Russia and Eurasia Programme paper: 2012/02
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- Bu səhifədəki naviqasiya:
- 6. UNDERSTANDING INTERNATIONAL RESPONSES
- Misdiagnosing nationalism
REP Programme Paper: Averting Violence in Kyrgyzstan: Understanding and Responding to Nationalism www.chathamhouse.org 25 Needless to say, these projects were not cheap. The construction of the towering bronze statue of Manas, near mainly Uzbek areas of the Kora-Suv region on the approach road to the city from the airport, was voted support of 31 million som (about two-thirds of a million dollars) by Osh city council. Justifying this vast expenditure while many neighbourhoods still lay in ruins, Myrzakmatov ‘explained how the construction of the statue of our father Manas played an important role in the creation of an ideology and was extremely important for the next generation.’ 92
Myrzakmatov underlined this in his speech at the opening of the Barsbek statue. He recounted that Barsbek was a great hero at a time when Kyrgyz statehood flourished, but most of his speech was about the defence of Kyrgyz statehood today. ‘Osh city can be considered the linchpin [tyrkyk] of Kyrgyz statehood,’ he insisted. ‘Last year,’ he continued, it was not ordinary Uzbeks and Kyrgyz, but separatists who threatened ‘the integrity of the state, our national language, our sacred culture and our inviolable boundary.’ 93 Here, we see again the deep-seated insecurity about Kyrgyz national statehood, how the state, culture and even language are imperilled. Therefore, he concluded, ‘The Osh tragedy is evidence of how extremely important it is to raise in the young generation a patriotic spirit and to strengthen in the general public a love for the fatherland.’ Invoking the defence of ‘the divine spirits of our father Aykol Manas and Kagan Barsbek,’ he concluded by calling the population of Osh to ‘unity’ and ‘concordance’ and by declaring his wish that Kyrgyz statehood would prove ‘everlasting.’ A recurring theme of Myrzakmatov’s is that outside forces, backing the Uzbek separatists, also represent a grave threat to Kyrgyz statehood. In a major article published in June 2011 in the Osh Shamy newspaper, he offered a trenchant critique of aspects of the findings and recommendations of the Kyrgyzstan Inquiry Committee (KIC). 94 Writing in the same newspaper, journalist Abdiraim Mamytov railed at foreign newspapers like the Financial Times and New York Times that, he said, had accused the Kyrgyz of ‘crimes against humanity’ and ‘genocide.’ He argued that the KIC’s report was driven by the same geopolitical interests that were behind NATO’s attacks on Serbia. 95
Myrzakmatov’s book carries colour plates of his supporters staging demonstrations in Osh against the perceived threat of foreign intervention, carrying banners with slogans like ‘We will not allow Kyrgyzstan to be broken apart’ and, in English, ‘No OSCE police’ and ‘Say “NO” to Kyrgyz Kosovo!’. It might appear that there is a contradiction between organizing a ‘year of strengthening the relations, concordance and friendship between ethnic groups in the city of Osh’, and imposing unambiguously Kyrgyz statues upon the landscape of Osh. I put this directly to Myrzakmatov in an interview in 2011. 96 He replied, ‘By building statues of Barsbek, of Manas, we are strengthening the Kyrgyz state and thereby are guarding the peace between the peoples.’ In this view, the reason for ethnic tensions is the weakness of the Kyrgyz state project and the lack of a strong national ideology: inter-ethnic peace in Osh is thus to be guaranteed through unity (birimdik) by creating loyalty to a strong state with a clear Kyrgyz character and ideology. That is to be achieved through the use of Kyrgyz language and the symbolic reinforcement of the Kyrgyzness of Osh as an integral part of the Kyrgyz state. Although interpreted as dangerous nationalism by foreign analysts, this has a rationale in its own terms and needs to be seen as the main ‘policy response’ of the mayor of Osh to the violence of 2010. As the next section shows, it is radically different from that of the international community.
92
Osh municipal council], Osh Shamy, 13 October 2011. 93
‘Osh shaarynyn meri M. Myrzakmatovdun Barsbek kagandyn aykelin achuu azeminde sozy’ [The words of Osh mayor M. Myrzakmatov at the opening of the statue of Barsbek khaghan], Osh Shamy, 20 October 2011.
94
‘Osh shaarynyn meri M. Myrzakmatov: ”El aralyk beytarap komissira uluttar aralyk mamilesi kurchtuuga bagyttalgan butum chygardy”’ [The independent international commission has issued its conclusions about the deterioration of inter- ethnic relations], Osh Shamy, 7 May 2011.
95 Mamytov, Abdiraim, ‘Koogalandan kiyinki kooptuu oyundar’ [Dangerous games after the riot], Osh Shamy, 28 May 2011.
96
Interview, 28 November 2011, Osh.
REP Programme Paper: Averting Violence in Kyrgyzstan: Understanding and Responding to Nationalism www.chathamhouse.org 26
In the aftermath of the June 2010 violence, there have been numerous international policy responses. These entail the actions and statements of neighbouring and more distant states, major intergovernmental and international agencies, and smaller international non-governmental agencies of all stripes. Their activities have included the provision of humanitarian and longer-term development aid, the production of investigative reports, a large-scale inquiry, bilateral cooperation with the Kyrgyz government and Osh municipal authorities, and cooperation with local NGOs on a plethora of programmes including promoting reconciliation and the protection of human rights. This section is not an attempt to exhaustively summarize and evaluate them. Rather, it explores how well some of these interventions have understood and grappled with the challenges related to Kyrgyz nationalism. It is based on an analysis of published reports, and also interviews with representatives of international actors in Kyrgyzstan, local agencies who worked with them and individuals who participated in their programmes. 97
By and large, international actors have failed to understand the trajectory of Kyrgyz nationalism and its role in conditioning responses to the Osh violence. 98 This leads to two problematic assumptions shaping policy, each of which will be discussed below. The first is that nationalism is a pathology that can be isolated to a few extreme individuals in politics and the media, and be eradicated by a central government that is willing and able to do so. The second is that it is therefore feasible to promote and foster the full civic reintegration of Uzbeks as citizens of an inclusive state. These assumptions do not take proper account of Kyrgyz nationalism, and, as a result, many policies proposed or pursued are unrealistic. Some are even dangerously counter-productive, playing into the hands of nationalists and fuelling a backlash against the Uzbek minority community whose interests they seek to protect. Misdiagnosing nationalism The first erroneous assumption proceeding from the international community’s misunderstanding of Kyrgyz nationalism is the misdiagnosis of it as an isolated streak of extremism in Osh that could be contained by concerted action from Bishkek. 99 The International Crisis Group’s 2012 report, ‘Kyrgyzstan: Widening Ethnic Divisions in the South', is typical of this. It largely blames the plight of Uzbeks in Osh on the ‘anti-Uzbek policies’ of the city’s mayor, Melis Myrzakmatov, ‘an ardent Kyrgyz nationalist’ by whom the city is ‘dominated.’ 100
The report is very superficial. For example, at one point it focuses on his ‘program of monumental architecture’ aimed at ‘reconfiguring the city’s identity to emphasise Kyrgyz roots.’ This is a correct observation of a disturbing process. However, it then says that he has erected monuments to ‘Manas, Kurmanjan Datka, and other Kyrgyz leaders,’ although Myrzakmatov has not erected a statue of Kurmanjan Datka – that statue in Osh dates to the Akaev period. Likewise, it goes on to say that ‘another commemorates Kyrgyz nomadic traditions’, an observation followed by some brief notes on the ethnic history of the Ferghana Valley, and an implication that a better statue to erect would be one of Babur. 101 It does not apparently bother to discover the subject of this other statue – presumably Alymbek, who is recognized by both Uzbek and Kyrgyz historians as an important leader at a time when the Ferghana Valley lacked ethno-territorial division.
97
them.
98 It is recognized that a major challenge facing international organizations is that of ensuring the impartiality of local staff who play important roles in receiving, transmitting and reporting understandings to foreign managers, directors and policy- makers.
99
This is also commonly true of academic analysis. Thus, for example, Marlène Laruelle correctly recognizes that nationalism is ‘an increasingly dominant psychological frame for interpreting Kyrgyzstan’s problems’, but goes on to isolate this ‘wave of nationalism’ to southern leaders who represent ‘ethno-nationalist radicalism.’ See Laruelle, ‘The paradigm of nationalism in Kyrgyzstan’.
100
International Crisis Group, ‘Kyrgyzstan’, p. 1.
101
Ibid., p. 8.
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