Assignment from bradley p122-4: 490 persian invasion darius’s Preparations



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ASSIGNMENT FROM BRADLEY p122-4: 490 PERSIAN INVASION

Darius’s Preparations

1 Demands for submission

a Earth and water were signs of submission to Persian rule.

b The Spartans and Athenians killed the envoys

c The Aegean Islands submitted because they were so exposed to attack from the large Persian force (which did subdue Naxos).

d Athens was most concerned that her near neighbour and bitter enemy, Aegina, had submitted as it held such an important strategic position in the Saronic Gulf. Sparta was concerned because Aegina was an ally of hers but had submitted to her enemy, Persia.

e This caused an on-going dispute between the two Spartan kings, Cleomenes and Demaratus, to come to a head. Demaratus was forced to flee and was replaced by Leotichidas.

f Aegina was forced by Cleomenes to send 10 leading citizens to Athens as hostages to ensure it did not go over to the Persians.

2 Recruitment of an army and a fleet

The fleet was recruited from the Asiatic Greek towns in Ionia and Aeolia (VI 47-8) and from Phoenicia (VI 46-7). The army was Persian.

3 Selection of Leaders

Mardonius was not considered as a leader for this expedition. The new leaders were Datis (a Mede) and Artaphernes (Darius’s nephew).



DARIUS’S AIMS

  1. As Ehrenberg argues (p135) Darius wanted to do far more than just punish Athens and Eretria (VI 105). The presence of Hippias indicates that he wanted to have Athens as a pro-Persian base in Greece while the demands for submission (VI 94-5, Hammond p212) and the conquest of Naxos prove Darius had imperial ambitions: he also wanted to add Greece to his empire.

Mardonius’s expedition in 492 looked like an invasion of all of Greece was planned and its failure would certainly have added an extra reason – for revenge (VI 46.)

  1. Hippias was an ex-tyrant of Athens who was now advising Darius. He did not let Darius forget the wrongs done to him by the Athenians, in the hope of being restored as tyrant. (V 95; sought Persian aid against Athens. Ehrenberg p 135)

Developments in Athens

  1. Hammond p210 – tells us that they were bitter enemies yet there had been no military action since 505 BC

Herodotus, V 81 – says theirs was a very old quarrel which led to a surprise attack by Aegina when the Athenian army was fighting Thebes.

  1. Bury p258 tells of a return to hostilities after the fall of Hippias (510). Aegina declared a state of “standing war” against Athens ... called a “war without herald” by the Greeks. Her ships ravaged the coast of Attica and it was expected that she would side with Persia.

  2. Themistocles was the eponymous archon in493-2 had making it Athens’ main port. Piraeus defended, By adding docks he made it a major port and led to his later naval policy ... to take to their ships and defy Xerxes, rather than attempt to defend Athens. (Bury, p263-4; Herodotus VII 142-4)

  3. Political infighting within Athens was the real reason for the impeachment of Miltiades. Hammond (p210) says it was brought by those who favoured Sparta. Ehrenberg (p 132) adds that the people (demos) who supported Themistocles may also have played a role in it.

The route taken by Darius

  1. Follow their route, from Samos, via Naxos and Delos, to Euboea and Marathon. Mark these places on the map.

  2. Darius chose this route to gain control of the Cyclades, esp. Naxos, as well as to punish Eretria and Athens. See Ehrenberg p.134; Herodotus VI 95 – 100; Hammond P.212.

  3. Naxos was defeated and forced to join the Persian Empire; Delos was unharmed as it was a religious centre. The other islands of the Cyclades were “subdued” – presumably they submitted to Persian rule. Carystus, which did not submit, was destroyed.

The fate of Eretria

  1. Hammond tells us (p 213) that Athens had sent 4,000 cleruchs to a site near Chalcis and they were to aid Eretria. Ehrenberg doubts this story (p 135).

  2. In Eretria some citizens wanted to abandon the town and flee to the hills, some wanted to defend the town and others wanted to submit to the Persians. Of these a few were willing to betray the city to the Persians, for their own benefit.

  3. This betrayal took place after 6 days of bitter fighting with heavy losses on both sides. Once inside the walls the Persians enslaved the people, stripped the temples of their treasure and burned the city. (VI 101) 213, VI 101)

The Persian landing at Marathon

The Persians chose Marathon as the battle site for 2 reasons:



  • because it was the closest Attic territory to Eretria and,

  • more importantly, because it was level land which would allow their cavalry to manoeuvre (VI 102). Hammond adds that it was also undefended as the Athenians expected them to land at Phalerum. Ehrenberg also argues that the other 2 Attic plains suitable for cavalry were not as accessible and that it may have been Persian strategy to lure the army away from Athens, allowing them to take it unopposed. He adds that Hippias and his supporters in Athens (p 136) may have played a role (p 141).

Athenian strategy and leadership

  1. The Polemarch (commander-in-chief) was Callimarchus.

  2. The strategoi were a board of 10 who decided what to do in military situations. When they couldn’t the Polemarch was invited to cast the deciding vote.

  3. Herodotus VI 109-112 tells us that Miltiades argued that division between the strategoi would only lead to a Persian victory ... and that would also occur if the strategoi decided not to fight ... but that a quick attack would be successful.

  4. The south end of the plain had great strategic importance (Ehrenberg p138): it was higher ground, less than suitable for cavalry; it guarded the hill road to Athens and the coast road; its slope would also have helped the Athenians to charge at the double. See Hammond p 215 too.

  5. Plataea sent aid because Athens had previously helped her against Thebes. Ehrenberg p 138; VI108-109

  6. (See 3 above)

7 The Athenians waited for several days because:

  • they could as they were defending all paths to Athens

  • they were waiting for help to come,, esp. from Sparta

  • they were unwilling to attack with the Persian cavalry nearby

  • they were waiting for an opportunity to attack. See Ehrenberg p 139-140; Hammond p 215-17

  1. The Persians delayed their attack because:

  • they were able to outwait the Athenians as they could ferry supplies across from Euboea

  • the Greeks were in an easily defended position, so an attack would be wasteful,

  • from their position on Marathon, with their ships on the shore, they could launch a surprise attack on Athens, which is what they seemed to be preparing for on the morning of the battle.

  • The importance of Miltiades tactics is emphasised by Hammond p 215, 217 and Ehrenberg p 140. He also praises the discipline of the Zeugitae class (hoplites).

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