THOMAS MORE et al.
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them to be, so no one's beliefs are just such as he wills them to be; (9) that the
inseparability of subject and accident may be maintained consistently with the
doctrine of transubstantiation; (10) that the words "hoc est corpus" pronounced during
the consecration of the bread are to be taken "materialiter" (i.e., as a mere recital) and
not "significative" (i.e., as denoting an actual fact); (11) that the miracles of Christ are
a most certain proof of his divinity, by reason not of the works themselves, but of his
manner of doing them; (12) that it is more improper to say of God that he is
intelligent, or intellect, than of an angel that it is a rational soul; (13) that the soul
knows nothing in act and distinctly but itself.
It is undeniable that some of these propositions smack somewhat rankly of
heresy, and Pico's ingenuity is taxed to the uttermost to give them even a semblance
of congruity with the doctrines of the Church. The following, however, is the gist of
his defence. Christ, he argues, did actually descend into hell, but only in spirit, not in
bodily presence; eternal punishment is inflicted on the finally impenitent sinner not
for his sins done in the flesh, which are finite, but for his impenitence, which is
necessarily infinite; the cross is to be adored, but only as a symbol, not in and for
itself, for which he cites Scotus, admitting that St. Thomas is against him. The thesis
that God cannot take upon himself a nature of any kind whatsoever, but only a
rational nature, must be understood without prejudice to the omnipotence of God,
which is not in question; God cannot assume the nature of any irrational creature,
because by the very act of so doing he necessarily raises it to himself, endows it with
a rational nature. The thesis that no science gives us better assurance of the divinity of
Christ than magical and cabalistic science referred to such sciences only as do not rest
on revelation, and among them to the science of natural magic, which treats of the
virtues and activities of natural agents and their relations inter se, and that branch only
of cabalistic science which is concerned with the virtues of celestial bodies; which of
all natural sciences furnish the most convincing proof of the divinity of Christ,
because they show that his miracles could not have been performed by natural
agencies. The sixth thesis must not be understood as if Pico maintained that the bread
was not converted into the body of Christ, but only that it is possible that the bread
and the body may be mysteriously linked together without the one being converted
into the other, which would be quite consistent with the words of St. Paul, I Cor. x.
16: "The bread which we break is it not the communion of the body of Christ?" if
interpreted figuratively. With regard to the salvation of Origen, Pico plunges with
evident zest into the old controversy as to the authenticity of the heretical passages in
that writer's works, and urges that his damnation can at most be no more than a pious
opinion. In justification of the position that belief is not a mere matter of will he cites
the authority of Aristotle and St. Augustine, adding a brief summary of the evidences
of the Christian faith, to wit, prophecy, the harmony of the Scriptures, the authority of
their authors, the reasonableness of their contents, the unreasonableness of their
contents, the unreasonableness of particular heresies, the stability of the Church, the
miracles. As to transubstantiation, Pico professes himself to hold the doctrine of the
Church, merely adding thereto the pious opinion that the Thomist distinction between
real existence and essence is consistent with the theory that the bread itself remains in
spite of the transmutation of its substance, and thus with the doctrine of the
inseparability of subject and accident; as for the words "hoc est corpus," it appears
from their context and their place in the office that they are not to be taken literally,
for the priest, when in consecrating the bread he says, "Take, eat," does not suit the
action to the word by offering the bread to the communicants, but takes it himself, and
so when in consecrating the wine he says, "qui pro vobis et pro multis effundetur," it
PICO DELLA MIRANDOLA
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is not to be supposed, as if the words were to be taken literally it must be supposed,
that he means that the blood of Christ actually will be shed, or that he does not mean
to claim the benefit of it for himself as well as the congregation, and the "many." That
the value of Christ's miracles as evidences of his divinity lies rather in the way in
which they were wrought than in the works themselves, is supported by Christ's own
words in St. John xiv. 12: "Verily, verily, I say unto you, He that believeth on me, the
works that I do shall he do also; and greater works than these shall he do; because I go
to my Father;" which are quite inconsistent with the idea that the works are
themselves evidence of his divinity. In support of the proposition that intellect or
intelligence cannot properly be ascribed to God, Pico invokes the authority of
Dionysius the Areopagite, who holds the same doctrine, but does not on that account
deny to God an altogether superior faculty of cognition, even farther removed from
angelic intelligence than that is from human reason. The last proposition, viz., that the
soul knows nothing in act and distinctly but itself, being extremely subtle and
profound, Pico forbears to enlarge upon it, pointing out, however, that it has the
authority of St. Augustine in its favour. The reference is to the De Trinitate, x. 14.[See
Note *]. The doctrine itself is of peculiar interest, for in it lay the germ of the
Cartesian philosophy.
*Note: Utrum emin æris sit vis vivendi, reminiscendi, volendi, cogitandi, sciendi, judicandi; an ignis,
an cerebri, an sanguinis, an atomorum, an præter usitata quatuor elementa quinti nescio cujus corporis,
an ipsius carnis nostrae compago vel temperamentum hæc efficere valeat, dubitaverunt homines: et
alius hoc, alius aliud affirmare conatus est. Vivere se tamen et meminisse, et intelligere, et velle, et
cogitare, et scire, et judicare quis dubitet? Quandoquidem etiam si dubitat, vivit: si dubitat unde dubitet,
meminit; si dubitat, dubitare se intelligit; si dubitat, certus esse vult; si dubitat, cogitat; si dubitat, scit se
nescire; si dubitat, judicat non se temere consentire oportere. Quisquis igitur aliunde dubitat, de his
omnibus dubitare non debet: quae si non essent de ulla re dubitare non posset.
Pico concludes the "Apologia" with an eloquent appeal to his critics to judge
him fairly, which was so little heeded that some of them saw fit to impugn its good
faith, and raised such a clamour about it that Pico, who in the meantime had gone to
France, was peremptorily recalled to Rome by the Pope. He complied, but through the
influence of Lorenzo was permitted to reside in the Benedictine monastery at Fiesole,
while the new charge was under investigation. Meanwhile Garsias, Bishop of Ussel,
published (1489) an elaborate examination of the "Apologia," nor did Pico hear the
last of the affair until shortly before his death, when Alexander VI., by a Bull dated
18th June, 1493, acquitted him of heresy and assured him of immunity from further
annoyance.
An oration on man and his place in nature -- with which Pico had designed to
introduce his theses to the learned audience which he had hoped to gather about him
to listen to the discussion -- was not published until after his death. The theme is the
familiar one of the dignity of man as the only terrestrial creature endowed with free
will, and thus capable of developing into an angel and even becoming one with God,
or declining into a brute or even a vegetable. On this Pico descants at some length and
with much eloquence, and a great display of erudition -- Schoolman and Neo-
Platonist, Cabalist and Pythagorean, Moses and Plato, Job, Seneca, Cicero, and the
Peripatetics jostling one another in his pages in the most bizarre fashion. With Pico, as
with Dante, theology is the queen of the sciences, and the true end of man is so to
purify the soul by the practice of virtue and the study of philosophy -- moral and
natural -- as that it may be capable of the knowledge and the love of God. His own
theological speculations are contained in three works, viz.: (1) a commentary on the