State of california in re: daniel escamilla



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WORKERS’ COMPENSATION APPEALS BOARD

STATE OF CALIFORNIA




IN RE: DANIEL ESCAMILLA,
Respondent.


Misc. No. 254
NOTICE OF HEARING REGARDING SUSPENSION OR REMOVAL OF PRIVILEGE OF DANIEL ESCAMILLA

TO APPEAR IN ANY PROCEEDING AS A

REPRESENTATIVE OF ANY PARTY BEFORE THE APPEALS BOARD OR ANY

WORKERS’ COMPENSATION

ADMINISTRATIVE LAW JUDGE
(EN BANC)




NOTICE IS HEREBY GIVEN that the Appeals Board may suspend or remove Daniel (Dan) Escamilla’s privilege to appear in any proceeding as a representative of any party before the Appeals Board or any workers’ compensation administrative law judge (WCJ) pursuant to Labor Code section 4907 for the reasons set forth herein unless good cause is shown why the privilege should not be suspended or removed.

A hearing on this issue is scheduled to commence at 8:30 a.m. on October 28, 2011 before the Honorable David Hettick at Hearing Room 2, Second Floor, 455 Golden Gate Avenue, San Francisco, California. Judge Hettick will act as hearing officer for the Appeals Board to receive evidence and arguments regarding this matter, and he will prepare and submit the hearing record to the Appeals Board for its consideration and decision. (Lab. Code, § 5309(b).)



FACTS SUPPORTING SUSPENSION OR REMOVAL OF PRIVILEGE

While acting as a hearing representative before the Appeals Board and WCJs, Mr. Escamilla has been repeatedly sanctioned for engaging in bad-faith actions or tactics that are frivolous or solely intended to cause unnecessary delay. The reasons for those sanctions included Mr. Escamilla’s willful failures to comply with statutory and regulatory obligations, disruption and delay of proceedings for an improper motive, and presenting arguments that were indisputably without merit, as shown by the orders, notices of intention, opinions and correspondence which are jointly incorporated by reference herein and identified in the accompanying list of certified documents as Board Exhibit A as follows:



1) In Case No. MON 206997 (Harris), Mr. Escamilla was sanctioned $750.00 plus costs and fees on August 19, 2003 pursuant to Labor Code section 58131 for willfully executing, verifying and filing a successive untimely petition for reconsideration that was frivolous and without merit because the successive petition asserted the same issues and arguments that were raised in the earlier petition for reconsideration that was dismissed by the Appeals Board as untimely;
2) In Case No. AHM 92791 (Rios), Mr. Escamilla was sanctioned $500.00 on May 19, 2006 pursuant to Labor Code section 5813 for willfully executing, verifying and filing a frivolous petition for reconsideration that was totally without merit because his client, lien claimant Ali Mostafavi, D.C., was not aggrieved by the challenged compromise and release agreement approved by the WCJ;
3) In Case No. VNO 0330565 (Fagan), Mr. Escamilla was ordered on May 7, 2007 to pay defendant’s reasonable costs and fees pursuant to Labor Code section 5813 for willfully executing and filing a frivolous petition for removal that mischaracterized earlier decisions of the Appeals Board and the Court of Appeal;
4) In Case No. LAO 0800614 (Cling), Mr. Escamilla was sanctioned $500.00 on June 14, 2007 pursuant to Labor Code section 5813 for willfully executing, verifying and filing a frivolous petition for reconsideration that was totally without merit because his client, lien claimant David Silver, M.D., was not aggrieved by the challenged compromise and release agreement approved by the WCJ;
5) In Case No. MON 0280037 (Crumpton), Mr. Escamilla was sanctioned $2,500.00 on August 1, 2007 pursuant to Labor Code section 5813 for willfully executing, verifying and filing a frivolous petition for reconsideration that was without merit and for continuing to litigate a lien claim of David Silver M.D., that was earlier settled (Escamilla v. Workers’ Comp. Appeals Bd. (Crumpton) (2008) 73 Cal.Comp.Cases 280 (writ den.));
6) In Case No. LAO 0829698 (Rozenblat), Mr. Escamilla was sanctioned $500.00 and ordered to pay defendant $800.50 costs and fees on May 1, 2009 pursuant to Labor Code section 5813 for willfully executing, verifying and filing an untimely petition for reconsideration that he knew or should have known was frivolous because the Appeals Board did not have jurisdiction to consider the petition and it would not have time to grant reconsideration on its own motion;
7) In Case No. RIV 057393 (Roberts), Mr. Escamilla was sanctioned $900.00 on August 5, 2009 by the WCJ for several failures to appear without good cause and for willfully executing, verifying and filing a petition for removal that mischaracterized the facts;
8) In Case No. ADJ1194116/LAO 0797672 (Ortiz), Mr. Escamilla was sanctioned $750.00 by the Appeals Board on July 14, 2010, for filing a verified petition for reconsideration on July 27, 2009 that contains materially false statements of fact;
9) In Case No. ADJ1130558 (Lee), Mr. Escamilla was sanctioned $3,150.00 by the WCJ on June 23, 2010 and ordered to pay $2,464.50 in costs and fees as affirmed by the Appeals Board on January 6, 2011, for tardiness and engaging in frivolous and bad faith actions (Escamilla v. Workers’ Comp. Appeals Bd. (Lee) (2011) 76 Cal.Comp.Cases 567 (writ den.));
10) In Case No. ADJ3897299 (Santangelo), Mr. Escamilla was sanctioned $1,000.00 and ordered to pay $44,169.81 in costs and fees by the WCJ, as amended and affirmed by the Appeals Board on April 14, 2011, for engaging in bad faith and frivolous actions and tactics;
11) In Case Nos. ADJ4517161/ADJ3871851 (Chavez), Mr. Escamilla was sanctioned $2,500.00 by the Appeals Board on June 13, 2011 for filing a petition for reconsideration that contains material misrepresentations of fact and frivolous legal arguments.
It has become apparent that sanctions are ineffective in causing Mr. Escamilla to conform his conduct to the Appeals Board’s Rules of Practice and Procedure (Appeals Board’s Rules).

On February 9, 2009, a panel of the Appeals Board conducted a Commissioner’s Conference and met with Mr. Escamilla to address its intention to impose a sanction in Rozenblat. As shown by the transcript of that Conference, which is incorporated herein and identified as Board Exhibit B, Mr. Escamilla confirmed his awareness of the Rules of Professional Conduct of the State Bar (State Bar Rules) that apply to attorneys and acknowledged that if he failed to act in conformity with the State Bar Rules while acting as a hearing representative before the Appeals Board and WCJs his privilege of appearing as a hearing representative could be suspended or removed.2

Since the conference in Rozenblat, Mr. Escamilla has continued to engage in actions that are contrary to the State Bar Rules and the Appeals Board’s Rules by willfully filing pleadings that contain false statements of fact and that are frivolous, and by engaging in other bad faith conduct that has brought discredit upon himself, his clients and the workers’ compensation system. These bad faith actions include the following:

1) In Case No. ADJ1194116 (Ortiz), Mr. Escamilla on October 14, 2009, willfully filed a petition for reconsideration, which is incorporated herein and identified as Board Exhibit C, that he executed and verified under penalty of perjury, which includes substantial misrepresentations of material fact. Specifically, Mr. Escamilla averred that he spoke to defendant’s adjuster Frances Whelan on August 13, 2008, that she agreed at that time on behalf of defendant to pay the full amount billed by Mr. Escamilla’s client David Silver M.D., that his claim of an oral settlement agreement was “uncontroverted” and “not explicitly disputed” by the defendant and that defendant had not submitted “even a scintilla of evidence” to rebut his claim.

In fact, as shown by the August 27, 2009 Minutes Of Hearing, which is incorporated herein and identified as Board Exhibit D, defendant appeared at the trial scheduled for August 27, 2009 to address Mr. Escamilla’s claim that Ms. Whelan had agreed on behalf of defendant to pay the full amount of Dr. Silver’s bill. In fact, defendant explicitly disputed Mr. Escamilla’s allegations and presented substantial testimonial and other evidence showing that Ms. Whelan did not speak to Mr. Escamilla on August 13, 2008, and that defendant never agreed to pay the full amount of Dr. Silver’s bills, as averred by Mr. Escamilla in the petition for reconsideration. Although Dr. Silver did not appear at the August 27, 2009 trial through Mr. Escamilla or any other hearing representative, Mr. Escamilla was subsequently served with the Minutes of Hearing from that trial, which set forth the substantial evidence presented by defendant rebutting the claim that an oral settlement was reached on August 13, 2008. Following the service of that information upon Mr. Escamilla, he willfully verified and filed the petition for reconsideration containing the material false representation of fact that defendant did not present any such evidence. Although Mr. Escamilla subsequently requested in a November 5, 2009 letter, which is incorporated herein and identified as Board Exhibit E, that his petition for reconsideration be withdrawn, he further wrote in that letter that he “is standing by the statements made in the verified pleadings,” which were demonstrably untrue.

2) In Case No. ADJ3897299 (Santangelo), Mr. Escamilla executed, verified and on December 31, 2009, filed a petition for reconsideration, which is incorporated herein and identified as Board Exhibit F, on behalf of Thomas Hewko, D.C., which asserted that Dr. Hewko was never a “party” in the case, and that the Appeals Board lacked jurisdiction over Dr. Hewko because he was not “personally served” with papers that were filed in the case. However, those averments by Mr. Escamilla were directly contradicted by oral and written representations he earlier made in the case. For example, on the top of the first page of the petition for reconsideration executed and verified by Mr. Escamilla and filed in the case on November 5, 2007, which is incorporated herein and identified as Board Exhibit G, Mr. Escamilla’s business, Legal Service Bureau, is identified as the “Representative for lien claimant Thomas Hewko, D.C./Back Pain Chiropractic Clinic, APC,” and the first sentence of the petition states, “Lien claimant Thomas Hewko D.C./Back Pain Chiropractic Clinic, APC, (hereinafter petitioner) [is] aggrieved by the Finding an [sic] Order dated October 25, 2007…”3 Likewise, in the petition for removal executed and verified by Mr. Escamilla and filed in the case on February 7, 2008, which is incorporated herein and identified as Board Exhibit H, Dr. Hewko was again identified in the caption of the pleading as “Lien Claimant,” and on page 2 in the “Statement Of Relevant Facts” Mr. Escamilla wrote, “[T]he defendant denied a lien in the amount of $19,521.22 asserted by Dr. Hewko for treatment to applicant’s claimed industrial injuries.” (Emphasis added.) Similarly, in a declaration executed and filed in the case by Mr. Escamilla shortly thereafter on February 25, 2008, which is incorporated herein and identified as Board Exhibit I, he avers under penalty of perjury that he is “the administrative law hearing representative from Legal Service Bureau, duly assigned to represent lien claimant Thomas Hewko, D.C./Back Pain Chiropractic Clinic, A Professional Corporation, in the above-captioned case,” and the case caption on the declaration identifies “Thomas Hewko D.C.” as the “Lien Claimant.” (Emphasis added.)

California Code of Regulations, title 8, section 10550 provides in pertinent part: “Whenever any party or lien claimant…files any…petition or other pleading… or…states its appearance on the record at any hearing before the Workers' Compensation Appeals Board (including but not limited to stating its appearance on any pretrial conference statement, appearance sheet, or minutes of hearing), the party or lien claimant, or its attorney or other representative, shall comply with the following requirements: (a) each party or lien claimant shall set forth its full legal name, and each attorney or other representative shall set forth the full legal name(s) of the party or parties he, she, or it is representing…” (Emphasis added.)

The above demonstrates that Mr. Escamilla willfully executed, verified and filed a petition for reconsideration on December 31, 2009 that falsely stated that Dr. Hewko was not a party in Santangelo. Moreover, Mr. Escamilla’s contention in his December 31, 2009 petition that Dr. Hewko was required to be personally served with certain papers in the case was frivolous because the Rules of the Appeals Board expressly provide that service by mail of such papers upon a lien claimant’s representative is proper service upon that party. (Cal. Code Regs., tit. 8, §§ 10505, 10510.)

3) In Case Nos. ADJ4517161/ADJ3871851 (Chavez), Mr. Escamilla made the following factual averment in the February 28, 2011 petition for reconsideration he filed with the Appeals Board, which is incorporated herein and identified as Board Exhibit J:

“The reports of Dr. Warick, identified as Exhibit C, are listed in the Minutes of Hearing but it is not clear whether these reports (and Defense Exhibits A through D) were simply offered into evidence or actually admitted into evidence.” (Emphasis added.)


Mr. Escamilla further argued in the petition that without the reports of Dr. Warick the WCJ’s decision “must be annulled” because it was not supported by substantial evidence.

Contrary to Mr. Escamilla’s assertion that it was “not clear” if the reports of Dr. Warick were admitted into evidence, the Minutes of Hearing, which is incorporated herein and identified as Board Exhibit K, and partial transcript from the trial on December 3, 2010, which is incorporated herein and identified as Board Exhibit L, make it absolutely clear that the reports were, in fact, admitted into evidence and that Mr. Escamilla was present and participated in the admission of those documents on behalf of his client, PORAC.

The Minutes of Hearing list the exhibits received into evidence at the trial, including “DEFENDANT’S EXHIBIT C: Medical report of Dr. Warick, May 31st, 2007, 4 pages in length; and his report of April 17th, 2007, 29 pages in length.” (Emphasis in original.)

The partial transcript of the proceedings on December 3, 2010 reveals Mr. Escamilla’s participation in the hearing where the reports of Dr. Warick were placed into evidence, as follows:

“THE COURT: On behalf of defendant, admitted into evidence without objection:

As Exhibit A, the treatment record of Dr. Gudeman.

Exhibit B, the treatment records of Simi Valley Hospital.

Exhibit C, the medical report of Dr. Warick, May 31st, 2007, 4 pages in length; and his report of April 17th, 2007, 29 pages in length.

Defendant’s D, the report of Dr. Sanders dated June 12th, 2007, already scanned into the EAMS system as Document No. 17473139.

Offered on behalf of defendant as Defendant’s E is the Ventura County Employees’ Retirement Association notice of Proposed Findings of Fact dated November 12th, 2008, 36 pages in length.

And Defendant’s F, the Ventura County Employees’ Retirement Association’s notice of decision dated March 3rd, 2009, 2 pages in length.

All right. And it is the understanding of the Court that E and F are subject to objections by lien claimant.

Mr. Escamilla[?]

MR. ESCAMILLA: Yes, we are objecting to Exhibit E and F based on relevance.

THE COURT: Very well. Thank you.



Over the objection of lien claimant, Exhibits E and F are admitted into evidence. The relevance will go to the weight of the evidence rather than admissibility and will be considered.

Very well, then. With all of that, have we fully stated all of the Stipulations and Issues of the parties and set forth all of the evidentiary exhibits?

MR. ESCAMILLA: Yes, your Honor.

MR. STRAATSMA: So stipulated.” (Emphasis added. Bracketed question mark substituted for clarity in accord with WCJ’s Report.)


In addition to presenting the above-described false statement that it was “not clear” if the reports of Dr. Warick were admitted into evidence, Mr. Escamilla improperly argued in the petition for reconsideration that even if the reports of Dr. Warick were in evidence they supported a finding of industrial injury to psyche because the physician indicated that applicant’s work “at least in part, aggravated, accelerated and lit up” applicant’s psychological condition. This argument was a mischaracterization of the reporting of Dr. Warick, who unequivocally opined that applicant’s psychiatric condition was predominantly caused by non-industrial factors. It was also a frivolous legal contention because the Legislature in 1991 enacted Labor Code section 3208.3(b)(1) to “establish a new and higher threshold of compensability for psychiatric injury,” which requires an employee to “demonstrate by a preponderance of the evidence that actual events of employment were predominant as to all causes combined of the psychiatric injury” in order to establish that a psychiatric injury is compensable. (Lab. Code, § 3208.3(b)(1), emphasis added.)

Mr. Escamilla’s arguments in the Chavez petition cannot be attributed to lack of awareness of the applicable law or simple neglect because the WCJ explicitly stated in his Opinion on Decision that Labor Code section 3208.3 applied in the case to preclude compensation for applicant’s claimed injury to psyche, which is incorporated herein and identified as Board Exhibit M. However, nowhere in the petition for reconsideration did Mr. Escamilla discuss or even identify Labor Code section 3208.3 as the statute that applied in determining whether an injury to psyche is compensable.



DISCUSSION

Labor Code section 4907 provides in full as follows:

“The privilege of any person, including attorneys admitted to practice in the Supreme Court of the state to appear in any proceeding as a representative of any party before the appeals board, or any of its referees, may, after a hearing, be removed, denied, or suspended by the appeals board for a violation of this chapter or for other good cause.”

Good cause appears to exist to suspend or remove the privilege of Mr. Escamilla to appear in any proceeding as a representative of any party before the Appeals Board and WCJs because of his continuing sanctionable conduct. A pattern of disciplinary actions and repeated misconduct, with no apparent attempt to reform, supports the suspension or removal of the privilege of practicing before the Workers’ Compensation Appeals Board.

As the Appeals Board recognized in the case of In Re Discipline, Suspension or Removal of the Privilege of Louis Moran to Appear in Proceedings Before the Board (1980) 45 Cal.Comp.Cases 519 (Appeals Board en banc) (Moran):

“The term ‘good cause’ [as used in Labor Code section 4907] is not legislatively defined. However, the State Bar Rules demarcate the sanctionable limits of advocacy and indicate how – what may at times be – conflicting duties to clients, opposing parties and the Board are to be reconciled. These rules also give an attorney or lay representative notice of what sort of conduct is required. By appearing as a lay representative he [Mr. Moran] is charged with accepting certain limitations on his advocacy.” (Moran, supra, 45 Cal.Comp.Cases at 525, bracketed material and emphasis added.)


Of particular concern with regard to actions taken by Mr. Escamilla following the February 9, 2009 Commissioner’s conference in Rozenblat is State Bar Rules of Professional Conduct 5-200(A) and (B), which provides in pertinent part as follows:

“In presenting a matter to a tribunal, a member:

(A) Shall employ, for the purpose of maintaining the causes confided to the member such means only as are consistent with truth;

(B) Shall not seek to mislead the judge, judicial officer, or jury by an artifice or false statement of fact or law;”

Following the Rozenblat conference on February 9, 2009, Mr. Escamilla repeatedly executed, verified and willfully filed pleadings containing misrepresentations of material facts made with reckless indifference as to their truth or falsity. These include the petition for reconsideration he verified and filed on October 14, 2009 in Ortiz, the petition for removal he verified and filed on December 31, 2009 in Santangelo, and the petition for reconsideration he verified and filed on or about February 28, 2011 in Chavez.

Verifying and filing pleadings containing misrepresentations of fact violates both Rule of Professional Conduct 5-200 and the Appeals Board’s Rules. (Lab. Code, § 5813; Cal. Code Regs., tit. 8, § 10561(b)(5); c.f. In re Aguilar (2004) 34 Cal.4th 386 [“It is, of course, an extremely serious breach of an attorney’s duty to a court to lie in statements made to the court, and an intentionally false statement made by an attorney to a court clearly constitutes a contempt of court” (citations omitted)].) Mr. Escamilla has appeared as a hearing representative in numerous workers’ compensation proceedings and stated during the February 9, 2009 Rozenblat conference that he is a law school graduate and that he passed the California Bar examination. Mr. Escamilla knows, or should know the Appeals Board’s Rules and the State Bar Rules. But even if Mr. Escamilla had never attended law school, he acts as a hearing representative before the WCAB and is expected to comply with all of the Appeals Board’s Rules, as is every other hearing representative.

Mr. Escamilla took the actions he did in Ortiz, Lee, Santangelo and Chavez after being sanctioned numerous times for filing frivolous petitions, and after he assured the Appeals Board at the Rozenblat conference on February 9, 2009 that he would act in compliance with the standards set forth in the State Bar Rules. However, his improper actions following the Rozenblat conference evince a habitual lack of appreciation and respect for the duties and responsibilities of a hearing representative appearing before the Appeals Board and WCJs. A pattern of disciplinary actions and repeated misconduct with no apparent attempt to reform supports a suspension or removal of the privilege of appearing before the Appeals Board and WCJs. (See e.g. Dixon v. State Bar (1982) 32 Cal.3d 728; Garlow v. State Bar (1982) 30 Cal.3d 912 and Garlow v. State Bar (1988) 44 Cal.3d 689; Lebbos v. State Bar (1991) 53 Cal.3d 37; Twohy v. State Bar (1989) 48 Cal.3d 502.)

Mr. Escamilla’s actions as described above have placed unreasonable burdens on opposing parties and have wasted limited judicial resources. His failure to change his conduct notwithstanding the several sanctions that have been imposed appears to be in willful disregard of the Appeals Board’s Rules contrary to Labor Code section 5813 and California Code of Regulations, title 8, section 10561. These ongoing concerns require that we consider taking action pursuant to Labor Code section 4907 to suspend or remove Mr. Escamilla’s privilege of appearing in any proceeding as a representative of any party before the Appeals Board or any WCJ.

Acting as a hearing representative and appearing before the Appeals Board and WCJs constitutes the performance of legal services. (Eagle Indemn. Co. v. Industrial Acc. Com. (Hernandez) (1933) 217 Cal. 244 [19 I.A.C. 150].) Suspension or removal of the privilege to appear before the Appeals Board and WCJs prohibits the performance of such legal services, including but not limited to the following: 

“(1) filing pleadings reflecting that the [individual] is ‘appearing’ on behalf of another…; 

(2) negotiating and settling claims on behalf of a client with third parties…;

(4) appearing at depositions on behalf of another…; and 

(5) engaging in discovery or responding to discovery requests…” (In the Matter of John Hoffman 71 Cal.Comp.Cases 609, 622 (significant panel decision) [bracketed material substituted], citing Rules Prof. Conduct, rule 1-311(B)(3) and rule 1-311(B)(4); Birbrower, Montalbano, Condon & Frank v. Superior Court (1998) 17 Cal.4th 119, 127 [949 P.2d 1, 70 Cal.Rptr.2d 304]; Morgan v. State Bar (1990) 51 Cal.3d 598, 603 [797 P.2d 1186, 274 Cal.Rptr. 8]; Benninghoff v. Superior Court (2006) 136 Cal.App.4th 61, 69 [38 Cal.Rptr.3d 759]; Gentis v. Safeguard Business Systems, Inc. (1998) 60 Cal.App.4th 1294, 1308 [71 Cal.Rptr.2d 122];]; Ex Parte McCue (1930) 211 Cal. 57, 68 [293 P. 47] c.f. Watung v. Riverside Beauty Supply (2003) 68 Cal.Comp.Cases 1602 (Appeals Board en banc); Moran, supra; Crumpton, supra.)

Mr. Escamilla is entitled to due process and Labor Code section 4907 provides that a hearing be conducted before the privilege to appear in any proceeding as a representative of any party before the Appeals Board or any WCJ is suspended or removed. Accordingly, a hearing is scheduled to be conducted by any WCJ to receive evidence and arguments concerning the suspension or removal of Mr. Escamilla’s privilege to appear pursuant to Labor Code section 4907 and this Notice and to receive any mitigating or other relevant evidence he may have to offer. (Lab. Code, § 5309(b).)

Following the hearing, the WCJ will prepare the hearing record and submit it to the Appeals Board for its consideration. The Appeals Board will then decide whether Mr. Escamilla’s privilege to appear in any proceeding as a representative of any party before the Appeals Board or any WCJ should be suspended or removed pursuant to Labor Code section 4907 and this Notice.

For the foregoing reasons,



NOTICE IS HEREBY GIVEN that the Appeals Board may suspend or remove Daniel (Dan) Escamilla’s privilege to appear in any proceeding as a representative of any party before the Appeals Board or any workers’ compensation administrative law judge pursuant to Labor Code section 4907 and California Code of Regulations, title 8, section 10561 for the bad faith actions and tactics alleged above.

NOTICE IS FURTHER GIVEN that a hearing to address whether Daniel (Dan) Escamilla’s privilege to appear in any proceeding as a representative of any party before the Appeals Board or any workers’ compensation administrative law judge should be suspended or removed pursuant to Labor Code section 4907 and California Code of Regulations, title 8, section 10561 is scheduled to commence at 8:30 a.m. on Friday, October 28, 2011 before the Honorable David Hettick at Hearing Room 2, Second Floor, 455 Golden Gate Avenue, San Francisco California.

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IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that pending the issuance of our decision herein, all written correspondence, objections, motions, requests, and communications shall be filed in paper format (not e-filed or in electronic format) with the Workers’ Compensation Appeals Board, P.O. Box 429459, ATTENTION: Office of the Commissioners, San Francisco, CA 94142-9459, and not with any local office.

WORKERS’ COMPENSATION APPEALS BOARD (EN BANC)
/s/ Joseph M. Miller____________________________

JOSEPH M. MILLER, Chairman

/s/ Frank M. Brass ____________________________

FRANK M. BRASS, Commissioner

/s/ Ronnie G. Caplane__________________________

RONNIE G. CAPLANE, Commissioner

/s/ Alfonso J. Moresi___________________________

ALFONSO J. MORESI, Commissioner

/s/ Deidra E. Lowe ___________________________

DEIDRA E. LOWE, Commissioner


DATED AND FILED AT SAN FRANCISCO, CALIFORNIA


9/21/2011

SERVICE BY MAIL EFFECTED ON ABOVE DATE ON THE FOLLOWING PARTY:
DANIEL (DAN) ESCAMILLA, 888 W. SANTA ANA BLVD., SUITE 100, SANTA ANA, CA 92701

JFS/jp/jmp

1 Labor Code section 5813(a) provides in full as follows: “The workers’ compensation referee or appeals board may order a party, the party’s attorney, or both, to pay any reasonable expenses, including attorney’s fees and costs, incurred by another party as a result of bad-faith actions or tactics that are frivolous or solely intended to cause unnecessary delay. In addition, a workers’ compensation referee or the appeals board, in its sole discretion, may order additional sanctions not to exceed two thousand five hundred dollars ($2,500) to be transmitted to the General Fund.”

2 Mr. Escamilla initially stated during the Rozenblat conference that one of the reasons he did not become licensed as an attorney was because “becoming licensed puts some restrictions on your practice that might not be in the best interest of the client,” and he identified State Bar Rule 2-100, which prohibits an attorney from directly contacting a party known to be represented by another attorney, as one of those restrictions. However, by the end of the conference he acknowledged that he was obligated to act in conformance with all of the State Bar Rules while acting as a representative of any party before the Appeals Board or any WCJ.

3 Quotations herein have been converted from upper case to lower case.






















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