Absence has become much more striking in the 1990s because of the renewed interest in migration and other intercultural exchanges as “security threats”
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- Bu səhifədəki naviqasiya:
- The Bounds of Race in International Relations: Redux
- Defining the New Racism
- IR, security and neoracism
- ‘Racism without races’: aesthetics, security and civilization
- Security and civilization
IntroductionAlthough in the past decades the study of international relations has become much more sensitive to questions of culture, identity and movement, racism has remained an undertheorized area. This absence has become much more striking in the 1990s because of the renewed interest in migration and other intercultural exchanges as “security threats”, as well the emergence of nationalism and putatively ‘ethnic’ conflict as a central basis of strife in the post-cold war era. This article is an attempt to discuss new forms of racism in international relations with particular reference to American international politics during the second Gulf War. Drawing from the work of Etienne Balibar, we argue that a contemporary neo-racism, which is devoid of races, is present in international relations simultaneously as a problem of knowledge and as a problem of political practice. Our aim is to contribute to the strategic movement of international relations theory from a conception of cultural encounters as “threats” to international order and security towards a critique of neo-racism as a continuous source of conflict. The Bounds of Race in International Relations: ReduxRework this section:
The significance of race for IR should not be in doubt: the discourses of the expansion of the European Empires that led to the ‘globalization’ of the states system were conspicuously racialised. The international law that emerged during the period of colonial expansion, involving notions such as ‘extra-territoriality’ (which applied to ‘counties where international rivalry excluded the introduction of direct or indirect colonial rule’) – exempting Western subjects from the laws of formally sovereign non-Western states – included racialized ‘standards of civilisation’ to justify their double-standards (Tinker 1977: 8). Such discourses continued through the emergence of the modern state system outside of Europe. The aftermath of World War I, for example, established both the norm of self-determination and, in the form of the Mandate System, the racialised limits of that norm: where the hierarchy constructed by its standard of civilization corresponded to the colonial race hierarchy (Louis 1985). At this time the international character of racial hierarchies was an explicit issue for discussion in the diplomatic arena, as Japan unsuccessfully fought to have racial equality included as a founding principle in the League of Nations. Racialized discourses in international politics continued after that, as has been well documented. R.J. Vincent reminds us: ‘It was, after all, well into this century, and not at the height of Victorian imperial enthusiasm, that Franklin Roosevelt put forward schemes for the inter-breeding of European and Asian stock to produce a less delinquent Asian race, and Churchill thought in terms of ‘baboos’, ‘chinks’ and ‘Hottentots’’ (Vincent 1982: 666). The conduct and resolution of World War II evidenced racialized understandings of the ‘enemy’ among the Allies, which would go on to construct the international organizations of the contemporary order. In the early post-war period, race and the politics of decolonisation significantly informed the politics of international institutions and the nature of cold war rivalry. Anti-colonial struggles appeared to resolve the issue of race in International Relations in grounding their claims in existing norms of the states system: the norms of self-determination and sovereignty. Self-determination addressed the anti-colonial principle of, as Ali Mazuri puts it, ‘rulers manifestly belonging to the same race as the ruled’, while sovereignty guaranteed the formal equality of political communities and the right to non-interference from external powers (Vincent 1982: 664). This may have been reinforced by the construction of racism and ‘race relations’ as objects of sociological study within industrialised countries in the post-WWII era, i.e., as questions that likewise predominantly took the boundary of the ‘nation’-state as parameters. Nevertheless, this does not provide sufficient explanation for how a discourse as conspicuous as race became removed from the study of International Relations.1 Race does have historically and socially specific articulations. The difficulty of defining the shifting concept of race contributes to the challenge of studying it. However, the process of ‘racialisation’ does not conform to the boundaries of the state.2 Quite paradoxically, given IR’s norm to silence race, many of the social fields through which race has been defined and racial codes have been articulated – nation, culture/civilization, ethnicity – are equally those by which international relations constitute its own boundaries and categories of analysis.
We suggest the work of Etienne Balibar is very useful for beginning to theorise Race in contemporary IR
Defining the New RacismAfter the end of the Second World War, scholars have come to overwhelmingly conceive of racism as a negative social phenomenon, as opposed to its previous status as a legitimate world view or theory. “Race” now can only be conceptualized as a social construct, which along with class, ethnicity and gender, establishes the social boundaries of inequality and discrimination.11 In most mainstream academic and political circles, overtly racist arguments have become if not illegitimate, at least unacceptable. “Race” as the central theoretical principle intended to explain biological and social phenomena no longer constitutes a legitimate object of knowledge. The “racist” intellectual of the pre-second world war era no longer exists as an influential figure, but only appears occasionally in the marginal sites of the ultra right-wing. As Balibar argues, however, with the marginalisation of the traditional forms of racism, a “neo-racism”, which is devoid of “races” but functions in an equally pervasive way through the concept of culture, has emerged as both a legitimate theory/ world view and as widely acceptable form of social practice. Balibar follows Colette Guillaumin and Pierre-Andre Taguieff in the conceptualization of “neo-racism” as a “differentialist” ideology.12 Accordingly, he argues that neo-racism is no longer founded on racial but on cultural difference. Although it shares with other forms of racism the desire for social categorization, which inevitably creates hierarchies, differentialist racism does not assume that difference is inscribed on hereditary, natural traits, but on cultural characteristics. This “racism without races” is, nonetheless, equally essentialist in assuming that the preservation of cultural boundaries is necessary in order to prevent social conflict. Within the logic of neo-racism, ‘culture can also function like a nature, and it can in particular function as a way of locking individuals and groups a priori into a genealogy, into a determination that is immutable and intangible in origin’.13 The main target of “neo-racism” is migration as a process that endangers social order by challenging the boundaries between different cultures. Crossing those boundaries creates (inevitably it seems) a natural aggressive instinct against foreign traditions and patterns: racism appears as a natural instinct, an inevitable reaction to the transgression of the “threshold of tolerance” in each society. Therefore, differentialist racism revisits biologism from a new perspective. The most important aspect of this conception of neo-racism is that it can take both an overtly racist and an anti-racist form. On the one hand, it can be a direct attack on alien cultures and traditions, and, on the other, it offers an (often benevolent humanist) explanation for the intolerant attitudes towards alien cultures and traditions. The latter is what Taguieff has termed “the intolerance of anti-racist discourses”.14 In both cases, what is at stake is the necessity to preserve order by avoiding the proximity of incompatible cultures. Therefore, according to Balibar neo-racism is not a well-structured comprehensive doctrine, but an ideology grounded on antithesis and contradiction. It has no determined agents, it is neither the prerogative of certain nations, nor of certain social classes, institutions or individuals. It operates, instead, in interrelation to humanist universalism, at once its opposite and its condition of possibility.15 There are two implications: Firstly, “neo-racism” can only be conceived in terms of a historicization of racism, which does not follow a strict chronological order. Accordingly, Balibar identifies racism as an ideology that has evolved historically to take different and often antithetical forms (colonialism, slavery, anti-Semitism, National Socialism). In the history of racism there is not linear progression from one model to the next. Instead the past always cohabits the present, even if that is as an impossibility, a negation. Neo-racism borrows elements from past racisms, but also turns against them, and denies their legitimacy. In turn, past racisms continue to exist in the margins of contemporary forms. Although it was born in the mist of decolonisation, “when humanity was torn from within a single political space”, it stands in direct opposition to colonial biologism: race no longer constitutes its basic organizing principle. Furthermore, although it borrows its form from anti-Semitism, the object of hatred is not the Jews. On the contrary, it often appears to be opposed to anti-Semitism having appropriated the defeat of National Socialism after the Second World War. Against the tradition of slavery, external characteristics, such as skin colour or physical features, are no longer considered as signs of inferiority.16 Secondly, neo-racism is constituted at once as “scientific-expert knowledge” and as an amalgam of “local knowledges and practices of the self-evident”. Thus, today expert-scientific knowledge of “differentialist racism” is produced in the name of the peaceful co-existence between different cultures. The main question that it responds to is why it is that social conflict occurs. And the reply that it produces is a common sense one: lack of distance between incompatible cultures. By being a theory that celebrates a world of cultural difference, neo-racism can become equally anti-imperialist and anti-globalization. It is against the destruction of subordinate, minority cultures and deplores the uniformity of universal schemes, while constantly reminding us of the urgent need for the preservation of humanity’s diverse cultural heritage. IR, security and neoracismIn the last decades, the discipline of international relations has undergone a crisis that led to a critique of the basic concepts and theoretical premises that underpinned research and analysis. Within this context, the concept of “security”, which had been traditionally associated with “high politics” and the military aspects of international relations, has been redefined to include migration and culture, topics traditionally associated with “low politics”.17 The interdisciplinary opening towards these “non-military” aspects of security, domains of sociology and anthropology, did not always produce the expected challenges to traditional state-centric assumptions. Security practitioners in Western organizations, such as NATO, sought to redefine their post cold war “raison d’ être” by identifying the dynamics of culture and migration as the new “threats”. Despite serious disagreements and differences over the moral implications and the dangers of “securitisation”, both international migration and inter-cultural exchanges have been discursively anchored to “security threats” to such an extent that, as Huysmans argued, it became almost impossible to escape the “security drama” even when it was an utterance born from a critical perspective.18 It is no accident that one of the most complete articulations of “neo-racism” has been produced by a prominent international relations expert. In the first pages of the “Clash of Civilizations”, one finds three maps used to graphically represent, as the author admits in a simplistic manner, the stages of world order since decolonisation. Huntington’s theory of conflict is founded on an appropriation of anti-racist arguments of the past. Its mapping is not based on racial divisions, but on cultural ones. Yet biologism reappears. Conflict arises naturally once the borders between different cultures break down. There is a natural explanation of human aggressiveness, a trait that is common to all races, to all peoples, a natural reaction. Cultural categories appear as static formations that never change. The effects of cultural difference are biological, natural, eternal. Violent, aggressive instincts always get activated once the frontiers between cultures break down. As a correlate of neo-racism, the clash of civilizations thesis allows for the essentialisation of political communities along new lines, and thus protects certain ontological assumptions of IR’s once dominant school of thought, realism: the hermetic nature of political community and the inevitability of conflict. If racism is an ever present particularist supplement to nationalism, neo-racism functions analogously as through the notion of ‘civilisation’, at once providing the grounds for a shared sense of identity while always threatening to disrupt it. Likewise, it reflects an aesthetic that creates the social terrain for a specific articulation of class and political community: as racism functioned to stratify labour hierarchies through the racialisation of manual labour, neo-racism extends the process to a global labour force through the regulation of immigration to the industrialised world, securitising the population movements of certain classes of people while normalising the population movements of others.19 Furthermore, as racism always contains some potential for obscuring class consciousness, neo-racism can obscure questions of class from international relations, constructing social divisions and conflict as the natural result of ethnic variation to the exclusion of the material. 20 New section The second Gulf War represents a particularly interesting example of neo-racism. The Bush administration has pursued an explicit policy of establishing an aesthetic of racial inclusivity in its public image for domestic and international consumption, such as highly choreographed conventions and town hall meetings and appointments such as Secretary of State and Attorney General. On the other hand, the ‘war on terror’ in Afghanistan and the subsequent invasion of Iraq relied on ‘identifying’ threats articulated through a racialising discourses that deployed cultural rather than overtly biological tropes. We argue that the Bush administration engaged in activating a ‘racism without races’ that remains to a very large extent unproblematised, even by its critics. Indeed, the terrain established by the logic of neo-racism could be said to structure the arguments of Bush’s most visible opponents; Michael Moore’s Fahrenheit 911, for example, likewise juxtaposes an extreme / degenerate cultural other to a racially inclusive American nationalism.21 ‘Racism without races’: aesthetics, security and civilizationGeorge Bush’s public appearances were staged in such a way as to promote an aesthetics of racial inclusion, often positioning “nonwhites” in the background of his speeches and meetings. This strategy has been observed from the very beginning of Bush’s presence in national level politics, including in his campaign materials before the 2000 election.22 High-level appointments, including the Secretary of education, the Secretary of State, National Security Advisor and Attorney General also promoted the idea of an administration dedicated to racial inclusivity.23 This aesthetics – and its articulation to nation and class – was taken up by “allies” of the United States and understood as central to the politics of the “war on terror”. When Tony Blair made the case for bombing Afghanistan to the 2001 Labour Party Conference, he drew attention to the fact that the Secretary of State was a person of color, although misrepresenting his class origins: ‘I think of a black man, born in poverty [he was not], who became chief of their armed forces and is now secretary of state, Colin Powell, and I wonder frankly whether such a thing could have happened here’ (Younge 2003).24 The inaccurate claim that Powell was born into poverty echoes a strong motif in US nationalism, the ‘“American dream” of material success through individual effort’ that is understood to be color-blind (even by many of its most marginalized citizens (Frederickson 1998) The Bush administration’s political aesthetic did not necessarily translate directly into political approval among visible minorities in the United States. Nevertheless, the politics of national unity did seem to transcend racial divisions in the aftermath of 9/11. The well-known and visible head of the hip-hop label Death Row Records, Suge Knight, argued: ‘We’re supporting Bush, we’re supporting the USA. At this moment there’s no such thing as ghetto, middle class, or rich. There’s only the United States’ (Croucher 2006: 181). Bush’s approval ratings in November 2001 reached 89% in the Hispanic population, stronger than his general level of support (Croucher 2006: 198). Such national unity would diminish over time (before even the Katrina disaster), though representatives of visible-minority communities would work to sustain it. Shelia Croucher notes: ‘when an April 2003 Gallup poll showed 78% of white Americans supporting the US-led war in Iraq, and only 29% of black Americans voicing support, NAACP Chairman Julian Bond quickly released a statement emphasizing that the NAACP supports our troops and urging African Americans to do the same’ (Croucher 2006: 193). PATRIOT ACT After September 11th, it was strongly emphasized that it was not on the basis of distinct racial characteristics that enemies were to be constructed, but on the basis of cultural traits. A central section of the PATRIOT act was accordingly dedicated to the “sense of Congress condemning discrimination against Arab and Muslim Americans”.25 This seemingly anti-racist sense was placed at the very beginning of the text, highlighting the significance of a distinction between members and non members of the national community: “Arab Americans, Muslim Americans and Americans from South Asia play a vital role in our Nation and are entitled to nothing less than the full rights of every American”. By negation, this sentence depicts the racist profiling of the terrorists the Act aims to eliminate: Arab, Muslim, and South Asian “aliens” are in fact the omnipresent threat to the Nation. Despite their biological proximity (shame descent), terrorists and minority citizens are thus identified as possessing distinct cultural characteristics. Acquiring the American citizenship signifies an apprentice of superior cultural norms translated into an ethics of individual responsibility, respect for human rights, value freedom and respect for difference. The text of the Act emphasized that it is anti-American to harass and act violently against American citizens of a different race. “The Acts of violence that have been taken against Arab and Muslim Americans since September 11, 2001 attacks against the US should be and are condemned by all Americans who value freedom”. By affirming American cultural values, however, this statement legitimizes -by negation again- the right (if not the obligation) to act violently against Arab and Muslim non American citizens in order to protect the freedom of Americans. Ultimately the test for inclusion is the ability to sacrifice oneself for the Nation and adhere to its moral values, as the example of a 23 year old American of Pakistani descent who has died in the World Trade Centre in an attempt to save fellow citizens exemplifies. Not only are the civil rights, and civil liberties of those “different” Americans to be respected, not only are the crimes against them to be punished, but also the “Nation is called upon to recognize the patriotism of fellow citizens of fellow citizens from all ethnic, racial and religious backgrounds”. Race, therefore is constructed as a cultural ‘fact’ inscribed in national belonging: by acquiring citizenship one is assumed to also to throw away all those negative cultural-racial traits associated with terrorism, while retaining only the more benign features of racial difference (such as color, external biological features, even religious habits and dress code). Thus practices of inclusion and denunciation of racism are interlinked as they establish the boundaries that exclude all those who are to be denied even respect of basic human rights, and legitimize the crimes committed against them. Migration was thus framed as a security issue: under title IV of the PATRIOT Act the Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952 was amended to include several policy measures to enhance border controls, including increased spending for border patrol personnel, improved monitoring technology and a new cross-agency information system that would allow multiple identity control of all applicants for visa entry. As a result, the preoccupation with the safeguarding of the borders of the American nation, which were defined in territorial terms, became the central theme organizing policy discourses of immigration. Aliens were identified as the main threat to national security. Security and civilizationOne of the first themes to be articulated in reaction to the attacks of 11 September 2001, and one of the most enduring, was that the attacks in the United States represented more than mere criminal acts, rather they were attacks on civilization itself. While the official expressions of this discourse typically included assurances that (‘moderate’) Islam and Arabs were not the enemy, the policies that followed engaged in ‘racial profiling’ constructed around perceptions of national origin and religious faith. One of the Bush Administration’s first reactions to the attacks was expressed on 11 September by Colin Powell, who argued: “It’s a war not just against the United States, it’s a war against civilisation”.26 This expression was echoed by Democrats as well: Senator Joseph Biden, chair of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee claimed “This is a struggle between civilization and barbarity” the next day while passing a unanimous resolution condemning the attacks.27 Foreign leaders likewise invoked the idea of civilisation the day after the attacks: the Irish president Mary McAleese claimed it was a crime against civilisation,28 the German chancellor Gerhard Schroder argued it was an attack on the civilized world,29 and British Foreign Secretary Jack Straw argued: “It was an attack on all of us - an attack on freedom and democracy, on civilisation and on humanity”.30 The rhetoric of the Bush administration, and particularly of Bush himself, would become more elaborate, constructing a discourse of war against an enemy beyond the bounds of civilization: an enemy that hides in caves and ‘in the shadows with no regard for human life’ and that ‘can only survive in darkness’.31 As Richard Johnson has observed, ‘these are inhuman, animal and devilish images … fixed and with no history’ (Johnson 2002: 221). When the idea that Iraq played a role in the attacks was introduced in Bush’s January 2002 ‘Axis of Evil’ speech, it was similarly constructed in terms of a ‘regime with something to hide from the civilised world’ (Merskin 2004: 172). (The theme of ‘evil’ and the idea of ‘evil-doers’ would of course also be consistent motifs in Bush’s rhetoric from his earliest statements (Merskin 2004: 166-9).) The Bush administration is not the only government to engage in this discourse of civilization; it is widespread. In the UK, the Blair government uses it frequently, as does the British media; indeed, the Sunday Times reprinted Samuel Huntington’s Clash of Civilizations article the weekend after the attack on the World Trade Center. The then Italian Prime Minster Silvio Berlusconi went so far as to claim explicitly the superiority of Western civilization over Islamic civilization on 28 September 2001.32 The Spanish government called the war on terror a struggle of ‘civilization against barbarism’.33 T.Y. Ismael and John Measor have documented how the frame of the ‘Clash of Civilizations’ structured the discourse of Canadian public officials and the media (Ismael and Measor 2003). The discourse of civilisation is mitigated by assurances that neither Islam nor Arabs are the enemy. As early as 13 September 2001, as a reaction to attacks on people of Middle Eastern and South Asian origin or decent, the US State Department’s Civil Rights Division announced: ‘any threats of violence or discrimination against Arab or Muslim Americans or Americans of South Asian descent are not just wrong and un-American, but also are unlawful and will be treated as such’ {Hassan, 2003 #1213}. On 16 September 2001, Vice President Cheney stated in a televised interview that: ‘The president has been very clear, and it would be a huge mistake for we as Americans to assume that this represents some kind of--or should lead us to some kind of condemnation of Islam. It's clearly not the case. This is a perversion, if you will, of some of these religious beliefs by an extremist group’.34 Such reassurances have underscored the idea of an extremist element. In the UK, Tony Blair has sought to reframe the civilization discourse in ostensibly more inclusive terms. He has suggested, “This is not a clash between civilisations. It is a clash about civilisation. It is the age-old battle between progress and reaction” (Tempest 2006). He argued that Islam in its origins had been inclusive and progressive, while in the 20th century, it had become "uncertain, insecure and on the defensive" (Tempest 2006). This position builds on his response to a 2005 proposal from Spain and Turkey to promote an ‘alliance of civilisations’, which he welcomed ‘as a way of joining "civilised people from whatever race or religion to combat the barbarity of terrorism" (Tempest 2005). While the rhetoric of the threat behind the war on terror appeals directly to civilisations rather than race, the actual response to the perceived threat has involved racial profiling. Racial profiling can be understood as the use of racial or ethnic appearance as a predictor of who is involved in an activity, usually crime or terrorism. It replaces the presumption of innocence and the ‘preponderance of evidence’ with ‘probably cause’ and ‘reasonable suspicion’ (Hassan 2003). The figures for those subject to ‘preventive’ measures in the US vary, due in part to the fact that racial profiling is not recognized as an official policy (though some in Congress, notably Rep. John Conyers, have been pressing towards official recognition that it takes place), nevertheless, the numbers are certainly large. Gary Younge reports, 5,000 men were ‘preventively detained’ and 19,000 sought for ‘voluntary interviews’ in the aftermath of the attacks on the basis of national origin (Younge 2006). In the following year, 170,000 men from 24 predominantly Muslim countries (and North Korea), were subject to interview and fingerprinting under a ‘special registration’ program (Younge 2006). (None of these measures resulted in a terrorism conviction (Younge 2006).) This year the US announced that it wanted the require Britons of Pakistani descent to hold special visas to enter (which the UK would not abide).35 Salah D. Hassan argues: It has become increasingly clear that the Bush administration opposes criminal acts of racial violence against Middle Easterners and South Asians in order to locate unequivocally its own racial policies of exclusion, surveillance and incarceration of Arabs and Muslims within the rule of law. In other words, if Bush succeeded in containing the racist vigilantism that erupted after September 11, 2001, it was only so that the administration could carry out its own legal assault on Arabs based largely on an unstated policy of racial profiling. (Hassan 2003) Practices of racial profiling are enabled by the redefinition of civil rights under anti-terrorism legislation, the Patriot Act most notably in the United States. However, such practices and legislation are not the exclusive domain of the US. Many countries around the world used the attacks on the United States and the climate since then to change their laws. The Economist noted as early as 2002 the widespread response in European countries and the European Union, which focused on new powers to investigate and detail suspects, expanded the scope of what constituted a terrorist organization and actions against asylum-seekers and immigrants, ‘though their motives in doing so have little to do with security’ (Economist 2002). Canada’s Anti-terrorism Act similarly allows for greater powers of surveillance, detention without charge, preventive arrest and the designation of groups as terrorist organizations, both in its own right (which includes ‘sunset’ clauses on some measures) and through changes to existing legislation such as the National Defence Act.36 (The UN Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination has recently sought information on how Canada will prevent ‘racial, religious and ethnic profiling’, largely in response to the case of a Syrian-born Canadian who was deported to Syria, and tortured there, by the US on the basis of Canadian security information.37 The UK, both as a response to 9/11 and the 7/7 London attacks, has several recent pieces of anti-terrorism legislation: the Terrorism bill (2005), Serious Organised Crime and Police Act (2005), Anti-terrorism Crime and Security Act (2001). These too have come under scrutiny vis-à-vis the question of racial profiling: the London police has agreed to publish its stop and search figures in response to concerns of racist spot checking.38 As Mariano-Florentino Cuéllar has observed, since 9/11, racial profiling has become more acceptable as a public discourse (Cuéllar 2003: 13). While some who defend the practice argue unapologetically that different racial groups represent a national security threat,39 other defenders of racial profiling have suggested that because relies on statistical generalizations and treats everyone in a particular category equally, it is amounts to ‘racial discrimination with a non-racist rationale’ (Kinsley 2001). An Arab-looking man heading toward a plane is statistically more likely to be a terrorist.... If trying to catch terrorists this way makes sense at all, then Willie-Sutton logic says you should pay more attention to people who look like Arabs than to people who don't. This is true even if you are free of all ethnic prejudices. It's not racism. (Kinsley 2001) (As should be apparent from our discussion, this view is extremely problematic; not least because it attempts to claim statistical significance for a category as subjective as ‘Arab-looking’, indeed without any specific evidence.40)
Balibar, Etienne and Wallerstein, Immanuel (1998), Race, Nation, Class: Ambiguous Identities (London: Verso). Croucher, Sheila (2006), 'Ambivalent Attachments: The Hegemonic Politics of American Nationhood ', New Political Science, 28 (2), 181-200. Cuéllar, Mariano-Florentino (2003), 'Choosing Anti-Terror Targets by National Origin and Race', Harvard Latino Law Review, (6), 9-41. Doty, Roxanne Lynn (1993), 'The Bounds of 'Race' in International Relations', Millennium: Journal of International Studies, 22 (3), 443-62. Economist, The (2002), 'For whom the Liberty Bell tolls - Civil liberties - Civil liberties since September 11th', The Economist. Frederickson, George M. (1998), 'Presidential Address: America's Diversity in Comparative Perspective', Journal of American History, 83 (3), 859-75. Füredi, Frank (1998), The Silent War: Imperialism and the Changing Perception of Race (Lonton: Pluto Press). Giddens, Anthony (2001), Sociology (4th edn.; Oxford: Blackwell). Hassan, Salah D. (2003), 'Enemy Arabs', Socialism and Democracy, 17 (1), 175-. Horne, Gerald (1999), 'Race from Power: U.S. Foreign Policy and the General Crisis of "White Supremacy"', Diplomatic History, 23 (3), 437-61. Howell, Sally and Shryock, Andrew (2003), 'Cracking Down on Diaspora: Arab Detroit and America's "War on Terror" ', Anthropological Quarterly, 76 (3), 443-62. Hulse, Carl (2000), 'Alabama delegates say racial differences stark', Sarasota Herald-Tribune, 16 August, p. A4. Ismael, T Y and Measor, John (2003), 'Racism and the North American media following 11 September: The Canadian setting', Arab Studies Quarterly, 25 (1/2). Johnson, Richard (2002), 'Defending Ways of Life: The (Anti-)Terrorist Rhetorics of Bush and Blair', Theory, Culture and Society, 19 (4), 211-31. Kinsley, Michael (2001), 'When Is Racial Profiling Okay?' The Washington Post, 30 September 2001, p. B07. Louis, Wm Roger (1985), 'The Era of the Mandates System and the Non-European World', in Hedley Bull and Adam Watson (eds.), The Expansion of International Society (Oxford: Clarendon Press), Chapter 13. Merskin, Debra (2004), 'The Construction of Arabs as Enemies: Post-September 11 Discourse of George W. Bush', Mass Communication & Society, 7 (2), 157-75. Silverman, Maxim and Balibar, Etienne (1991), 'Race, nation and class: Interview with Etienne Balibar', in Maxim Silverman (ed.), Race, Discourse and Power in France (Aldershot, UK: Avebury), 71-83. Tempest, Matthew (2005), 'Blair welcomes 'alliance of civilisations' plan', The Guardian, July 27. --- (2006), 'Blair sees Iraq as 'clash about civilisation'', The Guardian, March 21. Tinker, Hugh (1977), Race, Conflict and the International Order (Basingstoke: Macmillan). Vincent, R. J. (1982), 'Race in International Relations', International Affairs, 58 (4), 658-70. Vitalis, Robert (2000), 'The Graceful and Generous Liberal Gesture: Making Racism Invisible in American International Relations', Millennium, 29 (2), 331-56. Younge, Gary (2003), 'The US, race and war', The Guardian, 11 August. --- (2006), 'At least in America they understand the notion of cultural difference: The US is not free from Islamophobes, but nor is it a racially monolithic culturally static state like Tony Blair's Britain', The Guardian, 11 December. 1 There are very few studies in the field; the most explicit engagements with the question are: Hugh Tinker, Race, Conflict and the International Order (Basingstoke: Macmillan, 1977), R. J. Vincent, 'Race in International Relations', International Affairs, 58/4 (1982), 658-70; Roxanne Lynn Doty, 'The Bounds of 'Race' in International Relations', Millennium: Journal of International Studies, 22/3 (1993), 443-62; Frank Füredi, The Silent War: Imperialism and the Changing Perception of Race (Lonton: Pluto Press, 1998); Robert Vitalis, 'The Graceful and Generous Liberal Gesture: Making Racism Invisible in American International Relations', Millennium, 29/2 (2000), 331-56; Gerald Horne, 'Race from Power: U.S. Foreign Policy and the General Crisis of "White Supremacy"', Diplomatic History, 23/3 (1999), 437-61. 2 It seems then that one is faced with the impossible task of providing a sense of what is meant when one speaks of race and at the same time eschewing definitions of race that bear any resemblance to scientific racism. Doty 3 On the relation between racism and nationalism, Balibar specifies several models of conceptualizing the expression or manifestation of racism – theoretical (doctrinal) versus ‘spontaneous’ racism, internal versus external racism, auto-referential versus hetero-referential racism – but then explains the broad relationship between these phenomena. See: Etienne Balibar and Immanuel Wallerstein, Race, Nation, Class: Ambiguous Identities (London: Verso, 1998), 37-67. 4 Ibid., 50. 5 Ibid., 54. 6 Ibid. . 7 Ibid., 49-50. 8 Ibid., 61 9 Ibid., 209. See: Louis Chevalier, Labouring Classes and Dangerous Classes in Paris during the First Half of the Nineteenth Century, trans. F. Jellinek, Routledge & Kegan Paul, London, 1973. 10 Ibid., 58, 205. As Balibar notes in the preface, ‘For my part, I do not believe that racism is the expression of class structure; rather it is a typical form of political alienation inherent in class struggles in the field of nationalism, in particularly ambivalent forms’. Balibar and Wallerstein, Race, Nation, Class: Ambiguous Identities, 12. 11 On the debates surrounding the usage of the term “race” in relation to class and gender see, Anthias Floya and Yuval-Davis Nira, 1992, Racialized Boundaries: Race, Nation, Gender, Colour and Class and the Anti-racist Struggle (London: Routledge). 12 Colette Guillaumin, 1972, L’ ideologie raciste, genese et language actuel (Paris: Mouton) and Taguieff Pierre-André, 1987, La force du prejuge: Essai sur le racisme et ses doubles (Paris: La Decouverte).. 13 Balibar and Wallerstein, Race, Nation, Class: Ambiguous Identities, 22. 14 Taguieff, p. . 15 Etienne Balibar, 1994, “Racism as Universalism”, Masses, Classes, Ideas (NewYork: Routledge) 16 Maxim Silverman has pressed Balibar on the relationship between ‘neo-racism’ and past racisms, asking, ‘Given that the term “culture” has in the past been used as a euphemism for “race”, to what extent can today's neo-racism be described as a new form of racism?’. Balibar responded that both biological mythology and the discourses of the irreducible nature of culture do the same thing: ‘In the end, the hierarchy is the same but simply adapted according to specific historical needs’ and indeed, ‘cultural difference has always recieved at least as much, if not more, attention than the strictly biological discourse’. Maxim Silverman and Etienne Balibar, 'Race, Nation and Class: Interview with Etienne Balibar', in Maxim Silverman (ed.), Race, Discourse and Power in France (Aldershot, UK: Avebury, 1991), 71-83, 78-79 17 For two antithetical perspectives that share the same need to establish migrationas a security threat see Ole Waever, Barry Buzan, Martin Kelstrup and Pierre Lemaitre, eds., Identity, Migration and the New Security Agenda in Europe (London: Pinter Publishers) and Weiner Myron, 1995, The Global Migration Crisis: Challenges to States and Human Rights (New York: Harper Collins College Publishers). 18 Huysmans Jef, 2002, “Defining Social Constructivism in Security Studies: The Normative Dilemma of Writing Security”, Alternatives, No. 27, February, pp. 41-62. 19 Balibar and Wallerstein, Race, Nation, Class: Ambiguous Identities, 211. Silverman and Balibar, 'Race, Nation and Class: Interview with Etienne Balibar', 79 20 Balibar is quite cautious and critical of overly mechanistic or deterministic views on this. Balibar and Wallerstein, Race, Nation, Class: Ambiguous Identities, 207. 21 This film’s statement of the war should not be seen as one limited to the US context (e.g., it won an award at France’s Cannes film festival though it received no mention at the US Film and Motion Picture’s Academy Awards); nor should neo-racist logic of the Bush Administration’s aesthetic politics of security. 22 Parmelee, Carl Hulse, 'Alabama Delegates Say Racial Differences Stark', Sarasota Herald-Tribune, 16 August 2000 p. A4 23 Greenberg; National/Foreign PICKING OF POWELL, RICE SPURS A PUSH ON AFRICA , Anne E. Kornblut, Globe Staff , 1553 words, 25 December 2000, The Boston Globe, THIRD, A1 24 As Guardian reporter Gary Younge goes on to point out in this piece, ‘the truth is that as prime minister Blair could appoint a black person to the post of foreign secretary any time he wants’. Gary Younge, 'The Us, Race and War', The Guardian, 11 August 2003. 25 H.R.3162 “An Act to deter and punish terrorist acts in the United States and the around the world to enhance law enforcement investigatory tools and for other purposes”, 107th Congress, 1st Session October 24 2004 available at http://epic.org/privacy/terrorism/hr3162.pdf 26 Powell says US will respond to attacks as if at war. By FT.COM STAFF. 930 words 12 September 2001 Financial Times 27 Biden: `This is a struggle between civilization and barbarity.' CARL WEISER Gannett News Service12 September 2001 28 Stunned world leaders voice outrage and condemnation ... 12 September 2001 Yorkshire Post 29 Terrorist attacks 'act of war' says Bush. By FT.COM STAFF. 1097 words 12 September 2001 Financial Times (FT.Com) 30 EU ministers meet with NATO chief on U.S. attack. 203 words 12 September 2001 08:46 AM Reuters News 31 Richard Johnson, 'Defending Ways of Life: The (Anti-)Terrorist Rhetorics of Bush and Blair', Theory, Culture and Society, 19/4 (2002), 211-31, 221 Debra Merskin, 'The Construction of Arabs as Enemies: Post-September 11 Discourse of George W. Bush', Mass Communication & Society, 7/2 (2004), 157-75, 167-9 32 War On Terror - Superstars Unite - FURY OVER PM MUSLIM SLUR. JAMES HARDY. 28 September 2001 Mirror 33 War on terror is struggle of "civilization against barbarism" - Spanish minister. 23 May 2003 BBC Monitoring European 34 ‘Interview: Vice President Dick Cheney discusses the attack on America and response to terrorism’, 16 September 2001, NBC News: Meet the Press 35 US 'wants British Pakistanis to have entry visas' Matt Weaver Wednesday May 2, 2007 http://www.guardian.co.uk/terrorism/story/0,,2070680,00.html?gusrc=rss&feed=1 36 For an overview, see: http://www.cbc.ca/news/background/cdnsecurity/ 37 http://www.cbc.ca/cp/national/070219/n02199A.html 38 Met to give Terror Act stop and search figures, Sandra Laville, crime correspondent, Friday June 1, 2007, The Guardian 39 For example, Malkin, Michelle. "In Defense of Internment: The Case for "Racial Profiling" in World war II and the War on Terror" Washington, DC: Regnery Publishing, 2004 40 For a critique of racial profiling from a US legal perspective, see: Mariano-Florentino Cuéllar, 'Choosing Anti-Terror Targets by National Origin and Race', Harvard Latino Law Review, /6 (2003), 9-41. / Yüklə 74,99 Kb. Dostları ilə paylaş:
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