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- Bu səhifədəki naviqasiya:
- Introduction
- Person Vulnerable to Radicalisation (VTR) Referral Form
- APPENDIX B
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CHANNEL NORFOLK GUIDANCE ON SAFEGUARDING INDIVIDUALS VULNERABLE TO RADICALISATION (VTR) AND REFERRAL PROCESS 
The purpose of the PREVENT Strategy is to stop people becoming terrorists or supporting violent extremism in all its forms. The strategy has three objectives, one of which is to prevent people from being drawn into extremism and ensure they are given appropriate advice and support. This guidance document is intended to provide guidance to colleagues who have concerns expressed to them or have the concerns themselves in relation to any person, child or adult, who may be at risk of being adversely influenced or radicalised by any extremist group or ideology. The document provides a mechanism for assessing and advising on the support that can be provided to protect those at risk of being targeted by extremists. Unlike persons who fall within existing statutory frameworks, this guidance relates to persons who are at the early stages of becoming a person Vulnerable To Radicalisation or at risk of being Influenced by Extremism (hereafter referred to as ‘VTR’).
The VTR guidance uses existing collaboration between local authorities, the police and statutory partners such as Children’s Services, Adult Social Services and the local community to:
The VTR process has a Referral Form, Single Point of Contact, (Channel Practitioner) a Multi Agency Panel and an Information Sharing Protocol. Brief details of each of these are given below.
In choosing to share information, a key question for partners to help them provide a proportionate response is, does that partner hold any information that could make the individual more vulnerable to radicalisation. The following principles should guide information sharing: Power to Share - the sharing of data by public sector bodies requires the existence of a power to do so. This may be a statutory power relevant to the agency’s statutory function, or an implied power based on the agency’s common law function. The power may exist under specific legislation and may be different for each agency depending on their function. It is the responsibility of each agency to consider whether in this particular case the sharing of personal information is consistent with their powers and function as a public sector body. Governing legislation – for all bodies sharing personal information (private, voluntary or public sector) it is necessary to satisfy the requirements of the Data Protection Act, the Human Rights Act and the Common Law Duty of Confidentiality. Consent – Before any agency/group seeks consent from the person of concern this must be discussed at both the preliminary assessment and Multi-Agency Panel stages and a decision made on whether consent is to be sought and by whom. Obtaining consent can in itself prejudice the purpose of the Channel process and certain considerations must be taken before any agency seeks consent (see Appendix B). Other Gateways - in the absence of consent it is necessary to identify an exemption or a relevant condition for processing under the Data Protection Act (see Appendix B). Where a body owes a duty of confidentiality and (in the case of public bodies) must consider the Human Rights Act, it is necessary to determine that the level of public interest overrides the expectation of privacy (see Appendix B). Necessity, relevance and proportionality - information should only be shared where it is necessary to achieve the intended outcome and is relevant and proportionate to it. Information should be selected for sharing on the basis that the agencies involved need to know that information in order to make informed assessment and decisions. Key to determining this will be the professional judgement of the risks to an individual or the public. Non-discriminatory – agencies must be in a position to evidence that their decision to share information as part of a VTR Referral is not discriminatory.
This section provides examples of indicators that might suggest vulnerability to violent extremism and which may therefore be useful in the VTR process. It should not be assumed that the characteristics and experiences set out necessarily indicate that a person is either committed to violent extremism or may become so or that these indicators are the only basis on which to make an appropriate decision at this stage. Expressed opinions – this could include support for violence and terrorism or the values of extremist organisations, airing of political or religious based grievances, unaccepting of other nationalities, religions or cultures. Material – the following may be relevant:
Behaviour and behavioural changes – relevant may include, withdrawal from family, peers, social events and venues; hostility towards former associates and family, association with prescribed organisations; and association with organisations which hold extremist views that stop short of advocating violence in this country. Personal History – the following maybe relevant:
5. Referral Process – see Flow Chart Appendix D Channel Alert/Referral A VTR alert can come to the attention of statutory agencies in various ways. This could be through information or intelligence acquired or received by the police or partner agencies following an arrest or investigation that has not led to a charge or prosecution, or as a result of an acquittal. By contrast, the concern could be expressed by a parent to a teacher, other professional or indeed a community leader. A completed VTR referral form should be sent by email to the Multi Agency Safeguarding Hub (MASH) by the referrer with the full details needed for the preliminary assessment, (see Appendix A). The MASH will then disseminate the VTR to Norfolk Special Branch for initial deconfliction (to ensure no crossover with ongoing work and to carry out an initial screening). A referral should not continue through the VTR process if:
Once deconfliction checks have been completed within SB, the VTR referral form will then be emailed back to the MASH from SB; multi agency checks will then be completed by the MASH and returned to SB. The Channel Practitioner On receipt of a referral the Channel Practitioner will conduct a review of the information received. This review will be based on a professional judgement to ensure the referral meets the necessary threshold. In applying the threshold test the individual circumstances associated with the referral must be taken into account. As a minimum there must be:
If this link is not present the case should not be managed under Channel and should immediately exit the process. Other safeguarding measures should be considered. If the criteria is met the Channel Practitioner: Records full details of the referral on the Case Management Information System (CMIS), documenting all decisions and actions Applies a continual assessment of the risk factors Information Gathering Contact with Partners should be directed through previously established Single Points of Contact within the MASH and will be recorded by the MASH on the VTR referral form. If the referred individual is under the age of 18 and is suitable for further assessment the Channel Practitioner must liaise with the local FS Coordinator, the Safeguarding manager or social care officer in Children’s Services via the MASH. In some cases it may not be appropriate for an individual to continue through Channel due to involvement in other statutory support mechanisms (MAPPA and Safeguarding). Where it is apparent that the person referred has vulnerabilities not linked to radicalisation and has needs that require support through other mechanisms they should be referred to the appropriate service providers. This initial information gathering ensures that only cases appropriate for the Channel process continue to the next stage for a strategy meeting and the development of an appropriate support package. Risk Assessment / Vulnerability Indicators and Preliminary Assessment Decision Risk assessment is a continuous process from the point of referral to the point an individual exits the process. The assessment of risk is a key function of the Channel Practitioner, the Preliminary assessment group and the multi-agency Panel. The Preliminary assessment is led by the Channel coordinator and will include their line manager and will be conducted in consultation with senior leads within the MASH and other partners as deemed appropriate. The preliminary assessment will collectively assess risk, in doing so consideration should be given to the risk the individual faces of being drawn towards or attracted towards terrorism and the risk the individual poses to society. If during the Preliminary assessment it becomes apparent the referral is not in any way connected or applicable to the process the case can exit. If the referral is deemed ‘Suitable’, the case will progress to the multi-agency panel. Safeguarding Children and Multi-Agency Public Protection Arrangements In some cases it may not be appropriate for an individual to continue through the Channel Process because they are involved in a different statutory mechanism such as ‘MAPPA’ or child protection arrangements. Channel is not intended to replace those referral systems, in such cases the ownership will rest with the relevant statutory support mechanism and the case may exit the Channel process. If the referred individual is under the age of 18 or where the local authority has a legal duty of care the Channel Coordinator must liaise with the Family Support Co-ordinator. For referrals relating to children or young people the statutory arrangements for safeguarding must take precedence.
Following confirmation that the case is appropriate to continue through the VTR process, the referral should proceed to a strategy meeting and include the involvement of a wider range of partners. This will be convened on a necessity basis only and will be chaired by a Local Authority lead supported by the Channel Practitioner. The partners will develop a support package based on the risk assessment, the needs of the individual and any risks posed to potential support providers. Partners may consider sharing information with each other, taking into account the points made in section three. In assessing referrals the meeting may conclude that the individual is better suited to alternative support providers, or that further assessment indicates that the individual is not being drawn into violent extremism. If the consensus is that support is required they should devise an appropriate support package. This should take the form of an action plan setting out details of the statutory or third sector partners who will lead on the delivery of the support. One option for support through the Channel process which the multi agency panel may decide upon is the use of an ‘Intervention provider’. This is Home Office funded and uses providers on an approved list to work with individuals around their individual ideologies. The agencies invited should be any that have a role to play in the management of risk, so it is crucial to have non criminal justice system groups there. Appraisal and Review To ensure an effective review process to decide whether the individual should remain on the programme the Channel Practitioner is responsible for regularly liaising with the support provider and together with the Multi-Agency Panel assess the progress of the intervention. Each intervention will be different and there should be regular contact between the intervention provider and the coordinator. However, best practice dictates that a maximum time of 3 months is allowed to elapse between the panels reassessment of the individual's vulnerability. Intervention providers should be submitting regular written updates on progress. If the Panel is satisfied that the risk has been successfully reduced or managed they should recommend that the case exits the process. A closing report will be submitted setting out the evidence for the Panel’s recommendation. The recommendations will need to be endorsed by the senior partners involved in the preliminary assessments. Minute-Taking A confidentiality statement will be read out by the Chair at the start of the meeting and will appear in the minutes. (See Appendix C) It will be the responsibility of the Chair to provide a minute-taker. The minutes will include a list of all the agreed actions plus any amendments to the basic information that might have become clear as a result of the meeting. Action Points will be circulated within one working day of the panel meeting and minutes as soon as practicable.
Information shared at any stage of the referral process is confidential and is to be used only for the purpose of the VTR process and any subsequent actions allocated to the receiving agency or group. It will the responsibility of the disclosing agency/group to highlight any information which is particularly sensitive and to advice on the recording and storage arrangements for that information. Each agency/group is responsible for the secure recording and storage of any shared information and minutes of meetings, and for the secure deletion or return of the shared information once the agency/group is no longer involved in the VTR process in respect of that individual. APPENDIX A Person Vulnerable to Radicalisation (VTR) Referral FormApr 2016 
RESTRICTED WHEN COMPLETE
Once completed, email to Norfolk Multi Agency Safeguarding Hub: mash.mase@norfolk.pnn.police.uk
Send to Special Branch by e-mail: SpecialBranchFIMU@norfolk.pnn.police.uk
This form is to help you refer concerns about an individual who may be vulnerable to being drawn into terrorism. Below are questions which may help you to quantify and structure your concerns. The list is not exhaustive and other factors may be present but they are intended as a guide to help communicate your professional judgement about what has led you to make this referral. Faith / ideology Are they new to a particular faith / faith strand? Do they seem to have naïve or narrow religious or political views? Have there been sudden changes in their observance, behaviour, interaction or attendance at their place of worship / organised meeting? Have there been specific examples or is there an undertone of “ Them and Us “ language or violent rhetoric being used or behaviour occurring? Is there evidence of increasing association with a closed tight knit group of individuals / known recruiters / extremists / restricted events? Are there particular grievances either personal or global that appear to be unresolved / festering? Has there been an increase in unusual travel abroad without satisfactory explanation? Personal / emotional / social issues Is there conflict with their families regarding religious beliefs / lifestyle choices? Is there evidence of cultural anxiety and / or isolation linked to insularity / lack of integration? Is there evidence of increasing isolation from family, friends or groups towards a smaller group of individuals or a known location? Is there history in petty criminality and / or unusual hedonistic behaviour (alcohol/drug use, casual sexual relationships, and addictive behaviours)? Have they got / had extremist propaganda materials ( DVD’s, CD’s, leaflets etc.) in their possession? Do they associate with negative / criminal peers or known groups of concern? Are there concerns regarding their emotional stability and or mental health? Is there evidence of participation in survivalist / combat simulation activities, e.g. paint balling?
What are the specific factors which are contributing towards making the individual more vulnerable to radicalisation? E.g; mental health, language barriers, cultural anxiety, impressionability, criminality, specific grievance, transitional period in life etc. Is there any evidence of others targeting or exploiting these vulnerabilities or risks? What factors are already in place or could be developed to firm up support for the individual or help them increase their resilience to negative influences? E.g. positive family ties, employment, mentor / agency input etc. APPENDIX BLegal Grounds When Considering Sharing Information Protection against Unlawful and Unfair Disclosure
Consent Obtaining the informed consent (and in the case of sensitive personal data, explicit consent) of the person of concern will satisfy the requirement under data protection to identify a condition for processing, and to override the duty of confidentiality and Article 8 of the Human Rights Act. However, for consent to be valid it must be:
There may be reasons why consent cannot be obtained:
Before any agency/group seeks consent from the person of concern this must be discussed at both the preliminary assessment and multi-agency panel stages and a decision made on whether consent is to be sought and by whom. Where consent cannot be obtained or where a party does not intend to rely on consent for sharing information, agencies/groups must establish the legal basis for sharing. Sharing Without Consent Some agencies may be able to rely on specific legislation or the circumstances of the particular referral might engage specific legislation. If specific legislation does apply, this will satisfy the condition for processing and override the duty of confidentiality and Article 8 Human rights Act. Examples are:
Where there is no specific legislation each agency/group must identify a relevant condition for processing under schedule 2 (and for sensitive personal data schedule 3) of the Data Protection Act 1998. The most relevant conditions are:
Balancing Principles When considering whether to share information in that particular case, each agency/group should consider the following to determine whether the sharing is in the public interest and is fair and reasonable:
APPENDIX C Confidentiality Statement Attendees are reminded that all information shared in this meeting is confidential and is shared and recorded only for the purpose of the meeting. You are reminded of your obligations under the Norfolk Safeguarding Boards Guidance and under the Data Protection Act 1998. Information shared and recorded as part of this meeting will not be disclosed outside of the meeting other than for official purposes that have been sanctioned by the members of the meeting. Similarly, other than via official minutes, no attendees will make a record of another agency's information for any purposes other than those sanctioned by the members of the meeting. Information shared should not be discussed with the subject unless the owner of the information has given approval. Referral to MASH
Not appropriate Appropriate  
Seek endorsement  
Review APPENDIX D
Appropriate Referral to MASH
Referral sent to SB SPOE Deconfliction checks completed CP determines referral is not malicious, misinformed, or involves illegality CP returns VTR to MASH Not appropriate 
Channel Panel held. Determine suitability for Channel process. 
 
MASH complete full agency checks and send updated VTR to CP - decision with Head of Safeguarding/Channel Chair to determine if: Key: SPOE - Single Point of Entry Deconfliction - system checks to avoid conflict with ongoing work MASH – Multi Agency Safeguarding Hub SB – Special Branch CP – Channel Practitioner Yüklə 120,81 Kb. Dostları ilə paylaş:
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