Jürgen Habermas’ Language-
Philosophy and the Critical Study
of Language
Copyright © 2010
Critical Approaches to Discourse Analysis across Disciplines
http://cadaad.net/ejournal
Vol 4 (1): 18 – 37
ISSN: 1752-3079
BERNHARD FORCHTNER
Lancaster University
b.forchtner@lancaster.ac.uk
Abstract
Why is critical discourse analysis (CDA) critical? CDA takes the position of those being
excluded or suffering and, thereby, reminds the audience of modernity’s unredeemed
promises. However, it seems as if critical discourse analysts have understood critique
mainly against the background of their progressive consensus. That is: critical standards
have been based on a conventionalist understanding of what is right or wrong. But this
provides neither a theoretical- nor a grounded notion of critique which has led to
accusations of CDA being unprincipled. In this paper, I argue that especially Ruth Wodak’s
discourse-historical approach (DHA), which draws on the Frankfurt School, could avoid this
by referring in even more detailed ways to Jürgen Habermas’ language-philosophy. For
this, the paper introduces and relates his categories to those of the DHA in order to explicitly
outline an emancipatory and grounded concept of critique.
Keywords: Critique, discourse-historical approach, critical discourse analyses, Jürgen
Habermas, validity claims.
1. Introduction: (How) is ‘Critique’ Grounded in CDA?
1
Throughout the last two decades CDA has become an established academic
tradition – a development which has not challenged CDA‟s pluralistic
character (Wodak 2001a: 11, 2001b: 64; Martin and Wodak 2003: 5; Wodak
and Weiss 2005: 124). Instead of a uniform school, van Dijk rather suggests
that CDA should be understood as a heterogeneous movement. As such, CDA
stands on the shoulders of giants – different giants. That is, CDA‟s different
schools are orientated towards different epistemological underpinnings, such
as (Foucaultian) poststructuralism (Jäger 2001; Jäger and Maier 2009; cf.
also Chouliaraki and Fairclough 1999 but note their explicit anti-relativism),
cognitive approaches (van Dijk 1998, 2001, 2009; Chilton 2003) and the
Frankfurt School, in particular Jürgen Habermas.
The guiding question of this article, why CDA is critical, or rather, how CDA
validates and grounds its own critical standards, is therefore not generally
answerable. Rather, CDA‟s different approaches understand critique in
different ways due to their different underpinnings. Nevertheless, a shared
understanding of critique exist: hidden power structures should be revealed,
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inequality and discrimination have to be fought, the analyst has to reflect on
his own position and make her standpoint transparent.
Even though all branches within CDA emphasis these points, that does not
explain why their critique is particularly reliable or justified. We can notice
the significance of this lack of justification by asking ourselves: why should
CDA argue against discrimination, e.g. racism and anti-Semitism? Since the
end of the Second World War and through an increasing awareness of the
extermination of six million Jews, such positions have become more or less
tabooed in most Western public spheres. This is especially true for academic
communities, in particular in the humanities, which are often based on a
progressive consensus and committed to a seemingly self-evident (more or
less) humanist agenda. But can (or should) such conventions define our
notion of critique? I assume that this alone is not convincing enough to justify
CDA‟s ambitious concept of a „socially transformative teleology‟ (McKenna
2004: 9).
2
Rather, this lack has led to accusations of being biased and
unprincipled (cf. observers like Hammersley (1997) or critics like Widdowson
(1998, 2004) and Stubbs (1997)). Thus, a progressive consensus which is
„biased – and proud of‟ (van Dijk 2001: 96) taking a standpoint against
discrimination has to theoretically justify its understanding of why particular
forms of discrimination should be rejected. Let me be clear: I do not doubt
CDA‟s critical agenda which I, in fact, strongly support but I do think that its
critical standards and praxis, taking a stance against hidden power relations
and various forms of discrimination, need a foundation. In consequence, it is
of crucial importance that critique, being CDA‟s central category, is
theoretically grounded.
Firstly, I will briefly recapitulate the „core CDA‟ (Norman Fairclough, Teun
van Dijk and Ruth Wodak; cf. Blommaert and Bulcaen 2000: 454) which will
evolve into a more detailed review of the DHA and its understanding of
critique. Thereafter, I present Habermas‟ universal pragmatics (later: formal
pragmatics) in order to outline his language-philosophy which provides a –
certainly not the only possible – foundation in support of a normative notion
of critique. Afterwards, the article will link the two programmes and give a
short example. Finally, I summarise this paper‟s main claims.
2. Critique, CDA and the DHA
In order to outline the relevance of the problem I introduced, I will now briefly
recapitulate three of CDA‟s main proponents (cf. also Blommaert and Bulcaen
2000, McKenna 2004). I start with van Dijk who has since the 1980s
investigated racism in the public sphere – taking an explicitly ethical stance
(e.g. 1991, 1993). It can be argued that this is one of the great continuities in
his work; from 1991 when he stated that „the anti-racist point of view (…) of
this book need[s] no further justification‟ (6) to 2001 when he claimed that
„CDA is biased – and proud of it‟. But his position has, at least partly, run into
difficulties. In a recent article, van Dijk defined manipulation as „a form of
illegitimate influence (…) against the best interest of the manipulated‟ (2006:
360). He continues by pointing to CDA as having always argued against the
(re)production of inequality, identifying this as part of the foundation of CDA
(p. 364). However, these foundations are not yet theoretically justified. What