, such as lasers.³² Kinetic interception capabilities, such as the failed Brilliant Pebbles program, should not be affected by this countermeasure. Further, hardening will be expensive in terms of both cost and reduced payload. Missiles could not carry as much payload due to the added weight of the hardening material and additional fuel. The increasing costs of research and development (R&D) on countermeasures may limit the number of missiles available, increasing the probable effectiveness of SBMD. The development of faster-burning missiles, a second countermeasure, could reduce the missile's period of vulnerability to SBMD.³³ However, this countermeasure would decrease the range of these ballistic missiles, making them less likely to reach the United States. In such a case, theater missile defenses may be in a position to respond to these attacks. ASATs are a third countermeasure available to the adversary and could pose a serious problem. However, the extensive debris fields generated by ASAT interceptions would interfere with satellite operations so much that they would be self-deterring. If a state has an ASAT capability, they would almost certainly have satellites they want keep away from the debris field, as would other states not involved in the conflict. A fourth countermeasure available to the adversary is the fielding of more missiles to saturate the missile defense architecture.³⁴ The saturation point depends upon the numbers of both space- and terrestrial-based interceptors deployed. Space-based interceptors could strike ballistic missiles in boost phase. Because decoys and countermeasures are deployed after boost phase, this boost-phase work would lighten the load for midcourse and terminal phase defenses. SBMD interceptors would increase the effectiveness of the current BMD architecture even if the adversary employs countermeasures, but they might also deter an adversary from employing ballistic missiles altogether. The last countermeasure might involve the opponent shifting from ballistic missiles to cruise missiles. Cruise missiles remain beneath the atmosphere where SBMD may not be effective due to the difficulty of penetrating the Earth’s atmosphere. The adversary would pay a penalty in terms of speed, reach, and destructive potential for using cruise missiles instead of ballistic missiles. These penalties, in combination with existing cruise missile defenses, would make their attack less likely to succeed. While SBMD interceptors may not work well against cruise missile attacks, space sensors could still trigger theater missile defenses to intercept these missiles. Getting an adversary to switch from ballistic to cruise missiles would also be a victory for those seeking to deter the proliferation of ballistic missiles and a testament to the effectiveness of SBMD.