350 BC
PHYSICS
by Aristotle
translated by R. P. Hardie and R. K. Gaye
Book I chapter 2-3
Part 2
The principles in question must be either (a) one or (b) more than
one. If (a) one, it must be either (i) motionless, as Parmenides and
Melissus assert, or (ii) in motion, as the physicists hold, some declaring
air to be the first principle, others water. If (b) more than one,
then either (i) a finite or (ii) an infinite plurality. If (i) finite
(but more than one), then either two or three or four or some other
number. If (ii) infinite, then either as Democritus believed one in
kind, but differing in shape or form; or different in kind and even
contrary.
A similar inquiry is made by those who inquire into the number of
existents: for they inquire whether the ultimate constituents of existing
things are one or many, and if many, whether a finite or an infinite
plurality. So they too are inquiring whether the principle or element
is one or many.
Now to investigate whether Being is one and motionless is not a contribution
to the science of Nature. For just as the geometer has nothing more
to say to one who denies the principles of his science-this being
a question for a different science or for or common to all-so a man
investigating principles cannot argue with one who denies their existence.
For if Being is just one, and one in the way mentioned, there is a
principle no longer, since a principle must be the principle of some
thing or things.
To inquire therefore whether Being is one in this sense would be like
arguing against any other position maintained for the sake of argument
(such as the Heraclitean thesis, or such a thesis as that Being is
one man) or like refuting a merely contentious argument-a description
which applies to the arguments both of Melissus and of Parmenides:
their premisses are false and their conclusions do not follow. Or
rather the argument of Melissus is gross and palpable and offers no
difficulty at all: accept one ridiculous proposition and the rest
follows-a simple enough proceeding.
We physicists, on the other hand, must take for granted that the things
that exist by nature are, either all or some of them, in motion which
is indeed made plain by induction. Moreover, no man of science is
bound to solve every kind of difficulty that may be raised, but only
as many as are drawn falsely from the principles of the science: it
is not our business to refute those that do not arise in this way:
just as it is the duty of the geometer to refute the squaring of the
circle by means of segments, but it is not his duty to refute Antiphon's
proof. At the same time the holders of the theory of which we are
speaking do incidentally raise physical questions, though Nature is
not their subject: so it will perhaps be as well to spend a few words
on them, especially as the inquiry is not without scientific interest.
The most pertinent question with which to begin will be this: In what
sense is it asserted that all things are one? For 'is' is used in
many senses. Do they mean that all things 'are' substance or quantities
or qualities? And, further, are all things one substance-one man,
one horse, or one soul-or quality and that one and the same-white
or hot or something of the kind? These are all very different doctrines
and all impossible to maintain.
For if both substance and quantity and quality are, then, whether
these exist independently of each other or not, Being will be many.
If on the other hand it is asserted that all things are quality or
quantity, then, whether substance exists or not, an absurdity results,
if the impossible can properly be called absurd. For none of the others
can exist independently: substance alone is independent: for everything
is predicated of substance as subject. Now Melissus says that Being
is infinite. It is then a quantity. For the infinite is in the category
of quantity, whereas substance or quality or affection cannot be infinite
except through a concomitant attribute, that is, if at the same time
they are also quantities. For to define the infinite you must use
quantity in your formula, but not substance or quality. If then Being
is both substance and quantity, it is two, not one: if only substance,
it is not infinite and has no magnitude; for to have that it will
have to be a quantity.
Again, 'one' itself, no less than 'being', is used in many senses,
so we must consider in what sense the word is used when it is said
that the All is one.
Now we say that (a) the continuous is one or that (b) the indivisible
is one, or (c) things are said to be 'one', when their essence is
one and the same, as 'liquor' and 'drink'.
If (a) their One is one in the sense of continuous, it is many, for
the continuous is divisible ad infinitum.
There is, indeed, a difficulty about part and whole, perhaps not relevant
to the present argument, yet deserving consideration on its own account-namely,
whether the part and the whole are one or more than one, and how they
can be one or many, and, if they are more than one, in what sense
they are more than one. (Similarly with the parts of wholes which
are not continuous.) Further, if each of the two parts is indivisibly
one with the whole, the difficulty arises that they will be indivisibly
one with each other also.
But to proceed: If (b) their One is one as indivisible, nothing will
have quantity or quality, and so the one will not be infinite, as
Melissus says-nor, indeed, limited, as Parmenides says, for though
the limit is indivisible, the limited is not.
But if (c) all things are one in the sense of having the same definition,
like 'raiment' and 'dress', then it turns out that they are maintaining
the Heraclitean doctrine, for it will be the same thing 'to be good'
and 'to be bad', and 'to be good' and 'to be not good', and so the
same thing will be 'good' and 'not good', and man and horse; in fact,
their view will be, not that all things are one, but that they are
nothing; and that 'to be of such-and-such a quality' is the same as
'to be of such-and-such a size'.
Even the more recent of the ancient thinkers were in a pother lest
the same thing should turn out in their hands both one and many. So
some, like Lycophron, were led to omit 'is', others to change the
mode of expression and say 'the man has been whitened' instead of
'is white', and 'walks' instead of 'is walking', for fear that if
they added the word 'is' they should be making the one to be many-as
if 'one' and 'being' were always used in one and the same sense. What
'is' may be many either in definition (for example 'to be white' is
one thing, 'to be musical' another, yet the same thing be both, so
the one is many) or by division, as the whole and its parts. On this
point, indeed, they were already getting into difficulties and admitted
that the one was many-as if there was any difficulty about the same
thing being both one and many, provided that these are not opposites;
for 'one' may mean either 'potentially one' or 'actually one'.
3
If, then, we approach the thesis in this way it seems impossible for
all things to be one. Further, the arguments they use to prove their
position are not difficult to expose. For both of them reason
contentiously-I mean both Melissus and Parmenides. [Their premisses
are false and their conclusions do not follow. Or rather the
argument of Melissus is gross and palpable and offers no difficulty at
all: admit one ridiculous proposition and the rest follows-a simple
enough proceeding.] The fallacy of Melissus is obvious. For he
supposes that the assumption 'what has come into being always has a
beginning' justifies the assumption 'what has not come into being
has no beginning'. Then this also is absurd, that in every case
there should be a beginning of the thing-not of the time and not
only in the case of coming to be in the full sense but also in the
case of coming to have a quality-as if change never took place
suddenly. Again, does it follow that Being, if one, is motionless? Why
should it not move, the whole of it within itself, as parts of it do
which are unities, e.g. this water? Again, why is qualitative change
impossible? But, further, Being cannot be one in form, though it may
be in what it is made of. (Even some of the physicists hold it to be
one in the latter way, though not in the former.) Man obviously
differs from horse in form, and contraries from each other.
The same kind of argument holds good against Parmenides also,
besides any that may apply specially to his view: the answer to him
being that 'this is not true' and 'that does not follow'. His
assumption that one is used in a single sense only is false, because
it is used in several. His conclusion does not follow, because if we
take only white things, and if 'white' has a single meaning, none
the less what is white will be many and not one. For what is white
will not be one either in the sense that it is continuous or in the
sense that it must be defined in only one way. 'Whiteness' will be
different from 'what has whiteness'. Nor does this mean that there
is anything that can exist separately, over and above what is white.
For 'whiteness' and 'that which is white' differ in definition, not in
the sense that they are things which can exist apart from each
other. But Parmenides had not come in sight of this distinction.
It is necessary for him, then, to assume not only that 'being' has
the same meaning, of whatever it is predicated, but further that it
means (1) what just is and (2) what is just one.
It must be so, for (1) an attribute is predicated of some subject,
so that the subject to which 'being' is attributed will not be, as
it is something different from 'being'. Something, therefore, which is
not will be. Hence 'substance' will not be a predicate of anything
else. For the subject cannot be a being, unless 'being' means
several things, in such a way that each is something. But ex hypothesi
'being' means only one thing.
If, then, 'substance' is not attributed to anything, but other
things are attributed to it, how does 'substance' mean what is
rather than what is not? For suppose that 'substance' is also 'white'.
Since the definition of the latter is different (for being cannot even
be attributed to white, as nothing is which is not 'substance'), it
follows that 'white' is not-being--and that not in the sense of a
particular not-being, but in the sense that it is not at all. Hence
'substance' is not; for it is true to say that it is white, which we
found to mean not-being. If to avoid this we say that even 'white'
means substance, it follows that 'being' has more than one meaning.
In particular, then, Being will not have magnitude, if it is
substance. For each of the two parts must he in a different sense.
(2) Substance is plainly divisible into other substances, if we
consider the mere nature of a definition. For instance, if 'man' is
a substance, 'animal' and 'biped' must also be substances. For if
not substances, they must be attributes-and if attributes,
attributes either of (a) man or of (b) some other subject. But neither
is possible.
(a) An attribute is either that which may or may not belong to the
subject or that in whose definition the subject of which it is an
attribute is involved. Thus 'sitting' is an example of a separable
attribute, while 'snubness' contains the definition of 'nose', to
which we attribute snubness. Further, the definition of the whole is
not contained in the definitions of the contents or elements of the
definitory formula; that of 'man' for instance in 'biped', or that
of 'white man' in 'white'. If then this is so, and if 'biped' is
supposed to be an attribute of 'man', it must be either separable,
so that 'man' might possibly not be 'biped', or the definition of
'man' must come into the definition of 'biped'-which is impossible, as
the converse is the case.
(b) If, on the other hand, we suppose that 'biped' and 'animal'
are attributes not of man but of something else, and are not each of
them a substance, then 'man' too will be an attribute of something
else. But we must assume that substance is not the attribute of
anything, that the subject of which both 'biped' and 'animal' and each
separately are predicated is the subject also of the complex 'biped
animal'.
Are we then to say that the All is composed of indivisible
substances? Some thinkers did, in point of fact, give way to both
arguments. To the argument that all things are one if being means
one thing, they conceded that not-being is; to that from bisection,
they yielded by positing atomic magnitudes. But obviously it is not
true that if being means one thing, and cannot at the same time mean
the contradictory of this, there will be nothing which is not, for
even if what is not cannot be without qualification, there is no
reason why it should not be a particular not-being. To say that all
things will be one, if there is nothing besides Being itself, is
absurd. For who understands 'being itself' to be anything but a
particular substance? But if this is so, there is nothing to prevent
there being many beings, as has been said.
It is, then, clearly impossible for Being to be one in this sense.
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