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Morocco-Europol Agreement. Such an agreement has not yet been
concluded despite the efforts towards this direction that date back to
2000’s.
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In general, in the context of the fight against terrorism, the EU
and Europol depend to a great extent on the ENP countries for terrorism-
related intelligence. This dependency can potentially increase these
countries’ leverage in their interactions with the EU.
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In practice, in the
case of Morocco the need of Europol for potentially useful Moroccan
intelligence did not lead the European organisation in a more
compromising stance on data protection issues and Morocco has not
taken advantage of this European dependency. The uncompromising
stance of the EU, despite European dependency on Moroccan intelligence,
was based on several reasons.
Firstly, the EU’s is perceived as superior in the context of the ENP
framework and there is a perceived asymmetry of interests and power
between the two sides. This superiority and power asymmetry is related
to the economic and normative advantages of EU member states in
comparison with the ENP countries. In order for the EU to provide
financial and technical rewards to Morocco it sets a number of pre-
conditions, including rules and norms on the protection of personal data.
If Morocco does not comply with these preconditions then the EU holds
back the financial and technical benefits. At the same time, the EU does
not see any reason for compromising with Morocco on data protection
issues given that cooperation with Morocco is not perceived as enhancing
EU’s and member states’ counterterrorism capacity.
A second factor is that there is no common terrorism threat between the
EU and Morocco. While the EU has seen the Al Qaeda as a major threat to
its own security, Morocco’s threat perceptions regarding Al Qaeda has not
been as high as the EU’s. Therefore, if the EU is more flexible with
Morocco on data protection, this is not likely to reduce the Al Qaeda
threat to Europe. Additionally, such a compromise will mostly benefit
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Morocco rather than the EU; Europol can obtain personal data from
Morocco even without an agreement in place. Morocco, however, cannot
have access to Europol intelligence without firstly abiding to data
protection rules and concluding a data exchange agreement. As a result
of the above, the lack of a common threat among the two actors means
that the EU-Morocco interaction is not a symmetrical relationship in terms
of power and interests.
However, the recent expansion of the IS in Syria, Iraq and the unstable
countries of the Maghreb has created risks for Morocco. According to ISCR
figures, Morocco has a very high number of citizens (1500 individuals)
fighting for the IS, coming third after Tunisia (1500-3000) and Saudi
Arabia (1500-2500).
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The return of these fighters to Morocco and the EU
is a security risk for both sides of the Mediterranean. The main concern of
the EU is the prevention of radicalised individuals who may plan terrorist
attacks from entering EU countries.
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The above may create the impetus
for the urgent negotiation of a Morocco-Europol data exchange
agreement.
Regarding the actorness dimension, a relationship with Morocco has little
value in terms of enhancing the global image of Europol as a dominant
counterterrorism actor. Morocco has not been either as strong a
counterterrorism player at the global level as the US
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or at the regional
level as Turkey. Therefore, the EU is not dependent on Morocco’s
recognition of Europol as a counterterrorism partner, which means that it
is less likely that Europol and the EU will be flexible with Morocco on data
protection.
Finally, the political environment in Europe has changed after the entering
into force of the Lisbon treaty in 2009, making it more difficult for Europol
to have a flexible approach towards Morocco on data protection issues.
Though after the shock of the 9/11 attacks the political environment was
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more favourable for the conclusion of an agreement between Morocco and
Europol, no progress has been achieved so far. In the post-Lisbon treaty
period the negotiation and conclusion of an agreement with Morocco has
been more risky for Europeans. If Europol concludes an agreement with
Morocco before the latter has adopted EU’s data protection regulations,
the actions of Europol will come under scrutiny from the European
Parliament and the ECJ. Therefore, the lack of a suitable political
environment which would allow Europol to be more flexible means that
Europeans insisted on their data protection demands.
In line with the four conditions explained above, EU and Europol have
been less dependent on Morocco than vice versa and this has created a
situation of asymmetrical interdependence and power asymmetry in
favour of Europeans. Similarly to its stance towards Turkey, the EU
follows an uncompromising stance towards Morocco. Ultimately, the
European approach towards Morocco reflects the diverse and pragmatic
nature of EU’s external relations which are ultimately based on
calculations of interests rather than on normative concerns.
Conclusion
This article has shown that the interdependence between two
international actors can potentially create a situation of power asymmetry
where the stronger side influences the weaker sides’ interest calculations.
If the weaker actor is dependent on the benefits provided by the stronger
actor then it compromises and adapts its priorities in order to sustain
cooperation with the stronger party. The powerful actor may, however,
also compromise if it sees any opportunities for enhancing its own
interests and the power asymmetry between the two sides is, as a result,
diminished.
The above can be seen in Europol’s relations with third countries and in
Europol’s data protection requirements when considering the conclusion of
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