International Political Economy II

国際政治経済 II

(International Political Economy II)

公共政策大学院　 　社会科学研究所　樋渡展洋

2011年度冬学期・水曜３限　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　 　　　 [e-mail]

　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　 オフィスアワー：授業後　

　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　 (またはアポイントメント)

現在の国際政治経済の特徴は政治と経済、政策決定の国際要因と国内要因が交錯することにある。戦後の西側先進諸国の政治経済は「埋め込まれた自由主義」と称され、民主政治の枠内で国内政策による経済発展と社会安定、それに立脚した国家間合意による自由な貿易・資本移動の体制を発展させてきた。近年では、社会主義の崩壊により、民主政体と市場経済の拡大・規範化がもたらされ、政治と経済、政策の国際要因と国内要因の連動関係が一層強化されたといえる。

国際政治経済とは、政府の対外経済政策や国家間の経済関係を説明する際に、経済的要因を前提に、国際・国内政治の影響を理解する学問で、その分析枠組は―

　

対外経済政策・国際経済関係 = 政治的独立変数ベクトル + 経済的制御変数ベクトル　

と表現でき、制御変数に関しては経済学の基礎理論に立脚し、独立変数に関しては国際政治や政治学学の知見を応用する。

講義では、このような国際経済関係の政治的側面の理解に必要な理論枠組近の展開、および最新の実証成果を概観する。特に、（１）システムレベル分析の限界、即ち、国内社会経済の安定とそれに立脚した国家間合意による自由貿易や資本移動が拡大した要因として、貿易・投資拡大に伴う経済利得が民主政府下で、合意に基づき安定的に配分されたこと（「埋め込まれた自由主義」）の重要性。（２）通貨・金融や貿易・投資をめぐる国際的制度化に際しての国内民主制度や国内市場制度整備の重要性。（３）資本移動や貿易拡大が国際・国内の市場統合を媒介に、各国政府に迫る貿易・投資、金融・財政、産業・労働の政策適応や政策規律・政策制約問題。（４）各国が国内民主政や市場制度の脆弱性を補完し、国内政策対応・規律の国際的信認を強化する手段としての投資、貿易、通貨協定や国際経済機関への参加、などに焦点をあてる。最終の２回では、冷戦後の先進国および国際機関の援助や制裁の規定要因を概観して、国際政治経済と外交政策分析の架橋とする。

このように、国際経済関係の規定要因としての国内制度や国際協定に焦点を当てることは、経済危機の世界的伝播の原因究明のみならず、各国の国内対策と国際連携の特徴を理解する上でも重要であろう。そして、経済の国際化に伴い、経済運営と政権維持の両立に迫られた政府の選択肢がどう制約・規定され、それら政府の対立・連携の結果、地域・国際経済関係がどう展開・変容しているかを理解することは、行動主体としての国家・政府が経済政策的合理性と国内政治的妥当性をどう調整するかを考察することであり、それが本講の政策実践的含意であるとともに、本講と国際経済、国際政治、国際経済法科目との補完的相違点である。
授業は以下の形態をとる。まず、テキストは学部学生を念頭においているので、参加者はシラバスで指定された週はテキストの指定箇所（１章程度）を読んで来てＡ４用紙１ページ程度のレジュメを提出する義務がある（全部で７回、計10章）。教室では、最初の５分程度はテキストの内容を確認・復習し、質問点・疑問点を議論した後、講義形式で現状の展開や最近の問題関心に沿った理論枠組や実証研究を紹介して、テキストの内容を敷衍・補足するが、その際も、質問点・疑問点に随時議論できるようにする。

国際政治経済Iの受講や国際経済、国際政治、統計の予備知識は必要でない。講義は公共政策大学院生が対象のため、教科書の理論を更に展開し、かつ最新の実証結果を紹介する高度な内容を準備する予定であるが、それに怯まず挑戦し、基礎的なことでも怖じけず積極的に授業中、質問・発言し、納得することが要求かつ歓迎される。

単位認定は出席、レジュメ（9回分）と筆記試験による。（尚、このシラバスおよび昨年の授業の資料スライドは http://www.iss.u-tokyo.ac.jp/~hiwatari/ からもダウンロードできるようにする。）

Text Book and References

テキストは公共政策事務室でコピーできる。他に法学部研究室図書館や経済学部図書館で閲覧できる。

それ以外文献は学内の端末からe-ジャーナルでダウンロードできる。入手困難な文献については、適宜メール等で連絡のこと.

Text Book

Oatley, Thomas. 2008. International Political Economy: Interests and Institutions in the Global Economy, 4^th Edition (New York: Pearson/Longman　2010)

Related Readings

• 
  Gilpin, Robert. 1987. The Political Economy of International Relations. (Princeton: Princeton University Press).
  
• 
  Gilpin, Robert. 2001. Global Political Economy: Understanding the International Economic Order. (Princeton: Princeton University Press).
  
• 
  Spero, Joan Edelman and Jeffrey A. Hart. 1997. The Politics of International Economic Relations, 5^th Edition (London: Routledge).
  
• 
  Grieco, Joseph M. and G. John Ikenberry. 2003. State Power and World Markets: The International Political Economy, (New York: W.W. Norton & Company).
  
• 
  Stubbs, Richard and Underhill, Geoffrey R. D. 1999. Political Economy and the Changing Global Order Global Power, 2^nd Edition (New York: St. Martin’s Press).
  
• 
  Ravenhill, John. 2005. Global Political Economy (Oxford: Oxford University Press)
  
• 
  Frieden, Jeffry A. and David A. Lake eds. 2009. International Political Economy: Perspectives on Global Power and Wealth, 5^th Edition (New York: St. Martin’s)
  

Introductory readings

• 
  Oatley, Chapter 1
  
• 
  Waltz, Kenneth. 1979. Theory of International Politics (McGrew Hill), Chap 1.
  

I. Beyond System-level Analysis: The Second-image Revived

Week 1: System-level Analysis: Structural realism and liberal institutionalism
Structural Realism and Hegemonic Stability Theory

• 
  Kranser, Stephen D. 1976. “State Power and the Structure of International Trade.” World Politics 28 (3): 317-347. (Frieden and Lake, Chapter 1)
  
• 
  Eichengreen, Barry. 1989. “Hegemonic Stability Theories of the International Monetary System.’ In Richard Cooper et al., Can Nations Agree? Issues in International Economic Cooperation (Washington D.C.: Brookings Institution): 255-298. (Frieden and Lake, Chapter 15)
  
• 
  Gowa, Joanne. 1989. “Bipolarity, Mutipolarity, and Free Trade.” American Political Science Review 83 (4): 135-146.
  
• 
  Lake, David. 1993. “Leadership, Hegemony, and the International Economy.” International Studies Quarterly, 37, 459-489.
  
• 
  Gowa, Joanne and Edward D. Mansfield. 1993. “Power Politics and International Trade.” American Political Science Review 87 (2): 408-20.
  
• 
  Gowa, Joanne and Edward D. Mansfield. 2004. “Alliances, Imperfect Markets, and Major-Power Trade.” International Organization 58 (4): 775-805.
  

Complex Interdependence and Liberal Institutionalism

• 
  Keohane, Robert O.1984. After Hegemony: Cooperation and Discord in the World Political Economy (Princeton: Princeton University Press), chaps. 4-5
  
• 
  Keohane. Robert O. and Joseph S. Nye. 2000. Power and Interdependence, 3rd. Edition (London: Longman), Part 1.
  
• 
  Krasner, Stephen D. 1991.“Global Communications and National Power.”World Politics 43 (3): 336-366.
  
• 
  Powell, Robert. 1994. “Anarchy in International Relations Theory.” International Organization 48 (2), 311-44.
  
• 
  Mitchell, Sara McLaughlin and Paul R. Hensel. 2007. “International Institutions and Compliance with Agreements.” American Journal Political Science 51 (4): 721-727.
  
• 
  Estevadeordal, Antoni and Kati Suominen. 2008. “Sequencing Regional Trade Integration and Cooperation Agreements.” The World Economy 31 (1): 112-140.
  
• 
  Hansen, Holley E., Sara McLaughlin Mitchell, and Stephen C. Nemeth. 2008. “IO Mediation of Interstate Conflicts: Moving Beyond the Global versus Regional Dichotomy.” Journal of Conflict Resolution 52 (2): 295-325.
  

Week 2: System-level Analysis and Political Regimes
Democratic Peace and Commercial Peace

• 
  Barbieri, Katherine, and Gerald Schnerder 1999. “Globalization and Peace: Assessing New Directions in the Study of Trade and Conflict.” Journal of Peace Research 36 (4): 387-404.
  
• 
  Bearce David H. 2003. “Grasping the Commercial Institutional Peace.” International Studies Quarterly 41:347-70.
  
• 
  Gartzke, Eric, Quan Li, and Charles Boehmer. 2001. “Investing in the Peace: Economic Interdependence and International Conflict.” International Organization 55 (2): 391-438.
  

• 
  Gartzke Erik and Quan Li. 2003. “War, Peace, and the Invisible Hand: Positive Political Externalities of Economic Globalization.” International Studies Quarterly 47:561-86.
  
• 
  Gartzke Erik. 2007. “The Capitalist Peace.” American Journal of Political Science 51 (1): 166-91.
  
• 
  Mansfield, Edward D. and Jon C. Pevehouse. 2000. “Trade Blocs, Trade Flows, and International Conflict.” International Organization 54 (4): 775-808.
  

• 
  Oneal, John R. and Bruce M. Russett. 1997. “The Classical Liberals Were Right: Democracy, Interdependence, and Conflict, 1950-1985.” International Studies Quarterly 41: 267-294.
  
• 
  Oneal, J. R., and B. Russett. 1999. "The Kantian peace - The Pacific benefits of democracy, interdependence, and international organizations, 1885-1992." World Politics 52 (1):1-
  
• 
  Oneal, J. R., and B. Russett. 2005. "Rule of three, let it be? When more really is better." Conflict Management and Peace Science 22 (4): 293-310.
  
• 
  Oneal, J. R., B. Russett, and M. L. Berbaum. 2003. "Causes of peace: Democracy, interdependence, and international organizations, 1885-1992." International Studies Quarterly 47 (3): 371-93.
  

• 
  Russett, Bruce M., John R. Oneal, and David R. Davis. 1998. “The Third Leg of the Kantian Tripod for Peace: International Organizations and Militarized Disputes, 1950-85.” International Organization 52 (3): 441-467
  
• 
  Pevehouse Jon C., and Bruce Russett. “Democratic International Governmental Organizations Promote Peace.” International Organization 60 (Fall): 969–1000.
  
• 
  Peceny, Mark, Caroline C. Beer, and Shannon Sanchez-Terry. 2002. “Dictatorial Peace?” American Political Science Review 96 (1): 15-26.
  
• 
  Weeks, Jessica. 2008. “Autocratic Audience Costs: Regime Type and Signaling Resolve.” International Organization 62 (1): 35-64.
  

Regime Types and Selectorate Theory

• 
  De Mesquita, Bruce B., J. D. Morrow, R. M. Siverson, and A. Smith. 1999. “An Institutional Explanation of The Democratic Peace.” American Political Science Review 93 (4): 791-807.
  
• 
  De Mesquita, Bruce. B., J. D. Morrow, R. M. Siverson, and A. Smith. 1999. "Policy failure and political survival - The contribution of political institutions." Journal of Conflict Resolution 43 (2): 147-61.
  
• 
  De Mesquita, B. B., J. D. Morrow, R. M. Siverson, and A. Smith. 2002. "Political institutions, policy choice and the survival of leaders." British Journal of Political Science 32:559-590.
  
• 
  Epstein, David L., Robert Bates, Jack Goldstone, Ida Kristensen, and Sharyn O’Halloran. 2006. “Democratic Transitions.” American Journal of Political Science 50 (3): 551–569.
  
• 
  McGuire, Martin C. and Mancur Olson Jr. 1996. “The Economics of Autocracy and Majority Rule: The Invisible Hand and the Use of Force.” Journal of Economic Literature 34: 72-96.
  
• 
  Weeks, Jessica. 2008. “Autocratic Audience Costs: Regime Type and Signaling Resolve.” International Organization 62 (1): 35-64.
  

Economic Consequences of Political Regimes

• 
  Adsera, Alicia and Carles Boix. 2002. “Trade, Democracy, and the Size of the Pubic Sector: The Political Underpinnings of Openness.” International Organization 56 (2): 229-262.
  
• 
  Aghion, Phillipe, Alberto Alesina and Francesco Trebbi. 2004. Endogenous Political Institutions.” Quarterly Journal of Economics 119: 565-611.
  
• 
  Brender, Adi, and Allan Drazen. 2007. “Electoral Fiscal Policy in New, Old and Fragile Democracies.” Comparative Economic Studies 49: 446–466.
  
• 
  Brender, Adi, and Allan Drazen. 2007. “Consolidation of New Democracy, Mass Attitudes, and Clientelism.” American Economic Review: Papers and Proceedings 99 (2): 304-309.
  
• 
  Cameron, David R. 1984. “Social Democracy, Corporatism, Labor Quiescence and the Representation of Economic Interests in Advanced Capital Society.” in John Goldthorpe (ed.), Order and Conflict in Contemporary Capitalism (Oxford: Clarendon Press), 143-178.
  
• 
  Clague, C., P. Keefer, S. Knack and M. Olson. 1996. “Property and Contract Rights Under Democracy and Dictatorship.” Journal of Economic Growth 1: 243-76.
  
• 
  Deacon, Robert T. 2009. “Public Good Provision under Dictatorship and Democracy.” Public Choice 139:241-262.
  
• 
  Durham, J. B. 1999. “Economic Growth and Political Regimes.” Journal of Economic Growth 4: 81-111.
  
• 
  Down, Ian. 2007. “Trade Openness, Country Size and Economic Volatility: The Compensations Hypothesis Revisited.” Business and Politics 9 (2), Article 3.
  

• 
  Edwards, Sebastian. 1998. “Openness, Productivity, and Growth: What Do We Really Know?” The Economic Journal 108: 383-398.
  

• 
  Frankel, Jeffrey and David Romer. 1999. “Does Trade Cause Growth?” The American Economic Review 89 (3): 379-399.
  
• 
  Greenaway, David, Wyn Morgan, and Peter Wright. 2002. “Trade liberalisation and growth in developing countries.” Journal of Development Economics 67: 229–244.
  

• 
  Hays, Jude C., Sean D. Ehrlich and Clint Peinhardt. 2005. “Government Spending and Public Support for Trade in OECD Countries: An Empirical Test of the Embedded Liberalism Thesis.” International Organization 59 (2): 473-494.
  
• 
  Jones Bejamin F. and Benjamin A. Olsen. 2005. “Do Leaders Matter? National Leadership and Growth Since World War II.” The Quarterly Journal of Economics
  
• 
  Lee, Ha Yan, Luca Antonio Ricci, Roberto Rigobon. 2004. “Once Again, Is Openness Good for Growth.” NBER Working Paper 10749.
  
• 
  Mulligan, Casey B., Ricard Gil, and Xavier Sala-i-Martin 2004. “ Do Democracies Have Different Public Policies than Nondemocracies?” The Journal of Economic Perspectives 18 (1): 51-57.
  
• 
  Papaioannou, Elias and Gregorios Siourounis. 2008. “Democratization and Growth.” The Economic Journal 118 (October): 1520-1551.
  
• 
  Reuveny, Rafael and Quan Li. 2003. “Economic Openness, Democracy, and Income Inequality: An Empirical Analysis.” Comparative Political Studies 36 (5): 575:601.
  

• 
  Rigohorn, Roberto and Dani Rodrik. 2004. “Rule of Law, Democracy, Openness, and Income: Estimating the International Relationship.” NBER Working Paper 10750.
  
• 
  Rodrik, Dani. 1998. “Why Do More Open Economies Have Bigger Governments?” Journal of Political Economy 106 (5): 997-1032.
  
• 
  Rodrik, Dani. 1999. “Democracies Pay Higher Wages.” Quarterly Journal of Economics 114 (3): 707-738.
  
• 
  Rodrik, Dani, Arvind Subramanian and Francesco Trabbi. 2004. “Institutions Rule: The Primacy of Institutions over Geography and Integration in Economic Development.” Journal of Economic Growth 9: 131-165.
  

• 
  Ruggie, John 1982, “International Regimes, Transactions and Change: Embedded Liberalism in the Postwar Economic Order.” International Organization 31 (4), 379-415.
  
• 
  Schultz, Kenneth A. and Barry R. Weingast. 2003. “The Democratic Advantage: Institutional Foundations of Financial Power in International Competition.” International Organization 54 (1): 3-42.
  

• 
  Shi, M., and J. Svensson. 2006. "Political budget cycles: Do they differ across countries and why?" Journal of Public Economics 90 (8-9): 1367-89
  
• 
  Timmons, Jeffrey F. 2010. “Does Democracy Reduce Economic Inequality?” British Journal of Political Science 40: 741-757.
  
• 
  Wright, Joseph. 2008. “Do Authoritarian Institutions Constrain? How Legislatures Affect Economic Growth and Investment.” American Journal of Political Science 52 (2): 322–343.
  

Political Consequences of Globalization

• 
  Eichengreen, Barry, and David Leblang. 2008. “Democracy and Globalization.” Economics and Politics 20 (3): 289-334
  
• 
  Giavazzi, Francesco and Guido Tabellini. 2004. “Economic and Political Liberalization.” CESifo Working Paper 1249.
  
• 
  Gourevitch, Peter. 1978. “The Second Image Reversed.” International Organization 32 (4): 881-912.
  
• 
  Rudra, Nita. 2005. “Globalization and the Strengthening of Democracy in the Developing World.” American Journal of Political Science 49 (4): 704–730.
  
• 
  Li, Quan, and Rafael Reueny. 2003. “Economic Globalization and Democracy: An Empirical Analysis.” British Journal of Political Science 33: 29-54.
  

Week 3: Political Regimes and International Negotiations/Agreements
Commitment, Credibility, and Regimes

• 
  Dai, Xinyuan. 2006. “Why Comply? The Domestic Constituency Mechanism” International Organization 59 (2): 363-398.
  
• 
  Dai, Xinyuan. 2007. “The Conditional Nature of Democratic Compliance.” Journal of Conflict Resolution 50 (5): 690-713.
  
• 
  Dreher, Axel and Stefan Voigt. 2011. “Does membership in international organizations increase governments’ credibility? Testing the effects of delegating powers” Journal of Comparative Economics.
  
• 
  Downs, George W., David M. Rocke and Peter N. Barsoom. 1996. “Is the Good News about Compliance Good News about Cooperation?” International Organization 50 (3): 379-406.
  
• 
  Gaubatz, Kurt Taylor. 1996. “Democratic States and Commitment in International Relations.” International Organization 50 (1): 109-139.
  
• 
  Leeds, Brett Ashley. 1999. “Domestic Political Institutions, Credible Commitments, and International Cooperation.” American Journal of Political Science 43 (4): 979-1002.
  
• 
  Leeds, Brett Ashley and David R. Davis. 1999. “Beneath the Surface: Regime Type and International Interaction, 1953-78.” Journal of Peace Research 36 (1): 5-21.
  
• 
  Lipson, Charles. 1991. “Why Are Some International Agreements Informal?” International Organization 45 (4): 495-538.
  
• 
  Mertha, Andrew and Robert Pahre. 2005. “Patently Misleading: Partial Implementation and Bargaining Leverage in Sino-American Negotiation on Intellectual Property Rights.” International Organization 59 (4): 695-729.
  
• 
  Mitchell, S. M., and P. R. Hensel. 2007. "International Institutions and Compliance with Agreements." American Journal of Political Science 51 (4): 721-37.
  
• 
  Smith, Alastair, and Hayes, David R. 1997. “The Shadow of the Polls: Electoral effects on international agreements.” International Interactions 23 (1): 79-108.
  
• 
  Von Stein, Jana. 2005. “Do Treaties Constrain or Screen? Selection Bias and Treaty Compliance.” American Political Science Review 99 (4): 611-22.
  

Negotiations and Domestic Institutions

• 
  Andrews, J. T., and G. R. Montinola. 2004. "Veto players and the rule of law in emerging democracies." Comparative Political Studies 37 (1): 55-87.
  
• 
  Friman, H. Richard. 1993. “Side-Payments versus Security Cards: Domestic Bargaining Tactics in International Economic Negotiations.” International Organization 47 (3): 387-410.
  
• 
  Kaarbo, Juliet. 2001. “The Domestic Politics of International Negotiations: The Effects of State Structures and Policy Making Processes.” International Interactions 27 (2): 169-205.
  
• 
  Mayer, Frederick W. 1992. “Managing Domestic Differences in International Negotiations: The Strategic Use of Internal Side-Payments.” International Organization, 46 (4): 793-818
  
• 
  Minnich, Daniel J. 2005. "Veto Players, Electoral Incentives and International Commitments: The Impact of Domestic Institutions on Intergovernmental Organization Membership." European Journal of Political Research 44: 295-325.
  
• 
  Putnam, Robert. 1988. “Diplomacy and Domestic Politics.” International Organization 42 (3): 427-460.
  
• 
  Tarar, Ahmer. 2001. “International bargaining with two-sided domestic constraints.” Journal of Conflict Resolution 45 (3): 320-40.
  
• 
  Tarar, Ahmer. 2005. “Constituencies and Preferences in International Bargaining.” Journal of Conflict Resolution 49 (3): 383-407.
  
• 
  Tsebelis, George. 1995. “Decision Making in Political Systems: Veto Players in Parliamentialism, Multicameralism and Multipartyism.” British Journal of Political Science 25: 289-325.
  
• 
  Tsebelis, George. 1999. "Veto Players and Law Production in parliamentary democracies: An empirical analysis." American Political Science Review 93 (3):591-608.
  
• 
  Tsebelis, George 2000. “Veto players and Institutional Analysis.” Governance 13 (4): 441-74.
  
• 
  Tsebelis, George. and Eric. C. C. Chang. 2004. "Veto players and the structure of budgets in advanced industrialized countries." European Journal of Political Research 43 (3): 449-76.
  

International Organizations and Regimes

• 
  Keohane, Robert O., Stephen Macedo, and Andrew Moravcsik. 2009. “Democracy-Enhancing Multilateralism.” International Organization 63 (Winter) 1-31.
  
• 
  Mansfield, Edward D. and Jon C. Pevehouse. 2006. “Democratization and International Organizations” International Organization 60 (Winter): 137-167.
  
• 
  Mansfield, Edward D. and Jon C. Pevehouse. 2008. “Democratization and the Varieties of International Organizations.” Journal of Conflict Resolution 52 (2): 269-294.
  
• 
  Pevehouse, Jon C. 2002. “With a Little Help form My Friends? Organizations and the Consolidation of Democracy.” American Journal of Political Science 46 (3): 611-626.
  

II. Political Economy of International Trade and Investment
Week 4: Domestic Interests and International Trade and Investment

1. 
   Oatley, Chapter 4 (pp. 71-82), Chapter 5
   

Trade and Growth

• 
  Lee, Ha Yan, Luca Antonio Ricci, Roberto Rigobon. 2004. “Once Again, Is Openness Good for Growth.” NBER Working Paper 10749.
  
• 
  Nicoletti, Giuseppe, Stave Golub, Dana Hajkova, Daniel Mirza, and Kwang-Yeol Yoo. 2003. “Politics and International Integration: Influences on Trade and Foreign Direct Investment.” OECD Economics Department Working Papers 359.
  

Trade and Domestic Conflict

• 
  Alt, James E. and Michael Gilligan. 1994. “The Political Economy of Trading States.” The Journal of Political Philosophy 2 (2): 165-192. (Frieden and Lake, Chapter 21)
  
• 
  Alt, James E., Jeffry Frieden, Michael Gilligan, Dani Rodrik and Ronald Rogowski. 1996. “The Political Economy of International Trade.” Comparative Political Studies 29 (6): 689-717.
  
• 
  Hiscox, Michael. 2001. “Class Verses Industry Cleavages: Inter-Industry Factor Mobility and the Politics of Trade.” International Organization 55 (1): 1-46.
  
• 
  Ladewig, Jeffrey W. 2006. “Domestic Influences on International Trade Policy: Factor Mobility in the United States, 1963 to 1992.” International Organization 60: 69-103.
  
• 
  Mayda, Anna Maria and Dani Rodrik. 2005. “Why Are Some People (and Countries) More Protectionist than Others?” European Economic Review 49(6): 1393-1430.
  
• 
  Milner, Helen V. 1987. “Resisting the Protectionist Temptation: Industry and the Making of Trade Policy in France and the US.” International Organization 41 (4): 639-665. (Frieden and Lake, Chapter 23)
  
• 
  Milner, Helen V. and David B. Yoffie. 1989. “Between Free Trade and Protectionism: Strategic Trade Policy and a Theory of Corporate Trade Demands.” International Organization 43 (2):
  
• 
  Milner, Helen V., and B. Peter Rosendorff. 1996. “Trade Negotiations, Information, and Domestic Politics: The Role of Domestic Groups.” Economics and Politics 8 (2): 145-189.
  
• 
  Milner, Helen V., and B. Peter Rosendorff. 1997. “Democratic politics and international trade negotiations: Elections and divided government as constraints on trade liberalization.” Journal of Conflict Resolution 41 (1): 117-46.
  
• 
  Rogowski, Ronald. 1989. Commerce and Coalitions (Princeton: Princeton University Press). (Frieden and Lake, Chapter 20)
  
• 
  Takacs, Wendy E. 1981. “Pressures for Protectionism.” Economic Inquiry 39:
  

Trade and Domestic Adjustment

• 
  Aggarwal, Vinod K., Robert O. Keohane and David B. Yoffie. 1987. “The Dynamics of Negotiated Protectionism.”American Political Science Review 81 (2): 252-273.
  
• 
  Goodman, John B., Debora Spar & David B. Yoffie. 1996.“Foreign Direct Investment and the Demand for Protection in the United States.” International Organization 50 (4): 565-591.
  
• 
  Hathaway, Oona A. 1998. “Positive Feedback: The Impact of Trade Liberalization on Industry Demands for Protection.” International Organization 52 (3): 575-612.