The eu’s Legitimacy in the Eye of the Beholders

1.1 – Is the Problem really Democratic?

Many have linked the EU’s democratic deficit to the need for a finalité politique for the European project. The idea is that if the goal of the project is clear then the project as a whole becomes more transparent, and thus more legitimate. One of the most famous contributions to this discussion was in 2001 at Humboldt University in Berlin, when former minister of foreign affairs of Germany Joschka Fischer gave the speech: From Confederacy to Federation.

In this speech, Fischer sought a solution to the legitimacy problem of the EU and pointed toward the possibility of a European Federation. Or as he describes it: “[This speech forms] a contribution to a discussion long begun in the public arena about the ‘finality’ of European integration” (Fischer 2000: 1). The reception of his finalité politique was mixed, and criticism came from both Euro-sceptics and Euro-enthusiasts (Börzel and Risse 2000: 3). For the former, Fischer’s idea went too far from their ideal of ‘L’Europe des nations’ and violated the nation-states’ sovereignty, whilst for the latter it gave too little powers to the European level of governance and put too much emphasis on the nation-states. Fischer’s finalité politique of the European project was aimed at making Europe ready for a globalised age, in which (economic) cooperation is essential, whilst also doing justice to the historical realities of the European nation-states.⁸ He tried to propose a middle way between ‘L’Europe des nations’ and a full-fledged European Federal State, because these two ‘straightforward’ finalité politiques are not viable options.

Let us take a closer look at these other two finalités to understand the reasons for their unlikeliness, if not impossibility, in the foreseeable future, but also to uncover why the EU’s legitimacy deficit might not just be democratic in nature. First, returning to ‘L’Europe des nations’ is a highly unlikely road to travel down. Many sovereign powers of the nation-states are already effectively bundled at the European level of governance – the pooling of sovereignty. A return to the former situation seems unconceivable, but also unwanted, because of the historic achievement of the EU to bring peace and prosperity to a traditionally war-torn continent. Further, the EU’s problem-solving capabilities and competitiveness are needed in a global age. So much for the first finalité.

But also a European Federal State seems very unlikely to emerge anytime soon. Let us start with the nation-state’s perspective. The problem of full-fledged federalisation lies with the national political elites. Even though the EU is seen as important, they do not want to give away all their power.⁹ Political power is never easily surrendered. Still, the national political elites cannot turn away from the EU for, as already pointed out, they depend upon on it. In this regard the relationship between the EU and the Member States is much like a pro-wrestling match. Pro-wrestlers trade punches and some blows actually connect, but in the end they need each other. For what is the superstar without the jobber? The relationship is symbiotic. The problem is clearly not democratic in nature.

There is though another non-democratic obstacle. The European political elites have tried to tackle the EU’s democratic deficit. The result is that the European institutions are broadly speaking democratic in nature: an elected parliament, commissioners appointed by democratically legitimised heads of state and both democratic bodies play an important role within decision-making procedures.¹⁰ Democratic institutions are a necessary condition for the legitimacy of a democratic political order, but they are apparently not sufficient. The ‘European success’ of Wilders seems to indicate: people feel more closely connected to their own nation-states. They perceive national governments as legitimate and Brussels as a threat to their sovereignty. As Fisher observes people are loyal to their country and not to the ‘faceless, soulless Eurocracy in Brussels’ (2000: 1). The democratic improvements are perceived as the start of European federalisation, which is seen as an assault on the national identity and sovereignty. The peoples of Europe might then paradoxically themselves be a non-democratic obstacle or rather European democratisation is the source of the democratic deficit.

Yet, in this internationally connected world, problems have become increasingly more complex and ‘borderless’ and so have their solutions. People expect national governments to solve these problems. Democratic institutions were created and expended on the European level of governance in order to tackle these problems, but they are not perceived as legitimate by those, who indirectly demanded them.

Thus we find that both from the Member States’ as the peoples’ perspective, the EU is an illegitimate necessity: We cannot live with or without it. The legitimacy problem is clearly more than just democratic: there are problems related to (state) sovereignty and people’s loyalty. If the legitimacy deficit is not just democratic what then are the reasons for it?

1.2 – Aiming to Understand in order to Overcome

This research aims to uncover reasons for the EU’s legitimacy deficit and so hope to help overcome it. The first important assumption is, as Carl J. Friedrich (1974) argues, that legitimacy is in the eye of the beholder: No legitimacy without perception thereof. Normative theories applied as objective standards to reality are meaningless in themselves. Legitimacy lies in people’s perception of reality in combination with the theoretical conceptualisation of legitimacy. One might assume that the problem is that discussions on the EU’s legitimacy, at least those which result in the analysis of a democratic deficit, focus exclusively on objective democratic standards rather than people’s perceptions.

Another reason for this exclusive focus on democratic standards might be a flawed understanding of the nation-state’s legitimacy combined with the also flawed assumption that nation-states do not have a democratic deficit. Istvan Hont (2005) shows that the legitimacy of the nation-state is built on the basis of two versions of republicanism: universalist and nationalist. These republicanisms have mutated, taken each other’s place from time-to-time, are often not compatible, and even at odds with one another. The nation-states would also fail to meet the universalist democratic standards of legitimacy, but because their legitimacy is also based on the principles of nationalist republicanism they are seen as legitimate. In nationalist republicanism, which nowadays is often more salient, we might find an explanation for both Member States’ resistance and people’s lack of connection with the EU.

Another important element for our understanding of the EU’s legitimacy deficit is placing it within the context of Europe as an emerging novel political order of multi-level governance (Bekkers et al. 2007: 14; Thomassen and Schmitt 2004: 392). Our ideas of legitimacy might still assume a hierarchical government structure of the nation-state, but this system of governance has become outdated (e.g. Bekkers et al. 2007; Osborne and Gaebler 1993). The European political elites focus on democratic legitimacy, but our ideas of democratic legitimacy are not developed for the current reality. This mismatch between theory and reality might further explain the EU’s legitimacy deficit.

As said, legitimacy depends on the eye of the ‘beholders’ and therefore public discourse is important. In large modern societies, public discourse is mediated by the mass media. Their role though is not undisputed and may partially contribute to the EU’s legitimacy deficit (Bursens and Baetens 2004; Liebert and Trentz 2008). Therefore the mass media is also considered as a possible contributing source to the legitimacy deficit.

By analysing the EU’s legitimacy deficit within the wider historical discourse on legitimacy, this research aims to do more justice to the complexity of salient ideas contained in the ‘democratic consensus’ and their influence on the perception of the EU. Further it aims to understand the legitimacy deficit by investigating how normative principles – universalist and nationalist republicanism, and democratic theory – influence perceptions of the EU’s legitimacy and how they relate to empirical developments – globalisation, multi-level governance, state interests and people’s loyalty. This is important for legitimacy can only be achieved if theory and reality are in sync in perception.¹¹