REP Programme Paper: Averting Violence in Kyrgyzstan: Understanding and
Responding to Nationalism
www.chathamhouse.org
7
Although not by any means the sole explanatory variable, nationalism is an important factor in
understanding why violence did or did not occur in the past, and whether it will again. Kyrgyz
nationalism should not be seen as either an inherently negative or positive force; it is an
inescapable background to understanding Kyrgyzstan, and is a force that politicians can use for
good or ill. This paper finds current trends in Kyrgyz nationalism alarming, and argues that they
increase the potential for further outbreaks of violence that are potentially more destructive than
that in 2010.
Aftermath of June 2010 violence
In the aftermath of the June 2010 violence, many Kyrgyz reacted angrily to both the Uzbek
populations of southern Kyrgyzstan, and outside reporting on the events. The veteran queen of
Uzbek pop, Uzbekistani singer Yulduz Usmonova, released a provocative song, ‘To the Kyrgyz’,
asking them, ‘Have you no conscience? Ah, you’ve sold yourselves cheaply!’
11
A series of Kyrgyz
artists quickly wrote
and released responses, including Talant Anarbaev’s ‘Yulduz’ and Altynbek
Boroshov’s acerbic ‘To the Uzbeks of Osh.’ Siymik Beshikaev’s ‘Tor Talashpa’, more commonly
known as ‘A reply to Yulduz’, angrily rejected her accusations, in turn accusing the Osh Uzbeks
that ‘Coming from outside, growing wealthy, becoming greedy, they shed the first blood.’
12
Kyrgyz reactions reflected a double sense of grievance – at the behaviour of Uzbeks in Kyrgyzstan,
and at the way the outside world represented Kyrgyz responses to this behaviour. Some Kyrgyz
media, politicians and activists were angered by foreign news portrayals of Kyrgyz as savage
perpetrators of atrocities against Uzbeks, leading eventually to the blocking of internet access to
the pro-Uzbek media web-site Ferghana.ru.
13
In December 2010 the newspaper Jangy Agym
carried an article about the arrest of terrorist suspects and a bomb explosion in Bishkek, allegedly
carried out by a ‘national separatist group’ on the orders of the exiled ‘leaders of the Uzbek
separatist movement.’ The headline spoke volumes about how the newspaper understood the
plight of the country: ‘There are lots of “interested parties”, but Kyrgyzstan is alone.’
14
A Kyrgyz
government agreement with the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) in
July 2010 to send an international ‘police advisory group’ to help better train the police with crowd
control techniques was met with demonstrations by Kyrgyz nationalists in the south of the country.
They interpreted it as a Western attempt to ally with a separatist minority in order to break up the
state, just as the West had supposedly done in Serbia and Kosovo.
15
The perceived external threat was linked to internal ones. An article in the newspaper
Alibi in late
June 2010 moved seamlessly from invective against Uzbekistan for allegedly attempting to seize
Kyrgyz border territory, to invective against the Uzbek minority within Kyrgyzstan for neither
learning Kyrgyz nor loyally identifying with the state.
16
Osh Uzbeks, the article said, have ‘bakeries,
canteens, cafes, restaurants, kindergartens, schools, universities, a theatre, television stations,
newspapers [...] countless mosques and madrassas’ plus adequate elected representation in the
village, regional and national councils/parliaments. ‘What else do they need?’ asked the author. In
contrast, the article claimed, ‘in Uzbekistan there isn’t a single Kyrgyz-language kindergarten,
school or university, nor is there even one Kyrgyz person in the Uzbek parliament or government.’
Thus whereas Uzbekistan is attempting to ‘completely eliminate’ the idea of a Kyrgyz ethnic group
there, concluded the article, the Uzbeks in Kyrgyzstan have a strong desire for autonomy and are
11
Yulduz Osmonova, ‘Hechmi yo’qki ichingda vijdon?/ Ah, Qirg`izim sotilding arzon’, Qirg’izlarga, 2010.
12
‘Syrttan kochyp keliship/baylik menen mal jiydy/Achs kozdygy ashynyp/Algach bashtap kan kiydy.’ The song’s title literally
means ‘don’t contend for the tor’, the seat of honour given to the most important person present at a meal. It thereby implies
that the Uzbeks have come as guests to Kyrgyzstan, yet are abusing hospitality by trying to be top-dog.
13
For example Zulpukar Sapanov ‘Kyrgyzdar – tozokto kiygylo’ [Burn in hell, Kyrgyz], Alibi, Vol. 39, No 104, 6 July 2010, p.
2. This article claimed that the Uzbek media was portraying the Kyrgyz in a bad light, making lots of unsubstantiated claims
about atrocities they committed, etc. In particular the website Ferghana.ru came in for sharp criticism. The Kyrgyz
government later blocked access to this site, claiming it was inciting inter-ethnic hatred.
14
’”Kyzykkandat” kop, Kyrgyzdar jalgyz’,
Jangy Agym, No 22, 3 December 2010, pp. 1-2.
15
Timur Toktonaliev, ‘Kyrgyzstan divided over foreign police presence’, Institute for War and Peace Reporting, Reporting
Central Asia, No 627, 31 August 2010. See discussion in section 5.
16
Mashakbay Rakhmankulov, ‘Otkondu tapancha menen atsan... Ozubek ketip oz kaldyk’ [If you could shoot the past with a
gun... Uzbeks left, we stayed by ourselves], Alibi, Vol 35, No 100, 22 June 2010, p. 2.