Freedom in a Complex Society [ 267 ]
But power and economic value are a paradigm of social reality.
They do not spring from human volition; noncooperation is impossi-
ble in regard to them. The function of power is to ensure that measure
of conformity which is needed for the survival of the group; its ulti-
mate source is opinion—and who could help holding opinions of
some sort or other? Economic value ensures the usefulness of the
goods produced; it must exist prior to the decision to produce them;
it is a seal set on the division of labor. Its source is human wants and
scarcity—and how could we be expected not to desire one thing more
than another? Any opinion or desire will make us participants in the
creation of power and in the constituting of economic value. No free-
dom to do otherwise is conceivable.
We have reached the final stage of our argument.
The discarding of the market Utopia brings us face to face with the
reality of society. It is the dividing line between liberalism on the one
hand, fascism and socialism on the other. The difference between
these two is not primarily economic. It is moral and religious. Even
where they profess identical economics, they are not only different but
are, indeed, embodiments of opposite principles. And the ultimate on
which they separate is again freedom. By fascists and socialists alike
the reality of society is accepted with the finality with which the
knowledge of death has molded human consciousness. Power and
compulsion are a part of that reality; an ideal that would ban them
from society must be invalid. The issue on which they divide is
whether in the light of this knowledge the idea of freedom can be up-
held or not; is freedom an empty word, a temptation, designed to ruin
man and his works, or can man reassert his freedom in the face of that
knowledge and strive for its fulfillment in society without lapsing into
moral illusionism?
This anxious question sums up the condition of man. The spirit
and content of this study should indicate an answer.
We invoked what we believed to be the three constitutive facts in the
consciousness of Western man: knowledge of death, knowledge of
freedom, knowledge of society. The first, according to Jewish legend,
was revealed in the Old Testament story. The second was revealed
through the discovery of the uniqueness of the person in the teachings
of Jesus as recorded in the New Testament. The third revelation came
[ 268 ] The Great Transformation
to us through living in an industrial society. No one great name at-
taches to it; perhaps Robert Owen came nearest to becoming its vehi-
cle. It is the constitutive element in modern man's consciousness.
The fascist answer to the recognition of the reality of society is the
rejection of the postulate of freedom. The Christian discovery of the
uniqueness of the individual and of the oneness of mankind is negated
by fascism. Here lies the root of its degenerative bent.
Robert Owen was the first to recognize that the Gospels ignored
the reality of society. He called this the "individualization" of man on
the part of Christianity and appeared to believe that only in a coopera-
tive commonwealth could "all that is truly valuable in Christianity"
cease to be separated from man. Owen recognized that the freedom we
gained through the teachings of Jesus was inapplicable to a complex
society. His socialism was the upholding of man's claim to freedom in
such a society. The post-Christian era of Western civilization had be-
gun, in which the Gospels did not any more suffice, and yet remained
the basis of our civilization.
The discovery of society is thus either the end or the rebirth of free-
dom. While the fascist resigns himself to relinquishing freedom and
glorifies power which is the reality of society, the socialist resigns him-
self to that reality and upholds the claim to freedom, in spite of it. Man
becomes mature and able to exist as a human being in a complex soci-
ety. To quote once more Robert Owen's inspired words: "Should any
causes of evil be irremovable by the new powers which men are about
to acquire, they will know that they are necessary and unavoidable
evils; and childish, unavailing complaints will cease to be made."
Resignation was ever the fount of man's strength and new hope.
Man accepted the reality of death and built the meaning of his bodily
life upon it. He resigned himself to the truth that he had a soul to lose
and that there was worse than death, and founded his freedom upon
it. He resigns himself, in our time, to the reality of society which
means the end of that freedom. But, again, life springs from ultimate
resignation. Uncomplaining acceptance of the reality of society gives
man indomitable courage and strength to remove all removable injus-
tice and unfreedom. As long as he is true to his task of creating more
abundant freedom for all, he need not fear that either power or plan-
ning will turn against him and destroy the freedom he is building by
their instrumentality. This is the meaning of freedom in a complex so-
ciety; it gives us all the certainty that we need.
Notes on Sources
T O C H A P T E R O N E
i. Balance of Power as Policy, Historical Law, Principle, and System
1. Balance-of-power policy. The balance-of-power policy is an English national
institution. It is purely pragmatic and factual, and should not be confused either
with the balance-of-power principle or with the balance-of-power system. That
policy was the outcome of an island position off a continental littoral occupied by
organized political communities. "Her rising school of diplomacy, from Wolsey
to Cecil, pursued the Balance of Power as England's only chance of security in face
of the great Continental states being formed," says Trevelyan. This policy was
definitely established under the Tudors, was practiced by Sir William Temple, as
well as by Canning, Palmerston, or Sir Edward Grey. It antedated the emergence
of a balance-of-power system on the Continent by almost two centuries, and was
entirely independent in its development from the Continental sources of the doc-
trine of the balance of power as a principle put forward by Fenelon or Vattel. How-
ever, England's national policy was greatly assisted by the growth of such a system,
as it eventually made it easier for her to organize alliances against any power lead-
ing on the Continent. Consequently, British statesmen tended to foster the idea
that England's balance-of-power policy was actually an expression of the balance-
of-power principle, and that England, by following such a p olicy, was only playing
her part in a system based upon that principle. Still, the difference between her
own policy of self-defence and any principle which would help its advancement
was not purposely obscured by her statesmen. Sir Edward Grey wrote in his
Twenty-Five Years as follows: "Great Britain has not, in theory, been adverse to the
predominance of a strong group in Europe, when it seemed to make for stability
and peace. To support such a combination has generally been the first choice. It is
only when the dominant power becomes aggressive and she feels her own interests
to be threatened that she, by an instinct of self-defence if not by deliberate policy,
gravitates to anything that can be fairly described as a Balance of Power."
It was thus in her own legitimate interest that England supported the growth
of a balance-of-power system on the Continent, and upheld its principles. To do
so was part of her policy. The confusion induced by such a dovetailing of two es-
sentially different references of the balance of power is shown by these quotations:
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