Twenty Years of Institutional Liberalism


Changes in structure and the decreasing coherence of



Yüklə 102 Kb.
Pdf görüntüsü
səhifə7/10
tarix31.12.2021
ölçüsü102 Kb.
#81871
1   2   3   4   5   6   7   8   9   10
Robert K.-Liberalism (1)

Changes in structure and the decreasing coherence of 

international economic and environmental regimes 

Realists look for cycles and therefore have a tendency to expect observed changes to 

reverse themselves, because, as Robert G. Gilpin said 30 years ago, ‘the fundamental 

nature of international relations has not changed over the millennia. International rela­

tions continue to be a recurring struggle for wealth and power among independent actors 

in a state of anarchy.’

25 



134 

International Relations 26(2) 

Pursuing this line of thought, John J. Mearsheimer famously, and wrongly, pre­

dicted in 1990 that the collapse of the Soviet Union would take the world ‘back to the 

future’ – to a world of power politics in Europe. The liberal ‘prediction of peace in a 

multipolar Europe is flawed’.

26 


Waltz’s theory of balancing would have led us to 

believe that the dominance of the United States would generate a blocking coalition 

against it. Neither of these scenarios occurred. But the broader claim of Realism is 

embedded in balance of power theory: that power generates attempts to counter it. And 

in this light 9/11 can be seen as supportive of the Realist worldview, which is pro­

foundly cyclical and anti-progressive. Concentrated power does motivate efforts to 

oppose it. American dominance has been challenged by al-Qaeda, by North Korea and 

from Iran, and in a less radical but more enduring and fundamental sense there will be 

a continuing challenge over the next few decades from China. The point is that there is 

a counter-narrative to the progressive and pacific narrative of Institutional Liberalism. 

The most striking change in fundamental global power structures during the last 20 

years is the transformation of the economies of poor countries toward sustained and rapid 

growth. During the Cold War, a few countries, such as South Korea, Taiwan and 

Singapore, managed such a transition, but they were exceptions. Stagnation, or boom­

and-bust cycles, were more common in poorer countries. However, it is now undeniable 

that China, India, Brazil and other formerly very poor countries have passed through 

Walt W. Rostow’s ‘take-off’ into economic growth.

27 


With growth at 6−8 percent com­

pared to the 2 percent at best managed by rich countries, shifts in political power are easy 

to anticipate. And in politics anticipation often brings policy forward, since political 

actors are forward-looking. 

Countries such as Brazil, China, and India have different interests from those of the 

established industrialized democracies – with respect to trade, foreign investment, mon­

etary arrangements and governing arrangements for limiting climate change. It is there­

fore not surprising that the Doha Round trade talks seem permanently stalled, that China 

and other exporting countries keep their exchange rate undervalued and build up enor­

mous foreign currency reserves, that rivalry rather than cooperation characterizes oil 

politics, or that the non-Annex I countries under the Kyoto Protocol, exempted from 

rules for emissions controls when they were weak and small, refused until the Durban 

meetings in December 2011 to agree to be governed by common emissions rules despite 

being the major sources of increases in emissions. 

As a generalization, it seems to me that what could have been seen in the mid-1990s 

as a progressive extension of international regimes, with stronger rules and larger juris­

dictions, has been halted if not reversed. The hopes of observers such as John Ikenberry 

for a revival of liberal regimes under a more capacious form of American hegemony are 

not, so far, being realized. And here again Realism remains relevant: to understand insti­

tutions and international law, we need to peer through the veil of rhetoric and law, to 

discern the power and interest structures that lie below. Those power and interest struc­

tures moved strongly toward greater coherence and uniformity with the collapse of the 

Soviet Union: when the WTO was formed, the West was at a historic high point of domi­

nance. With the rise of China, India and other emerging economies, structures of power 

and interest have become more diverse; and as Structural Realism would have antici­

pated, the institutions that link major powers have been weakened, with more contention 




Keohane 

135 


over their proper arrangements. Liberal regimes with United States leadership may be 

easy to join, as Ikenberry asserts; but they can also be rejected by states with sufficient 

independent power.

28 


As institutional theorists anticipated, many of these institutions 

persist despite changes in patterns of power and interests; but as Realists claimed, it has 

become increasingly difficult to construct strong new institutions. 

We need to be careful, as E. H. Carr was, about the ways in which Realism remains 

relevant. It is not a good guide to the future: Gilpin was wrong to see just endless cycles, 

within a fundamentally unchanging reality, and Mearsheimer was wrong to forecast 

‘back to the future’ in Europe. Progressive change, driven in part by new ideas both of 

ethics and feasibility, does occur. Whatever conflicts occur in the twenty-first century, it 

is very difficult to believe that the associated destruction would be accepted with the 

equanimity with which human beings confronted organized violence for centuries.

29 

Realism is also in my view not a good moral guide: it dodges many issues of ethical 



choice by unduly discounting how much choice leaders of great powers have. ‘Necessity’ 

is not a convincing justification for the very powerful. But a core lesson of Realism needs 

to be learned and relearned: 

Institutions rest on power and changes in power generate 

changes in institutions

. Furthermore, dominance over institutions by one set of actors 

generates opposition by those who do not have it. They may fear its impact on them or 

they may just envy those with power and seek to replace them. In either case, they are 

motivated to resist the extension of alien institutions even when they cannot replace them 

with their own creations. 

Yet the Realist story is not sufficient, since it leaves out domestic politics and learning. 

Domestic politics in democracies helps to explain legalization, since it protects leaders in 

democracies from protectionist and nationalist movements. Multilateral institutions are 

hard to change and ‘lock in’ policies, along with cementing coalitions of support. Domestic 

politics also helps to explain the difficulty that established powers have in trying to induce 

rising powers to contribute to global public goods. Doing so is costly in the short term, 

although it may be rewarding in the long term; and it runs against nationalist prejudices. So 

although experts in the United States of the 1920s or Germany or China today may favor 

policy changes that are conducive to global prosperity and peace, they may be blocked by 

protectionists, self-righteous savers, or nationalists and other vested interests. Learning is 

also possible, but by no means guaranteed, as the poisonous and anti-intellectual contem­

porary politics of climate change in the United States illustrates. A scientific view that 

human beings are generating global climate change, supported by overwhelming evidence, 

is disbelieved by millions of Americans to the point that climate change denial has become 

a tenet of faith among today’s Republican primary electorate. Aided by the continuing 

economic distress, climate deniers may gain the upper hand politically, making the United 

States the largest single obstacle to a coherent climate regime.

30 


It is hard to adapt to change. Adaptive policies are often costly in the short run and 

their success may depend on reciprocity from others. Domestic publics are often poorly 

equipped to understand these relationships and unwilling to pay short-term costs for 

long-term gains that to them seem highly uncertain. As Martin Wolf of the 



Financial 

Times 

has commented, ‘confronted with painful choices, human beings choose denial’.

31 

A realistic liberalism needs to recognize the realities of human psychology and the fre­



quently problematic nature of democracies.

32 



136 

International Relations 26(2) 


Yüklə 102 Kb.

Dostları ilə paylaş:
1   2   3   4   5   6   7   8   9   10




Verilənlər bazası müəlliflik hüququ ilə müdafiə olunur ©genderi.org 2024
rəhbərliyinə müraciət

    Ana səhifə