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Global trends in cbrn terrorism: Implications for pathogen security Dr Robert Stagg
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tarix | 19.10.2018 | ölçüsü | 2,05 Mb. | | #74945 |
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Global trends in CBRN terrorism: Implications for pathogen security Dr Robert Stagg Department of Defence
The CBRN terrorism threat in context… Terrorism is likely to remain the preferred tactic of non-state actors to violently address grievances Most terrorist groups have and will probably remain ‘tactically conservative’ - Explosives will continue to be the overwhelmingly preferred tactic
Some will continue to seek CBRN to achieve tactical and/or strategic goals - Most organisations don’t start with CBRN but escalate
- Potential to increase fear, attention and scale
- Requires a degree of organisational learning
- Acquisition of expertise and material
WMD vs. CBRN Mass casualties can be achieved without CBRN - 9/11 attacks killed 3000 people after hijacking four planes with box cutters
Most interest in CBRN is not for the purposes of causing mass casualties - Typically insurgents pursuing discreet and small-scale targets
But… CBRN attacks do represent one of the most viable ways for terrorists to inflict mass casualties
Who pursues CBRN? Lone actors – with personal grievances and ready access to CBRN materials or expertise. eg 2001 ‘Amerithrax’ attacks - A small proportion of insurgents invariably consider CBRN
- Discreet targets, low scale, crude in nature
Religious cults - perpetrators of historical CB attacks Terrorists with local grievances - Political, nationalist, religious, issue-motivated
- Low-level interest in CBRN that is rarely put into practice
Violent global Jihadists (AQ and AQ-inspired) - Seek WMD-like CBRN capabilities
- Prepared to invest time and resources in sophisticated effort
Crude vs. sophisticated Crude Extension of conventional tactics and goals Often improvised or requires little preparation Requires minimal expertise and uses readily available materials Purchase or theft of off-the-shelf toxic chemicals or radiological material Dispersal by IEDs, food supplies, conventional munitions Expect low scale casualties Sophisticated Usually for the explicit purpose of causing mass casualties (civilian targets) Requires access to specialised expertise – experienced scientists Requires specialised materials – CW agents, BW agents, fissile material Technical challenge of weaponisation (varying difficulty) Time consuming and relatively heavy investment of resources Potential to cause tens of thousands of casualties
Examples of crude CBR terrorism Crude CBR devices incorporate readily available materials - Require little to no manipulation – cyanides, pesticides, chlorine…
- Terrorists utilise existing expertise – recognition of additional fear factor, increased casualties & complication of the response process
- Most cases use explosives to disseminate the CBR material
Chlorine IEDs in Iraq (AQI), acid IEDs in Thailand
Comparative difficulty
Sophisticated CBRN over time
Rajneeshees: The first sophisticated CBRN terrorists (1984) Religious cult who sought to win County elections (USA) Aimed to incapacitate opposition voters
Aum Shinrikyo: The most sophisticated CBRN effort A Japanese-based apocalyptic cult > 10 000 members including dozens of scientists with post-graduate qualifications Hundreds of millions of dollars of assets WMD development was the centrepiece of the group’s goals - Investigated acquisition of fissile material
- 1993 – commenced program to manufacture VX and sarin
- 1994 – Tested sarin and VX on sheep in Australia
- 1994 – Used sarin in assassination attempts – 7 killed
- 1995 – Tokyo subway attack – sarin kills 12, thousands injured
- Attempted anthrax attacks – but used vaccine strain
Afghanistan: AQ’s WMD efforts (1999 – 2001) Commenced about 1999 but went unnoticed - Recruited multiple scientists and established multiple labs
Concentrated on traditional agents Outreach to Jemaah Islamiyah to acquire ‘appropriate’ expertise - Recruitment of Yazid Sufaat – a U.S. trained biochemist - to isolate and culture Bacillus anthracis in a laboratory near Kandahar
- Isolation almost certainly failed
Considered weaponisation - Interest in crop dusters for dissemination of agent
Disrupted by Coalition invasion - Removal of safe haven and key operatives
- Without disruption, WMD efforts may have been successful
AQ post 2001 AQ have not realised WMD ambitions (yet) Maintained intent (rhetoric), but what about in practice? - Have they had significant time/ space/ resources to achieve development of relatively sophisticated agents?
Possibility of ongoing highly compartmented projects - Increasingly difficult with CT efforts
AQ doctrine offers religious sanction, strategic preference and practical justification for using WMD and specifically CBRN AQ has been able to influence elements of other groups with overlapping ideology - JI bombings against Western targets in Indonesia
Some groups susceptible to AQ’s influence have greater access to expertise and materials
Bioterrorism: The worst of a bad bunch Bioterrorism probably represents a greater threat than chemical, radiological or nuclear terrorism Compared to bioterrorism: - Radiological terrorism has lower potential to cause casualties
- Nuclear terrorism is very unlikely to occur
- Chemical terrorism has less potential to proliferate
What can bioterrorists achieve? Disruption, annoyance, fear Augment conventional attacks - Increase impact and complicate response to IED attack
Poisoning of food or water - Suitable for attacking a discreet group of people
- But why not use chemicals? Incapacitate instead of kill?
Agricultural terrorism Mass casualties
Bioterrorism threat: a product of intent and capability… ‘Low impact’ bioterrorism could meet the goals of many terrorist groups - Few groups have shown intent in the past
‘High impact’ bioterrorism only meets the goals of very few groups - AQ and affiliates
- ‘Lone scientist’
- Apocalyptic cults
Capability of terrorist group - Financial & logistical resources
- Knowledge/skill acquisition
- Materials & technology acquisition
- Production, weaponisation and delivery
Biological agents of concern Agricultural diseases - eg Foot and Mouth Disease, wheat rust
- Huge costs to a country’s economy
Human pathogens suitable for ‘low impact’ bioterrorism - Salmonella, Shigella, E. coli, influenza and other respiratory viruses, malaria, TB, HIV etc
- Relatively low fatality rate
- The Rajneeshee Salmonella attacks
Human pathogens suitable for ‘high impact’ bioterrorism - Bacillus anthracis, Yersinia pestis, Clostridium botulinum…
- Suitable for weaponisation (inhaled, environmentally hardy)
- High fatality rate
- No terrorist group has ever obtained a suitable strain
Terrorist interest in biological agents Predominantly traditional biological warfare agents - Recognition of state development as weapons
- Volume of reporting and experimental data on internet
- Media coverage of agents eg AQIM & plague
- Preparation by governments to respond to the threat
Bacillus anthracis, Yersinia pestis, Clostridium botulinum, toxins including botulinum toxin, ricin, etc. - Particularly if mass casualties are not a priority
- Selected agent will be influenced by availability & expertise
The science fiction side Artificial manufacture of BW agents - Synthesis of smallpox virus
Genetically modified ‘super germs’ - Interleukin or toxin expressing viruses
Theoretically possible and increasingly within the capabilities of states or elite researchers Non-state actors have shown little to no interest Non-state actors do not have the expertise or resources to attempt such efforts - Exception of ‘lone scientist’?
Successful tactics proliferate Driven by media exposure and ease of information sharing Chlorine IEDs in Iraq - Idea proliferated on the internet and in extremists circles
- Has not resulted in proliferation of chlorine attacks
Consider bioterrorism Expect that once acquired, a BW-suitable agent would proliferate - Highlights the importance of preventing initial acquisition (pathogen security)
Importance of biosecurity
Some thoughts on biosecurity Traditionally, biosecurity has focused on containing the pathogen rather than securing the facility. - Some biosafety practices contribute to biosecurity
Biosecurity requires multiple different security layers that, when combined, dramatically reduce terrorist access to pathogens - Vetting of staff
- Culture of responsibility
- Controlled access to material
- Improved facility security
- Inventory control
- Management of infectious material
Understanding where pathogens are housed - Importance of considering ‘small’ facilities
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