Towards a Sociology of Critique

1. The Critic’s Paradox

“Our age is properly the age of critique,

And to critique everything must submit.”

Kant, A Critique of Pure Reason 1781
‘All Cretans are liars’ said Epimenides the Cretan. This old but still delightful philosophical conundrum should not be resolved too hastily. Of course the difficulty may be resolved by very mundane qualification to the statement, for instance, that all Cretans are liars means that they are sometimes liars, but not always, or that Epimenides didn’t mean to include himself in this sweeping slur upon Cretans. Such a clarification takes all the philosophical import and playfulness out of the Liar’s paradox. It is much preferable to assume that all Cretans lie all the time and that Epimenides is a lying Cretan, but that since he is a liar... Imagine Crete in those days, a society composed of liars, what would that look like?

However, the paradox jumps out of philosophy and into sociology when we come to realise how many of our contemporary theorists are roughly equivalent to Epimenides. By and large the over-riding insistence is that people do not tell the truth; they believe things that are untrue and declare them openly, and live these lies through their ‘identities’. The contemporary equivalent of Epimenides is the grand statement: ‘Everything is socially constructed’, with a suspicious undertone; everything is false. What was obviously a paradox in ancient times is not always recognised as such now, it seems possible to assert that ‘everything is a social construct’ while somehow bracketing off that statement as the only true statement. Another contemporary tendency is to exclude the theory and the theorist from the accusation; rather than refute this illogical operation, it is much more fruitful to consider how it is that the theorist came to think of themselves as separate from their own society. What is the operation by which a modern Epimenides becomes different? Is it possible that it is something so simple as the very act of accusing society of being merely a social construction has the effect of transforming the accuser? If this is how a critic is constituted, then what is the nature of a society made up of critics?

What is critique?
At the very minimum, to critique is to expose errors, omissions or falsehoods, deliberate or inadvertent in truth-claims about society. Occasionally, in common usage the term ‘to criticise’ merely means to make a negative assessment of something, merely finding fault or complaining, but if critique is to be more than mere carping it must expose errors in claims to truth. Within literary criticism, the term ‘critique’ generally means an appraisal, containing both positive and negative. If science is occasionally dubbed ‘the critique of nature’ something else is meant by this, after all nature has no errors, as it makes no claims to truth, it simply is reality. There is no helping the fact that the term has other connotations, what is important here is the social phenomenon under discussion, which is very widely prevalent in our times, even a foundation stone of modernity, and yet rarely analysed sociologically. Though the phrase ‘exposure of errors in truth-claims’ appears rather dry, it underpins such colourful things such as the revelation of social order as the stultifying, limiting artifice of power, the unmasking of beliefs as obfuscating ideology, the debunking of behaviour as mere clichéd imitation and the exposure of social forms as dull, craven conformity.

So, modern critique is the search for truth by the exposure and elimination of errors, often by the light of reason or by experimental data, sometimes by way of inspiration and sudden insight, and but rarely by applying the standards of tradition. There is no doubt that critique is extraordinarily important; surely great social changes, revolutions, transformations, scientific innovation, democratic liberation, colonial emancipation, feminism and sexual politics are intrinsically bound up with critique. Yet, it could equally be argued that critique has much to do with cold capitalist efficiency displacing traditional working practices, or with rationality replacing reason, or with materialist consumption triumphing over unchanging habits. Such considerations may stem untrammelled enthusiasm for critique. So far critique appears to correspond with modernist thought, yet critique can also be the debunking of myths of progress, anti-modern nostalgia – indeed, it is clear that even fascism was a critique of ‘modern civilisation’. The point is that critique is protean; it can be adapted to any topic or any phenomenon by any group or individual, because its sole requirement is the exposure of error or falsehood.

As Kant has it, our age is the ‘age of critique’, and it is a familiar part of our world, even if we do not always call it by that name. There is perhaps no modern person who has never had occasion to critique, in the full sense of exposing errors in others’ claims to truth. Does this indicate that critique is a natural attribute of humankind? Surely everyone has exposed errors in truth claims? Could critique be a capacity inherent in the neurological make up? In our great ‘age of critique’ this is a popular claim; even children’s films abound with protagonists who are heroes precisely because they are not afraid to be different and question the status quo, whether it is in patriarchal ancient China or rustic medieval France or just a suburban ant-hill. Yet it is only through the legacy of Rousseau’s critique of civilisation as corrupting that we tend to take these children and their critiques as emblematic of pure human nature.

The problem here is unfortunately posed in terms of individuals. Of course, every human being is capable of exposing a faulty truth-claim on a matter of fact, such as how many or where or what time. Yet these are merely corrections made in line with collective truth claims about number or geography or chronology; what is meant by critique is clearly more complex. Of course, part of critique may be the revelation that certain truth-claims are not merely matters of fact but matters of belief, for instance in truth-claims about the nature of men and women. Nonetheless, critique is generally not a mere factual correction but a challenge to existing beliefs. On the one hand this may focus on the truth-claims of other groups, which perhaps tends to strengthen our shared truth-claims; ‘they are wrong and we are right’. More significantly, there is the exposure of error in the truth-claims of one’s own group, which both sets the individual against their own society and transforms the individual’s identity. In a sense, this quickly begins to resemble the former example, but now, ‘they are wrong and I am right’, is swiftly followed by the emergence of a group of critics of society and again ‘they are wrong and we are right’. However, the critics and the mainstream are still part of the same critical society, and indeed, critique may spread through society. The possibility for genuine, challenging rather than correcting critique lies within society rather than with single individuals.

It is not difficult to imagine that individuals are more critical now than they once were, say in medieval times, or outside the West. Examples of critical groups of individuals also come easily to mind, from avant-garde artists to intellectuals, to punk-rockers to eco-warriors, and the list goes on. Furthermore, it is possible to imagine varying degrees of critique, say from feminist theorists through women’s issue advocates to everyday critical exposures and opposition to sexism. However, to imagine a critical society requires something more – yet nothing less is implied by Kant’s ‘age of critique’ and this book proposes a sociology of a critical society. Doubtlessly influenced by critique itself, the over riding tendency of sociology is to conceive of society as a group bounded together by collective beliefs. Disregarding elite elements, can contemporary popular culture warrant the description of ‘critical’? Surely the mainstays of mainstream cinema, pop music, celebrity culture, fashion and advertising should be analysed in terms of their ideology? Yet, each of these in turn is demonstrably critical of pre-existing traditions and social bonds, and presents itself as emancipation, as an exposure of what went before. Very briefly, fashion entails the repudiation of traditional limits on desires, emphasising the individual over the group, and a constant cycle of critique by pastiche or irreverence or taboo breaking or even by being more authentic. Even belief in romantic love, the mythical union between a couple tends to occur by way of a rejection of social claims and the establishment of a new space of absolute freedom; the modern couple are Bonnie and Clyde without the guns. Something very peculiar is at work in modernity, scarcely compatible with society, if that is to mean a group with collective solidarity and shared beliefs and values. Of course, from its inception sociology has been concerned with the peculiarity of modernity, historically, society becomes a matter for thought and reflection when it becomes problematic, and this problematisation is critical.

So although everyone knows critique from experience, how is it possible to gain a perspective on this thing which forms our selves and our society? By further critiques? By referring to history and anthropology we shall see that critique is generally rare or greatly circumscribed, except in modern times. Critique is a social phenomenon, even though it is manifestly anti-social in that it disrupts and exposes existing truth-claims which hold societies together. Understanding critique is a also a paradoxical and reflexive undertaking: paradoxical, because it is nigh-upon impossible to conduct a sociology of critique without carrying out a critique of critique; reflexive, because critique is ineradicably part of our intellectual culture and understanding critique as a social phenomenon may shed new light on our selves and our ways of seeing.

The Sociology of Critique
The first problem of a sociology of critique is in providing a recognisable description of critique, because critique is a hotly disputed territory. What appears to one group as a genuine critique may appear to others as merely a belief or an ideology. So, critique is relative, perhaps even subjective. In this approach, critique becomes part of history and a dynamic force in modernity, constantly generating ruptures with passing traditions and annunciating the new. Yet it does not automatically follow that critique then becomes part of the ‘background’ or taken for granted, rather, critique transforms the social world in ways that simply cannot become ‘traditional’ in any meaningful sense. If we seriously ask what critique is sociologically rather than what it should be philosophically, then critique becomes a social phenomenon, a thing of this world, alloyed to other elements, for instance, social identities, cultural values and even artistic forms. It becomes difficult to discriminate absolutely between critique and unmasking, debunking, defamiliarising, exposing and revealing, or to discern precisely what is critical in cynicism or freethinking or nihilism. Critique is entangled in politics, in notions of liberty and assertions of equality, and in the endless to and fro of struggles over meaning and power. And critique is no less a personal question, individual autonomy can hardly be expressed without it, nor the creativity or uniqueness or difference of the self.

Moreover, anyone engaged in sociology, philosophy or related disciplines knows that various schools and theorists conceive critique very differently. For instance, Marxist critique centres on the revelation of the true, real, economic factors that underlie whatever people think or believe. By contrast, deconstructivist critique insists that these ‘real’ factors are mere stories, conjured into solidity by the truth-producing scientists. There are a host of positions in-between these, many of which support concrete research projects. This diversity poses three difficulties for a sociology of critique: first of all, it is not clear that the term ‘critique’ always refers to the same thing, secondly, critique appears a theoretical term beyond investigation – at best one can debate about it, but not study it, and thirdly, these versions of critique are so numerous and so labyrinthine that a life-time would not suffice to study them.

However, this is not a book about critical theories. Concentrating on theoretical accounts can distract from the life of critique beyond the academic and intellectual spheres; as we shall see in later chapters, critique pervades the media, it is the dynamo of consumerism, and is the leitmotif of popular culture, it transforms politics – it is far from esoteric. My claim is that critique is one of the constitutive forces of modern society, and forms an integral part of modern culture, and the exercise of critique even constitutes the modern self. This may be for good or for ill, but such questions are bracketed here. Our question is not what critique should be but what it can be, and clearly, critique can be a great many things. Very often, critique has been employed in the course of great emancipatory movements such as those for civil rights or humane working conditions or against violence, domination and exploitation. Yet, there are more ambivalent manifestations of critique, say in relativism or the ‘critique of mass society’ (Frank, 1997). Furthermore, critique is deployed so widely across the political spectrum that it is impossible to agree with each particular critique, and simply calling one’s political opponents ideological rather than critical does not solve this problem. Some political situations are far too complex to be divided into a duality of critical/ideological and good/evil, for instance, questions around gender and life-style, or the geographic spread of modernity. Eventually it is necessary to recognise the critical dimensions of what are typically understood as ideologies, for instance, the neo-liberal critique of state regulation of markets. Once critique is considered as a social phenomenon, it must be recognised in its myriad manifestations and analysed rather than idealised.

The suggestion that critique is just one specific cultural vision which could be contextualised and historicised appears already to be a critical gesture. There is no question of easily escaping the tendency towards critique, as it utterly pervades the modern intellectual atmosphere. However, the purpose here is less to criticise critique and debunk its truth claims, but instead to understand critique by recognising it, not by dispensing with it, but making it visible. This much alone is certainly worthwhile, not simply because it opens up new topics for research but because it provides the possibility of reflexive self-understanding. If it is impossible to avoid being critical, it is at the very least worth understanding what critique entails, and exactly how critique effects other truth-claims. Whilst critique may clear the ground by allowing us to see through existing truth claims it might equally prevent us from seeing meanings.

Why is it worth while to see the meaning in beliefs rather than simply exposing their cultural contingency and construction? This is not to suggest that sociologists should seek after contingent truth-claims and give them credence; nothing could appear more unprofessional. Yet, how can social existence be understood without recognising the importance and even the reality of meaning? If the alternative is the critical exposure of all and any meaning, what remains other than nihilism? In any case, contrary to the critical vision, meaning persists; it is not clear that critique is always decisively corrosive (Lynch, 2000). It is worth remembering that critique is only one phenomenon amongst many, one vision often alloyed to others. Even the most committed critic probably maintains their individualised subjectivity, gendered behaviour, family ties, professional and class pride and group identity even though they know well that these are all merely contingent illusions, products of society, historical creations doomed to fade in time. Yet, as the sociology and history of critique in modernity will show, these fragile elements are slowly eroded over time by the increasingly pervasive effect of critique. However, it is not too late to become reflexive about critique itself; once individuality was the unquestionable truth of modern intellectual life, and doubtlessly it eroded the social constantly, but since at least Norbert Elias (1936) the reality of autonomous individuality has become questioned in academia and even in popular culture. Someday the same may be said for critique; indeed the sociology of critique already has some purchase in the contemporary academic scene.

The Pragmatic Sociology of Critique

The pragmatic sociology of critique is a forerunner to the approach proposed here with Luc Boltanski as its central figure; his interest in the Sociology of Critique stretches over three decades, but came to wider notice with The New Spirit of Capitalism (2005). Empirically this work discussed the new ‘projective’ spirit of capitalism, that is, the cultivation of engagement and commitment and ‘excellence’ in the work place and how management harnesses the ethos of innovation and dynamism. More significant was the analysis of how capitalism absorbs, incorporates and even profits from critiques against it. In particular, ‘aesthetic’ critiques that unmasked the boring, instrumental and constraining elements of companies were redeployed to enable high-level employees to put all their creative talents at the disposal of business. So the field is concerned with the various deployments of critique, as a real social phenomenon, rather than a solely academic tool.

More recently Boltanski provided a more programmatic statement on critique in On Critique: Towards a Sociology of Emancipation. The work begins with an attempt to reconcile his pragmatic sociology of critique as deployed by ‘ordinary people’ with the ‘metacritical’ theories of Critical Sociology, particularly in its Bourdieusian incarnation. An encounter between the two is inevitably underway as academic disciplines genuinely influence the ‘real world’. Boltanski’s synthesis attempts to overcome the localised limits of merely describing the capacity of actors for critique, and the demoralising tendencies of ‘radical’ critiques, which are often too abstract. He salvages the way “...the sociology of critique undertook to describe the world as the scene of a trial” (25); that is, analysis of the diverse flows of accusation and justification which make up disputes. From Critical Sociology he retains the ‘standpoint of totality’ which provides actors with ‘exteriorisation’ and ‘collective tools’ for critique; in short, a critical vision which transcends the locality of dispute (44-45). Boltanski avows that he is learning from the history of critique, and rejects ‘general unmasking’; the nihilistic ‘dizzily exciting’ suspicion of everything (114). While he is too kind to list examples of this sort of critique, it clearly resembles his description of Bourdieu’s Critical Sociology. As a limit to excesses, Boltanski proposes that critiques should provide an alternative vision – although this does not have to be ‘utopian’, merely better.

Boltanski then links critique firmly to institutions, by which he means those elements which define or construct social reality. These are always necessary to deal with “Uncertainty, which is at the heart of social life” (70). Institutions articulate and justify a certain state of affairs, and it is this ‘justification’ that links them to critique conceived as ‘tests’. Institutions generally attempt to justify and naturalise themselves through truth tests, generally tautologies such as ‘the king is the king’ or ‘the committee acknowledges itself as the committee for acknowledging committees’. This meta-pragmatic confirmation of the institution nurtures everyday pragmatic, unreflective action; “When they succeed, their effect is not only to make reality accepted. It is to make it loved” (105 italics in original). However, the (modern) tendency is for these truth tests to be unconvincing, particularly when events in the ‘world’ disrupt the social construction of ‘reality’ lead to more robust critiques. (For critics ‘reality’ is socially constructed, and always different from the real but inevitable unknown ‘world’ of nature or society which occasionally disrupts the constructed ‘reality’.) The particular tendency here is for crisis to lead to critique – a relationship which will be addressed later, suffice for the moment to suggest that whereas once crisis always preceded critique, the extension of a feeling of crisis leads to the potential for critique at any moment, which may then provoke or intensify further crises.

Therefore, critique is the subjection of institutions to tests, firstly by reality tests that measure real outcomes against articulated values – for example, assessing the concrete effects of policies of gender equality or the implementation of ‘mission statements’. Such tests can affirm or challenge the institution by generating meta-pragmatic reflexivity, but only within the bounds of the institution itself; ‘is this king the true king?’ or ‘has this committee been legitimately formed?’ Such challenges also have the effect of renewing or reforming the institution. Beyond these there are existential tests; these question the validity of the existing institutions and even the tests to which it subjects itself: To ask ‘should we have kings at all, and do our tests robustly assess their royalty?’ or ‘are committees meaningful and are our criteria for forming them legitimate?’ would constitute an existential test of monarchy or bureaucracy. For Boltanski, these tests are made on the grounds of genuine lived experience, both humiliation or suffering and even ‘the joy created by transgression when it affords access to some sort of authenticity’ (108). Such tests come from outside the institution, even from outside the socially constructed ‘reality’, hailing from the ‘world’ whose uncertainty institutions keep at bay. Existential tests thereby expose the arbitrary nature of institutions, forcing them into change or justification.

In this we can see Boltanski’s ‘alternative vision’; institutions subjected to constant critique. Rather than the eclipse of institutions, Boltanski would prefer reflexive institutions (154-155). This would unmask all forms of ‘domination’, that is, the unacknowledged institutional determination of social life, and replace it with ‘power’ which is explicit and must claim legitimacy via justification, and therefore is engaged with critique. Boltanski doesn’t view this as a cyclical process; institutions – crisis – critique – institutionalisation – crisis – critique, which he compares to Weber’s institutionalisation of charisma, but a distinctive turn from domination and illusion to reflexivity about power. Boltanski’s sociology of critique is clearly critical – it places uncertainty as fundamental and exposes all institutions as false contrivances which are probably oppressive.

All of the above is theory; but when Boltanski turns to the contemporary scene of capitalism there are clear difficulties. Contemporary capitalism is founded on constant change, on protean shifts in ‘tests’ which make critique play catch-up with institutions which don’t necessarily trouble themselves with consistent justification. Social change was once the ground for relativising critique of the arbitrariness of institutions but constant change outruns critique. Consequently, uncertainty is accepted rather than kept at bay by contemporary institutions, and often cited as justification for temporary arrangements, flexibilisation and so forth. Simultaneously, the ‘reality’, say, of property rights, is socially constructed and asserted fully, yet the intrusion of the ‘world’ – for instance, in the form of financial crashes – is smoothly incorporated by institutions that no longer accept responsibility for ‘reality’ but make it appear an inevitable ‘natural’ phenomenon. Even crises seem to exonerate the system which in fact causes them. More importantly, Boltanski’s contemporary capitalist partially resembles the critic; institutional rules are seen as arbitrary, ‘handicaps’ to action in an uncertain world; instead the preferred tactic is to interpret creatively or make new rules. (‘Rules are for the little people’) Clear concrete examples of this are to be seen in the competitive banking culture worldwide, which recently bankrupted the Irish state. On such a world, critique has difficulty in gaining any purchase. A further similarity is capitalism’s future-orientation (change-making, embrace the future!) which corresponds to the requirement of an ‘alternative vision’ in critique.

Boltanski scarcely responds to these difficulties, other than insisting that critique is the only bulwark against domination, which must react against institutions’ injustice, and hoping “...that the first victim...would be nothing other than the nation-state” (158), presumably because this is a target which will actually stand still long enough for critique to unmask it. Boltanski recommends the critique of the arbitrariness of property rights, an arbitrariness which he insists the dominant class is already aware of, and also a major questioning of ‘tests’ which judge people, specifically education, for the purposes of emancipating certain classes from domination. He insists that critique is necessary (inevitable?) as institutions will collapse without its challenge, and that critique’s meta-pragmatic questioning will unmask domination and replace it with reflexive emancipation. In support of this he insists that contemporary lack of interest in the state, and vague unease about certain tests (education, employment, elections) are further steps on the ‘...eternal road of revolt’ (158).

Clearly, even Boltanski finds critique to be floundering in the contemporary scene, and recognises that critical sociology has its excesses. To what extent does his synthesised version of critique answer to the challenge? One striking problem with the book as a whole is the absence of history. Institutions are clearly necessary to all societies, and if they must justify themselves this implies critique, which makes critique trans-historical. However, generally, critique is temporary – often confined to ritual scrutiny and renewal of institutions. Boltanski does not address why reflexivity becomes interminable in modern times. From his account, rituals always seem empty ceremonial formulae, and institutions are brittle and verging on being meaningless; the creative, persuasive and emotional power of these elements are de-emphasised so that “...doubt is introduced and critique erupts” (83). In his account, institutions rarely appear capable of allaying uncertainty about reality and almost never of ‘making it loved’. Even in this ‘sociology of critique’ it is clear that the critical vision hampers Boltanski’s capacity to recognise the meaning of social phenomena.

Boltanski’s assumption that uncertainty is always at the heart of social life is misleading; but surely this perception is itself grounded in times of reflexivity and meta-pragmatic questioning. Is critical estrangement really the foundation of human experience? Moreover, while critique may take its genesis from the self-justification of institutions, surely institutions mainly exist to replace uncertainty or the ‘world’ with a social construction of reality, that is, a meaning for the world. Critical attempts to unmask institutions as arbitrary ‘meaningless’ or ‘foundationless’ may not necessarily lead to better institutions, but their ineffectuality or the generation of new institutions, that is, new social constructions of reality.

A further problem in this is the assumption that reflexivity lends itself exclusively to relativising critique; another possibility would be scientific detachment and though the two are historically linked they cannot be collapsed into each other (Kilminster, 2011). Other varieties of reflexivity might be creativity, or the celebration of cultural specificity. Boltanski objects to the Weberian position as circular (116), and because it insists domination is ubiquitous and inevitable. Weber’s formulation involves ‘charisma’ instead of ‘critique’ – and charisma is a radical rupture with institutions and even inverts hierarchies (1978: 1117). There is certainly something circular in the ‘institution-crisis-charisma-instiutionalisation-crisis-charisma’ cycle, but historically there are innumerable examples of the routinisation of charisma and Weber uses this to describe long-term processes of rationalisation. However, charisma is not the same as critique, it is another potential response to crisis, a renewal of values, an invigoration of tradition that gives an answer to the meaning of the ‘world’. Charisma and critique are responses to crises in social institutions; focusing exclusively on critical responses can only be justified if they pre-dominate in a particular society.

This brings us back to the question of the sociology of critique: If we are to examine critique as a social phenomenon, should we adopt its commitments? If we borrow the ‘tools’ of critical sociology what are the consequences for our understanding? Boltanski’s work focuses on the pragmatic capacities of actors for critique in distinct situations, and it is important that these are recognised, rather than people being considered as passive dupes of ubiquitous domination. Yet whether we agree with these ‘critical capacities’ is quite beside the point; for instance, many actors seek to expose the ‘arbitrary’ and constructed nature of ‘political correctness’ or ‘traditional values’. Of course, any theorist may prefer to label one or the other as an effect of domination and the other as ‘everyday’ critique, but surely this sort of clarification simply fails to recognise the critical dimensions of both.

The wider diffusion of this ‘critical tool’ of ‘unmasking the arbitrary’ simply cannot be ignored by sociology. Furthermore, it forces sociology to reflect upon the nature of its ‘critical tools’. Is critique a non-cultural transcendent form of thought which exposes the social construction of reality so that institutions appear as they really are – arbitrary? Or could critique be a modern form of gnosticism which disfigures the world/reality as the creation of a demi-urge/domination? Of course, any critique of critique appears paradoxical, as critique is now unmasked as a mere ‘truth-claim’, something like power/knowledge in Foucault’s sense. Partially, Boltanski addresses this, arguing that ‘full exteriority’ from the social world is impossible, and hence any analyst inevitably partakes in local, specific critiques – but the point is to understand what critique actually does as a social phenomenon amongst others.

Having observed the play of critique in social disputes, Boltanski has sought to reconcile it with critical sociology, in order that critique be stronger and more powerful (150). Our concerns are different; herein we will try to understand the meanings generated by critique and their social consequence, and analyse how critique is constitutive of modernity. Without ignoring nuances, it is important to note the similarities of Boltanski’s ideal critic and the sort of criticism which he eschews; that is the excessive critic and the capitalist critic. All of them take their identity from transgressing existing institutions in some way, and all of them provide an alternative vision of the future; but Boltanski’s ideal critic is distinct in that they are in favour of explicit testable egalitarian rules. ‘No rules’ is as much a recipe for disaster as authoritarianism, as recent events in the ‘financial world’ have proved uncontrovertibly. As such, the ideal critic must do more than merely provoke crisis by unmasking and exposing the arbitrary. They should also be an ‘arbitrator’; one who judges and discriminates, or even a kritikos (Greek for judge). Crisis also means a moment in which judgement becomes necessary, be it to justify or criticise, but also perhaps to institute a testable rule for society. Moreover, the critic comes to the scene when existing institutions appear to fail and this is exactly the situation to which charisma responds. Yet, in modernity crisis is interminable, charisma no longer restores order, and critique becomes ubiquitous.

Problematising Critique
Let us return to Epimenides’ statement that all Cretans are liars: This can be taken as a critique, a truth-claim that represents Cretan society in a particular way. It unmasks and reveals the Cretans as being something other than they claim to be, and highlights their lying character over all else. The statement separates Epimenides from the Cretans and incites his audience to become critical of the Cretans. On the other hand, the statement also generates the suspicion that Epimenides might be a liar in turn, slandering the Cretans, and proposing a sweeping generalisation about lying which directly undermines his own statement. In a compact form, this is the approach to critique proposed here. Firstly, even though it tends to undercut other truth-claims, critique is itself a truth-claim, it is a discourse in the Foucauldian sense. Secondly, it is a discourse which tends to undermine itself; a critique which reveals that everything is constructed, or all ideals are reflections of economic interests or whatever else, if applied absolutely stringently tends to undermine itself. This leads us back to the heart of the Liar’s Paradox, taking critique as a discourse is in a certain way a critique of critique, applying critique to critique is to undercut one’s own analysis. But how can we proceed?

This book does not intend to undermine and expose critique as an ideology or a contradiction, to reveal Epimenides as a Liar, but to understand critique as a social phenomenon. Foucault’s conception of discourse does not deconstruct discourses, but reminds us that ‘truth is a thing of this world’; and likewise ‘critique is a thing of this world’. The approach herein intends to restore the context of critique as a social phenomenon and real practice; the approach is to problematise critique, to ask what is critique and how has it transformed modernity into a critical society? In order to pose and answer these questions, this book has a tripartite structure. It begins with a broad theoretical approach which attempts firstly to give an anthropological account of critique as a possibility within all societies, and suggests that in modernity, the boundaries or limits of critique have been eroded. Then the focus shifts to a reflexive historical sociology of critique, emphasising the importance of crises, social transformations and charisma in explaining how critique becomes unleashed through history, culminating in Kant’s ‘great age of critique’. From this the concept of critique as a discourse emerges; rather than a possibility confined to temporally and culturally limited occasions, critique becomes a mode of producing truth which is much more widely deployed, proliferating, diffusing, mixing promiscuously with other discourses and even becoming trivialised. In closing, the theoretical section addresses critical subject formation and the emergence of critical identities.

The theoretical framework is then put to the test in empirical studies of phenomena which are peculiarly animated by critique in three chapters concerning the public sphere, economics and politics, with close readings made of print media, stand-up comedy, advertising, Neo-liberalism and the Occupy movement. There is a vast range of phenomena which could be analysed as animated by critical discourse, these studies are arranged to be indicative of the centrality and influence of critique in the constitution of modern society. Of course, all empirical phenomena are localised, and many of these studies are drawn from Irish society and are broadly concerned with contemporary political and economic concerns such as the on-going ‘Great Recession’ and responses to it. Nonetheless they are also indicative of the robustness of the model of critical discourse as a concept which can shed light on many modern phenomena, past, present and presumably future. In particular, these studies demonstrate a way of approach which avoids the dualism of explaining society in terms of ideology or as agency.

From these empirical case studies, we then turn to literary sources for this sociology of critique, writers whose works explore the limits of critique. While this is an academic work which draws from certain bodies of theory and empirical methods, its original inspirations were literary. Only a small selection of the literary and artistic sources which help us understand critique can be discussed here; Romantic writers like Blake, Wordsworth and Austen who reacted to the ‘great age of critique’ and Orwell’s literary response to the diffusion of critique throughout politics. What is important about these literary resources is not just that they are the first to ‘reveal’ or ‘unmask’ critique which would only be the repetition of the critical gesture – which is quite common in literature as elsewhere. Rather, these works represent critique as a response to problems of meaning in modernity, so that critique is part of the social world rather than a position of detachment from it. Furthermore, each of these works illustrate that once critique is kept within certain limits, there are still possibilities for meaning and value – even in a critical society. It is in this spirit that the book as a whole is offered to the reader; an interpretation in which critique is recognised as a social phenomenon with a certain history, which now constitutes our society and can scarcely be avoided as it even constitutes are subjectivity, yet as only one element amongst many which should be kept within certain limits.