Masaryk university faculty of social studies

MASARYK UNIVERSITY

FACULTY OF SOCIAL STUDIES

Department of International Relations and European Studies



Application of theories of international relations to Japanese post-war development

Diploma thesis

Michal Kolmaš

Supervisor: PhDr. Pavel Pšeja, Ph.D.

UČO: 182016

Field: International Relations

Matriculation year: 2009 Brno 2010

I hereby profess that I have written the diploma thesis Application of theories of international relations to Japanese post-war development alone, using only literature and resources given in the list.

Brno, April 10, 2010 Michal Kolmaš

Here, I would like to thank Dr. Pavel Pšeja for his guidance, consultations and advice he has provided me. Also, I would like to thank everyone who helped me in any way, especially my family and friends.

Table of Contents

Introduction 7

2 Theoretical approach 10

2.1. Neorealism 10

2.1.1. Traditional realism 10

2.1.2. Neorealism 13

2.2. Neoliberalism 15

2.2.1. Liberal theories 15

2.2.2. Neoliberal institutionalism 18

2.3. Neo-Neo debate 19

3 Background for analytical work 21

3.1. Brief overview of Japanese post-war history 21

3.1.1. Centrality of United States 21

3.1.2. The primacy of economic tools 22

3.1.3. Constraints on the use of force 23

3.1.4. No alternate strategic vision 25

3.2. Domestic institutions and foreign policy 26

3.2.1. Policy making model 27

3.2.2. Main actors - bureaucracy 28

3.2.2.1. Ministry of foreign affairs (MOFA) 29

3.2.2.2. Ministry of finance (MOF) 30

3.2.2.3. Ministry of international trade and industry (MITI/METI) 31

3.2.2.4. Evaluation 31

3.2.3. Liberal Democratic Party and the party system transition 32

3.2.4. Zaikai: the business community 37

4 Grounds for application 39

4.1. U.S.-Japan security relations 39

4.1.1. Neorealist approach 43

4.1.2. Liberal and neoliberal approach 46

4.1.3. Evaluation 48

4.2. Japan-China relations 49

4.2.1. Neorealist approach 51

4.2.2. Neoliberal approach 53

4.2.3. Evaluation 54

4.3. Japan and the North Korea issue 55

4.3.1. Neorealist vs. neoliberal approach 57

4.3.2. Evaluation 58

4.4. Japan and multilateral diplomacy 60

4.4.1. Neorealist approach 62

4.4.2. Liberal and neoliberal approach 64

4.4.3. Evaluation 66

4.5. The Japanese constitutional change debate 67

4.5.1. Neorealist vs. neoliberal approach 68

4.5.2. Evaluation 69

Conclusion 71

Resources 75

Suffixes 87

Introduction
Japan is and always has been a very peculiar player in world politics. However, it is only now, that the attention of researchers in the field of international relations has reached the Japanese islands. Even a few decades ago, the research only belonged to “Japan hands”, whose study was more concerned with Asia as a whole. This can most easily be said about thinkers concerned with theories of international relations. Through the viewpoint of international relations theorists, Japan has primarily been a “sui generis” nation, whose political culture, foreign affairs or even the society itself were singular and strange.

Today, those, who explicitly or implicitly see Japan as a nation “sui generis”, have been joined by more systemic thinkers, trying to explain Japan through a broad range of theories of international relations. Some, following the teaching of the neorealist school, regard Japan as a future military superpower, one that will definitely acquire nuclear weapons and force projection capabilities (Waltz 1993, 64-67).

The others, following liberal or neoliberal teaching, see Japan as a modern, liberal and pacifistic country of the future (Rosencranze 1985); a country that “lives” for the international system, multilateral diplomacy and contribution towards the global order (Berger 2007, 259-261). However, these approaches are but a fragment of many different viewpoints, used to look at Japan. These two approaches are more of a major a priori assumptions, which are fundamental within the broader theoretical perspective in the research connected to Japan. The reason is that Japan is still to some extent regarded as a sui generis country, and its international relations in the post-World War II era have been subject to a range of contending interpretations.

Although Japan might have been described from different points of view, it is these two discussions – neorealism and neoliberal institutionalism - which are still taking a major role in whatever theoretical approach we may come across. Even though they are sometimes labeled as insufficient, they still provide considerable explanatory power. And, as Jeremy D. Mayer (1996, 51) points out “Interpretations and predictions about Japan are greatly affected by which set of a priori assumptions about Japan’s place in the structure of world politics is adopted.”

Therefore, this thesis will try to test these a priori assumptions; the applicability of the range of theories of international relations towards Japanese post-war development. Although even post-positivist theories might be considered within the text, the emphasis will be put primarily on neorealist and institutionalist approaches, as these two theories still are the principal means of analyzing Japan’s international relations, reflected in most theoretical academic writings.

Since the hypothesis is that “Japanese line of foreign policy has been changing since the Second World War and especially in the last 20 years”, the thesis will have to provide a broad analysis of Japanese domestic as well as foreign policy making processes; for only through thorough knowledge of the subject matter can the theories be applied holistically. The second hypothesis this thesis is aiming to prove is that the neorealist school of thought gives the most accurate explanations for the dynamics and development inside Japanese politics, and can be most easily used to foresee the changing nature of Japanese politics. This hypothesis will be executed through a comparative analysis lead by the theories; by applying neorealism and institutionalism to a broad range of aspects of Japan’s foreign policy.

For the first hypothesis, this thesis will set up two terms for working with independent and dependent variables. These terms, “reactive” and “proactive”, describe separate stages of Japan’s foreign policy making process, of which this thesis will advocate change towards a “proactive” process. Therefore, the change from a “reactive” foreign policy to a “proactive” one is the dependent variable. To account for this change, five aspects of Japan’s international relations will serve as the elements to account for the independent variable. These elements will consist of five principal notions of Japan’s foreign policy: Japanese security policy and U.S.-Japan bilateral relations; Japan-China relations, Japan-North Korea relations, Japan and multilateralism, and the discussion about constitutional change in Japan. These elements were chosen, because not only are they the most important issues within Japan’s foreign policy, but also they serve as wonderful grounds for a theoretical approach.

This change within Japan’s international relations will then be analyzed by neorealist and institutionalist paradigms, with the second hypothesis, stating that a neorealist approach still provides the best explanatory power when dealing with Japan in international relations. But as theoretical approach is never “truthful” nor “absolute”, the evaluation of the theoretical approach will primarily be executed by the author. This evaluation will be primarily based on primary literature, such as Japanese Ministry of Foreign Affairs-issued security policy outlines, treaties, and bilateral arrangements, as well as on communiqués and speeches by Japanese government officials. Secondary literature will be composed of theoretical books and journals, with emphasis on most influential theorists concerned with the region, such as Kenneth Waltz, Robert Keohane, Joseph Nye, Thomas Berger or John Ikenberry.

Methodology will be anchored in a qualitative approach, since the method of theoretical comparative analysis supported by a significant body of research especially provides explanatory and analytical potential based on a deep understanding of the subject matter. The subject matter is the elements of independent variable; Japan’s foreign policy issues framed within a historical analysis. Only the second part of the 20^th century, though, will be put forth, since within this period, the change in Japan’s policy making is most clearly visible.

I have chosen to write this thesis in English, because it will be a part of my future research outside of the boundaries of the Czech Republic; therefore I have to write it in a more commonly accepted language.

2 Theoretical approach
As I have already stated, this work will be based primarily on positivist theories; therefore it is necessary to describe these theories first. In detail, the primary theories to be used will be the Waltz’s version of neorealism and the set of theories based on the liberal paradigm, commonly addressed as neoliberalist¹.
2.1 Neorealism
Neorealism is a theory based on a classical realist school, which started with Edward Carr and Hans Morgenthau in the inter-war period². However, Morgenthau’s Politics Among Nations (1948) has been deconstructed so many times that by the end of the 1980’s, traditional realism had already changed drastically from what it was when the book was written. Since there are many versions of realist thinking, for the sake of this thesis only the “main” ones will be described and used.
2.1.1 Traditional realism
Realism was a reaction to the international system after the First World War, especially a reaction to newly emerging conflicts in Asia and Europe. Idealism, a leading theory of the inter-war period, relied on rational actions of individuals and thus a peace-forming potential; realists on the other hand, put emphasis rather on power and interests. Edward Carr criticized idealists for relying on ideals, rather than history and scientific methods of analysis. However, Carr did not reject idealism as a whole, since he regarded realism as over-emphasizing causality; for Carr any viable theory should have characteristics of both of the main theories (Plechanovova 2003, 16).

It was the experience of the Second World War that allowed realists to be fully established into international relations theory. The war proved that the ideals propagated by liberalists (such as rationality) were not enough to provide peace. Thus, after the war, a new generation of thinkers had developed, without any connection to pre-war idealism and rejecting legalistic and moralistic foundations of the field. Hans Morgenthau, a German immigrant to the United States, is usually considered as the founder of classical realism, because in his book Politics Among Nations he defined the essential premises of realist thinking. In the beginning of Politics Among Nations, Morgenthau (1948, 1) says:

The theory, (in other words), must be judged not by some preconceived abstract principle or concept unrelated to reality, but by its purpose: to bring order and meaning to a mass of phenomena which without it would remain disconnected and unintelligible.
This phrase defines the basics of the classical realist theory: Realism of various stripes may be said to wish “to go directly to the effectual truth of the thing”, rather than to “the imagination of it”, in particular, refusing to be tempted to lift its gaze from the harsh political “is” by the charms of any wished for political “ought” (Bartlett 1994, 381). “And may have imagined republics and principalities that have never been seen or known to exist in truth; for it is so far from how one lives to how one should live that he, who lets go of what is done for what should be done learns his ruin rather than his preservation” (Machiavelli, 71).

However, this idea is not the only one that has lived through the transformation of realist thought up to the version we know today. All realist thinkers, neo-classical, structural, etc., have also some other assumptions regarding political life in common.

The first is the essentially conflictual nature of international affairs. Realist thinkers have always tried to find someone to tell, that as Hobbes put it “It’s jungle out there”; anarchy (in international system) is the rule; order, justice and morality are the exceptions. The realist need not believe that one must always forego the pursuit of these higher virtues, but realists do stress that in the world as it is, the finer arbiter of things political is power. All moral schemes will come to naught if this basic reality is forgotten (Gilpin 1984, 290).

The second assumption of realism is that the essence of social reality is the group. The building blocks and ultimate units of social and political life are not the individuals as liberalists put it, nor classes as seen through the prism of the Marxist paradigm³, but “tribes” or organized groups of people. The loyalty of Homo sapiens in an unjust world towards tribes ranks to most of us above all loyalties other than that of the family. This form of loyalty in the modern world can be called “nationalism” and the competition of these tribes can be described as between “nation-states”. And even though this category has always been changing - tribes, city states, kingdoms, empires, nation-states, the essential nature of intergroup conflict remains unchanged.

The third assumption of realism is the privacy of all political life of power and security in human motivation. As Thucydides (431 B.C.E) told us long time ago: “Men are motivated by honor, greed and above all, fear”. This doesn’t necessarily mean that other virtues, such as beauty, wisdom, love are not important in human life, but that these noble virtues will always be subordinated to basic and unchangeable human needs and ambitions (Gilpin 1984, 291). Thus, this pessimistic view of human nature lead realist thinkers even to redefine morality in international relations: it was Machiavelli who argued for strong and efficient rulers for whom power and security are the major concerns. Unlike individuals, such rulers are not bound by individual morality. Any action, that can be regarded as important for the survival of the state carries in it a built-in justification (Smith 1986, 12 in Griffiths 2007, 12).

Thus, realists speak in terms of power, not ideas. The projection of power is state interest, which objectively exists and so it can be observed. However, this doesn’t necessarily mean that the contents of interest (and consequently of power) are given; power in these terms is anything that provides the control of one person over the other. Power engulfs all social relations, which serve this purpose; from physical violence to the most delicate psychological connections, by which one mind controls the other (Morgenthau 1948, 18). This power is then executed on the state⁴ level, and thus states and those who lead them become the fundamental actors for understanding international relations. The understanding and explanation of international relations and the struggle for war and peace is, after all, the main realist objective. All the research is useless, unless it is connected with this aim (Morgenthau 1948, 18).

2.1.2 Neorealism

The realist worldview was revived and revised with the publication of Kenneth Waltz’s 1979 Theory of International Politics, a book that replaced Morgenthau’s Politics Among Nations as the standard bearer for realists (Griffiths 2007, 13). This teaching (or as it is called now, neorealism) is usually considered as a response to the changes within the international system, society and the theories themselves. Growing interdependence, intra-national organizations, institutionalization (Brown 1997, 40-45), and importance of international political economy⁵ as described by the new pluralist theorists, pushed on classical realist theory⁶, resulting in a re-emergence of realist thinking. This thinking accepts most of the basic realist axioms, but tries to focus more on structural characteristics of the international system, which are able to influence the behavior of its actors more than the actors’ own attributes (Plechanovova 2003, 24).

Thus, even though neorealism still accepted the assumptions mentioned earlier, the focus has switched primarily towards the international system. And by describing the international system as a singular unit, with structural level and the level of units distinct, yet interconnected, neorealism advocates the autonomy of international politics (Plechanovova 2003, 24). Neorealism develops the concept of a system’s structure, which binds the domain that students of international politics deal with, and enables them to see how the structure of the system and variations in it affect the interacting units and the outcomes they produce. International structure emerges from the interaction of states and then constrains them from taking certain actions while propelling them towards others (Waltz 1990, 29).

However, the main objective of Kenneth Waltz’s neorealist theory of international relations is to construct a systemic theory, and not a general account of all aspects of international relations⁷ (Sorensen 2005, 22). This enables him to gaze benignly on many of the changes described by the pluralists, because they do not address the nature of the international system as such, only aspects of its component units. One of the positions he advocates most forcefully is that it is only possible to understand the international system via these systemic theories; to understand the system by theories that do not concentrate on the system as whole, but on the units within the system is the ultimate sin of reductionism (Brown 1997, 46).

Waltz adds that we know that reductionism is wrong, because there are recurring patterns within the international system, which must be a product of the system itself, not of any of its components. Thus, for example Lenin-Hobson theory that explains imperialism in the terms of the dynamics of monopoly capitalism is wrong because some forms of imperialism have been around here forever, but monopoly capitalism is of a recent origin (Waltz 1979, 20-28; Wendt 1987, 341).

Broadly framed, realists and neorealists pay over-whelming attention to the material forces of the state and the structure of international system in seeking to explain its behavior (Waltz 1979). The state’s pursuit of an immutable national interest, through power political means, including the use of military force if necessary, is at heart of the realist approach towards international relations. If one image dominates in realist literature, it is that of an international system made up of unitary actors, as in the billiard ball metaphor, even if more sophisticated versions of realism paint a more complex picture of a state’s domestic policy process influencing international behavior (Carr 1946 in Hook 2001, 38). This approach will be in the center of a neorealist understanding of Japan’s international relations; an understanding based on the pressure of the international system and relations with its surroundings.


2.2 Neoliberalism
Even though “classical” liberal internationalism is considered as a basis for most of the modern “neo-liberal” theories (such as neoliberal institutionalism, commercial liberalism, republican liberalism or sociological liberalism⁸), there is no firm consensus amongst the IR theorists about how much “modern” liberal theories are still considered as “liberal”. For the sake of this essay, after illustrating the general history and basic ideas of this theory, we will distinguish two major approaches; “modern” liberalism defined by Andrew Moravcsik and neoliberal institutionalism, based on the classical literature of Robert O. Keohane and Joseph S. Nye.
2.2.1 Liberal theories
A neoliberal theory is a set of theories originating in “classical” liberal internationalism – the projection of liberal thought and political principles to the international realm. This theory emerged as a coherent worldview in the Enlightenment and reached its height as a systematic statement of international reform with Woodrow Wilson’s Fourteen Points, intended to form the basis of the post-World War I peace. Liberals⁹ believed that the outbreak of World War I had vindicated their critique of the prevailing system of international relations and sought to establish a liberal peace marked by open diplomacy, the right of self-determination, free trade, disarmament, the peaceful settlement of disputes and the establishment of an international security organization in the form of the League of Nations. (Griffiths 2007, 21, Brown 1997, 23-24) However, the system created in the inter-war period (by the Versailles Peace Treaty of 1919) was shattered by German, Italian and Japanese armament during the 1930’s, culminating in the World War 2. These events with the onset of the Cold war brought a number of influential realist critiques, which almost devastated this idealistic teaching.

The major assumption of this theory is individualism; the human ability of moral distinction based on a reason that is capable of understanding natural law and the common good. To be able to execute this ability, one must be independent in all his actions, not only in political, but also in economic spheres¹⁰ (Plechanovova 2003, 20).

This independence of a human being is also being transferred to the state level. Liberals say that the state is an institution, whose role and functions are merely derived from the interests and needs of individuals - interests, such as safety of oneself and safety of one’s property (Sorensen 2005, 194). The connection between the individual and the state are then transferred even to the international level, since the international sphere is considered only as an extension of the domestic politics. This liberal belief leads to another classical liberal conviction that the relations between states can be organized by the same instruments as the relations among people on the state level.

Idealism (as the beginning of this field right after the World War I) to a certain extent originated in the experiences from the (until that time) biggest known war. As an alternative to this incident, idealism believed that there is an incentive to act good (and the ability to cooperate and act altruistically) within the human nature¹¹ (Hollis, Smith 1990, 22-23, Griffiths 2003, 20-22). According to this belief, the concern for others, which is natural to humans, justifies the premise, and that progress is possible; that the enlightened project of improving the human society through rational steps is still valid (Plechanovova 2003, 20). If one acts evil, it is not because of his nature then, but because of the faulty institutions and structural organization that lead him to act selfishly.

This idea leads even to the certainty that war itself is also a product of this faulty institutional organization¹², and as such can be diminished or even completely extinguished. However, as the old international system assumed the need for war, idealism argued for international cooperation to unite in order to remove the old institutions and create a new international system based on rational criteria. The reorganization of the system and banning of war were supposed to come out of three major principles: the establishment of international (global) organization, pursuit of international law¹³ and disarmament through the study of peace.

However, from the beginning of 20^th century, as international relations theory has constantly been changing, so has classical liberalism. As I wrote before, there are many forms of “new”, “modern” liberalism today and even liberalism itself has changed. To account for this change, Andrew Moravcsik has formulated a new version of liberalism, defining liberalism as a single and comprehensive theory with many applications (Meyer 1996, 51); clearly based on liberal premises, yet different from the theories formulated about three decades ago: pluralism, rationalism, neoliberal institutionalism. Moravcsik (1997, 516-517) picks out three fundamental assumptions:

The first one is the primacy of societal actors. Differently from realism, liberalism teaches that the fundamental actors in international politics are individuals and private groups, who are on the average rational and risk-averse and who organize exchange and collective action to promote differentiated interests under constraints imposed by material scarcity, conflicting values, and variations in societal influence. (Moravcsik 1997, 517)

Second are representation and state preferences. States (or other political institutions) represent some subset of domestic society, on the basis of whose interests state officials define state preferences and act purposefully in world politics.¹⁴

The third assumption deals with interdependence and the international system. It states that “the configuration of interdependent state preferences determines state behavior” ¹⁵ (Moravcsik 1997, 519). In other words, a state’s preferences are always determined by other states. This new formulation of liberalism acts as a bridge between classical liberal theory and its branches, neoliberal institutionalism in particular. However, for the sake of this thesis, the description and work with neoliberal institutionalism itself is more challenging, so from liberal theories, the biggest emphasis will be put on institutionalism.

2.2.2 Neoliberal institutionalism

Neoliberal institutionalism originated with Robert Keohane’s book After Hegemony¹⁶ (1984, 9), “a response” to the gloomy international situation of the 1980’s and the undermined position of liberalism.

According to Keohane’s description, institutionalism accepted several core propositions of realism: the central role of power in politics, the dominance of nation state in the contemporary international system and the realist argument, that anarchy impedes the achievement of international cooperation (Grieco 1988, 486). Accepting this, Keohane was able to explain why even self-centered, rational egoists often prefer multilateral cooperation to competitive unilateral politics (Schweller, Priess 1997, 3). However, the main focus of the newly established neoliberal institutionalism shifted to the role of organizations within the international system: “State actions depend to a considerable degree on prevailing institutional agreements” (Keohane 1989, 2).

These international institutions (regimes¹⁷) then serve states in several ways. Neoliberals argue that they help states to overcome “market failures” in international relations. Specifically, institutions enable fruitful cooperation by reducing the “relative costs of transaction” or as Keohane writes: “At any point in time, the transaction costs are to a substantial degree the result of an institutional context”¹⁸ (Keohane 1988, 386). However, as Keohane adds that even though these institutions should last only as long as member states have incentives to maintain them, the effect of these institutions is never neutral; they may advantage the fully participating members and disadvantage others: the rules of any institution will reflect the relative power positions of its actual and potential members, which constrain the feasible bargaining space and affect transaction costs (Keohane 1988, 387).

Another major institutional way of promoting the cooperation is the increase of the amount of information available to states about each other, which, as neoliberalists claim, reduces the likelihood that states will cheat (or profit by cheating) on established agreements and norms (Keohane 1984, 92-96): “As anticipated by the theory, effective international regimes include arrangements to share information and to monitor compliance, according to standards established by the regime; and they adapt to shifts in capabilities among their members“ (Keohane 1988, 387).