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DDW 2011

1

***eLoran CP***


***eLoran CP*** 1

eLORAN 1NC (1/3) 2

eLoran CP-Solvency: GPS Failure (1/2) 4

eLORAN CP—Solvency—Air Power 6

eLORAN CP—Solvency—Solves Land Mobile 7

eLORAN CP—Solvency—Time Synchronization 8

eLoran CP-Solvency: Maritime Navigation 9

eLORAN CP—AT: Less Accurate 10

eLoran CP-AT: eLoran Will be Attacked (1/2) 11

eLORAN CP—AT: Power Outage 13

eLoran CP-AT: Expensive 14

GPS Will Fail (1/2) 15

GPS Will Fail (2/2) 16


eLORAN 1NC (1/3)


CP Text: The United States Federal Government should fully reinstate Long Range Navigation system revision C technology and develop enhanced Long Range Navigation system technology.
eLORAN solves all military and civilian uses for satellites.

ILA 7

International LORAN Association- Authoring Team: Dr Sally Basker General Lighthouse Authorities (GLA) of the UK and Ireland, Commander Joseph Chop US Coast Guard, Colonel J Ron Davis (USAF, Ret.) Booz Allen Hamilton, Captain G Thomas Gunther (USCG, Ret.) Booz Allen Hamilton, Lieutenant Michael Herring US Coast Guard, Mr Francis Hubert DCN Brest, France, Professor David Last GLA Consultant, Dr Sherman Lo Stanford University, Commander John Merrill US Coast Guard, Lieutenant Kirk Montgomery (USCG, Ret.) Symmetricom, Inc, Mr Mitchell J Narins US Federal Aviation Administration, Commander Christopher Nichols US Coast Guard, Dr Gerard Offermans Reelektronika BV, Dr Ben Peterson (Captain, USCG, Ret.) Peterson Integrated Geopositioning, Captain Robert Wenzel (USCG, Ret.) Booz Allen Hamilton, Lieutenant Ronald Wright US Coast Guard 16 October 2007 ‘Enhanced Loran (eLoran) Definition Document’ //DoeS



eLoran services will deliver safety, security and economic benefits to a wide range of stakeholders (e.g. governments, service providers) and users (e.g. aviation, maritime) by: supporting aircraft operations during all phases of flight;  enabling maritime e-Navigation including permanent or temporary virtual AtoNs to be used to mark dangerous waters;  supporting road user charging providing authentication; and maintaining synchronization of wired and wireless telecommunications without the need for expensive external oscillators. The Way Ahead eLoran is an independent, dissimilar complement to GNSS. As such, it will allow PNT users with demanding safety-critical or mission-critical applications to secure their safety, security and economic benefits even when their satellite services are disrupted. eLoran is capable of meeting the accuracy, availability, integrity, and continuity performance requirements for: • aviation non-precision instrument approaches; • maritime harbor entrance and approach maneuvers; • land-mobile vehicle navigation; • location-based services; and • precise time and frequency users.
eLORAN solves the aff without having to send satellites into space.

ILA 7

International LORAN Association- Authoring Team: Dr Sally Basker General Lighthouse Authorities (GLA) of the UK and Ireland, Commander Joseph Chop US Coast Guard, Colonel J Ron Davis (USAF, Ret.) Booz Allen Hamilton, Captain G Thomas Gunther (USCG, Ret.) Booz Allen Hamilton, Lieutenant Michael Herring US Coast Guard, Mr Francis Hubert DCN Brest, France, Professor David Last GLA Consultant, Dr Sherman Lo Stanford University, Commander John Merrill US Coast Guard, Lieutenant Kirk Montgomery (USCG, Ret.) Symmetricom, Inc, Mr Mitchell J Narins US Federal Aviation Administration, Commander Christopher Nichols US Coast Guard, Dr Gerard Offermans Reelektronika BV, Dr Ben Peterson (Captain, USCG, Ret.) Peterson Integrated Geopositioning, Captain Robert Wenzel (USCG, Ret.) Booz Allen Hamilton, Lieutenant Ronald Wright US Coast Guard 16 October 2007 ‘Enhanced Loran (eLoran) Definition Document’ //DoeS

This Enhanced Loran (eLoran) Definition Document has been published by the International Loran Association to provide a high-level definition of eLoran for policy makers, service providers, and users. It was developed in November 2006 at the United States Coast Guard Navigation Center by an international team of authors. Enhanced Loran is an internationally-standardized positioning navigation, and timing (PNT) service for use by many modes of transport and in other applications. It is the latest in the long- standing and proven series of low-frequency, LOng-RAnge Navigation (LORAN) systems, one that takes full advantage of 21st century technology. eLoran meets the accuracy, availability, integrity, and continuity performance requirements for aviation non-precision instrument approaches, maritime harbor entrance and approach maneuvers, land-mobile vehicle navigation, and location-based services, and is a precise source of time and frequency for applications such as telecommunications1. eLoran is an independent, dissimilar, complement to Global

eLORAN CP-- 1NC (2/2)
Navigation Satellite Systems (GNSS). It allows GNSS users to retain the safety, security, and economic benefits of GNSS, even when their satellite services are disrupted. The eLoran System eLoran meets a set of worldwide standards and operates wholly independently of GPS, GLONASS, Galileo, or any future GNSS. Each user’s eLoran receiver will be operable in all regions where an eLoran service is provided. eLoran receivers shall work automatically, with minimal user input. The core eLoran system comprises modernized control centers, transmitting stations and monitoring sites. eLoran transmissions are synchronized to an identifiable, publicly-certified, source of Coordinated Universal Time (UTC) by a method wholly independent of GNSS. This allows the eLoran Service Provider to operate on a time scale that is synchronized with but operates independently of GNSS time scales. Synchronizing to a common time source will also allow receivers to employ a mixture of eLoran and satellite signals. The principal difference between eLoran and traditional Loran-C is the addition of a data channel on the transmitted signal. This conveys application-specific corrections, warnings, and signal integrity information to the user’s receiver. It is this data channel that allows eLoran to meet the very demanding requirements of landing aircraft using non-precision instrument approaches and bringing ships safely into harbor in low-visibility conditions. eLoran is also capable of providing the exceedingly precise time and frequency references needed by the telecommunications systems that carry voice and internet communications.


eLORAN solves positioning and communication over oceans.

ILA 7

International LORAN Association- Authoring Team: Dr Sally Basker General Lighthouse Authorities (GLA) of the UK and Ireland, Commander Joseph Chop US Coast Guard, Colonel J Ron Davis (USAF, Ret.) Booz Allen Hamilton, Captain G Thomas Gunther (USCG, Ret.) Booz Allen Hamilton, Lieutenant Michael Herring US Coast Guard, Mr Francis Hubert DCN Brest, France, Professor David Last GLA Consultant, Dr Sherman Lo Stanford University, Commander John Merrill US Coast Guard, Lieutenant Kirk Montgomery (USCG, Ret.) Symmetricom, Inc, Mr Mitchell J Narins US Federal Aviation Administration, Commander Christopher Nichols US Coast Guard, Dr Gerard Offermans Reelektronika BV, Dr Ben Peterson (Captain, USCG, Ret.) Peterson Integrated Geopositioning, Captain Robert Wenzel (USCG, Ret.) Booz Allen Hamilton, Lieutenant Ronald Wright US Coast Guard 16 October 2007 ‘Enhanced Loran (eLoran) Definition Document’ //DoeS

The world’s shipping industry is experiencing strong growth, which is expected to continue. Ships are getting larger and faster, sea-lanes are becoming more crowded, and crews are increasingly relying on electronic navigation systems to operate in this environment9. The newly proposed concept of e-Navigation will improve safety, security, and protection of the marine environment as well as potentially reducing costs. It will provide bridge officers with all the information they need on a single display. In order to make these critical e-navigation services available, the system will require a supply of position and timing data of exceptionally high accuracy and reliability. This information will come principally from GNSS. But GNSS alone cannot be guaranteed to meet the availability and reliability required. Uniquely, the combination of GNSS and eLoran will do so, with the two systems operating independently of one another, but providing a single combined output data stream. Thus, eLoran is the key that will enable e-Navigation to deliver its full range of benefits and maintain safety through redundancy10. The high availability achieved could also lead to a reduction in the number of traditional physical aids to navigation - lights and buoys – with potentially substantial cost savings. The International Maritime Organization (IMO) sets the navigation performance requirements for systems to gain acceptance into the World Wide Radionavigation System (WWRNS). These apply in harbor entrances, harbor approaches and those coastal waters with a high volume of traffic and/or a significant degree of risk11.

eLoran CP-Solvency: GPS Failure (1/2)


eLoran would constantly be back up GPS – Solves any surprise attacks

Pappalardo 2009

(Joe Pappalardo, Popular Mechanics, Joe Pappalardo is senior editor at Popular Mechanics and a former associate editor at Smithsonian's Air & Space magazine., 12/18/2009 pg online @ www.popularmechanics.com/technology/military/satellites/4318471//arjun)

But his language describes LORAN-C, an older system that the Department of Homeland Security last year started upgrading with modern electronics and solid-state transmitters. Users of the improved system, called eLORAN, would acquire and track signals from ground stations in much the same way they triangulate signals from multiple satellite feeds. The new hardware would add a data channel that can handle more detailed information. The system won't just wait for GPS to fail: eLORAN stations would continually transmit timekeeping data needed for navigation and warnings about coming disruptions. But without LORAN-C there can be no eLORAN; if the Obama administration cuts funding to the older system, the new system won't exist either. Delays facing the satellite program are not all that could go wrong with GPS. Satellites face a myriad of threats and eLORAN's goal was to be there to cover for GPS, especially for commercial ships and the military, in a pinch. The military has backup plans in the event that GPS fails or is shut down, but some civilian consumers would be left with useless or unreliable devices. On Capitol Hill, some politicians are rallying to defend the eLORAN program. "The federal government has already invested $160 million in modernizing LORAN," Sen. Susan Collins (R-Maine) told Homeland Security Secretary Janet Napolitano during a hearing last week. "Discontinuing the entire program would leave the nation without a backup to the GPS program, wasting millions of dollars already spent."
eLoran is a good option – works together and backs up GPS

Locus 2005

(Locus, Locus inc. A news company, "A Migration to Enhanced or eLoran," 08/05 pg online @ www.locusinc.com/pdf/Loran%20Brochure_What%20is%20E-Loran%20w%20logo6.pdf//arjun)



Over the past several years, the US Congress has provided approximately $140 million for eLoran infrastructure upgrades, and will approve additional modernization funding for FY2006. This Loran modernization program also involved technical studies by the US FAA and Coast Guard to determine if eLoran can meet their stringent performance criteria, and a benefit/cost study by the Volpe Center. The technical report* on these studies was released in December 2004, and a summary (Appendix C) states: “Both the technical evaluation and the benefit/cost study strongly support retaining a modernized Loran-C system as a part of radionavigation systems provided by the US government.” This report underscores a bright future for eLoran products throughout the world. In today’s age of technology, and given the changing political and economic conditions which affect our world, many people and their governments recognize that “putting all your eggs in one basket” is rarely a good idea. The idea of GPS as a sole-means solution for timing and frequency applications doesn’t make sense, as the consequences of interruption would be severe. The synergistic nature of Loran and GPS will ensure the continued operation, efficiency and security of critical infrastructures around the globe.
eLoran can work anywhere in the world – is the most accurate replacement to GPS

Basker and Williams – After 2007

(Dr. Sally Basker and Dr. Paul Williams, Research and Radionavigation, General Lighthouse Authorities of the United Kingdom and Ireland, Part of the International Loran Association, PHD in satellite geodesy and Electronic Engineering “Navigating eLoran: Challenges And the Way Forward,”https://docs.google.com/viewer?a=v&q=cache:Ra3PujlAeugJ:www.gla-rrnav.org/file.html%3Ffile%3D652be60e268e09c0d91c5b6a976fbc30+"eLoran"+%2B+military&hl=en&gl=us&pid=bl&srcid=ADGEESi7Y-hA3S2KDnYV_TEdCeUYraswhpOGoPRGut3ULmXKPj66J366CNlwUSOHR3m5HEnaEKVynlyDDXRTrFGZAOpg_k9tlEm7WMPU6E2nG4szV5zajQgChH-kxx3L4DqssVLrEXkU&sig=AHIEtbSX4KRcEqc4dofiXTHtmVHUkCpEYA//arjun)

Enhanced Loran is an internationally- standardized positioning, navigation, and timing (PNT) service for use by many modes of transport and in other applications. It is the latest in the longstanding and proven series of low-frequency, LOng-RAnge Navigation (LORAN) systems, one that takes full advantage of 21st century technology. eLoran meets the accuracy, availability, integrity, and continuity performance requirements for aviation non-precision instrument approaches, maritime harbour entrance and approach manoeuvres, land-mobile vehicle navigation, and location-based services, and is a precise source of time and frequency for applications such as telecommunications. eLoran is an independent, dissimilar, complement to Global Navigation Satellite Systems (GNSS). It allows GNSS users to retain the safety, security, and economic benefits of GNSS, even when their satellite services are disr

eLoran CP-Solvency: GPS Failure (2/2)
eLoran key to backing up GPS

GPS World 2010

(GPS World, The Buisness Technology of Global Navigation and Positioning, "RCTM supports Loran," January 2010 pg online @ EbscoHost - Business Source Complete//arjun)

The article reports on the support of the Radio Technical Commission for Maritime Services (RTCM) for the use and enhancement of Loran service in the U.S. It states that RTCM sent a letter to Janet Napolitano, secretary of U.S. Homeland Security, which asserts that the agency cannot guarantee that termination of the Loran-C signal will not affect the maritime navigation's safety. It also mentions that Loran-C infrastructure is essential as a backup to the country's Global Positioning System (GPS).

eLoran is the best option to prevent against GPS failure

Becker 2009

(Georg T. Becker, Master Thesis, Written at the GPS Laboratory at Stanford University, "Security mechanisms for positioningsystems - enhancing the security ofeLoran," July 30 2009 pg online @ www.emsec.rub.de/media/crypto/attachments/files/2011/03/BeckerMasterthesis.pdf//arjun)

The Positioning, Navigation and Timing (PNT) infrastructure becomes more and more important. Today, most PNT systems are based on the Global Positioning System (GPS). This dependency on GPS makes the PNT infrastructure very vulnerable. Therefore, a backup for GPS is needed in case of attacks on GPS or system failures. One of the most promising backups for GPS is the Long Range Navigation System (LORAN). To be able to be an independent backup for GPS, LORAN is currently being upgraded to enhanced LORAN (eLoran). Civil navigation systems are very vulnerable to jamming and spoofing attacks, as no security countermeasure is used to prevent these attacks. But because these systems are used in more and more critical applications, the threat of attacks and therefore the need for security mechanisms increases. The development of eLoran is a great opportunity to embed security mechanisms into the design of eLoran to make eLoran a secure positioning system. In this thesis, efficient security mechanisms for eLoran are discussed. A modified version of the TESLA authentication algorithm, called adjusted TESLA, is proposed for the eLoran data channel. The main modification is to embed the transmission time of each key into the one-way chain generation. With this modification it can be shown that a key size of 80 bit can provide sufficient security for many years. Furthermore, it is possible to use this key on its own to authenticate the most important information in eLoran, the source of the signal and the transmission time of the signal. In this way, it is not necessary to use a MAC to prevent signal-synthesis attacks. But message authentication is only one step towards a secure positioning system. Only signal-synthesis and counterfeit correction message attacks can be prevented using adjusted TESLA. Other attacks like selective-delay and relaying attacks are still possible. Therefore, additional countermeasures against these attacks are discussed in the last chapter. A new method, called colliding signals, is introduced that can prevent signal-synthesis attacks. Although this method seems to be impracticable for eLoran, it can be a powerful tool in other terrestrial positioning systems.
eLORAN CP—Solvency—Air Power
eLORAN solves airpower.

ILA 7

International LORAN Association- Authoring Team: Dr Sally Basker General Lighthouse Authorities (GLA) of the UK and Ireland, Commander Joseph Chop US Coast Guard, Colonel J Ron Davis (USAF, Ret.) Booz Allen Hamilton, Captain G Thomas Gunther (USCG, Ret.) Booz Allen Hamilton, Lieutenant Michael Herring US Coast Guard, Mr Francis Hubert DCN Brest, France, Professor David Last GLA Consultant, Dr Sherman Lo Stanford University, Commander John Merrill US Coast Guard, Lieutenant Kirk Montgomery (USCG, Ret.) Symmetricom, Inc, Mr Mitchell J Narins US Federal Aviation Administration, Commander Christopher Nichols US Coast Guard, Dr Gerard Offermans Reelektronika BV, Dr Ben Peterson (Captain, USCG, Ret.) Peterson Integrated Geopositioning, Captain Robert Wenzel (USCG, Ret.) Booz Allen Hamilton, Lieutenant Ronald Wright US Coast Guard 16 October 2007 ‘Enhanced Loran (eLoran) Definition Document’ //DoeS

Aviation navigation services support aircraft operations in the departure, en-route, and approach and landing phases of flight. In the US, Loran-C has long been approved by the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) for use by aircraft with certified receivers for flying en-route and making departures and arrivals, but not for the critical approach and landing phases. The much higher accuracy, availability, integrity, and continuity of eLoran does meet the specifications for each of these phases allowing eLoran to support aircraft operations from gate-to-gate. eLoran meets the requirement for non-precision approaches; this means that although eLoran (which has no means of measuring height) will not provide any vertical guidance, it will provide sufficient horizontal guidance. Specifically eLoran meets the requirements for Area Navigation (RNAV) non-precision approaches to Lateral Navigation (LNAV) minimums. For non-precision approaches aviation has the following stringent requirements.

eLORAN CP—Solvency—Solves Land Mobile


eLORAN solves land mobile functions.

ILA 7

International LORAN Association- Authoring Team: Dr Sally Basker General Lighthouse Authorities (GLA) of the UK and Ireland, Commander Joseph Chop US Coast Guard, Colonel J Ron Davis (USAF, Ret.) Booz Allen Hamilton, Captain G Thomas Gunther (USCG, Ret.) Booz Allen Hamilton, Lieutenant Michael Herring US Coast Guard, Mr Francis Hubert DCN Brest, France, Professor David Last GLA Consultant, Dr Sherman Lo Stanford University, Commander John Merrill US Coast Guard, Lieutenant Kirk Montgomery (USCG, Ret.) Symmetricom, Inc, Mr Mitchell J Narins US Federal Aviation Administration, Commander Christopher Nichols US Coast Guard, Dr Gerard Offermans Reelektronika BV, Dr Ben Peterson (Captain, USCG, Ret.) Peterson Integrated Geopositioning, Captain Robert Wenzel (USCG, Ret.) Booz Allen Hamilton, Lieutenant Ronald Wright US Coast Guard 16 October 2007 ‘Enhanced Loran (eLoran) Definition Document’ //DoeS



eLoran will provide PNT data for a variety of land mobile applications, working alongside GNSS.

However, it can also provide the e-Loran compass capability to determine the heading of a vehicle even when it is stationary. eLoran, via the data channel, can authenticate its own and GNSS data when it is used for toll collection or vehicle monitoring. It is perhaps on land that eLoran’s greatly enhanced immunity to jamming compared to that of GNSS will prove to be of the greatest value. eLoran employs high-powered transmitters, so the signals reaching receivers are of much greater strength than those of GNSS and require much more power to jam. Given that radiating significant power efficiently at the low frequency and long wavelength of Loran requires large antenna structures, it is extremely difficult to produce a signal that could jam an eLoran signal over more than a very small local area. In contrast, jamming a GNSS signal even over a whole city (for example, to block a road pricing system) is not very technically demanding. A further important benefit of eLoran’s low frequency signals is their ability to penetrate into places where GNSS signals either cannot be received at all, or where they are intermittent or inaccurate. These include the urban canyons in the centers of major cities. Loran signals have been shown to penetrate reliably into steel shipping containers, refrigerated vehicles and storage warehouses14. This ability has led to the development of systems that track items either of high-value or whose safe and timely delivery must be guaranteed. The tracking of hazardous cargoes also demands the consistent updates and high availability of eLoran-based systems. Unlike aviation and maritime systems, those designed for land tracking applications are generally not required to meet published performance standards. Rather, their performance is normally assessed and optimized for user specific applications.



eLORAN CP—Solvency—Time Synchronization
eLORAN solves global time synchronization.

ILA 7

International LORAN Association- Authoring Team: Dr Sally Basker General Lighthouse Authorities (GLA) of the UK and Ireland, Commander Joseph Chop US Coast Guard, Colonel J Ron Davis (USAF, Ret.) Booz Allen Hamilton, Captain G Thomas Gunther (USCG, Ret.) Booz Allen Hamilton, Lieutenant Michael Herring US Coast Guard, Mr Francis Hubert DCN Brest, France, Professor David Last GLA Consultant, Dr Sherman Lo Stanford University, Commander John Merrill US Coast Guard, Lieutenant Kirk Montgomery (USCG, Ret.) Symmetricom, Inc, Mr Mitchell J Narins US Federal Aviation Administration, Commander Christopher Nichols US Coast Guard, Dr Gerard Offermans Reelektronika BV, Dr Ben Peterson (Captain, USCG, Ret.) Peterson Integrated Geopositioning, Captain Robert Wenzel (USCG, Ret.) Booz Allen Hamilton, Lieutenant Ronald Wright US Coast Guard 16 October 2007 ‘Enhanced Loran (eLoran) Definition Document’ //DoeS

Using GNSS is now the principal method of recovering UTC time world-wide. GNSS is extensively employed as a time source in the telecommunications and many other industries. It provides time with an accuracy of 5 – 100 nanoseconds. eLoran is a viable alternative source of time, since its transmissions are precisely synchronized to UTC. The data channel carries messages that receivers use to identify the timing of each individual eLoran pulse from each station. Other messages on this channel also correct for small variations caused by propagation delays. Employing them allows absolute UTC time to be recovered with an accuracy of 50 nanoseconds. Thus an eLoran timing receiver can serve as a reference clock, a primary source of time, or as an alternative to GNSS; combined GNSS-Loran timing receivers are available commercially. A particular advantage of eLoran over GNSS is the availability of its signals indoors. This avoids the need to install an outside antenna with a clear view of the sky, something that can be particularly difficult (and even expensive) in downtown city-center locations and high-rise buildings. eLoran is also used as a source of precise frequency; frequency is the rate of change of a clock. eLoran timing receivers have been shown to meet the Stratum 1 (1x10-11) frequency standard, even without differential corrections. And this can be done with an indoor antenna!

eLoran CP-Solvency: Maritime Navigation


eLoran key to Maritime Navigation

GPS World 2010

(GPS World, The Buisness Technology of Global Navigation and Positioning, "RCTM supports Loran," January 2010 pg online @ EbscoHost - Business Source Complete//arjun)

It may be moot by the time you read this — the U.S. Coast Guard (USCG) could unplug Loran on January 4 — but the Radio Technical Commission for Maritime Services (RTCM) wrote to Secretary of Homeland Security Janet Napolitano in support of continuing and enhancing Loran service. The letter asserts that it cannot be accurately certified that termination of the operation of the Loran-C signal will not adversely affect the safety of maritime navigation — counter to opinion issued by the USCG Commandant. The RTCM president states that the Loran-C infrastructure is needed to complete the eLoran system to serve as a backup to the U.S. Global Positioning System (GPS). New Technique. Researchers have developed a technique to demonstrate a low-cost backward-compatible way to exploit eLoran to make GPS more robust. The method paves a way for the average GPS user to become a GPS+eLoran use

eLORAN CP—AT: Less Accurate
The old LORAN-C was not accurate but eLORAN is accurate.

Pappalardo 9

Joe Pappalardo, senior editor at Popular Mechanics and a former associate editor at Smithsonian's Air & Space magazine. Recipient of a 2005 distinguished reporting award from Military Reporters and Editors. December 18, 2009 ‘Will Obama Kill Navigation Backup System as GPS Threatens to Fail?’ //Do



eS)

Even as a government watchdog agency warns that GPS navigation satellites could fail, the Obama administration's proposed fiscal 2010 budget has quietly killed the nation's backup navigation system. The Government Accountability Office (GAO) released a report last week warning, "It is uncertain whether the Air Force will be able to acquire new satellites in time to maintain current GPS service without interruption. If not, some military operations and some civilian users could be adversely affected." The report also notes that the current program is about $870 million over budget and the launch of its first satellite has been delayed to November 2009, almost three years late. This GAO report comes at a bad time for the Obama administration, which cut funding for the nation's only backup to GPS from its 2010 budget. The LORAN system, which stands for Long-Range Aids to Navigation, is a network of terrestrial transmission stations, equipped with antennas as tall as 900 feet and staffed with Coast Guard personnel. The network has been on the verge of obsolescence because GPS has a wider range and can transmit more precise information. That's why Peter Orszag, director of Obama's Office of Management and Budget, in an online posting on the White House's website wrote the "long-range, radio-navigation system has been made obsolete by GPS." But his language describes LORAN-C, an older system that the Department of Homeland Security last year started upgrading with modern electronics and solid-state transmitters. Users of the improved system, called eLORAN, would acquire and track signals from ground stations in much the same way they triangulate signals from multiple satellite feeds. The new hardware would add a data channel that can handle more detailed information. The system won't just wait for GPS to fail: eLORAN stations would continually transmit timekeeping data needed for navigation and warnings about coming disruptions. But without LORAN-C there can be no eLORAN; if the Obama administration cuts funding to the older system, the new system won't exist either.
eLORAN is more than accurate enough to meet needs.

ILA 7

International LORAN Association- Authoring Team: Dr Sally Basker General Lighthouse Authorities (GLA) of the UK and Ireland, Commander Joseph Chop US Coast Guard, Colonel J Ron Davis (USAF, Ret.) Booz Allen Hamilton, Captain G Thomas Gunther (USCG, Ret.) Booz Allen Hamilton, Lieutenant Michael Herring US Coast Guard, Mr Francis Hubert DCN Brest, France, Professor David Last GLA Consultant, Dr Sherman Lo Stanford University, Commander John Merrill US Coast Guard, Lieutenant Kirk Montgomery (USCG, Ret.) Symmetricom, Inc, Mr Mitchell J Narins US Federal Aviation Administration, Commander Christopher Nichols US Coast Guard, Dr Gerard Offermans Reelektronika BV, Dr Ben Peterson (Captain, USCG, Ret.) Peterson Integrated Geopositioning, Captain Robert Wenzel (USCG, Ret.) Booz Allen Hamilton, Lieutenant Ronald Wright US Coast Guard 16 October 2007 ‘Enhanced Loran (eLoran) Definition Document’ //DoeS

eLoran meets a set of worldwide standards and operates wholly independently of GPS, GLONASS, Galileo, or any future GNSS. Each user’s eLoran receiver will be operable in all regions where an eLoran service is provided. eLoran receivers shall work automatically, with minimal user input. The core eLoran system comprises modernized control centers, transmitting stations and monitoring sites. eLoran transmissions are synchronized to an identifiable, publicly-certified, source of Coordinated Universal Time (UTC) by a method wholly independent of GNSS. This allows the eLoran Service Provider to operate on a time scale that is synchronized with but operates independently of GNSS time scales. Synchronizing to a common time source will also allow receivers to employ a mixture of eLoran and satellite signals. The principal difference between eLoran and traditional Loran-C is the addition of a data channel on the transmitted signal. This conveys application-specific corrections, warnings, and signal integrity information to the user’s receiver. It is this data channel that allows eLoran to meet the very demanding requirements of landing aircraft using non-precision instrument approaches and bringing ships safely into harbor in low-visibility conditions. eLoran is also capable of providing the exceedingly precise time and frequency references needed by the telecommunications systems that carry voice and internet communications.
eLoran CP-AT: eLoran Will be Attacked (1/2)
eLoran is unjammable and unlike GPS is not vulnerable to attack

Locus 2005

(Locus, Locus inc. A news company, "A Migration to Enhanced or eLoran," 08/05 pg online @ www.locusinc.com/pdf/Loran%20Brochure_What%20is%20E-Loran%20w%20logo6.pdf//arjun)

Loran Most of us are well aware of GPS’ role in navigation, timing and frequency applications. Because GPS is vulnerable to intentional, unintentional, and natural interference, the United States and other governments have placed increased emphasis on technologies that can mitigate overdependence on GPS in these critical applications. Loran is very complementary to GPS and can backup GPS in multiple applications. While GPS technology is satellite-based and high frequency, Loran uses ground-based transmitters and is low frequency. Loran signals are very high-powered, so they penetrate cities, buildings and densely foliaged areas where low level GPS signals are often blocked. From a practical perspective, Loran is virtually unjammable because of its high power. What is Enhanced or eLoran? Enhanced, or eLoran is a Loran system that incorporates the latest receiver, antenna, and transmission system technology to enable Loran to serve as a backup and complement to global navigation satellite systems (GNSS) for navigation and timing. This new technology provides substantially enhanced performance beyond what was possible with Loran-C, eLoran’s predecessor. For example, it is now possible to obtain absolute accuracies of 8-20 meters using eLoran for harbor entrance and approach. Similarly, eLoran can function as a highly accurate frequency source and as an independent source of coordinated universal time (UTC). An eLoran transmission infrastructure is now being installed in the US, and a variation of eLoran is already operational in northwest Europe. There will be a global evolution towards eLoran, and users can anticipate integrated eLoran/GNSS receivers in the near future for a variety of applications



Attacking eLoran is much harder than attacking GPS

Becker 2009

(Georg T. Becker, Master Thesis, Written at the GPS Laboratory at Stanford University, "Security mechanisms for positioningsystems - enhancing the security ofeLoran," July 30 2009 pg online @ www.emsec.rub.de/media/crypto/attachments/files/2011/03/BeckerMasterthesis.pdf//arjun)



In this thesis I discussed the different attacks and countermeasures for positioning systems, focusing on LORAN and eLoran. I showed that attacking eLoran is much more dicult than attacking satellite based positioning systems, due to the high signal strength and the low-frequency. However, LORAN is unprotected to directinjection attacks, as there are no authentication mechanisms or any other countermeasures implemented in LORAN. For the development of eLoran, I propose the use of a very efficient authentication mechanism to increase the security against signalsynthesis and counterfeit correction message attacks. Because of the very small data rate of only about 17 bits/second, only a very efficient authentication mechanism can be used for eLoran. In this thesis, I developed an authentication mechanism called adjusted TESLA. In adjusted TESLA, the time and station information is linked to the one-way chain generation. This results in two major improvements: 1: The time message works like a counter. I showed that introducing a counter makes attacks on the one-way chain much more complex. An attacker will only be able to compute keys that are valid for a short time. 2: As the time and station information is already embedded in the one-way keys, these one-way keys can be used to authenticate the time and station. This makes it possible to completely leave out the MAC, while still authenticating the most important information. I showed in section 6.1.1 that by binding the time information into the one-way chain generation, even keysizes of 80-bit will provide reasonable security. Even when brute-force attacks against 80-bit block ciphers become feasible, attacking the one-way chain will still be very difficult and will exceed the capabilities of most attackers. If the attacker can not test 2 80 keys within a second, the attacker will not be able to attack more than one station at a time. This will limit the attacker in several ways. First of all, the attacker will not be able to launch a selective-delay attack, as at least 4 signals are needed to calculate the exact position. Furthermore, if the attacker only spoofs one signal, this signal will create contradictions if more than 4 signals are available. Hence, the user will be able to detect the attack. The only advantage an attacker gains by breaking one one-way chain is that the attacker will be able to launch a counterfeit-correction attack. But these attacks are limited, as only errors of +/- 600 meters can be introduced. Furthermore, these correction messages can also be double checked using data from dierent stations. Hence, an attacker possessing only keys for one chain has only very limited opportunities to use it. With these results I could show that it is reasonable to use a key size of only 80 bits. For higher security a 120 bit keys can be used. If protection against counterfeit78 Conclusion correction message attacks is needed and enough bandwidth is available for authentication a MAC should be used. My analysis shows that the size of the MAC can be very short to provide sufficient security so that a MAC size of 32 bits

eLoran CP-AT: eLoran Will be Attacked (2/2)
provides sufficient security. To generate the one-way chain efficiently and secure, I propose to use a one-way chain generation based on AES. I also propose to use AES in CBC mode for the MAC generation. The use of AES makes the one-way generation very efficient. With a hardware implementation of the one-way chain generation, it is possible to generate about 2 24 keys per second or more. In one year about 2 25 keys are used so that a 30 year old key can be validate in about a minute. Once the receiver has validated a current key, the key validation will only take microseconds, as only about 60 keys need to be authenticated. (If one key pro minute is sent out) This enables the user to validate one-way chain keys even if the public key is very old. In this way, one one-way chain can be used for many years instead of several small one-way chains that need to be authenticated. In section 6.2 I showed that the keys can be publish directly after the MACs. Because of the very low data rate of the LORAN data channel, the security delay is still big enough in this case. This fact eliminates the disadvantage of TESLA that messages can only be authenticated after a delay. Because the signature size of adjusted TESLA is significantly smaller than that of traditional signature schemes, the authentication delay for adjusted TESLA is much smaller compared to classic signature schemes such as DSA or ECDSA. Message authentication is only the first step towards a secure positioning system. Message authentication on its own can not be used to defend against selective-delay or relaying attacks. But message authentication is a requirement for many further countermeasures such as hidden markers or colliding signals. In chapter 7, countermeasures against selective-delay attacks for eLoran are examined. Hidden markers, the only asymmetric countermeasure against selective-delay attacks known for GNSS systems, can not be implemented in eLoran, as eLoran uses high-power, low-frequency signals. In this thesis I proposed a new method to prevent selective-delay attacks, called colliding signals. The idea of colliding signals is to generate different data at different locations, by making sure that different data packets are lost at different locations. The idea is that if two signals arrive at the same time, these signals will jam each other, so that some data is lost. As the lost data differs at each location, this information can be used to detect attacks. In a selective-delay attack the attacker delays each signal for a different amount of time. However, the attacker will have lost data packets different from the ones lost at the wanted spoofing position. Hence, the attacker will not be able to transmit all data packets that the receiver expects to receive. I used a Matlab simulation to test the performance of the system with realistic parameters for eLoran. The area in which the same signals are lost is quite big (about 3 km2 - 17 km2 ) with the assumed values. Although the values of the simulation were chosen to be realistic for eLoran, implementing this system in eLoran is stillConclusion 79 very difficult. Especially the needed change of transmitter equipment and the additional interference caused by the additional signals make the system impracticable for eLoran. The security achievements do not justify these costs. But although colliding signals are not the desired countermeasure against selectivedelay attack for eLoran, they can be very promising for other terrestrial positioning systems. In systems without the limitations given by eLoran, much better performance can be achieved. Furthermore, in other systems, the interference caused by the additional signals might be negligible. All in all, I showed that the security of positioning systems is very important. Although several ways to achieve better security for positioning systems are known today, there is still a lot of research needed in this area. Several problems remain unsolved, e.g. countermeasures against selective-delay attacks for low-frequency positioning systems such as LORAN or countermeasures against relaying attacks. It is also important to understand the limitations and vulnerability of todays positioning systems. Although more and more applications and infrastructure depends on GPS, civil GPS today is more or less unprotected. This shows the urgent need for better security mechanisms for GNSS systems and the need for an independent and secure backup. eLoran can be a secure and reliable backup for GNSS systems, due to its dierent errors sources and its robustness against over-the-air attacks. As embedding security mechanisms into existing positioning systems is very dicult and time consuming, the development of eLoran is a great opportunity to embed security mechanisms into the design process of this renewed positioning system
eLORAN CP—AT: Power Outage
eLORAN uses an uninterruptable power supply.

ILA 7

International LORAN Association- Authoring Team: Dr Sally Basker General Lighthouse Authorities (GLA) of the UK and Ireland, Commander Joseph Chop US Coast Guard, Colonel J Ron Davis (USAF, Ret.) Booz Allen Hamilton, Captain G Thomas Gunther (USCG, Ret.) Booz Allen Hamilton, Lieutenant Michael Herring US Coast Guard, Mr Francis Hubert DCN Brest, France, Professor David Last GLA Consultant, Dr Sherman Lo Stanford University, Commander John Merrill US Coast Guard, Lieutenant Kirk Montgomery (USCG, Ret.) Symmetricom, Inc, Mr Mitchell J Narins US Federal Aviation Administration, Commander Christopher Nichols US Coast Guard, Dr Gerard Offermans Reelektronika BV, Dr Ben Peterson (Captain, USCG, Ret.) Peterson Integrated Geopositioning, Captain Robert Wenzel (USCG, Ret.) Booz Allen Hamilton, Lieutenant Ronald Wright US Coast Guard 16 October 2007 ‘Enhanced Loran (eLoran) Definition Document’ //DoeS



All eLoran transmitters use modern solid-state transmitter (SSX) and control technology. They have uninterruptible power supplies (UPS) that ensure that any failure of the incoming power will neither interrupt nor affect the transmitted signal. The time and frequency control systems of the transmitter are designed for eLoran operation and they apply phase corrections in a continuous manner. The time reference system uses multiple cesium clocks, or an alternative technology of at least equal quality. eLoran transmissions are synchronized to an identifiable, publicly-certified, source of Coordinated Universal Time (UTC) by a method wholly independent of GNSS. This allows the eLoran Service Provider to operate on a time scale that is synchronized with but operates independently of GNSS time scales. Synchronizing to a common time source will also allow receivers to employ a mixture of eLoran and satellite signals. When an eLoran station is detected as being out of tolerance it is immediately taken off the air to ensure that receivers promptly cease to use its signals. Traditional Loran-C blinking8 is used to show that a station is under test and should not be used.

eLoran CP-AT: Expensive
The only cheap, time efficient solution is eLoran

Basker and William – After 2007

(Dr. Sally Basker and Dr. Paul Williams, Research and Radionavigation, General Lighthouse Authorities of the United Kingdom and Ireland, Part of the International Loran Association, PHD in satellite geodesy and Electronic Engineering “Navigating eLoran: Challenges And the Way Forward,”https://docs.google.com/viewer?a=v&q=cache:Ra3PujlAeugJ:www.gla-rrnav.org/file.html%3Ffile%3D652be60e268e09c0d91c5b6a976fbc30+"eLoran"+%2B+military&hl=en&gl=us&pid=bl&srcid=ADGEESi7Y-hA3S2KDnYV_TEdCeUYraswhpOGoPRGut3ULmXKPj66J366CNlwUSOHR3m5HEnaEKVynlyDDXRTrFGZAOpg_k9tlEm7WMPU6E2nG4szV5zajQgChH-kxx3L4DqssVLrEXkU&sig=AHIEtbSX4KRcEqc4dofiXTHtmVHUkCpEYA//arjun)

GPS now underpins much of our critical infrastructure including telecommunications, power distribution, finance, and transport. However, the low-power, high-frequency GPS signals are fragile and vulnerable to all sorts of intentional and unintentional interference. More satellite systems are not the answer: existing low- cost jammers are designed to deny the civil and military signals of all Global Navigation Satellite Systems (GNSS - i.e. GPS, GLONASS, Galileo). The requirement is for resilient positioning, navigation and timing: it needs to be inherently reliable, secured against obvious external threats and capable of withstanding some degree of damage. A single, cross-sector solution that augments GNSS with an independent, dissimilar and complementary system is best for users: they will benefit from economies of scale to keep equipment costs low; existing networks - user, technology, business and regulatory - can be exploited; and this will all lead to lower long-term average costs than any other approach. eLoran is the only candidate that can be deployed in a timely fashion. This paper presents an overview of eLoran in Section 2. In Section 3, the paper discusses the drivers and requirements for eLoran. eLoran technology is briefly described in Section 4 before the GLAs’ eLoran trials in the Orkneys are summarised in Section 5. Finally, future challenges are identified in Section 6.

GPS Will Fail (1/2)


Enemies can easily jam and spoof GPS.

Hopson 10

D.J Hopson March 4, 2010 ‘Addicted to Satellites? Air Force Searches For Alternatives to GPS’ //DoeS

Last week, the Air Force's Chief of Staff, Gen. Norton Schwartz, gave voice to a chink in the U.S. military's armor, one that many know about but few like to discuss in public: Without satellites, modern militaries lose most of their edge. "It seemed critical to me that the joint force reduce its dependence on GPS (Global Positioning System)," he told attendees at a national security conference in Washington. There are two main reasons why a GPS system might fail: spoofing and jamming. Spoofing can trick the GPS system into showing a false location. This is especially dangerous with bombs, unmanned aircraft and missiles that use GPS for guidance. Enemies on the ground can also jam signals from the satellite, while more technologically-advanced foes can fire kamikaze space vehicles that could disable a satellite at a critical moment. Schwartz assured the audience that Air Force researchers are busy designing backups to GPS. "The Air Force wants a system that will still be up when, or if, the current system is attacked in some way," says Leemon Baird, a senior research scientist at the Academy Center for Cyber Space Research (ACCSR). "If you have multiple systems it is harder to attack them all."


GPS failure means no detection of natural disasters, loss of hard power, banking crash, treaty violations and poverty.

Krepon 8


Michael Krepon is co-founder of Stimson, and director of the South Asia and Space Security programs. He has championed confidence-building and nuclear risk-reduction measures between India and Pakistan, several of which have subsequently been implemented. He has mentored more than seventy visiting fellows from the region, and has worked on the general outlines of a Kashmir settlement. Krepon is the author or editor of thirteen books, and more than 350 articles. Prior to co-founding Stimson, he worked at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, the US Arms Control and Disarmament Agency during the Carter administration, and in the US House of Representatives, assisting Congressman Norm Dicks. Krepon's current research focus is on nuclear stability and crisis management in South Asia. His work on space security centers around the promotion of a code of conduct for responsible space-faring nations, which has subsequently been endorsed by the European Union and the Obama administration. October 06, 2008 ‘Space: A Code of Conduct’ //DoeS

Satellites are indispensable and vulnerable. Satellites perform essential military functions. They provide early warning of missile launches and offensive military preparations. They provide intelligence to monitor compliance with treaties, or the emergence of new security challenges. They help soldiers communicate and navigate in unfamiliar terrain. Satellites also guide weapons to their targets. They help many countries, rich and poor, to manage and develop their natural resources. Satellites provide early warning of disastrous storms, and help to pin-point relief efforts. They are essential for communication and global commerce. Emergency cell phone calls and pagers depend on satellites. Many essential services, including those provided by the medical and banking professions, would break down if satellites fail. Anti-satellite weapons have been tested recently by China and the United States, and many military technologies can be adapted to harm satellites. The challenge we face is how to best assure that US satellites will remain available to advance US national and economic security.

GPS Will Fail (2/2)


Solar flares mean GPS will fail.

Lochhaas 10

Tom Lochhaas, writer in developing college-level textbooks and ancillaries, working independently for several publishers. Full-time faculty teaching writing courses at UCLA. June 10, 2010 //DoeS

Scientists are saying the sun is entering a period of more intensive solar flare activity that may disrupt GPS satellite signals in the near future. Solar activity is expected to peak in 2011-12 after a decade of low activity. Since GPS consumer devices were in much less widespread use during the last flare-up, no one knows for sure what effects to expect. But solar flares could incapacitate GPS navigation devices for short periods or could produce position errors. This has some obvious serious implications for marine navigation.


Last printed 9/4/2009 07:00:00 PM




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