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ELECTRONIC JOURNAL FOR PHILOSOPHY
ISSN 1211-0442 6/2009
Pathos, Pleasure and the Ethical Life
in Aristippus
Kristian Urstad
University of Economics
Prague
K. Urstad
Pathos, Pleasure and the Ethical Life
2
Abstract
For many of the ancient Greek philosophers, the ethical life was understood to be
closely tied up with important notions like rational integrity, self-control, self-
sufficiency, and so on. Because of this, feeling or passion (pathos), and in particular,
pleasure, was viewed with suspicion. There was a general insistence on drawing up a
sharp contrast between a life of virtue on the one hand and one of pleasure on the
other. While virtue was regarded as rational and as integral to advancing one’s well-
being or happiness and safeguarding one’s autonomy, pleasure was viewed as
largely irrational and as something that usually undermines a life of reason, self-
control and self-sufficiency. I want to try to show that the hedonist Aristippus of
Cyrene, a student and contemporary of Socrates, was unique in not drawing up such
a sharp contrast. Aristippus, I argue, might be seen to be challenging the conception
of passion and pleasure connected to loss of self-control and hubristic behavior. Not
only do I try to show that pleasure according to Aristippus is much more
comprehensive or inclusive than it is usually taken to be, but that a certain kind of
control and self-possession play an important part in his conception of pleasure and
in his hedonism as a whole.
K. Urstad
Pathos, Pleasure and the Ethical Life
3
For many of the ancient Greek philosophers, the ethical life was understood to be
closely tied up with notions like rational integrity, self-control, self-sufficiency, and
so on. Because of this, feeling or passion (pathos), and in particular, pleasure, was
viewed with suspicion. There was a general insistence on drawing up a sharp
contrast between a life of virtue on the one hand and one of pleasure on the other.
While virtue was regarded as rational and as integral to advancing one’s well-being
or happiness and safeguarding one’s autonomy, pleasure was viewed as largely
irrational and as something that usually undermines a life of reason, self-control and
self-sufficiency.
I want to try to show that Aristippus of Cyrene, a student and contemporary of
Socrates, did not draw up such a sharp contrast. This may seem surprising since
Aristippus is traditionally understood as a sybaritic hedonist, someone who only
cares for physical pleasures at the expense of any concern for such ethical notions,
like self-control and rational integrity. But this traditional interpretation, I will argue,
is simply not correct. Rather, Aristippus, I claim, might be seen to be challenging the
conception of passion and pleasure connected to loss of self-control and hubristic
behavior. Not only do I try to show that pleasure according to Aristippus is much
more comprehensive or inclusive than it is usually taken to be, but that a certain kind
of control and self-possession play an important part in his conception of pleasure
and in his hedonism as a whole.
I proceed in roughly four stages. First, I argue against that aspect of traditional
interpretation which has Aristippus tagged as someone upholding exclusively a
sybaritic view of pleasure. I contend that a careful reading of the testimony reveals
no such exclusivity on his part. Second, I take a closer look at Aristippus’ intellectual
context and influences with respect to the notion of pleasure. This supplies us with
further reason, I argue, to suppose that Aristippus would not have construed
pleasure so narrowly. Third, I attempt to uncover a more positive account of
Aristippus’ notion of pleasure. And finally, I speculate on the ethical significance of
pleasure according to Aristippus.
1
Aristippus is viewed, both by ancient and modern commentators, as holding a
sybaritic view of pleasure, that is to say, one concerned exclusively with the more
immediate or short-term bodily pleasures, usually associated with appetites for sex,
food and drink. For instance, Cicero attributes to him, in polemical fashion, the view
that pleasure is “an agreeable and delightful excitation of the sense, which is what
even dumb cattle, if they could speak, would call pleasure” (De fin. II 18); and later in
the same work he says that Aristippus held that we are here “like some dull, half-
K. Urstad
Pathos, Pleasure and the Ethical Life
4
witted sheep, in order to feed and enjoy the pleasure of procreation” (II 40).
1
Lucian
dubs him the ‘sophist of pleasant sensations’, and it is clear he has primarily bodily
pleasure in mind since his (Aristippus’) drunken condition prohibits him from
actually speaking in Lucian’s sketch (Vit. auct. 12). A modern example is Guthrie,
who claims that Aristippus “was a hedonist in the vulgar sense of indulging
excessively in food, drink and sex…” and that his “hedonism was of the strictest sort.
Pleasure was confined to bodily pleasure” (1971, 143, 174). And the list is not
insubstantial that goes on in this vein.
2
First, though one must not neglect Aristippus’ more profligate tendencies, since they
are indisputably there, as, among others, the reports of both Xenophon
Let me first begin with this often made claim about sybariticism. Is there really
strong evidence for this view of Aristippus? The answer here must be, not especially,
or at least, not exclusively so. I start with three preliminary but important points
which must be considered.
3
and
Athenaeus
4
clearly point out, such reports should be taken with a large grain of salt.
This is because the ‘voluptuous and pleasure-loving’
5
Second, we should see, in part, some of Aristippus’ apparent levity and crudity as
representing a Socratic trait, namely, his playfulness and ironical mode of
presentation. Like Socrates, Aristippus, through his own brand of shock tactics and
witticisms, wanted to rouse those who hear him to thought.
position of Aristippus no
doubt inspired much contempt from contemporaries and various later thinkers (for
instance, according to Diogenes Laertius, Xenophon, Theodorus and Plato are all said
to have abused Aristippus because of his position on pleasure –II 65). And such
contempt most likely expressed itself in exaggerated and scandalizing stories about
Aristippus, where these stories were then in turn used to provide one-sided
illustrations of his position on pleasure. That hedonists, even those of the most subtle
and sophisticated variety, often get tarred with the brush of excess and sensualism,
is, after all, not all that surprising. We need only be reminded of Epicurus who was
slandered by his contemporaries (DL 10 4-8).
6
1
Earlier, in Book I, Cicero states clearly that it is physical enjoyment (corpore voluptatem) Aristippus is after
(23).
2
To mention but a few: Gosling and Taylor, 1982, 40; Rankin, 1983, 200; Kahn, 1996, 18.
3
Xenophon reports that Socrates is aware that Aristippus is intemperate regarding “eating and drinking and
sexual indulgence” (Mem. 2. 1. 1).
4
Athenaeus claims that Aristippus “…lived amid every form of luxury and expensive indulgence in perfumes,
clothes and women.” ( Deip. XII 544b)
5
Quoted from Aristocles, Preparation for the Gospel, XIV. 18. 31.
6
See Rankin, 1983, 199.
Thus we ought not
always take all the scandalizing and profligate things Aristippus says or does as
entirely and accurately representing the underlying view or theory on his part.
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