University of Dundee The counterterrorism agreements of Europol with third countries
Yüklə 275,33 Kb. Pdf görüntüsü
|
24
data sharing agreements. On the one hand, if the EU is dependent on a third country for operational cooperation then the power asymmetry between the EU and the third country diminishes and the EU adopts a more flexible approach regarding the adoption of data protection norms. On the other hand, if the EU is less dependent on a third country for operational cooperation then it is reluctant to make any compromises and it adopts a stance of hierarchical superiority over the third country. The EU’s ambivalent approach on data protection rules which is shaped mostly by the power dynamics between the EU and third countries undermines, as a result, both its normative reputation and its reliability in its relations with third countries.
This ambivalence is expected to continue in the future. As noted in the Turkey and Morocco cases, the recent threat posed by the IS means that the EU political actors may be more flexible in the future in order to facilitate the exchange of data and intelligence with third countries which do not have, however, as high democratic standards and credentials as the EU. In other words, according to the model developed in the article, it is expected that the increased terrorist threat posed by the IS and the situation in Syria will change EU’s interest calculations and therefore the power asymmetry between the EU and the countries which can play a role against these threats will be reduced.
In this respect, one path that the EU political actors are expected to follow in the future is to continue prioritizing the counter-terrorism cooperation with third countries and being more flexible regarding the EU’s data protection regime. In other words, EU’s stance of normative superiority, according to which third countries should always adopt EU’s data protection norms and standards en bloc when cooperating with the EU,
25
will continue being replaced by a more pragmatic EU behaviour. This pragmatism is derived from the EU realization that closer counter- terrorism cooperation with third countries (especially with those in its close vicinity) is essential for EU’s security and safety. Such a conviction makes the EU actors more flexible when negotiating data protection standards.
This article supports the general argument that in its external relations the EU could be described more as a pragmatic and realist actor rather than as a normative actor and, in particular, that security concerns regarding terrorism have taken priority over the broader and normative goals of human rights promotion and data protection. 79 In other words, this article complements previous research concerning whether the EU has upheld to its values and normative commitments in its internal security relations with third countries by looking at Europol’s relations with three countries and by examining the reasons behind the European inconsistency and ambivalence on data protection norms.
Moving beyond Europol’s relations with third countries, the conceptual model presented by this article can be applied to additional cases examining the EU inconsistency and behaviour in other fields. Further research could be done, for instance, on comparing how the EU negotıated its Passenger Name Record (PNR) agreements with the U.S., Canada, and Australia and on looking whether the EU was consistent in its data protection requirements during these negotiations.
In order to do that, the EU authorities should not only prioritize their own policies, institutions and reputation whilst signing an agreement with third countries. Furthermore, waiting until the formation of a common terrorist threat between the EU and third country should not be a precondition of signing a data exchange agreement. Finally, the EU policy makers should find ways to ease legal and political conditions to facilitate conclusion of
26
data exchange agreements with third countries for the sake of EU security.
1 Els De Busser, Data Protection in EU and US Criminal Cooperation (Antwerp: Maklu, 2009), 225. 2 Javier Argomaniz, “When the EU is the ‘Norm-taker’: The Passenger Name Records Agreement and the EU's Internalization of US Border Security Norms,” Journal of European Integration 31, no. 1 (2009): 119-136. Christian Kaunert, Sarah Léonard, and Alex MacKenzie, “The Social Construction of an EU Interest in Counter-terrorism: US Influence and Internal Struggles in the Cases of PNR and SWIFT,” European Security 21, no. 4 (2012): 474-496. Alex MacKenzie, “The External Dimension of European Homeland security,” in Christian Kaunert, Sarah Léonard, and Patryk Pawlak (eds.), European
95-110. Patryk Pawlak, “Made in the USA? The Influence of the US on the EU's Data Protection Regime” (Brussels: CEPS Liberty and Security in Europe Papers, 2009). 3 Monica Den Boer, Claudia Hillebrand, and Andreas Nölke, “Legitimacy under Pressure: The European Web of Counter-Terrorism Networks,” Journal of Common Market Studies 46, no. 1 (2008): 101-124. Monica Den Boer, “Towards an Accountability Regime for an Emerging European Policing Governance,” Policing and Society 12, no. 4 (2002): 275- 289. Willy Bruggeman, “Policing and Accountability in a Dynamic European Context,” Policing and Society 12, no. 4 (2002): 259-273. Madalina Busuioc, Deirdre Curtin, and Martijn Groenleer, “Agency Growth Between Autonomy and Accountability: the European Police Office as a ‘Living Institution’,” Journal of European Public Policy 18, no. 6 (2011): 848-867. Madalina Busuioc and Martijn Groenleer, “Beyond Design: the Evolution of Europol and Eurojust,” Perspectives on European Politics and Society 14, no. 3 (2013): 285-304. Willy Bruggeman, “What Are the Options for Improving Democratic Control of Europol and for Providing it with Adequate Operational Capabilities?,” Studia Diplomatica 59, no. 1 (2006): 163-184. Cyrille Fijnaut, “Introduction to the Special Issue on Police Accountability in Europe,” Policing and society 12, no. 4 (2002): 243-248. Wolfgang Wagner, “Guarding the Guards. The European Convention and the Communitization of Police Co-operation,” Journal of European Public Policy 13, no. 8 (2006): 1230-1246. 4 Kristin Archick, “Europe and Counterterrorism: Strengthening Police and Judicial Cooperation” (Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service, 2002), 1-25. David Brown, “Defending the Fortress? Assessing the European Unions Response to Trafficking,” European Security 13, no. 1-2 (2004): 95-116. Oldrich Bures, “EU Counterterrorism Policy: A Paper Tiger?,” Terrorism and Political Violence 18, no. 1 (2006): 57-78. Oldrich Bures, “Europol's fledgling counterterrorism role,” Terrorism and
“Europol and its Influence on EU Policy-making on Organized Crime: Analyzing Governance Dynamics and Opportunities,” Perspectives on European Politics and Society 14, no. 3 (2013): 357-371. Bjorn Fagersten, “Bureaucratic Resistance to International Intelligence Cooperation: the Case of Europol,” Intelligence and National Security 25, no. 4 (2010): 500-520. Nadia Gerspacher, “The Roles of International Police Cooperation Organizations,” European Journal of Crime, Criminal Law and Criminal Justice 13, no. 3 (2005): 413-434. Mauro Tebaldi and Marco Calaresu, “Level of Europeanization and Policy Outcomes: The Common Security Policy and the Case of Europol,” SAGE Open 3, no. 2 (2013): 1-19. James I. Walsh, “Intelligence-sharing in the European Union: Institutions are not Enough,” Journal of Common Market Studies 44, no. 3 (2006): 625- 643.
5 Mathieu Deflem, “Europol and the Policing of International Terrorism: Counter- Terrorism in a Global Perspective,” Justice Quarterly 23, no. 3 (2006): 336-359.
Yüklə 275,33 Kb. Dostları ilə paylaş:
|