The Possibilities of Ethnomethodology in Modern Art Studies
189
Bachofen (1815-1857),
5
L. H. Morgan (1818-1881),
6
A. Bastian (1826-
1905),
7
J. Lubbock (1834-1913)
8
is the concept of a person and culture as a
stable formation which holds ideas significant to that ethnic society
regarding various aspects of social life.
The researcher I. V. Davydova offers the opinion that ideas of an
ethnomethodological character occur in the writings of philosophers who
pursue a phenomenological direction of inquiry.
9
The systematic description
of the phenomenological method, including such components essential to
ethnomethodology as contemplation, reflection, phenomenological
reduction and intentional analysis, belongs to the founder of
phenomenology, E. Husserl.
10
The general denominator of phenomenological and
ethnomethodological concepts is their ontological and gnoseological
character, that is, they give crucial importance to the problem of the
interrelation between existence and essence. Phenomenology pays attention
to a person’s experience, specifically first-hand experiences such as those
the ethnomethodologist pursues - and on the search for methods by which
to explain them. According to the theory of intentionality, which links the
consciousness with the object of cognition, the process of thinking occurs
only in the presence of the object of thought. Intentionality was recognised
in ancient philosophy in the works of Parmenides (5
th
century BC), who
characterised intentionality as relational, and showed that in the case of
non-existent objects an intentional attitude is impossible. The aim of the
intentional analysis of consciousness is to identify and study those aspects
of consciousness that are involved in the comprehension of reality. The
object of cognition is constructed in the process of cognition and
phenomena of the world exist not objectively but from the perspective of
cognition. In Cartesian Meditations (1931) E. Husserl writes: “The term
‘intentionality’ means nothing more than the general property of
consciousness to be consciousness of something.”
11
Intentionality in the
phenomenologist’s interpretation is a value, a structure which is constructed
in its entirety at the moment of individual and collective perception. This
perception is characterised in phenomenology as something intersubjective,
superpersonal and mental. Intersubjective in its essence, the world of
mentalities, as described by E. Husserl, defines one of the actual problems
5
Bachofen 1975.
6
Morgan 1983.
7
Bastian 1884.
8
Lubbock 1870.
9
Davydova 2002.
10
Ibid.
11
Husserl 2001, p. 13.
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L. I. Nekhvyadovich
190
of ethnomethodology - the relation between mental acts and the actions of
the people using language to express them. So, for example, in Husserl’s
Ideas, the act of cognition is constructed on the basis of the relationship
between “noemata” and “noeses.” The notion of noema plays a special role
in phenomenology. The noema is the object of intentionality; while the
noesis is a technique by which a subject directs itself to the intentional
object; accordingly, noeses are means of constructing facts of reality relating
to objects and their relationships.
The theoretical assumptions of ethnomethodology are found in E.
Husserl’s development of the category “life world” defined as a single
universum possessing its own internal laws and characteristics. The life
world, according to the philosopher’s opinion, is the set of fundamental
assumptions upon which public institutions and cultural traditions are
based. As such, this theoretical statement is of importance for the formation
of ethnomethodology formulated by him in the work Philosophy as a Strict
Science:
“... people who have changed their attitudes continue to keep their natural
interests … as the individual members of an universal life community (their
nation); they cannot simply lose them, i.e. cease to be themselves, those who
they are from the birth.”
12
We find the development of E. Husserl’s ideas in the
phenomenological sociology of A. Schyuts. In his work Semantic Structure of
Everyday World: Essays on Phenomenological Sociology, in defining the concept of
life world the philosopher puts forward a statement which will become one
of the bases of isolation of ethnomethodological problematics. The
statement can be reduced to the following: the life world is formed around I
as a centre in compliance with its systems of relevancies, thus everyday
knowledge of the social world is inseparable from this contingency. The
world of everyday life in A. Shyuts’s philosophy interfaces with the culture
world,
“because from the very beginning the everyday life appears to us as the
semantic universum, the combination of meanings which we must interpret
to find support in this world, to reach an agreement with it. However, this
combination of meanings - and there is the difference of a kingdom of
culture from a kingdom of nature in it - arose and continues to form in
human acts: our own and other people’s, contemporaries and
predecessors.”
13
12
Husserl 1994, p. 112.
13
Schyuts 1988, p. 130.
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